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“The  lightning  flashes  of  the  divine  beauty  are  absolutely  ineffable  and
indescribable;  speech cannot convey them; the ear cannot receive them.
The morning star's rays, and the moon's brightness, and the sun's light, all
these are unworthy to be mentioned in comparison to that glory, and are
found greatly wanting as analogies to the true light. They are more distant
from the divine beauty than the depth of night and moonless gloom are from
the pure light of noonday. This beauty is not contemplated by fleshly eyes
but is grasped by the soul alone and the mind. If at any time it shined upon
the saints,  it  also left  behind in  them the unbearable  pain of  yearning.”
(Basil of Caesarea, c. 329-379)
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Abstract (Danish)
Gennem  tre  casestudier  argumenterer  denne  afhandling  for,  at  der  findes  et  nært
forhold mellem på den ene side den negative teologi, som følger af den radikale, kvalitative
distinktion mellem Skaber og skabning, som forefindes i mange tidlige kristne teologier, og
på den anden side bestemte moralepistemologiske udviklinger i denne tænkning. Denne
distinktion omtales i afhandlingen som den 'jødisk-kristne distinktion'. Ved 'negativ teologi'
forstås et epistemologisk og lingvistisk princip, som kun tillader tale om Guds væsen eller
natur  i  negative  definitioner.  Gennem  en  række  antropologiske  og  etiske
forbindelsespunkter  har  dette  princip  en  række  mulige  konsekvenser  for
moralepistemologien.
Enhver teologisk refleksion som antager denne form for negativ teologi, vil i nogen grad
være en theologia viatorum. Som en teologisk undergenre som sådan, vil det også gøre sig
gældende for teologisk  etik.  Dertil  kommer at  den dynamik,  som er et  resultat  af  den
jødisk-kristne  distinktion,  gennem den  delvist  bibelske  og  delvist  filosofiske  idé  om,  at
mennesket skal efterligne eller efterfølge Gud, kan spores i moralfilosofiske forestillinger
om  ting  såsom  dyd,  perfektion  og  det  gode.  Dette  har  igen  konsekvenser  for
moralepistemologien.
Afhandlingen diskuterer tre casestudier: 1) Brevet til Diognetus (Diognetbrevet) (2. årh.
e.Kr.) hvor Guds usynlighed og gerninger i frelseshistorien gør efterlignelse af Gud til et
delvist paradoksalt forhold; 2) Klemens af Alexandria (c. 150-215 e.Kr.) i hvis værker findes
en spænding mellem at efterligne den simple og uudsigelige guddommelige natur, og Jesu
Kristi  konkrete gerninger;  3)  Gregor  af  Nyssa  (c.  335-395 e.Kr.)  i  hvis  værker  negativ
teologi, en forestilling om Guds uendelighed og en særlig sprogfilosofi fører til udviklingen
af en avanceret og kompleks idé om moralsk perfektion. Der argumenteres for, at selvom
der er store forskelle på de tre casestudier, er de alle eksempler på hvordan den jødisk-
kristne distinktion influerer moralepistemologien gennem en form for negativ teologi, en
forestilling  om  efterlignelse  eller  efterfølgelse  af  Gud,  samt  bestemte  antropologiske
forbindelsespunkter.
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Abstract (English)
Through three case studies this dissertation argues that there is a close relationship
between on the  one  hand the negative theology, resulting from the radical  qualitative
distinction between Creator and creation discernible in many early Christian theologies,
and on the other certain developments in the moral epistemology of this thinking. This
distinction  is  in  the  dissertation  termed  'the  Judeo-Christian  distinction'.  By  negative
theology is  meant  an epistemological  and linguistic  notion that only  allows talk of  the
divine essence or nature in negative definitions. Through a range of anthropological and
ethical points of  connection this idea has a number of  possible ramifications for moral
epistemology. 
Any theological reflection that presupposes this kind of negative theology will to some
degree be a  theologia viatorum. As a sub-genre of theology as such, this will also be the
case for theological ethics. Moreover, through the idea, partly biblical, partly philosophical,
that  human  beings  should  in  some  way  imitate,  be  assimilated  to  or  follow  God,  the
dynamics  produced  by  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  and  negative  theology  can  be
recognized in moral philosophical conceptions of such things as virtue, perfection, and the
good. This again has consequences for moral epistemology.
The dissertation discusses three case studies: 1) The Epistle to Diognetus (2nd century
AD),  where  God's  invisibility  and  his  works  in  the  history  of  salvation  makes  human
imitation of God a somewhat paradoxical matter; 2) Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 AD)
in whose works there is a tension between imitating the simple and ineffable divine nature,
and the concrete works of Jesus Christ;  3) Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-395 AD) in whose
works negative theology, a notion of divine infinity and a certain philosophy of language is
influential in the development of an advanced and complex idea of moral perfection. In the
last chapter it is argued that even though there are great differences between the three, all
are examples of how the Judeo-Christian distinction affects moral epistemology through a
form  of  negative  theology,  an  idea  of  imitation  or  following  God,  and  certain
anthropological points of connection.
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Preface
References to works will be in italics, e.g. AdDiog., The Epistle to Diognetus. In
the body text is used English titles.  References are of the form '([author]), [Latin
title and reference], [page reference to English translation]. Author and edition are
only specified if abbreviation of title is not introduced in the list of abbreviations.
For example:  Str. 4.3.8.4, p. 410 refers to Clement of Alexandria, Stromata PG
4.3.8.4, ANF p. 410.
The  critical  editions  used  are  mostly  those  available  through  the  online
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
For English translations the ANF and NPNF are typically used as an offset. This
is primarily due to availability, though the translations are to a large degree not up
to date. Hence the quoted passages are often modified.
Original Greek text is added inside quoted passages in so far as needed, in soft
brackets. For references to the original Greek will  be used Greek unicode:  For
example  “the  Existent  (τὸ  ὄν)”.  The  most  central  Greek  terms  will  also  be
transliterated into beta code, e.g. epinoia, diastema, epektasis. Anglicized versions
of Greek words are italicized, e.g. diastemic, apophatic.
The author of the dissertation uses plural singular for self-reference, 'we'.
Introduction
The hypothesis of the following is that the radical qualitative distinction between
Creator  and  creator,  that  we  find  in  different  forms  in  much  early  Christian
thinking,  gives rise to a negative theology that will  often have implications for
moral  epistemology.  This  distinction,  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction,1 is  what
defines the relationship between Creator and creation. These are separated by a
qualitative  difference,  though  bridged  in  so  far  the  Creator  acts  and  reveals
himself in the world. This framework is the background for ontology as well as for
epistemology. In relation to ethics it becomes relevant for the relationship between
human beings and God, not least in so far as human beings are said to be made in
(or according to) the image of God,2 and are thus supposed to imitate or follow
God,  or  similar.  This  imitation  must  always  be  understood  simultaneously  in
negative as well as positive terms.
Negative  theology is,  in  the words  of  Guilio  Maspero,  “in  its  most  profound
essence,  conversion.”3 Negative  theology  means  a  break  with  any  idea  of  an
1 This is a generic term. See below.
2 Gen 1:27
3 Maspero 2007, p. 144. What we call 'negative theology' Maspero calls 'apophatism'. 
Others use the term 'apophaticism', but there are reasons for reserving these terms for 
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unbroken  continuity  between  positive  thinking  and  being.  Hence  it  gives
philosophical  and  theological  reflection  and  speculation  an  impetus,  that  also
breaks it  off in its processes. Thinking based on negative theology tends to be
unstable. Negative theology is in its proper sense a theologia viatorum, a theology
of the way, true, though inadequate: True in so far as it goes out from and leads to
God,  but  inadequate  in  so  far  as  it  can  never  conceptually  and  structurally
represent  its  object  in  any final  way. Hence the idea of  an 'adequate negative
theology'  is  a  contradiction  in  terms. Theological  moral  epistemology  cannot
escape  this  condition:  Given  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  and  its  implied
negative theology, there can be no final and adequate comprehension of the good,
and  no  final  system  of  ethics,  only  one  in  development  and  re-consideration.
Though such an ethics cannot be adequate, it can still be true. 
Through a range of anthropological and ethical connection-points, not least the
idea that human beings are created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27), this idea has a
number of influences on moral epistemology.
The study attempts to exemplify this idea through three case studies. The idea is
far from being original, but our main contention is, that such an approach to our
cases can bring out elements, that are sometimes overlooked or underestimated.
Our approach is in some aspects 'speculative'. We are not doing a concise study
into the history of certain theological or philosophical ideas, neither do we wish to
read the authors solely one their own terms. Still, we must closely consider the
texts on their own terms as far as possible to avoid anachronisms.
In the first part we will develop a generic definition of what to understand by the
Judeo-Christian distinction and the negative theology resulting from it. Philosophy
does not necessarily deal in arguments. Just as important is the task of developing
concepts  that  makes  us  able  to  comprehend,  ask  and  attempt  answers,  to
fundamental questions. This is not least true for intellectual history and the history
of philosophy. The definitions worked out in the following will serve as tools to
grasp  the  fundamental  relationships  between  theology,  ontology,  epistemology,
anthropology and ethics in our three case studies. Our claim is that even if these
conceive of negative theology in widely different ways, and even if their ethics are
very different, they are still build around a somewhat common framework.
particular uses. By 'negative theology' will be meant a broad generic definition, with 
apophatism/apophaticism as a subgenre.
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Part I. Negative theology and ethics in the early Church: 
Introduction, terminology and methodology.
“No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and
his love is made complete in us.” (1 Jn 4:12)
Some observations on the Judeo-Christian distinction, 
negative theology and ethics in early Christian thought
Negative theology comes in many varieties. The following introduces a range of
examples of  negative theology and related subjects from the early  Church (i.e.
until  the  4th  century).  Initially,  at  the  beginning  of  Church  history,  negative
theological  thought-forms  were  rarely  applied  systematically,  if  ever.  The  New
Testament contains  examples  that  could  arguably  be  classified  as  negative
theology,  but  these  are  hardly  ‘philosophical’  or  specimens  of  any  systematic
theology. If any, some of the (Pseudo-)Pauline epistles and the gospel of John come
closest.  Things  change  as  Christian  thinkers  increasingly  take  up  and  utilizes
Hellenic  culture,  terminologies,  philosophy,  rhetoric.  Most  often  as  a  weapon
against  Hellenic  religion and philosophy itself.  But  gradually  negative  theology
akin  to  that  used  by  contemporary  Neo-Platonists  and  others  are  applied  for
positive purposes. Hence, the increased diversity in the use of negative theological
language in the early Church is to a large degree due to the influx of philosophical
traditions  in  Christian  thought.  Some  of  these  philosophical  traditions  were
themselves developed, however, with an influence of Oriental ideas.
The development of negative theology affected the views on such issues as faith,
knowledge and ethics. But before looking at some possible views on how ethics
(moral  epistemology  in  particular)  can  be  conceived  from  the  perspective  of
negative  theology,  we  will  simply  look  at  some examples  of  negative  theology,
primarily from the early Church (until the fourth century).
What is the 'Judeo-Christian distinction'?
The term 'Judeo-Christian4 distinction' has been used in a range of contexts to
denote the differences between such things as the letter and the spirit,5 or the
religious  and  the  political.  In  our  definition  it  first  of  all  refers  to  the  radical
4 The term 'Judeo-Christian' is a fairly modern concept typically used to describe common
ethical standards in the Judaic and Christian worldviews. Though being a modern term 
it as such fits well to describe the fundamental likenesses between, e.g., the philosophy 
of late antique Alexandrian Judaism (Philo) and early Christian thinking.
5 For example Redekop 1999
8
qualitative  distinction  between  Creator  and  creation  that  characterizes  much
traditional Christian theological thinking.6 We borrow the term with modifications
from Robert Sokolowski who defined 'the Christian distinction' not so much as a
line drawn between the transcendent and immanent, or even between that which
we can only speak of negatively and that which we can have positive knowledge
about, as a distinction “between God and everything”.7 This distinction “defines
how we are to understand God, how we are to understand the world, and how we
are to understand the relationship between the world and God.”8
In the Hebrew Scriptures the idea is perhaps best expressed in Ecc 5:2: “God is
in heaven and you are on earth, so let your words be few.” As a 'theological idea',
by the Judeo-Christian distinction we mean a distinction that has consequences for
all  traditional  areas  of  philosophy,  whether  ontology,  epistemology  and  finally
ethics.9 It is our claim that this distinction is the key framework through which
most  negative  theology  in  late  antique  Christian  and  Jewish  thinking  must  be
conceived.10 As Gregory of Nyssa says: “[...]wide and insurmountable is the interval
that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature (πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ
ἀδιεξίτητον, ᾦ πρὸς τὴν κτιστὴν οὐσίαν ἠ ἄκτιστος φύσις διατετείχισται).”11 If
Hans Uhrs Von Balthasar is right, then for Gregory the first essential characteristic
of  the creature is negative,  consisting in the very fact  that the creature is not
God.12
In this case, as in many others, the Judeo-Christian distinction is related to a
conception of the world as created rather than generated by God. By creation is in
Christian theology traditionally meant that the Creator creates  ex nihilo. This is
different  from,  e.g.,  Plato's  account  in  Timaeus,  where  the  Demiurge  remolds
6 For example Aristides: “He has no name, for everything which has a name is kindred to 
things created”. Aristides, Apologia 1, p. 264. See also, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa 
ConEunII. 96, p. 260.
7 Sokolowski 1995, p. 32
8 Sokolowski 1995, p. xiii
9 In modern theology a version of this idea is, of course, best known from Søren 
Kierkegaard and 'dialectical theology', e.g., Karl Barth. We should, however, beware of 
forcing late antique theologies into the concepts of this tradition.
10 See Mortley 1986; Wissink 2000; Sokolowski 1995; Jenson 2002, pp. 163-164; Burrell 
2004. Burrell argues that the idea is also present in, e.g., Maimonides and Al-Ghazali, 
i.e., in non-Christian theologies, and calls it a Jewish-Christian-Muslim distinction. For 
our purposes 'Judeo-Christian' is the most fitting ('Judeo-' referring primarily to Philo). 
Burrell 2004, p. 218
11 Gregory continues: “The latter is limited, the former not. The latter is confined within 
its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only 
by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of extension, limited by 
time and space: the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling curiosity from every
point of view.” ConEunII. 69, p. 257
12 Balthasar 1988, p. 27
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existing matter.13 This latter idea is present in the Book of Wisdom,14 Philo, and in
some early  Patristic  sources,15 but  even if  this  is  the case,  there was an early
tendency in Patristic literature, and also Philo, to uphold a qualitative (rather than
quantitative)  distinction  between  God and everything  else.16 If  not  so  much  in
terms of ontology, then at least in terms of epistemology and ethics (this becomes
clear as we consider the negative theology that unfolds around this notion).17 For
example, as Wolfson argues, Philo’s use of negative attributes in the description of
God “[...]is presented only as a way of expressing the scriptural principle of the
unlikeness  between  God  and  all  other  beings.”18 Negative  theology  is  closely
related to this distinction.
Upholding the Judeo-Christian distinction was, if Sokolowski is right, the central
concern  in  the  Christological  controversies  all  the  way  up  to  the  Council  of
Chalcedon (AD 451).19 Also, it was central for the Cappadocians in their attacks on
Eunomianism. Even if they used negative theology in their 'mystical', 'spiritual' and
'ascetic'  theology,  its  theoretical  ground  was  a  claim  about  the  qualitative
distinction between the infinite and the finite. Hence, with a modern terminology,
theology based on the Judeo-Christian distinction is of ‘the Wholly Other’, though
maybe  'the  Wholly  First'  would  a  more  proper  name,  at  least  with  Philo  and
Clement who repeatedly identifies God with the One and the First Principle, so that
God's  simplicity  or  'firstness'  is  that  which  distinguishes  Him from the  rest  of
creation.
The (Judeo-)Christian distinction draws a negation line “[...]through all positive
dicta about God.”20 God cannot simply be defined as the highest being among other
beings or that Being in which other beings participate (even if this often happens),
but must be defined as a being quite different from all others.21 Hence from this
distinction follows the need for negative theology. In Gregory of Nyssa, the aim of
negative  theology  is  to  make  clear  that  the  divine  nature  does  not  have  any
13 Timaeus 32C-33A
14 Wis 11:17
15 Justin Martyr, Apologia 1.59; Clement of Alexandria, Str. 5.14. Kelly argues that Justin 
did not hold matter to be co-eternal with God. Kelly 1978
16 Especially against Pagan philosophies and Gnosticism. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo
was established in Roman Catholicism in 1215.
17 Yahwe's response to Moses in Exodus 3:13, ”ehyeh aser ehyeh”, translated in LXII as ”I 
am HE WHO IS” and by Philo as ”I am THE BEING”, is often taken as signifying that 
God is, but that by being different from His creation, he cannot be known. Philo, De Vita
Mosis 1.75
18 Wolfson 1957, p. 145
19 Sokolowski 1995
20 Wissink 2000, p. 106
21 The concluding chapters will discuss these general claims further, on the background of
our case studies.
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relationship  with  “these  things  below”.22 God  is  not  just  distinguished  in  his
difference from other things, but he is “differently different”,23, i.e. the way God is
different from His creation is itself different from the way things in creation differs
from each other.
The Judeo-Christian distinction seems to bar any form of 'natural theology'.24
There are examples of sorts of natural theology in the Scriptures, however. In the
Book of  Wisdom,  we  hear  that  “by  the  greatness  and  beauty  of  the  creatures
proportionably the maker of them is seen.”25 This passage is often alluded to in
Patristic literature, not least the Cappadocians (Gregory of Nyssa in particular). In
the  New Testament,  an example which is often taken as an instance of natural
theology, is Paul’s claim in Rom 1:20. This passage has the interesting quality of
also having a certain negative theological bend:
“For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly
seen,  being  perceived  through  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his
everlasting power and divinity”26
Somewhat  paradoxically,  Paul  seems  to  be  saying  that  even  though  God’s
“invisible  things  (τὰ … ἀόρατα)”  cannot  be  seen,  they  are  nevertheless  visible
through nature. But it is not at all  obvious that this is an instance of a simply
positive (not negative) natural theology per se.27 Of course one interpretation could
be that Paul believes the properties of God to be indirectly discernible. But maybe
Paul is saying that it is the invisibility of God’s things as such that is discernible? In
other words, by looking at creation we are able to reach the conclusion that God
cannot be seen, that He is completely different and cannot be approached. Hence
Paul is using a common philosophical idea of natural theology to express the Judeo-
Christian distinction and a negative theology.
By the Judeo-Christian distinction,  we should notice,  is  not meant the actual
ontological  difference between Creator  and creation  as  such,  but  an idea  that
reflects  this  difference  (or  the  experience  of  such  a  difference).28 In  negative
theologies based on the Judeo-Christian distinction God cannot be fully grasped,
22 ConEunI. PG 1104
23 Sokolowski 1995; Wissink 2000
24 In his lost work Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum, Marcus Terentius Varro 
distinguished between three kinds of theology: Civil theology, mythical theology, and 
natural theology. For reasons of precision we talk of theosemiotics instead.
25 Wis 13:5, KJV. There is hardly any negative theology in the Book of Wisdom.
26 Rom 1:20
27 Gregory of Nyssa has an interesting discussion of this passage. See below. Cant. 384-
385
28 For Sokolowski the distinction is phenomological. We treat it, perhaps, rather as a mode
of thinking, something that structures thought and experience in a particular way.
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whether by positive or negative definitions. Such theology rather attempts to grasp
the ineffableness of God. But this does not preclude that we in some way can have
a direct experience of this fact. According to Sokolowski the distinction between
God and human beings is first of all something to be lived, i.e. it has a practical and
phenomenological  meaning.29 This  presumably  explains  why  it  is  not  always
explicitly present in texts. Only secondarily is it something to be reflected upon.
The  distinction  is  “always  energetic  and  always  needs  to  be  worked  out  and
worked through, because we have a permanent propensity to take the whole as
ultimate and to see the divine as part of the whole.”30 But, says he, theology does
not establish the distinction, but it can confirm and protect it. Our claim in the
following  is  that  the  distinction  leaves  certain  traces  in  theology,  first  of  all
negative theology, but also anthropology and ethics. It does so in such a way that
reflection  on  these  issues  must  be  conceived  of  as  a  processual,  continuously
ongoing matter, a theologia viatorum (see below).
Our  approach  is,  to  start  with,  epistemological:  From  the  Judeo-Christian
distinction  (which  we  take  for  granted)  follows  the  need  for  certain  forms  of
negative theology, since there can be no successful attempts of comprehending the
Creator, as such.31  What this means is the topic of the following.32
Negative theology
By using the concept 'negative theology' we enter a minefield. The term is often
associated with obscurantism, anti-intellectualism or worse. The Greek variant of
the term, 'apophatic' theology, might seem more neutral, though the meaning is
roughly the same. But for reasons that will hopefully become clear, we will stick to
the term 'negative theology' in the following (apophatic theology will be defined as
a  sub-genre  of  this).  As  a  temporary  generic  definition  we  will  by  'negative
theology' simply understand any statement about God that, whether implicitly or
explicitly mentioning or referring to God or our experience of God, uses negations,
29 Sokolowski 1995, pp. 23-24
30 Sokolowski 1993, p. 198
31 That two things are distinct does not, of course, in itself preclude a positive 
epistemology. The traditional idea that for something to be known it must have 
something in common with the knower seems to be presupposed in much negative 
theology. That the Judeo-Christian distinction is 'radical' means that there can be no 
relationship between Creation and creator, ontologically or epistemologically, unless 
established by God.
32 This exemplifies an important aspect of our methodology: We are looking into what 
happens if certain ontological ideas are taken for granted. This endeavour is 
philosophical in so far as it seeks to connect ontology, epistemology and ethics in an 
abstract. We do not, however, for now assume any radical distinction between theology 
and philosophy.
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whether in relation to ontology, epistemology or ethics. Following this definition
negative theology need not be systematic in any way, or a philosophical 'method' or
'discipline'.  As  a  broad  tradition,  negative  theology  in  this  sense  not  only
encompasses those famous 'mystic' theologies of a Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 5th-6-th
century AD) or a Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1327 AD), but a range of ways of talking
about  the divine  present  in  widely  different  contexts.  Negative  theology  is  not
necessarily an attempt to systematically describe God's nature, but can just as well
be the result of the acknowledgment that such theology is not possible.
One of the most extreme examples of negative theology might very well be John
Scot Eriugena (9th century AD) who claimed that, “We do not know what God is.
God Himself does not know what He is because He is not anything. Literally God is
not, because He transcends being.”33 The idea of God as above being (ὑπερουσία)
is a Pseudo-Dionysian concept.34 This kind of negative theology is often considered
the 'standard' version. But we can find much less flamboyant forms of negative
theological speech about God in the early Church. Taking the extreme examples of
later negative theology as paradigmatic too easily blurs our vision.
Hence we do not define negative theology as Jacques Ellul in his commentary on
Ecclesiastes. For Ellul, the central theme for the Qoheleth is the impossibility of
formulating a positive, rational and systematic theology:
“What has been called “negative theology” becomes a temptation at this
point.  But  that  will  not  do  either,  since  it  constitutes  a  theology  –  still
another discourse about God, and therefore a means of forcing him into our
categories.”35
It is our claim that negative theology in the Patristic period is often exactly an
acknowledgment of the fact that God cannot be forced “into our categories” (this
results  from the Judeo-Christian distinction).  Often later  negative  theologies  as
that of Pseudo-Dionysius are considered more 'radical'  than the earlier ones of,
e.g., Philo or the apologetic fathers. From the Ellulian perspective the opposite is
the case, since the latter falls for the temptation to make negative theology into a
kind of  philosophical  speculation rather  than a  break with  philosophy as such.
When we talk of negative theology in the following, the term will  refer to both
understandings. 
Instances of negative theology can be found throughout the tradition of Greek
33 John Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon 2.589b-c
34 In Pseudo-Dionysius (5th-6th cent. AD) God is systematically conceived of as 'above' 
(ὕπερ) whatever positive concepts we can think of ascribing to Him.
35 Ellul 1990, p. 220
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philosophy. Already in the Pre-Socratics we find a somewhat negative vocabulary in
descriptions of the divine. A famous quote was attributed to Thales by Diogenes
Laërtius: “What is divine? What has no origin, nor end.”36 Another example of early
negative theology is Anaximander’s notion of the ἄπειρον, the infinite, unbounded
ἀρχῇ of  everything,  an  indefinite,  unbounded  spatial  reservoir.37 Being  a
description  of  a  ‘first  principle’  using  a  negative  definition,  ἄ-πειρον,  this  was
arguably an instance of negative theology.
While infinity and other ontological concepts becomes central in later negative
theology, epistemological terms such as the notion of ineffability was central for
much negative theology before Gregory of Nyssa (e.g. Philo, see below). Neither
Plato nor Aristotle had any real negative theology, though some passages stresses
the difficulty of declaring God.38 Important for later negative theology was this
passage from Timaeus:
“Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed;
and  having  discovered  Him,  to  declare  Him  unto  all  men  were  a  thing
impossible.”39
This passage was in the Patristic tradition taken as an example that Plato had
some indirect knowledge about God,  through knowledge of his ineffability (e.g.
Clement of Alexandria). What Plato says is, however, that there are some men who
will not be able to understand God, not that God is wholly ineffable (something
which, among others, Origen was aware of).40 It is to a large degree Aristotle's
definitions of such central terms as ἀπόφασις (negation), ἀφαίρεσις (abstraction),
and στέρησις (privation), that lays the ground for the technical developments in
negative theology.41 Aristotle did not himself, however, hold a negative theology.
Negative theology as a more developed way of speaking about the divine seems to
have  its  origin  and  background  in  the  Hellenic-Judaic  philosophy  of  Philo  of
Alexandria (20 BC-59 AD), who according to Louth “[...]certainly has some claim to
be called the Father of negative theology.”42. Philo writes that:
“Do not  however  suppose that  the Existent  (τὸ  ὄν)  which  truly  exists  is
apprehended (καταλαμβάνεσθαι) by any man; for we have in us no organ by
which we can envisage it, neither in sense, for it is imperceptible by sense
36 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 1.1
37 See Jaeger 1947, p. 34
38 Wolfson 1947, 1957
39 Plato, Tim 28c, tr. Lamb 1925
40 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.43
41 Mortley 1986, p. 255. These concepts will be discussed below.
42 Louth 2007. See also Wolfson 1952, p. 115
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(οὔτ’ αἴσθησιν), nor yet in mind (οὔτε νοῦν).”43
In  his  allegorical  readings  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  Philo  described  God  as
without  attributes,  incorruptible  (ἄφθαρτος),  and  incomprehensible
(ἀκατάληπτος). It has been argued that Philo was the first to call God ‘ineffable’
(ἄρρητος).44 This  arguably  follows  from  the  ontological  fact  that  God  has  no
qualities,  he  is  ἄποιος.45 These  concepts  are  important  ontological  and
epistemological components of later negative theologies.
Philo's  negative  theology  was  based  on  a  distinction  between  Creator  and
creation, that made God as such inapproachable outside work and revelation. As
claimed such a distinction serves as the backbone or framework for many later
negative theologies in the Patristic period. God is essential being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν)46
but according to Philo we can know that God exists but not what He is.47 Only in so
far as God is active and relates to us through works and revelation can we know
anything  about  the  divine.  Hence,  Philo  distinguishes  between  God’s  essence
(sometimes οὐσία) and activities (ἐνέργεια) (see quotation below).48 It is not clear
exactly what this distinction consists in ontologically. Is God fully present in his
activities  as seems to be the case in  Gregory of  Nyssa?49 Or  are his  activities
different from his essence as in Gregory Palamas (1296-1359 AD)? At any rate,
from  an  epistemological  perspective  this  distinction  in  Philo  enables  us  to
distinguish between the divine essence which can only be spoken of in negative
definitions and the divine activities which can be comprehended.
Philo imagines that God told Moses about His activities that:
“[...]while  in  their  essence (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν)  they are  incomprehensible
(ἀκατάληπτοι), they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and
copy of their activity (ἐνεργείας). […] Do not, then, hope ever to be able to
apprehend (καταλαβεῖν) Me or any of my Powers (δυνάμεων) in our essence
(κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν). But I readily and with goodwill admit you to a share of
what is attainable.”50
43 Philo, De Mutatione Nominum 7.10, quoted from Louth 1983, p. 20. Notice that Philo 
does not here use the privative alpha to form negative names.
44 Wolfson 1957, p. 156. Wolfson translates arretos as unutterable, but the norm seems to 
be to translate this as 'ineffable'. We reserve 'unutterable' for aphatos instead.
45 Philo, Legum Allegoriae 1.51
46 With a phrase used by Plato of the ideas. Philo, De Mutatione Nominum 27
47 Philo, De Specialibus Legibus 1.6-8
48 Though the distinction is only worked out in detail much later, it is arguably present in 
early Patristic theology also. See Hägg 2006
49 See, e.g., Balás 1966
50 Philo, Specialibus Legibus 1.47-49. Quoted from D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: 
Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, Cambridge 2004, p. 63, modified.
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God  is  ineffable  and  cannot  be  apprehended  because  of  his  simplicity  (in
Gregory of Nyssa it becomes his infinity), but through his activities he relates to
the multiplicity of the world. These activities can be named. God's activities are
sometimes identified with Plato's ideas (“Some among you call them not inaptly
Forms or Ideas, since they bring form into everything that is[...]”).51 These are not
abstract entities since they depend on God and as the powers of God their essence
is unknowable.
Philo's distinction between  essence and activity was not completely new. P.L.
Reynolds has argued that the distinction between essence (οὐσία)  and powers,
works, activities is somewhat present in a fragment from Onatas and the pseudo-
Aristotelian  De Mundo.52 The οὐσία-ἐνέργεια distinction might be reminiscent of
the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (or action)
(ἐντελεχείᾳ and ἐνέργεια).53 But where God's activity in Aristotle is as self-thinking
thought, in Philo it is creation. Also, in Aristotle knowing that something exists also
implies knowing something about what it is. Philo applied the distinction between
potentiality and actuality (if that is what he did) in an original and radical way that
made any human relation to God wholly a matter of God's self-revelation.54 It was
probably his use of this distinction in connection with negative theology that laid
the ground for subsequent Christian as well as Pagan55 negative theologies.56
In the later Platonic tradition, with Albinus, Plotinus and Proclus in particular,
we find negative theological language about the divine similar to that of Philo.
Albinus (c. 150 AD) calls the first principle ineffable (ἄρρητος).57 Middle- and Neo-
Platonism also took over central Aristotelian concepts, ἀφαίρεσις, ἀπόφασις and
στέρεσις, though not in their precise technical meanings.58 Albinus also gives an
important distinction between  ἀφαίρεσις,  ἀναλογία and ὑπεροχή.59 The latter is
usually best translated as preeminence, but becomes a central term for denoting
transcendence. In explaining the meaning of abstraction Plotinus says that:
51 Philo, Specialibus Legibus 1.48. See also Louth 1983, p. 21
52 Reynolds 1992, pp. 351–353
53 Aristotle, Metaphysica 1046a12, 1048a25
54 Louth 1983, p. 20
55 By 'Pagan' will be meant non-Judeo-Christian.
56 Wolfson 1986. This distinction is not inseparable from Judeo-Christian negative 
theologies, but it, or similar, is a very common way of explaining how God can be 
radically different from the creation, while simultaneously being present in creation.
57 Albinus, Didaskalikos
58 These terms abstraction, negation and privation were often simply taken to mean 
'negation'. See below.
59 Celsus (2nd c. AD) uses ἀνάλυσις instead of ἀφαίρεσις, but it has the same function of 
clearly distinguishing between what belongs to a subject and what not. Daniélou 1973, 
pp. 340-341
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“Though we do not grasp Him by knowledge, we do not completely fail to
grasp Him; we grasp Him enough to say something about Him, without,
however, expressing Him himself; for we say what He is not, but what He is
we do not say.”60
But in  opposition to Philo  and the subsequent  Patristic  tradition,  in  Plotinus
knowledge or the 'vision' of God is not dependent upon revelation.61 Moreover, the
negative method in Plotinus, according to Mortley, is “[...]founded on that which
there is of identity between levels: its object is simply the conceptual removal of
the incomparable and the differentiated, so that the continuous may stand out.”62
Hence  in  Plotinus  the  negative  method  does  not  imply  an  absolutely  radical
distinction between Creator and creation.
Jean Daniélou  argues  that  for  Judaism,  God's  transcendence is  first  of  all  a
matter of the inability of created things to measure and comprehend what God is
while simultaneously acknowledging that His existence can be known.63 For the
Platonist, the ineffability of God cannot be more than relative in the sense that God
would be graspable if just the mind could free itself from all the conceptions of the
sensible  world.64 In  Gnosticism,  however,  God is  unknown both essentially  and
existentially.65 Hence, in the many sects of Gnosticism negative theology was used
eagerly.  For  example  in  this  passage  from  the  Tripartite  Tractate (unknown
author), a (most likely) Valentinian work from the 3rd century:66
“[...]nor  can  any  work  express  him,
nor  can  any  eye  see  him,
nor  can  any  body  grasp  him,
because  of  his  inscrutable  greatness,
and  his  incomprehensible  depth,
and  his  immeasurable  height,
60 Plotinus, Ennead 6.7.36
61 This can mean a crucial difference. Joseph Wissink has argued that we should 
distinguish between two kinds of negative (in his words “apophatic”) theology, the one 
Christian, the other Pagan. The first is based on revelation and thus assumes the radical
distinction between Creator and creation, the other does not. Pagan negative theology 
evolved as a result of a growing skepticism, says Wissink. The gods became more and 
more 'abstract' and distant. But “[b]oth forms have in common that people speak 
explicitly about God and/or the gods: on one side the gods that disappear and on 
another the God who is near us, but remains God.” Wissink 2000, p. 118
62 Mortley 1984, p. 53
63 Daniélou 1973, pp. 335-336
64 Hence Plotinus writes that: “Things here are signs; they show therefore to the wiser 
teachers how the supreme God is known; the instructed priest reading the sign may 
enter the holy place and make real the vision of the inaccessible.” Plotinus, Ennead 
6.9.11
65 Daniélou 1973, pp. 335-336
66 Edwards 2012, p. 101
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and his illimitable will.”67
The distinction between not knowing what God is and knowing that he is,  is
important and helps to distinguish between traditional Judeo-Christian negative
theologies and more extreme kinds. As Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-390 AD) puts
it subsequently to having argued for the ineffability of God:
“Do  not  take  our  frankness  as  ground  for  atheistic  caviling  and  exalt
yourselves over against us for acknowledging our ignorance. Conviction, you
see, of a thing's existence is quite different from knowledge of what it is.”68
Though  this  distinction  is  to  some  degree  defining  for  Christian  negative
theology, it does not mean that it is explicitly acknowledged in all Patristic sources.
Sometimes a view closer to the Gnostic one is present, as when God's powers are
also said to be ineffable.69 But it is also a common idea, closer to the Platonic one,
that God's goodness and wisdom can be seen in creation,70 or that God is 'above' or
'beyond' comprehension in a way which tends to suggest a quantitative difference
rather  than a  qualitative  distinction  between Creator  and creation  (as  in,  e.g.,
Origen at times).71 Hence, though God cannot be directly known, in such thinking
He can be known indirectly, through what we might talk of theosemiosis.72
Negative theology and imitation of God
We should notice how God's positive self-revelation in the history of salvation
can hardly be taken out of account in negative theologies that are to be called
'Christian'.  Karl  Barth  notes  that  the  problem  with  philosophical  negative
descriptions  of  God  is  that  they  only  go  so  far  as  the  “limits  of  the
incomprehensible, of that which is superior to us”. Hence he argues that:
67 Tripartite Tractate 54, tr. Attridge and Mueller, quoted from Mortley 1986.
68 De Theologia 28.5
69 For example Theophilus: “The appearance of God is ineffable (ἄρρητον) and 
indescribable (ἀνέκφραστόν)”, Theophilus, Ad Autolycus 1.3. See below.
70 E.g., Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 3.24. This is arguably inspired by Plato's Timaeus. 
See Karamanolis 2013 (forthcoming). Or Gregory of Nyssa: “For it is possible to see 
Him who has made all things in wisdom by way of inference through the wisdom that 
appears in the universe.” Beat., 1264-1272
71 The term 'ἐπέκεινα' is often used to express that something is 'beyond' or 'above' in the 
sense of being transcendent. It is not always obvious, however, whether this is in a 
quantitative or qualitative sense. PGL, “ἐπέκεινα”.
72 This concept has been developed especially by Michael Raposa. Inspired by C.S. Peirce, 
Raposa has argued that: “[...]the problem of religious knowledge is to be conceived 
primarily as a problem of sign-interpretation, that it is possible to discern a logic of such
sign-interpretation, and that this is primarily the logic of abduction.” Raposa 1989, p. 
148. The concept 'theosemiosis' refers to processes of thought that in some way or 
other bring out theological claims, ideas or notions from abductive reflection (non-
inductive and non-deductive) on 'nature' or 'creation' (that which is not God).
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“If  one  says  of  God,  “He  is  limitless,  incomprehensible,  free  sovereign,
eternal  omnipotent,  transcendent,”  these expressions do not  derive  their
exact meaning from an idea, from an abstraction, as if one wished to define
the contrary  of  what is  limited,  comprehensible,  and temporal.  All  these
qualities draw their true meaning from the goodness of the heavenly Father,
who has made himself our Father in Jesus Christ.”73
In  other  words,  it  is  when God reveals  himself  positively  in  history,  that  he
simultaneously reveals himself as incomprehensible. Thus such negative theology
cannot be thought independently of a positive theological idea of the atonement.
Our  claim  is  that  even  if  negative  theology  often  seems  to  be  developed
independently of positive theological ideas of the works of Jesus Christ in history,
these  things  come together  in  the  ethical  questions  of  what  it  means  to  be  a
Christian, not least as the idea of imitating God must refer to both the positive
(historical) and negative (transcendent) aspects.74
Negative  theology  has  consequences  for  ethics,  most  often  through
anthropological  ideas  where  the  human person  is  in  some  way  said  to  reflect
(actually  or  ideally)  the divine essence and/or  activities.  A classical  example is
Plato’s concept of “likeness unto God as far as possible (ὁµοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ
δυνατόν)”75 or the Neo-Pythagorean idea of being an “imitator of God (μιμητὴς
Θεοῦ)”76.  If  to  such  ideas  are  added  that  God  is  simultaneously  conceived  as
ineffable, incomprehensible or the like, we should expect such negative properties
to  have  consequences  for  anthropology  so  that  we  can  talk  of  a  negative
anthropology.77 In  the  Patristic  context,  negative  theology  has  an  influence  on
anthropology through the idea that human beings are created in the image of God.
This is our primary example of what we have called points of connection between
theology  and  ethics  (though  the  polemical  use  might  also  have  an  ethical
significance it does not have so through any obvious points of connection in this
sense). This notion in its many forms is what is traditionally called 'imago Dei'. The
idea of the human being as an imago Dei follows, e.g., from a traditional reading of
Genesis 1:27. Combined with a negative theology this means that if human beings
or humankind in general (an important difference, though maybe not so much in
73 Karl Barth 2002, p. 25. Wissink argues for similarities between dialectical theology and 
Patristic negative theology. Wissink 2000
74 This, however, should not be confused with the claim that the apophatic and the 
kataphatic ways always follow each other (as in Pseudo-Dionysius), if by this is meant 
that both speak in abstract terms about the transcendent. The positive always refers to 
history.
75 Plato, Theaetetus 176b
76 See Heintz 2004
77 See, e.g., Merki 1952; Annas 1999
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this context) are/is created in, after, or according to (κἆτα) the image of God, and
God must be essentially defined in negative terms, then so must humankind. Philo
writes that,
“[...]why should we wonder that the Existent cannot be apprehended by men
when even the mind in each of us is unknown to us? For who knows the
essential nature of the soul?”78
Almost perfectly similar statements can be found in, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, for
whom this anthropology (especially his view of the soul) had obvious consequences
for ethics.  On the one hand Gregory frequently  used the idea as an argument
against such things as violence, power, inequality and slavery. Since humankind is
made in the image of God such things  mean doing violence to the very image of
God.  In  these  contexts  it  is  not  always  very  obvious  that  Gregory’s  negative
theology has any direct impact.79
These  consequences  can  most  fundamentally  be  understood  in  terms  of  a
relationship between the abstract and the concrete. The abstract will often have to
do with the essence or nature of things or persons while the concrete will often
have to do with the activities or works of a thing or a person. By the abstract we
mean  that  which  is  removed  (as  in  ἀφαίρεσις) or  de-contextualized.  By  the
concrete is meant that which can only be understood in its relation to other things
or in a broader context (time or space). As practice, abstraction can take the form
of an ideal of self-control, asceticism, and similar, while concretion can take the
form of social ethics or a certain idea of a spiritual development according to one's
relationship to others or a historical context. Our claim is that both aspects will
very often be present in a form that might often look paradoxical.
In The Epistle to Diognetus this can be seen as Christians are said to be invisibly
present  in  society  while  simultaneously  imitating  God  (μιμητἡς …  θεοῦ).  In
Clement of Alexandria it can be seen as the idea that the true Gnostic imitates the
oneness of God while simultaneously imitating the love of the Logos for human
beings (φιλανθρωπία). In Gregory of Nyssa the idea can be seen in so far as both
abstraction and negation play a role in the virtuous person's spiritual progress, a
progress that can only be described in positive definitions in so far as it is given
expression  in  concrete  circumstances  (in  following,  ἀκολουθία).  In  all  three
examples different kinds of negative theology are combined with certain notions of
history of salvation and the atonement.
78 Philo, De Mutatione Nominum 7.10, quoted from Louth 1981, p. 20
79 It could be argued that the idea of divine infinitude influences anthropology normatively.
See the part on Gregory of Nyssa.
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Theological ethics as theologia viatorum
A commonly used metaphor for the Christian life and theology is journeying. We
find this in Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa and many others. For example
the story of Abraham's journey into Canaan is by Gregory interpreted allegorically
as a metaphor for the Christian life with its gradual, but never ending, experience
of God's mysteries.80 Also Moses' third theophany is interpreted in these terms in
On the Life of Moses. This idea, in its many variations, seems to be grounded in a
negative theology: If we cannot have any positive knowledge of God's essence, but
only of his activities, no final systematic knowledge of God is possible. This is often
coupled with some eschatological idea of hope or anticipation: We have not yet,
and  might  never,  gain  a  final  comprehension  of  the  divine,  but  through  the
continual use of negative theological methods we can at least retain an openness
to the divine reality ahead, which, however, lies beyond our understanding. Such
ideas are, of course, often associated with negative theology in a way that can be
described not just as an ad hoc-argument, but as a via negativa.81
In Clement and Gregory this kind of thinking is arguably a result of an ontology
where  becoming  plays  a  role  that  being  cannot,  in  so  far  as  we  speak  about
creation and human beings in particular.82 Only God is self-sufficient and creation
only exists in so far as God continuously grants existence. In a way human beings
cannot be like or imitate God but only continuously become like God, in action. In
terms of ethics and epistemology this leads to a range of ideas that in different
forms express the notion that the thinking subject, the human person, is always 'on
the way'. From the perspective of ethics this unfolds in the idea of  epektasis,  a
'reaching out' which is often thought of as a constant progress in virtue (Gregory
of Nyssa). In our generic definition the term epektasis will be somewhat related to
this idea in a way that holds together negative theology and an idea of anticipation,
hope, and some degree of moral progress (if not a more neutral idea of moral non-
stability that is not, however, 'evil').
As a technical idea, epektasis is only developed after the Patristic period, but on
the background of Patristic thinking, going back to  Irenaeus.83 Gregory of Nyssa
80 ConEunII., p. 259
81 The concept via negativa often implies a more systematic and methodological idea of 
negative theology, as that developed by Pseudo-Dionysius. It cannot be simply identified 
with negative theology as such.
82 E.g., in terms of ὀυσία (being) or το εἶναι (to be) and γίγνεσθαι (to become). The idea 
that becoming is ontologically primary, so that being is an abstraction from becoming, is
often associated with Heraclitus and in modern times, e.g., Nietzsche or process 
metaphysics and theology. Here we leave such fundamental issues aside since our 
theme is more specifically anthropological and ethical.
83 PGL, “ἐπεκτασις”, “ἐπεκτείν-ω”
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derives this idea from Phil 3:13.84 Both Clement of Alexandria and Origen refers
and  alludes  to  the  same  passage  when  discussing  moral  perfection.  Epektasis
means reaching after something that can never be possessed in any final way.
Daniélou describes epektasis as follows:
“There is at once for the soul an aspect of stability and possession, which is
her participation in  God,  and an aspect  of  movement,  which is  the ever
infinite gap between what she possesses of God and what He is […] Spiritual
life is thus an everlasting transformation of the soul in Christ Jesus in the
form of a growing ardour, thirst for God growing as participation in Him
increases, which is accompanied by a growing stability, the soul becoming
simple, and fixed ever more firmly in God.”85
We will assume a minimalistic definition of the term (epektasis means reaching
forward to the good, in some way), but throughout discuss how it can be deepened
in relation to the central themes in our authors. We should be ready to add to our
definition that  epektasis  is an activity in which the precedence of becoming over
being produces a continuous, never-ending reaching forward to a perfection or a
good that lies ahead, so that the present state is constantly, in each moment of
time,  negated  for  a  future  state  (this  negative  element  is  important,  though
perhaps controversial).
The notion that the soul is in an “everlasting transformation” can be seen in
theological  reflection  in  general  (not  just  theological  ethics).  In  Gregory  (and
perhaps Clement) nothing in human existence is exempt from changeability, but
nothing is exempt from continuous perfection either, then. Hence this is also true
for epistemology and theology in general.
If the believer, and thus also the theologian, is always “on the way”, then, in
other  words,  such  negative  theology  is  often  most  adequately  described  as  a
theologia viatorum, a theology of the road or the pilgrim. H.L. Martensen defined
the theologia viatorum as distinguished from the theologia beatorum as a matter of
truth in distinction from adequacy:
“We cannot have an adequate knowledge of God, that is, a knowledge co-
extensive in every feature with its subject. Such a knowledge would be that
vision  of  Him face  to  face,  which  cannot  be  ours  till  the  last  change  is
accomplished and everything partial shall  have ceased. We can, however,
have a true knowledge, that is, a knowledge true in principle, true in its
84 ”Brothers, I do not consider that I have made it my own. But one thing I do: forgetting 
what lies behind and straining forward (ἐπεκτεινόμενος) to what lies ahead”. Phil 3:13, 
ESV
85 Daniélou 1944, pp. 305-307
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tendency, and true in the goal at which it aims;—true because it goes out
from and leads to God. This distinction between a true and an adequate
knowledge of God hovered before the minds of our elder theologians when
they distinguished between a “theologia viatorum et beatorum.””86
By theologia viatorum (or the 'theology of the pilgrim') we should understand a
theology that is true, but not adequate; true because it “goes out from and leads to
God”, inadequate because we cannot have a knowledge that is “co-extensive in
every feature with its subject”. Such a theology would be a  theologia beatorum.
Hence we see that according to this  definition truth is  not  so much matter  of
correspondence  between  a  proposition  and  reality,87 as  it  is  a  matter  of  a
'movement' or a 'signification' that points in a certain direction. The ethical side to
this is what we have called epektasis while the epistemological side might best be
conceived in terms of a certain sem(e)iotic.88
When Clement of Alexandria in his  Stromata insists on the continuous need to
'veil'  the  mysteries,  and  when  the  Cappadocians  in  their  arguments  against
Eunomius claim that our conceptions about God are signs that point to, but do not,
however,  reveal  the  divine  essence,  we  are  arguably  dealing  with  theologia
viatorum. Why use this concept at all? The distinction 'viatorum et beatorum' is, of
course, only relevant in so far as we work with both. It is our claim now that we at
least  need  this  distinction  as  a  heuristic  tool  as  we  reflect  upon  what
methodologies will work as we approach negative theologies. We need to be able to
find  those  methodologies  that  let  us  approach  Patristic  sources  as  works-in-
progress rather than finished systems.
This must also be the case when working with theological ethics. We can have
no final adequate vision of God, but must follow him indefinitely instead (this is not
least  the  case  in  Gregory  of  Nyssa  where  God's  infinity  bars  any  adequate
theological system). Granted the fundamental premises of negative theology, we
can never have a final, adequate comprehension of God. There are at least two
ways that this is also true of theological ethics. Firstly, if ethics are to some degree
86 Martensen 1904, p. 82
87 What is known as the 'correspondence theory of truth'. Aristotle, Metaphysica 1011b25,
Plato, Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b. In modern times the theory was especially 
defended by Moore and Russell: “[...]a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, 
and is false when there is no corresponding fact”, Russell 1912, p. 129. Something akin 
to this idea is not surprisingly also present in Patristic theology, though the 
identification of truth with the person of Christ in the New Testament seems radically 
different. As we will see Gregory of Nyssa's negative theology leads him to a new idea of
truth. Our definition of the concept theologia viatorum does not, however, depend on 
the ideas of truth explicitly present in our case studies, but only on what is speculatively
feasible.
88 Spelling 'semeiotic' rather than 'semiotic' suggests a Peircean idea of signs. Liszka 1996
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derived from our idea of God, then it  will  be subject to the same instability as
theology as such. Secondly, if  ethics  are derived from an anthropology which is
based on some sort of idea of  imago Dei,  then this anthropology will serve as a
point of connection between negative theology and ethics. In both cases it will not
be possible to formulate a closed ethical ‘system’: Because of negative theology,
every  true  positive  proposition  about  the  nature  of  the  good  only  becomes
meaningful if related to negative truths about what the good is not, or what the
not-good is. We only know God positively through his revelations and activities in
concrete  historical  contexts.  But  theological  ethics  leads  somewhere.  It  points
beyond the present historical context. Hence it can be true, if not adequate.
If theological ethics from the perspective of negative theology cannot hope to
have an ‘adequate’ but only a ‘true’ conception of God, so that theological ethics is
always in a way a kind of  theologia viatorum, then this means that we must be
skeptical about perceiving such theology in terms of ‘philosophical systems’ or the
like. Our project is, however, to point out the systematical relationship between
certain ideas in our case studies. But on a meta-plane these ideas, so to speak,
systematically bars theology from becoming a finalized system. Hence what we are
looking  for  might  be  said  to  be  a  philosophical  system,  though  one  that  is  in
development,  not  closed,  not  final.  This  means  that  when  we  consider  our
methodology, we must be aware of a range of approaches.
Methodology, scope and selection
By formulating a 'speculative'  idea about  the (possible)  relationship between
negative  theology  and  moral  epistemology,  we  to  some  degree  have  already
decided on what we are looking for in our case studies. Hence our exposition of the
ideas found in the authors is not 'neutral' or 'objective', but is a result of a process
of  pick-and-choose  that  is  partly  determined  by  our  primary  hypothesis.  This
hypothesis, however, is not fully developed beforehand, and must be continuously
reconsidered  throughout  the  exposition.  It  can  easily  be  confused  with  many
modern ideas about the difference between God and human beings.89 That the idea
must be developed processually is fully in line with our idea of theology. Hence the
exposition of ideas in our case studies is also a part of a speculative process that
seeks to establish the plausibility of our idea. We ask the reader to have this in
mind.
In one sense what we are doing belongs to the genre known as 'the history of
89 E.g., Kierkegaard and 'dialectical theology'.
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ideas'.90 At least in so far as we are attempting to describe how the Judeo-Christian
distinction as a more or less trans-historical idea unfolds in different philosophies
in different historical contexts.91 That the idea is often not explicitly stated in our
sources  only  adds  to  this,  since  such an  approach inevitable  presupposes  that
authors can share a common (trans-historical)  idea even if  there is  no obvious
direct relation between the these. At least, we can say that different authors in
different contexts have made similar retroductions from similar ideas. For example
it has been common to infer from the idea of creation ex nihilo the hypothesis that
God is qualitatively different from creation. We must acknowledge, however, that
the idea cannot be abstracted from its concrete historical context(s) or at least that
this is the only medium through which we can approach it.
Deciding whether or not to approach our subject ‘systematically’ or otherwise is
crucial  for  how  we  read  and  understand  the  texts  in  question.  The  idea  that
philosophy is always (or ideally)  a systematic way of thought has an important
history as a historiographical concept.92 Eighteen-century scholars, such as Jacob
Brucker,  were  a  main  source  for  this  view,  claiming  that  philosophy  basically
attempts  (or  should  attempt)  to  pose  a  single  fundamental  principle  (or  set  of
principles) from which it can deduce true doctrines (a 'system of philosophy') for
the various brands of philosophical thought (ethics, epistemology etc.).93 According
to this  methodology,  philosophers of  the past should be read as attempting to,
more  or  less  successfully,  formulate  such  systems.  Thus  according  to  Brucker,
historians  of  philosophy  should  attempt  to  expose  the  basic  principles  and
(re-)establish the inherent philosophical systems of earlier philosophies, whether
or  not  such  systematical  thought  is  explicitly  present.  This  has  arguably  also
affected the way theological  history has been conducted since,94 also in a way
directly relevant for the present study. Hence Palmer has rightly noted that,
90 See Lovejoy 1936. According to Lovejoy the history of ideas is in a sense made up of 
building-blocks, the so-called 'unit-ideas', trans-historical individual concepts that 
combine in different ways throughout history, and which the historian of ideas 
identifies. We are not here taking over any strong notion of 'unit ideas' or similar, but 
nevertheless recognize that the 'Judeo-Christian distinction' and negative theology can 
at least to some degree be thought of as trans-historical 'unit-ideas'.
91 The 'Judeo-Christian' distinction arguably has similar consequences in widely different 
contexts. For example, when discussing Karl Barth's early (dialectical) theology, 
Balthasar argued that “[d]ialectical theology is expressly designed as a theology for a 
journeying People of God who are merely on their way to God but not there: a theologia 
viatorum[...]”. The reasons for this are much the same as ours, when dealing with 
Patristic negative theology. Balthasar 1992, p. 79
92 See Catana 2008
93 A form of what is known today as epistemological foundationalism.
94 Though of course systematical scholasticism in the Church goes as far back as at least 
John of Damascus (c. 675-749), who attempted to systematize previous Patristic 
thought. John of Damascus, Expositio Fidei
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“[w]hen  modern  scholars  have  given  attention  to  the  apologists'  use  of
negative  theology,  they  have  frequently  fitted  it  into  a  systematic
framework, which is not in keeping with the method and purpose of  the
apologists themselves.”95
An  example  of  this  is  when  Clement  of  Alexandria  is  taken  to  be  the  first
Christian author to apply negative theology systematically.96 This might reflect a
too system-oriented view of what it means to do negative theology. The problem
with this can, not least, be that examples of negative theology that do not fit into a
'systematical'  way  of  doing  theology,  are  left  out.  There  is  a  risk  that  we
misinterpret the apologetic use of negative theology if we read such texts solely
with a systematic or dogmatic framework in mind. This risk is especially prevalent
when searching for the historical roots of doctrines, not least ethical ones, since
these  are  often  formulated  in  relation  to  concrete  problems  in  certain  social
contexts. While a systematical view can still be methodologically useful if we aim
to distinguish systematical from non-systematical thought, it is clearly deficient if
the aim is  to  actually  present  the varieties of  negative  theology  and their  use
adequately, in their own right.
This  is  why  we  should  also  take  other  methodologies  into  account.  Quentin
Skinner  argued against  'the  myth  of  coherence',  the idea  that  the  historian  of
philosophy  should  attempt  to  find  an  underlying  coherent  system  of  thought
beneath  a  philosopher's  oeuvre,  even  if  it  seems  to  be  incoherent  or  self-
contradictory  from  work  to  work.97 Instead  we  need  a  view  on  philosophical
thought  that  takes  'performativity'  seriously.  We  need  to  ask  what  a  specific
philosopher was doing, and why, when writing or saying specific things. Hence we
should look for the author's intentions, typically in terms of speech act theory. With
a commonly used term, we will  call  this alternative to the systematic approach
'intentionalism'.
Though Skinner developed his methodology in relation to political philosophy,
there can be no doubt that intentionality is central when working with negative
theologies. Wissink writes that:
“When we want to describe philosophical thinking as 'negative theology' we
must question the intentionality of that thinking. Does the thinker want to
95 Palmer mentions Donaldson 1866 as an example. Palmer 1983, p. 236
96 See, e.g., Mortley 1986; Hägg 2006. It is not obvious that Clement's negative theology 
differs radically from previous ones, except in quantity.
97 Against Skinner, Mark Bevir argues that while the desires that govern some speech acts
only have a thin coherency requirement, the beliefs that govern most speech acts are 
subordinated to a firmer coherency requirement. To understand something as the 
expression of a belief implies an expectation that this belief is coherent. See Bevir 1997.
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eliminate the gods or God to make room for the true secret of reality? Has
something of the secret that we call 'God' been shown to the thinker and
does  his  or  her  thinking  circle  around  it?  If  so,  the  rejection  of  closed
systems is positively motivated by the desire to keep reality open to what
transcends it.”98
Wissink's point is that there can be different forms and functions of negative
theology that are not discernible,  however,  from particular negative theological
utterances in themselves and that Pagan and Christian forms of negative theology
can take the form of each other without necessarily sharing the same aim.99 We
cannot at face value identify specimens of negative theology with, on the one hand,
“the conceptual removal of the incomparable and the differentiated, so that the
continuous may stand out”100 or, on the other, an attempt to guard the distinction
“between God and everything”. Hence, e.g., the claim 'God is not visible' does not
in itself tell us what kind of negative theology is presupposed. This means that we
should be able to look at, e.g., seemingly philosophical and speculative thought as
potentially not very speculative or philosophical after all,  and  vice versa. Since
negative  theology  is  a  way  (a  method  or  practice)  of  speaking  indirectly,
understanding the context of negative theological statements seems particularly
important.101 Negative  definitions  are  radically  open  propositions,  and  the
reference of names made from such can be quite indefinite.102 A grasp of context
and  the  author's  intentions  are  crucial  for  understanding  the  full  meaning  of
negative  theological  utterances.  For  example,  taken  as  an  implicit  moral
imperative ‘this  is  not God’  can,  by itself,  simply mean that  ‘this’  is  not  to  be
worshiped, but without telling us what to worship instead, or whether to worship
anything  at  all.103 Similarly,  whether  or  not  a  proposition  counts  as  a  simple
negation, or indirectly points beyond what it negates, seems not only to depend on
the context, but also on the intention of the speaker (the context might only serve
98 Wissink 2000, p. 118
99 This was arguably the result of the introduction of foreign logics into texts, what Hadot 
calls 'borrowing' (Hadot mentions Ambrose's introduction of Origenian mysticism into 
an ascetical and ontological system derived from Plotinus), or the adoption of the ideas 
and behaviors of adversaries, 'contamination'. Hadot 1965
100Mortley 1984, p. 53
101In a way we are dealing with a kind of 'holism' since indirect references to a thing are 
always dependent on its relation to a larger whole, whether negatively or not. For a 
discussion of holism of reasons see Dancy 2004, McKeever & Ridge 2006.
102Not least when of the apohatic form in the Aristotelian sense. See Mortley 1981, p. 10
103A parallel can be found in Skinner's discussion of irony. Understanding ironic 
utterances implies understanding the intention behind the utterance. Not because irony
changes the meaning of a proposition, but because understanding irony as an 
illocutionary act depends on understanding the intention behind the utterance. Skinner 
2002, pp. 111-112
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as  what  we  might  call  a  contingent  enabler  according  to  holistic  theories  of
reasons).104
Hence,  e.g.,  Mortley's  distinction  between  anti-anthropomorphism  and  truly
negative (apophatic) theology, is too rigid.105 Whether or not a claim that God does
not,  e.g.,  have  a  body  like  human  beings  is  an  instance  of  a  simple  anti-
anthropomorphism or a more thorough-going negative theology depends on the
context.  Identifying a theological  utterance as negative theology requires some
idea of the intention of the utterance as well as the framework of ideas in which
this utterance is based.
Of course, intentions might not always be fully developed in the formulation of
thoughts and doctrines. Intentions often evolve in a dialogical interplay with the
formulated doctrines and the subject(s) formulating them.106 In moral philosophical
contexts  the  intentionalistic  view  is  particularly  problematic  since,  as  Talbot
Brewer argues,  practice (including ethical  reflection) is  often construed around
what he calls 'dialectical activities'. Such aim at an intrinsic goodness that is more
or less 'opaque', but incrementally self-revealing as the practice is engaged in.107
Hence intentions are not (always or mostly not) propositional attitudes. Moreover,
intentions can be quite indefinite and often develop historically and can be hard to
distinguish from motives.108 All this suggests that we cannot abstract the limited
context  of  a  negative  theological  utterance  (say  a  sermon  or  an  apologetic
situation) from its broader historical context.
While  we  perhaps  cannot  assume  an  underlying  coherent  system  in  a
philosopher's  thought,  we could  at  least  assume that  an  author's  philosophical
activity is part of an attempt to render practice coherent.109 In other words, when
an author tries 'to do' something with a speech act, the intention is (or might be)
regulated  by  an  ideal  of  practical  coherency.  This  means  that  a  given  set  of
philosophical doctrines extracted from a philosopher's writings does not need to fit
together  in  a  philosophical  system in  order  to  be  viable,  but  it  would  still  be
104See, e.g., Dancy 2004
105Mortley 1986, p. 17
106Hence the idea that the intentions of the author does not determine the meaning of the 
text, at least not fully. A text to some degree 'writes itself'.
107Brewer, 2009, p. 39. Brewer illustrates his notion of dialectical activities with reference
to Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa's concept of epektasis, never-ending progress in 
virtue.
108For example we might ask whether Gregory of Nyssa intended to convert Eunomius, 
defend his brother Basil or to develop a theory of language or a systematic defense of 
trinitarianism when he engaged in the polemicism against Neo-Arianism. All might be 
true, of course (though some of these things are rather motives than intentions), but 
Gregory himself might not have had any clear idea of what he was doing.
109Practice can be understood as a 'world' which action attempts to render coherent. See 
Oakeshott 1933
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possible  to  view  them  as  parts  of  a  broader  practical  coherency.  To  use  the
terminology from Witttgenstein and Austin, we should at least assume that agents,
when performing speech acts, do not suddenly change the rules of language games
and the use of concepts, but try to keep some degree of consistency.
Another possibility  compatible with this  idea is  that  we approach philosophy
from the perspective of biography where the 'philosophical persona' is central.110
The biographical approach answers to some of the objections made above. It is
wider than the intentionalistic approach, though it takes account of the intentions
of an author. But it also takes account of the context that shapes these intentions
as they develop. For example, we should expect a certain 'feedback' effect when
negative  theological  statements  are  made  in  a  polemical  context.  These
statements, though being a part of a practical-polemical context, tend to affect an
author's basic theoretical presuppositions, which again reshapes the way future
statements are made.111 We need to take seriously that late antique thinkers did
not share the modern skepticism towards biography, Diogenes Laërtius being just
one example.112 This is also the case for the understanding of ethics.113
The question of how negative theology affects ethics in general is too extensive
for a study of the present kind, especially if analyzed historically. If nothing more,
the many examples above should prove that.  Hence to achieve both depth and
consistency the present study will focus narrowly on the use of negative theology
and the influence of such on the views on the possibility of ethics in a few authors.
Firstly there is  The Epistle to Diognetus (by an unknown, probably 2nd century
author). The point in this short text is pretty straight forward with its claims that
God is invisible and does not need anything. This leads to a polemicism against
Pagan and Jewish modes of worship, but also the claim that Christians are invisibly
present in the world while imitating God. It is especially the latter claim we will
discuss.
110See Hadot 1995. The biographical approach to the history of philosophy was one of the 
methods that suffered most hardly from the attacks made by Brucker and other 
proponents of the systematic approach.
111For example when Gregory of Nyssa used negative theology against the theological 
positivism of Eunomius the ideas developed arguably inspired Gregory's own thought in 
later works, in a way he had not himself foreseen.
112Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae Philosophorum
113When Gregory of Nyssa developed his philosophy partly through biographies (most 
famously in On the Life of Moses and The Life of Macrina), this view on ethics was 
arguably a contributing factor. In Gregory, following (ἀκολουθία) does hardly mean to 
follow specific rules or ethical principles. Fellowship with God is “a living fact (τὴν ζωὴν
ἐνεργήσας)”. Cat. 35, p. 502. That someone like Gregory used the biographical 
approach does of course not mean that we should necessarily adopt this. That would be 
to mix up planes of thought. In the final part we will discuss, however, how a conception
of ethics as biography can use elements in our case studies.
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Secondly there is Clement of Alexandria's  Stromata. In this work Clement lays
works  through  a  multitude  of  philosophical  questions.  During  his  deliberately
confusing  discussions  he  touches  upon  themes  such  as  negative  theology  and
ethics. These will be attempted abstracted and their relations discussed.
Thirdly there is Gregory of Nyssa. We will discuss elements from most of his
philosophical career. But it is especially his polemics against Neo-Arianism and its
consequences for his late work On the Life of Moses we will focus on. Though it
was especially  developed during his  arguments against  Eunomius,  his  negative
theology  is  not  only  polemical  but  also  grounded in  “the  Biblical  perspective”
(Maspero), with a self-revealing God at the center. But at times, especially in the
ascetic  works,  Gregory sounds more Neo-Platonic  than biblical.  So we actually
have a variety of negative theologies present in his thinking. It is our job to sort
things out and see the links between the different forms negative theology takes
and Gregory's ethical views.
These examples will be used as possible paradigms of how negative theology
developed and influenced ethics in the first four centuries. Of course this will be
far  from enough  to  paint  a  general  picture  of  how negative  theology  evolved.
Rather the claim is the more specific that the three tend to be good paradigmatic
examples  of  how  different  negative  theologies  are  related  to  different
(meta-)ethics.
To understand the mechanisms at play in the texts we need to have a firm grip
on context,  as has been argued above. This means that even if our focus is on
negative theology and its relation to meta-ethics, then a range of other subjects
need to be thought through. In the case of The Epistle to Diognetus, we especially
need to  consider  the etymological  and historical  backgrounds for  the concepts
used in metaphors, as when the Christians in the world are likened to the soul in
the body. In the case of Clement we need to consider how his negative theology
and  ethics  relate to  other  topics  in  the  Stromata.  In  the  case  of  Gregory,
apologetic, polemical as well as dogmatic and ethical statements from his earlier
corpora at large will be treated. This will take the form of an historical analysis of
the development in his thought, especially during the Eunomian controversies, and
the consequences of this for his later views on negative theology and (meta-)ethics.
Different forms of negative theology can take the form of each other, not least in
pragmatic contexts: In polemics, homilies or ethical exhortations and treatises. In
such texts, though one takes the Judeo-Christian distinction for granted, one can
apply different forms of negative theology from a range of philosophical schools
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(the usual example being Middle- and Neo-Platonism), whether consciously or not.
Using different kinds in a polemical context especially seems a likely strategy in a
cultural  context  that  generally  does  not  provide  a  philosophical  vocabulary
expressive  of  God's  radical  difference  from  creation.  Especially  in  apologetic
Platonic philosophy proved to be an effective instrument,  and an apparent ally,
against Pagan religion and mythology.
The differences between our three cases  mean that we must approach these
with different methodologies. While a biographical and intentionalistic approach
might seem fitting with Gregory of Nyssa, this is not the case for  The Epistle to
Diognetus since the author is unknown. With Clement of Alexandria this is to some
degree also the case,  since we do not  know much about  his  life.  It  is  obvious
however that much of his thinking was developed in opposition to gnosticism. The
overall approach is somewhat systematic, but only in a way that acknowledges the
fact that none of the thinking discussed contains a closed philosophical system.
The diversities of negative theology in the early Church
We will now discuss a variety of passages from early Patristic literature that to
some degree convey seeds of negative theological thinking. This will in no way be a
fully adequate exposition of the tradition but only a quick overview.
As  negative  theology  was  applied  in  different  traditions  things  grew  more
complex. As we follow history it  becomes increasingly obvious that we need to
distinguish  between  different  forms  of  negative  theology.  A  technical  negative
vocabulary can rarely be found in any fully developed form, not even in such a
figure  as  Gregory  of  Nyssa  whose  writings  contain  extensive  reflections  on
linguistics,  logic and ontology. But the use of negative definitions, methods and
strategies are present from early on in Church history.
The New Testament
According to our broad generic definition the New Testament can be said to
contain specimens of negative theology.114 Obvious candidates are examples from
the gospel of John, e.g. “No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is in the
bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.”115 and Paul, 1 Tim 6:16, “[T]he King of
kings and Lord of lords, who alone is immortal and who lives in unapproachable
light, whom no one has seen or can see.” The first epistle of John contains an often
114Rocca lists the following references to New Testament in which he believes to find 
negative theology in a broad sense: Rom 1:20, Col 1:15, 2 Cor 12:4, 2 Cor 9:15, Rom 
11:33, Ep 3:8, 1 Tim 6:16. Rocca 2004, pp. 8-9
115Jn 1:18, ASV
31
referenced example: “No man hath beheld God at any time: if we love one another,
God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us”.116 Indeed this could often be the
motto for many negative theologies, in so far as they are driven by the belief that
God is essentially ineffable, incomprehensible and so on, on the one hand, while his
works and actions are discernible through his revelation on the other. The ethical
consequence is  that  the former cannot  in any comprehensive way be imitated,
while the latter can. The result is a double ethics and moral epistemology, negative
with regards to essential ontology, positive with regards to action. As we will see
this structure is discernible in a range of ethics based on negative theology.
We can also find many examples of polemical and apologetic uses of negative
theology. Paul's famous speech to the Athenians might be categorized as negative
theology, though the context is obviously apologetic:
“People of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious. For as I
walked around and looked carefully at your objects of worship, I even found
an altar with this inscription: to an unknown god. So you are ignorant of the
very thing you worship—and this is what I am going to proclaim to you.”117
It is of course not at all obvious that this is an instance of negative theology in
the sense described above. What is important about this passage is, however, that
it was received and used as an instance of negative theology in Patristic thought
(e.g. in Clement of Alexandria). It is not obvious that his statements are instances
of negative theology per se. Paul’s claim could just as well be understood as saying
that the Athenians’ belief that God is unknown is false, and as such as the opposite
of negative theology. But Paul does not say, e.g., that the Athenians very well know
God and should stop calling him unknown, but he accepts the statement on the
altar and uses it for his own rhetorical purposes. Whether or not this was a clever
rhetorical  use  of  material  at  hand  or  a  sincere  claim about  the  religiosity  (or
superstition) of the Athenians,118 Paul's use of a reference to an 'unknown God'
uses negative definitions in speaking about God. Indirectly Paul says something
about the Athenians' lack of knowledge about God until a present point in time, in
order to be able to present his own positive account.
In  a  later  apologetic  context,  negative  theological  statements  often  have  a
polemical function. Often negative theology was used as a means against a too
speculative approach to faith. But fairly early on we also see examples of a more
philosophical negative theology.
1161 Jn 4:12, ASV
117Acts 17:22-23, NIV
118Acts 17:22
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Justin Martyr
Except for Paul (granted the above), Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) might have been
the first Patristic author to have used negative theology in an apologetical (though
more  polemical)  context.  Justin  complains  that  Pagan  idols,  being  made  of
corruptible  material,  are  “[...]insulting to  God,  who,  having ineffable  glory  and
form, thus gets His name attached to things that are corruptible[...]”119. But Justin
also uses the term in a more ‘dogmatic’ context, e.g. when speaking of Christ: “And
that the Spirit of prophecy might signify to us that He who suffers these things has
an ineffable origin, and rules His enemies, He spake thus: ‘His generation who
shall declare?[...]” (Isa. 53:8). Christ, the Word, is by Justin described as “a power
(δύναμίς)  of  the  ineffable  (ἀρρήτου)  Father”.120 In  his  discussion  of  baptism
(illumination) Justin paradoxically claims that when a person is baptized “the name
of God the Father and Lord of the universe” is pronounced over him by “he who
leads to the laver”, but that “no one can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if
any one dare to say that there is a name, he raves with a hopeless madness.”121 
In Justin it is primarily the idea of divine ineffability that makes him an example
of negative theological thinking. But at times Justin connects the theme of God’s
ineffability with a broader framework of negative descriptions:
“[...]you must  not  imagine that  the unbegotten  (ἀγέννητον)  God Himself
came down or went up from any place. For the ineffable (ἄρρητος) Father
and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor
rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick to behold and
quick  to  hear,  having  neither  eyes  nor  ears,  but  being  of  indescribable
(ἀλέκτῳ) might [...] neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other
man, saw the Father and ineffable (ἄρρητον) Lord of all, and also of Christ,
but [saw] Him who was according to His will His Son, being God[...]”122
Justin  refers  to  God  as  the  “unbegotten  and  ineffable  God”.123
Unbegottenness/ungeneracy  and  ineffability  are  the  concepts  that  establish
Justin’s  negative  theology.  At  times  it  even  seems  that  unbegottenness  is  the
ontological  quality  from  which  God’s  ineffability  follows.  In  his  perhaps  most
articulate negative theological discourse, Justin about the names of God famously
notes that:
“But to the father of all, who is unbegotten there is no name given. For by
119Justin, Apologia Prima 9, p. 190
120Justin, Apologia Secunda 10
121Justin, Apologia Prima 61
122Justin Martyr, Dialogus cum Tryphone 127, p. 263
123See also Justin, Apologia Secunda 13
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whatever name He be called, He has as His elder the person who gives Him
the name.124 But these words Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and
Master,  are  not  names  (ὀνόματά),  but  appelations  (προσρήσεις)  derived
from his good deeds (εὐποιϊῶν) and functions (ἔργων). And His Son, who
alone is properly called Son, the Word, who also was with Him and was
begotten before the works, when at first He created and arranged all things
by  Him,  is  called  Christ,  in  reference  to  His  being  anointed  and  God’s
ordering  all  things  through  Him;  this  name  itself  also  containing  an
unknown significance (ἄγνωστον σημασίαν); as also the appelation “God” is
not a name, but an opinion (δόξα) implanted in the nature of men of a thing
that can hardly be explained.”125
Notice that even the name 'Christ' contains an “unknown significance”. With this
claim Justin  prefigures Clement's  theory of  veiling where Christ  simultaneously
reveals and veils the divine mysteries. In his claim that the appellations for God
are derived from his “deeds and functions”, rather than names for God himself,
Justin  arguably  affirms  the  important  distinction  between  οὐσία and  ἐνέργεια,
which becomes prominent especially with the Cappadocians, even if he does not
use those concepts explicitly. As noted above, as applied within the tradition of
negative theology, this distinction typically means that God’s essence (οὐσία) can
only  be  described  in  negative  definitions,  while  His  works  (ἐνέργεια)  can  be
described both positively and negatively.
Aristides of Athens
In the apology of Aristides of Athens (2nd century) negative theology is used for
polemic  purposes.  But  there  are  short  passages  where  ontology  and
epistemological ideas and arguments are developed. Hence Aristides says that:
“I say, then, that God is not born, not made, an ever-abiding nature without
beginning and without end, immortal, perfect, and incomprehensible. Now
when I say that he is  "perfect,"  this means that there is  not in him any
defect, and he is not in need of anything but all things are in need of him.
And when I say that he is "without beginning," this means that everything
which has beginning has also an end, and that which has an end may be
brought to an end. He has no name, for everything which has a name is
kindred to things created. Form he has none, nor yet any union of members;
for whatsoever possesses these is kindred to things fashioned.”126
124Mortley calls this idea that a name is always given by a “parent” a “Philonic principle”, 
where to name something means being in some respect superior to it. Mortley 1986, p. 
133. There is arguably a biblical point in this, e.g., as the sin of Babylon in Gen 11:4, is 
that the builders want to “make a name for” themselves which can be taken to mean 
gaining independence.
125Justin, Apologia Secunda 6, p. 190
126Aristides, Apologia Prima, p. 264
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Hence  we  see  how God's  difference  from “things  created”  is  what  grounds
negative theology. The idea that God is simple (not composed) seems to be derived
from this. 
Tatian
Similar to Justin is Tatian (c. 120-180) who in his apology writes that,
“Our  God  did  not  begin  to  be  in  time:  He  alone  is  without  beginning
(ἄναρχος), and He Himself is the beginning of all things. God is a Spirit, not
pervading matter, but the Maker of material spirits, and of the forms that
are in matter; He is invisible (ἀόρατός), impalpable (ἀναφής), being Himself
the Father of  both sensible and invisible things.  Him we know from His
creation,  and  apprehend  (καταλαμβανόμεθα)  His  invisible  power  by  His
works (τοῖς ποιήμασι).”127
Tatian's  reasoning is  the traditional  that  we can know the existence of  God
through his works, but not what God is himself. Tatian immediately adds that as a
result  of this God should not be given offerings:  “Nor even ought the ineffable
(ἀνωνόμαστον)  God  to  be  presented  with  gifts;  for  He  who  is  indeficient
(ἀνενδεὴς) is not to be misrepresented by us as though He were indigent.”128 Thus
there is an obvious (negative) practical consequence of Tatian's negative theology.
Preaching of Peter
Another work from the second century is (probably) the apocryphal Preaching of
Peter,  quoted  by  Clement  of  Alexandria  in  his  Stromata.  This  text  is  known
primarily from Clement. Its dating is uncertain, but since we know it from Clement
it is not newer than the late second century. Though we do not know much about
its origin, it presents a fairly clear example of early negative theology:
“Know then that there is one God, who made the beginning of all things, and
holds the power of the end; and is the Invisible (ὁ ἀόρατος), who sees all
things;  uncontainable  (ἀχώρητος),  who  contains  all  things;  indeficient
(ἀνεπιδεής), whom all things need, and by whom they are; incomprehensible
(ἀκατάληπτος), incorruptible (ἄφθαρτος), unmade (ἀποίητος), who made all
things by the ‘Word of His power,’”129
As in Philo, Clement and others, what is central in this fragment is especially the
relation  between  God's  indeficiency  (need  of  nothing),  his  invisibility  and
incomprehensibility.
127Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 4.2
128 Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos, p. 66, modified.
129Str. 6.5.39.3, modified
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Theophilus
Of a bit later dating, something similar to Justin and the Preaching of Peter can
be found in Theophilus (d. ca. 181-185) who writes in his apology to the learned
Pagan Autolycus that,
“The  appearance  of  God  is  ineffable  (ἄρρητον)  and  indescribable
(ἀνέκφραστόν),  and cannot  be  seen by eyes  of  flesh.  For  in  glory  He is
uncontainable (δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος),  in greatness incomprehensible
(ἀκατάληπτος),  in  height  inconceivable  (ἀπερινόητος),  in  power
incomparable, in wisdom unrivalled, in goodness inimitable (ἀμίμητος), in
kindness indescribeable (ἀνεκδιήγητος). For if I say He is Light, I name but
His own work; if I call Him Word, I name but His sovereignty; if I call Him
Mind, I speak but of His wisdom; if I say He is Spirit, I speak of His breath;
if I call Him Wisdom, I speak of His offspring;[...]”130
As Justin,  Theophilus applies  the (Philonic)  distinction  between God and His
activities/works. Theophilus goes on the explain that though God cannot be seen by
the  eyes  and  though  his  glory  is  ineffable,  he  can  be  perceived  through  his
works.131 Notice  that  Theophilus  calls  God  'inimitable'  in  goodness,  something
which  could  suggest  a  problem for  ethics.  As  we  will  see  in  both  Clement  of
Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa this problematic is fleshed out in an (apparent)
paradox between negative theology and the demand to follow Christ.
Irenaeus and Gnosticism
As  noted  above,  negative  theology  played  a  prominent  roles  in  strands  of
Gnosticism. In our context this is primarily of interest in so far as orthodox authors
related to Gnosticism.132 In Irenaeus the term ‘unnameable’ is primarily used when
he refers to the thought system of the Gnosticists: “They maintain, then, that in the
invisible (ἀοράτοις) and unnameable (ἀκατονομάστοις) heights above there exists
a  certain  perfect,  pre-existent  Æon,  whom  they  call  Proarche,  Propator,  and
Bythus[...]”.133 Amongst his opponents is Marcus who according to Irenaeus talks
about “the invisible and unnameable (ἀκατονομάστων) regions above”134 and who
has  claimed  that  “the  unoriginated,  inconceivable  (ἀνεννόητος)  Father,  who  is
without  material  substance  (ἀνούσιος)[...]  willed  to  bring  forth  that  which  is
ineffable  (ἄῤῥητον)  to  Him”135.  Notice  the  strong  claim  allegedly  made  by  the
130Theophilus, Apologia ad Autolycum 1.3, p. 89, modified.
131Theophilus, Apologia ad Autolycum 1.5
132The question of 'orthodoxy' is only relevant, however, in so far as it is useful for 
establishing the context of the works of Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa.
133Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 1.1.1, p. 316, modified
134Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 1.13.1
135Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 1.7.6
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Valentinians  that  God  is  insubstantial  (ἀνούσιος).  The  Valentinians  maintain,
Irenaeus notes, “that they alone are acquainted with these ineffable and unknown
mysteries”.136 Against those who “allege that those things which are super-celestial
and spiritual” are types of another pleroma, Irenaeus argues that when they claim
that “God is the image of another Father” they make “their imaginations range
beyond  God,  they  having  in  their  hearts  surpassed  the  Master  Himself,  being
indeed in idea elated and exalted above [Him], but in reality turning away from the
true God.”137 Irenaeus does seem to agree that these “super-celestial and spiritual”
things are invisible and ineffable and he in another place also uses the term “the
ineffable  Father”  in  reference to  the  true  God.138 Hence ‘unnameability’  is  not
reserved to the vocabulary of  his opponents.  But it  is  in his use of  an idea of
incomprehensibility and immeasurability that Irenaeus proves able to use negative
theology even though his polemics are against opponents who in some aspects had
made negative theology their own form of thought.
“As Scripture  itself  suggests,  one may justly  ask the heretics,  How high
above God do you lift up your imaginations, you rashly elated people? You
have heard that the heavens are measured in the palm of  his  hand [Isa
40:12]:  tell  me the measure,  and recount  the  endless  number of  cubits,
explain to me the fulness— the breadth, length, height, beginning and end
of the measurement. The human mind cannot understand or comprehend
them, for the heavenly treasuries are great. God cannot be measured in the
heart, and he is incomprehensible by the mind; he holds the earth in the
hollow of his hand. Who can measure his right hand? Who even knows his
finger?  Who  understands  his  hand—  that  hand  which  encompasses
immensity; that hand which, by its own measure, spreads out the whole of
the heavens and which enfolds the earth with all its abysses in its palm? […]
But if no human being can comprehend the fulness and the greatness of his
hand, how will anyone be able to understand or know in his heart so great a
God?”139
Notice  also  that  Irenaeus  analogizes  negative  properties  from  creation  to
Creator  when  he  claims  that  we  do  not  understand  the  measurement  of  the
heavens and subsequently  uses this  statement when claiming that  God himself
cannot be understood. Tactics against Gnosticism similar to Irenaeus’ can be found
in Clement of Alexandria whose negative theology we will briefly discuss.
136Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 2.14. What the exact philosophy of Marcus and the 
Valentinians consisted in is less relevant here – what is interesting is how Irenaeus 
tackles his opponents.
137Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 4.34
138Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 4.34
139Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 4.19.2, p. 112
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Clement of Alexandria
The first attempt at a (at face value) more systematic use of negative theology is
probably Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215). Clement of Alexandria was far from
being  the  first  Christian  author  to  use  Hellenic  philosophy  (as  is  well  known,
Hellenic language and models of thought can be found in the earliest Christian
literature). In an important passage Clement writes that,
“No one can rightly express Him wholly. For on account of His greatness
(μεγέθει) He is ranked as the All,  and is the Father of the universe (τῶν
ὅλων πατήρ). Nor are any parts to be predicated of Him. For the One is
indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἕν); wherefore also it is infinite (ἄπειρον), not
considered  with  reference  to  inexhaustability  (ἀδιεξίτητον),  but  with
reference to its being without dimensions (ἀδιάστατον), and not having a
limit (μὴ ἔχον πέρας). And therefore it is without form (ἀσχημάτιστον) and
name  (ἀνωνόμαστον).  [...]  It  remains  that  we  understand,  then,  the
Unknown (ἄγνωστον), by divine grace, and by the word alone that proceeds
from Him; as Luke in the Acts of the Apostles relates that Paul said, “Men of
Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For in walking
about, and beholding the objects of your worship, I found an altar on which
was inscribed, To the Unknown God. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship,
Him declare I unto you.””140
Here Clement grounds his negative theology in God's qualitative infinity and
lack of dimension, i.e. his radical transcendence.141 God is identified with the One
of  Pythagoreanism  or  the  Platonic  'Parmenides'.  Clement’s  reference  to  Paul’s
speech to the Athenians is also interesting. Paul’s statements about an “unknown
God” might in themselves only loosely be associated with negative theology. But
they were certainly understood as instances of negative theology (though not using
the term) by later generations.
Clement’s claims were not new. Much of it is reminiscent of Philo, and as we
have seen the claim that no predicates can be given to God because all predicates
depend on higher principles is reminiscent of Justin’s more metaphorical statement
that “[God] has as His elder the person who gives Him the name.”142 What is more
original about Clement is how he connects these themes in his use of negative
theology  as  a  philosophical  method,  a  via  negativa to  use  a  later  terminology.
Clement's  whole  concept  of  faith  and  knowledge  is  influenced  by  his  negative
140Str. 5.12.81-82, pp. 463-464, modified. We will deal with this passage in more detail 
later.
141Whether Clement believed God to be qualitatively infinite is a matter of controversy 
(see, e.g., Mühlenberg 1966), infinity in this passage seems to be what qualifies all 
other negative predicates that Clement ascribes to God.
142Justin, Apologia Secunda 6, p. 190
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theology which means that it influenced his whole theological 'system'.
Tertullian
Clement is often compared to his contemporary Tertullian who at times uses
negative theology in a way much similar to Clement,  but for  much more 'anti-
philosophical' purposes. Tertullian (c. 160-225) is most famous for his polemical
question, “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”,143 usually taken as meant to
express the incompatibility of philosophy and theology. The interesting thing about
Tertullian is that he applied what we would often consider somewhat philosophical
arguments to establish this contradiction:
“That which is infinite is known only to itself (quod vero inmensum est, soli
sibi notum est). This it is which gives some notion of God, while yet beyond
all our conceptions (Hoc quod est, deum aestimari facit, dum aestimari non
capit)—our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of what
He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as
at once known and unknown.”144
The ‘philosophical’ premise here is, to be sure, the claim that God is infinite. The
idea that the divine is infinite is somewhat peculiar to Christian philosophy, with a
few exceptions (e.g. Anaximander’s 'ἄπειρον'). Hence also Clement of Alexandria
used notions of infinity to establish his negative theology. It is not clear from this
passage what Tertullian means by 'infinite'. The term is arguably used  ad hoc  to
establish incomprehensibility.
Origen?
In the East, especially in Alexandria, Clement’s use of philosophy inspired a long
tradition. Best known in the pre-Nicene age is probably Clement’s student Origen
(c. 185-254). Origen writes that,
“God is incomprehensible, and incapable of being measured. For whatever
be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by perception
or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far
better than what we perceive Him to be. For, as if we were to see any one
unable to bear a spark of light, or the flame of a very small lamp, and were
desirous to acquaint such a one, whose vision could not admit a greater
degree of light than what we have stated, with the brightness and splendour
of the sun, would it not be necessary to tell him that the splendour of the
sun was unspeakably and incalculably better and more glorious than all this
light  which  he  saw?  [...]  But  among  all  intelligent,  that  is,  incorporeal
143Tertullian, De Praescriptione 7
144Tertullian, Apologeticus pro Christianis 17, p. 32
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beings, what is so superior to all others—so unspeakably and incalculably
superior—as God, whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of
any human understanding, even the purest and brightest?”145
It is not surprising that Origen’s use of ‘light’-metaphors is reminiscent of Plato
(e.g. the sun in the Republic).146 Origen expands the analogy to mean that as our
eyes cannot look upon the sun itself, we can behold its light “through windows or
some  small  openings”  and  thereby  come  to  reflect  upon  its  greatness.  As  is
common in  authors  influenced  by  Platonism,  nature  reflects  the  beauty  of  the
intellectual forms. In Origen it seems that the incomprehensibility of God first of all
follows from the fact that He is ‘more’. It is as if human intelligence can only grasp
objects of a certain scale and that God surpasses that scale. 
It is somewhat disputed to what degree Origen conceived of God as ‘infinite’. It
has been argued that for Origen God is limited, not by any opposing reality, but by
his own perfection.147
“[...]we must not be deterred by the pretext of piety from the assertion of its
limitation.  For  if  the  divine  power  were  infinite,  it  would  necessarily  by
incapable  of  self-knowledge;  for  in  the  nature  of  things  the  infinite  is
incomprehensible.  So God made  as  many  beings  as  he  could  grasp  and
control and keep under his providence.”148
It has further been argued that the finitude of God was a necessary constituent
in  Origen's  view  that  the  fall  happened  when  souls  grew  tired  (κορός)  of
contemplating God.149 But Panagiōtēs Tzamalikos has pointed out that Origen at
times explicitly conceives of God as essentially infinite,150 and that this claim was
closely related to the claim that God is beyond knowledge (finite knowledge only
applies to that which is finite).151 Against Celsus, Origen said on Plato's statement
in Timaeus 28c (on the difficulty of finding out and expressing the Creator) that the
Christians “[...]maintain that human nature is in no way sufficient for the search
for God, or for finding him in an unsullied way unless aided by Him who is being
sought.”152 Hence even if it is true that Origen did not conceive of the difference
between Creator and the human mind as radically as did others, he did hold some
145Origen, De Principiis 1.1.5-6, p. 243
146Plato, Politeia
147Woody 1998, p. 120
148Origen, De Principiis 2.9.1-6, p. 163-70, Koetschau's edition of frag. 24 from Justinian.
149Heine stresses this point in his discussion of Gregory of Nyssa. See, e.g., Heine 1975
150Origen, Contra Celsum 3.77
151Tzamalikos 2006, p. 246
152Origen, Contra Celsum 7.42, quoted from Mortley 1986, p. 82
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sort of revelation theology, where divine grace is needed.153
Cyril of Jerusalem
Negative theology did not just have a polemical and apologetic use, but also a
homiletic  (in  preaching  and  sermons  addressed  to  a  community  of  believers).
Homilies often contained both, so there is not a sharp distinction. When found in a
homiletic context,  negative theological statements tend to have a less technical
character than in the more philosophical use. When for example the archbishop
Cyril of Jerusalem (c. 313-386) noted that,
“[...]though the mind is most rapid in its thoughts,  yet the tongue needs
words, and a long recital of intermediary speech. For the eye embraces at
once a multitude of the 'starry quire;' but when any one wishes to describe
them one by one, which is the Morning-star, and which, the Evening-star,
and which each one of them, he has need of many words. In like manner
again the mind in the briefest moment compasses earth and sea and all the
bounds of the universe; but what it conceives in an instant, it uses many
words to describe. Yet forcible as is the example I have mentioned, still it is
after  all  weak  and  inadequate  (ἀσθενὲς  καὶ  ἀνίσχυρον).  For  of  God  we
speak not all we ought (for that is known to Him only), but so much as the
capacity of human nature has received, and so much as our weakness can
bear. For we explain not what God is but candidly confess that we have not
exact knowledge concerning Him (ἀκριβὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἴδαμεν). For in
what concerns God to confess our ignorance is the best knowledge (μεγάλη
γνῶσις, τὸ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν). Therefore magnify the Lord with me, and let us
exalt His Name together[...]”154
In  Cyril’s  sermon  negative  theology  has  an  obviously  rhetorical  use  and
therefore  also  (it  could  be  argued)  a  practical  function.  Negative  theological
statements are made in order to realize a certain liturgical function. We do not find
the same technical language in this passage as in, e.g., Clement. But we do find the
same reasoning as in Tertullian: Knowing that we do not know God is the highest
knowledge  of  God.  What  is  especially  noteworthy  in  Cyril's  sermon  is  his
awareness of the inability of human language to express the divine,  something
which does not lead to quietism, but to an emphasis on liturgy.155
Seen in a broader context, Cyril's statements might very well have an ethical
significance,  or  at  least  it  has  consequences  for  practice.  This  way  of  using
153Mortley notes that for Origen “God is within the intellect and not outside it […] [t]he 
mind is of the same nature as that which it contemplates[...]”. Mortley 1986, pp. 77-78
154Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses ad Illuminandos 6.2, p. 33
155Thus the Judeo-Christian distinction becomes the background for divine disclosure in 
liturgy. See Sokolowski 1993
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negative theological statements is, by the way, very much reminiscent of the first
epistle of John: “No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in
us and his love is made complete in us.” (1 Jn 4:12) As such we again see that a
negative epistemological position has its positive side in practice.
Gregory of Nazianzus
Through the Alexandrian school, with Origen and others (Thaumaturgos?), the
Cappadocian Fathers largely inherited Clement's philosophical ideals and his use
of negative theology. But they made new use of them. Gregory of Nazianzus writes,
“That  God,  the  creative  and  sustaining  cause  of  all,  exists,  sight  and
instinctive law inform us (ὄψις διδάσκαλος, καὶ ὁ φυσικὸς νόμος) - sight,
which lights upon things seen as nobly fixed in their course, borne along in,
so  to  speak,  motionless  movement;  instinctive  law,  which  infers
(συλλογιζόμενος) their author through the things seen in their orderliness.
How could this universe have had a foundation or constitution, unless God
gave all things being and sustains them?”156
The philosophical  method used  by  Gregory  in  the  above could  be  called  an
instance  of  natural  theology  or  theosemiosis,  but  only  with  regards  to  God's
existence, not his being or essence.
It is crucial that very often the knowledge of the existence of God is not in some
way  deducted  from  premises  to  a  conclusion,  but  a  more  or  less  intuitive
knowledge:  “What can your  conception of  the divine be,  if  you rely  on all  the
methods of deductive argument?”, Gregory of Nazianzus asks.157 This is how far
theosemiosis can take us. That God exists is derived from the properties of nature.
But God as such we cannot know anything about, and so positive theosemiosis
inevitably  bounces  up  against  a  negative  limit:  “[...]whatever  we  imagined  or
figured to ourselves or reason delineated is not the reality of God (οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἶναι
θεόν).”158 In the same oration Gregory of Naziansus says that:
“Every slightest  objection (ἐνιστάμενον)  bars,  hinders,  the  course of  the
argument  (τὸν  τοῦ  λόγου  δρόμον),  and  checks  its  progress.  It  is  like
applying the reins suddenly to galloping horses, making them veer round
with the surprise of the shock. So it was with Solomon, the superior of his
predecessors and contemporaries in education, gifted by God with breadth
of  heart  and  an  expanse  of  vision  ampler  than  the  sand.  The  more  he
entered into profundities (τοῖς βάθεσι), the more his mind reeled. He made
156Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 6, pp. 40-41.
157Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 6. Clement of Alexandria is similar in his view 
on this point. See below.
158Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 6
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it a goal of his wisdom to discover just how far off it was.”159
What we find here is not the ‘unbroken’ semiotic continuity from created nature
to Creator that we find in other natural theologies. Thinking, though it is guided by
“instinctive law” (φυσικὸς νόμος), is continually confronted, not confirmed, by the
realities of God. Mentally to grasp the divine is “utterly beyond real possibility”.
This applies to “every creature born”.160 Even if the good design of nature proves
the  existence  of  God,  He  is  infinitely  different  from everything  we  know.  Our
thinking  about  God  is  thus  broken  and  ‘far  off’.  Again  this  shows  that  often
negative theology is not so much about proving that God is ‘above’ comprehension
(a quantitative claim) as it is about establishing the conviction that God contradicts
every expectation.
Basil of Caesarea
We should also consider the following statement by Basil of Caesarea (c. 329-
379):
“The lightning flashes of the divine beauty are absolutely ineffable (Ἄῤῥητοι)
and  indescribeable  (ἀνεκδιήγητοι);  speech  cannot  convey  them;  the  ear
cannot receive them. The morning star's rays, and the moon's brightness,
and the sun's light, all these are unworthy to be mentioned in comparison
(εἰκασίαν) to that glory, and are found greatly wanting (ἄτιμα) as analogies
(σύγκρισιν) to the true light. They are more distant from the divine beauty
than the depth  of  night  and moonless  gloom are from the pure light  of
noonday. This beauty is not contemplated by fleshly eyes but is grasped by
the soul alone and the mind. If at any time it shined upon the saints, it also
left behind in them the unbearable pain of yearning.[...]”161
The beauty of creation is “greatly wanting as analogies”. This might seem like a
'quantitative' claim. But the claim is radicalized when Basil opposes the “depth of
the night” with the “light of noonday”. It is not just that these have nothing in
common, except that they fall under a common category, 'beauty'. Rather they are
mutually exclusive. Basil’s analogy reflects the radical distinction between Creator
and creation in a way that makes it plausible that we are talking of a qualitative
distinction (even if the same label, 'beauty', can be applied to the two). God is not
just above comprehension, but radically different from what can be comprehended,
if  not  opposite  to  this  (the  use  of  a  common  category  makes  such  opposition
ambivalent, of course).
159Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 21
160Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 4
161Basil of Caesarea, Asceticon magnum sive Quastiones 2.1, pp. 113-114
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While  all  terms  regarding  this  world  can  be  defined  negatively  in  their
difference to others, God is “differently different” and He is what He is completely
independently of the world. Basil's poetic claims about the beauty of the divine
certainly fits into such a definition (as quoted above), and Gregory of Nyssa's claim
that  “[...]the  characteristic  of  the  divine  nature  is  to  transcend  all
characteristics”162 seems to affirm the idea that in negative theology based on the
Judeo-Christian  distinction  God  is  “differently  different”.  But  Basil  affirms  the
distinction between God's essence and his activities through which God can be
known.163
Gregory of Nyssa
Gregory of Nyssa was the one among the Cappadocians who most thoroughly
developed negative  theology in  technical  terms.  The Judeo-Christian distinction
was fundamental, not least in the polemics against Eunomianism. God's essence
can only be described in negative definitions. Gregory grounds this in an idea of
divine  infinity.  God's  activities  can  be  spoken of  in  positive  definitions,  though
Gregory at times calls God's power and similar things ineffable.164 Gregory is also a
good example  that  negative theology  had a much more ’mystical’  and as such
ascetic and ethical function in the Cappadocians.
The incomprehensibility of God was ascribed a positive value, e.g. when Gregory
famously claimed in his writings On the Life of Moses that”[t]his truly is the vision
of God: never to be satisfied (κόρον) in the desire to see him.”165 For Gregory the
fact that God is unknowable had immense ethical consequences. The ‘hinge’  of
negative theology in Gregory’s works is the notion of God’s infinity (God is ἄπειρον
and ἀόριστος). This idea of infinity, conceived as the lack of limits, is reflected in
Gregory’s ethics. Gregory notes that where the perfection of “[...]everything that
can  be  measured  by  the  senses[...]”  is  marked  off  by  definite  boundaries,  the
perfection of virtue knows no limit, since “[...]no good has a limit (ὅρον) in its own
nature (φύσει)[...]”166.  The good can only  be limited by its  opposite.  Therefore,
everything that is marked off by boundaries is not virtue. From this also follows
that  it  is  “[...]undoubtedly  impossible  to  attain  perfection  (τοῦ  τελείου)[...]”.167
Gregory concludes by introducing the theme of  epektasis (infinite  or perpetual
162DeVitMoys. 2.234
163Basil of Caesarea, Homilia in illud Attende tibi ipsi 7. Basil makes an interesting 
analogy: As the human soul is only recognized from its activities, so God is.
164Cant. 1.33, p. 35
165DeVitMoys. 2.239, p. 116
166DeVitMoys. 1.5, p. 30
167DeVitMoys. 1.8, p. 31
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progress in virtue): “For the perfection of human nature consists perhaps in its
very growth in goodness.”168
The ethical use of negative theology that we find here is reminiscent of the form
that we know in the later, more well known forms of Pseudo-Dyonysius and the
medieval tradition stemming from this. Also, the pragmatic (ethical) function is to
some degree what determines the contents of the theology. Gregory's polemical
engagements mean that we cannot simply identify his negative theology with the
later Pseudo-Dyonysian via negativa, even if it looks similar to this.169
Negative theology in theory and practice
So far we have only drawn the contours of a broad concept of negative theology.
Most examples might seem to be 'theoretical' statements about the character of
God, God's activities, His ineffability and the like. This is only partly true however,
since many examples above are taken from a context where the statement have a
practical function, whether polemical,  liturgical or ethical. We should be aware
that just as different forms of negative theology could be used in homiletic and
similarly rhetorical contexts, different forms of negative theology was also used in
ethical contexts. We will discuss the most obvious ways in which negative theology
must be assumed to shape ethics and moral epistemology in particular. But before
doing so we will  attempt to distinguish between different forms or functions of
negative theology. The framework of these forms is most often (but not always) the
'Judeo-Christian  distinction'  between  God's  ineffable  nature  and  his  works  or
activities which are not ineffable. This framework can be filled out in different
ways, as we will see.
The terminology of negative theology
In the negative theological tradition from Philo to the Church Fathers and Neo-
Platonism a broad range of  terms were applied technically,  philosophically  and
rhetorically.  Often the privative alpha is  present  in  the terms used in negative
theologies, and in a broad sense any theology that speaks of God using such terms
could  be  called  'negative'.  Also,  in  the  tradition  we find examples  of  linguistic
reflections on how to apply negative theology by forming new names for God using
the privative alpha (especially in Gregory of Nyssa).  There are, however,  terms
which are more obviously examples of negative theology than others.
Not all negative statements about God are equally radical examples of negative
168DeVitMoys. 1.10, p. 31
169In the part on Gregory we will discuss these themes more systematically. See below.
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theology. Hence that God is called, e.g., 'immortal'/'incorruptible' (ἀφθαρτος) does
not necessarily mean that we have a full-blown negative theology. Depending on
the  context,  terms like this  might  hold  a  certain  negative  theological  meaning
anyway. We should conceive of the field as a network of negatively defined names,
a family relationship of concepts that does not necessarily, by themselves, imply
negative theology, but can be said to do so to the degree that they revolve around
central concepts such as the ineffability and incomprehensibility of God. Also, the
most  important  contextual  factor  might  prove  to  be  the ontological  framework
established by the distinction between Creator and creation (as discussed above in
relation to Philo). Compared to this distinction, whether God's incomprehensibility
or ineffability or similar is derived from, e.g. his infinity or oneness might prove to
be  secondary  items,  i.e.  postulates  put  forward  to  give  a  comprehensible
theoretical background for one's negative theology.
Some terms are names applied to God (such as ineffable, unnameable, infinite
etc.), and some refer to the methodology of the discipline (such as negation or
abstraction). It is not possible to make a complete and adequate overview here.
But  as  the  above  presentation  was  intended  to  at  least  give  some  important
examples of negative theology in the early Church, it will also be used as the offset
for the following. Hence many of the terms discussed below are extracted from
passages  quoted  above.  Most  terms  used  tend  to  have  a  variety  of  meanings.
Moreover,  an  author  might  present  obvious  examples  of  negative  theological
thinking without explicitly using the standard terms associated with this tradition.
We  are  dealing  with  a  genre  that  often  generates  a  poetic  and  metaphorical
language. Hence it can be hard to gain a general overview of the terminologies of
the  tradition.  Nevertheless,  having a  tentative  overview might  at  least  give  us
some sense about what we are dealing with, what we are looking for, and what we
need to be careful about when discussing negative theology. For this reason, the
following  will  discuss  some  of  the  uses  of  terms  and  concept  central  for  the
tradition. Some of the most important terms in question (with all their derived and
related  meanings)  are  treated  below.  Also,  a  terminology  will  be  useful  when
quoting translated passages. In the following, translations will be modified in order
to fit with the proposed terminology.
Some  of  the  terms  belong  to  a  linguistic  or  logical  category,  others  to  an
epistemological  or  ontological  class.  It  is  not  always  clear,  however,  where  to
categorize a term – for example, is infinitude an inherent ontological quality of
something,  or  does  it  mean  that  something  can  not  be  approached  through
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ordinary language, with its limits (an epistemological claim)? Is it a positive or a
negative concept? For example we often see that 'simplicity', which is not explicitly
a negative definition (it does not contain the privative alpha), is really conceived of
as an inherent negative definition.170 Because of problems as these, we will  not
attempt to schematize our terminology too rigidly, but simply mention a range of
examples of how the different terms are used.171
We can distinguish between perhaps four classes. Firstly we have terms that
have to do with speech and language. Secondly we have terms that have to do with
epistemology. Thirdly we have terms that have to do with ontology. Fourthly we
have methodological (meta-level) terms.
1) Language. As we have seen in Philo the ineffability of God is central. God is
basically  ἄρρητος  (adjective,  negation  of  ῥητός,  'spoken  of',  'famous'  or
'utterable')172, a term that can also mean unspoken, but which is better translated
as ineffable. A similar term often used by Gregory of Nyssa is ἀπόρρητος. Though
this  term  can  often  mean  'forbidden'  or  'not  to  be  spoken  of'  it  will  also  be
translated  as  'ineffable'.  That  God  is  essentially  ineffable  is,  perhaps,  Philo’s
primary negative theological claim. If we agree with Wolfson and others that Philo
represents  the  first  clearly  philosophical  example  of  negative  theology,  then  it
would be reasonable to see the tradition grounded in the idea of the ineffability of
God.  Hence  we  might  talk  of  'arretic'  theology.  The  term 'ineffable'  is  closely
related  to  the  term  ἄφατος  (negation  of  φατός,  'famous',  'spoken',  'notable'),
meaning 'not uttered', 'not named' which we will translate as 'unutterable'.173 This
might  cause  some  confusion,  since  ἄρρητος  is  sometimes  translated  as
'unutterable'.174 Often the term ἀνεκδιήγητος is also translated as 'unutterable' as
well, but we will translate as 'indescribeable' (as in modern Greek where it also
means 'untold'). Another term that has to do with language is ἀκατονομάστοις or
more simply ἀνωνόμαστον, 'unnameable'. This and other terms that talk of the
inability of putting a predicate or a name on God are important as they relate to
issues of language and logic, e.g. in Clement of Alexandria where God's oneness
and his  being the  first  principle  mean that  he does  not  fall  under  any names.
Though  they  refer  to  our  inabilities,  mostly  such  terms  are  used  directly  in
reference to the nature of God, i.e. God Himself is ineffable. Moreover they are
170This is arguably the case in Clement of Alexandria, as it is in Plotinus. Wolfson 1947
171See appendix I for a comprehensive list.
172LSJ, ”ἄρρητος”. PGL translates ἀρρήτως 'indescribably', 'inexplicably', 'ineffably', 
'inexpressibly'. PGL, “ἀρρήτως”, p. 230
173LSJ “ἄφατος”. PGL translates ἄφατος “in a way that cannot be described, abundantly”. 
PGL “άφάτως”, p. 274
174For example Wolfson 1952
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also used in reference to the properties, powers or activities of God.175 Usually the
terms are used adjectively, describing a quality, or a lack of a certain quality, in
God. God is ineffable, God’s origin is ineffable, etc. Often we see the term used
independently of other negative definitions, and very often it is used in a rhetorical
context.
2) Epistemology. If we move from linguistics (speech) to epistemology (thinking),
we find a term like ἀκατάληπτος which means 'ungraspable' or 'incomprehensible'
and  will  be  translated  as  'incomprehensible'.  That  something  is ἀκατάληπτος
basically means that it cannot be reached or touched.176 In Skepticism this term
means the inability to comprehend or attain conviction.177 In Stoic epistemology
κατάληψις means comprehension or grasping (as πρόληψις means preconception
or anticipation) in the sense of direct apprehension.178 Against Stoicism academic
skepticism  claimed  that  all  perceptions  were  incapable  of  bearing  any
comprehensive relationship to their object.179 The term ἀκατάληπτος is sometimes
translated as “beyond apprehension” (e.g. Bradshaw's quote of Philo),180 but this
often  implies too  much:  Not  least  does  the  'beyond'  seem  to  imply  some
quantitative measure, whether spatial or 'intellectual'. But often the point in using
this term is that God is qualitatively different. A related term is ἀναφής, meaning
'impalpable'.  Another  related  term is  ἀπερινόητος,  which  basically  means  that
something  cannot  be  touched  by  the  mind.  We  will  translate  it  as
'incomprehensible' as well. Moreover, the invisibility of God is often an element in
negative  theologies.  That  God is  ἀθέατος or  ἀόρατος,  'unseen'  or  'invisible',  is
often taken to have epistemological  or  moral  consequences though the term is
rarely understood to imply negative theology as such.181 It is our claim that it often
does so in a late antique Christian theological context (The Epistle to Diognetus
being an example of this). We will translate both terms as 'invisible'.
3) Ontology. A commonly used adverb to express God's transcendence is the
word ἐπέκεινα, 'beyond' or 'above'.182 This can express an ontological relationship,
as  well  as  an  epistemological  one  (e.g.  if  God  is  above  speech).  A  central
ontological term, especially in later negative theologies, is  ἄπειρον (negation of
175See for example Gregory of Nyssa, ConEunI. 1.21
176See, e.g., Aristotle 921b23
177LSJ, ” ἀκατάληπτος”
178Krauth & Calderwood 1878, p. 589
179http://www.oxfordreference.com, “Scepticism”, 8-7-2013
180Bradshaw 2004, p. 63
181PGL, “ἀόρατος”, p. 168
182In Plato the Good is said to be “beyond (ἐπέκεινα) being in seniority and power”. Plato, 
Politeia 509
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'limited'), 'infinite'.183 A related, almost synonymous term is ἀόριστος which we will
translate  as  'unlimited',  though  the  terms  are  often  used  interchangeably  (as
Gregory  of  Nyssa  says:  “the  unlimited  (ἀόριστος)  is  the  same  as  the  infinite
(ἄπειρόν)”184). Another term is ἀδιεξίτητον, 'inexhaustable'. Though this term often
denotes inexhaustability in the sense of quantitative infinitude, it is only to some
degree an ontological term, since it can refer to the inability of the thinking subject
to exhaust  its  object,  due  to the nature of  either subject or  object.  Related to
'infinite'  is  ἀδιάστατον,  meaning  without  dimensions,  interval  or  gap,  or
'continuous', 'undivided'.185 It is especially central when God is distinguished from
creation in time and space (that which is διαστατόν). Two related terms that are
obviously ontological, but not clearly 'negative' in the radical sense is ἀνεπιδεής
and ἀνενδεής. That something is ἀνενδεής means that it is in want of nothing or
complete.186 But we need a term with a negative prefix. We go for 'indeficient'.
Related to this is ἄφθαρτος, which we translate as 'incorruptible'.187 In a passage
quoted above Justin  Martyr  notes  that  God has  “ineffable  (ἀρρήτου)  glory  and
form”.188 Hence Justin does not (in this passage) link ineffability with formlesness.
But Justin links ineffability with another term that have an ontological significance,
namely  'unbegotten'/'ungenerate',  when  he  says  that  “we  have  the  unbegotten
(ἀγέννητον)  and  ineffable  (ἀρρήτου)  God  as  witness  both  of  our thoughts  and
deeds”189 and “we worship and love the Word who is from the unbegotten and
ineffable God”.190 That God is ἀγένητος or ἀγέννητος often has negative theological
implications. We translate these terms as 'unoriginate(d)' and 'ungenerate(d)'.191
As  noted,  the  distinction  between  God's  essence  and  his  activities  are  very
important  in  many  negative  theologies.  The  terms  used  to  refer  to  these  two
categories are not as such negative definitions, but they form a framework that is
often  crucial  when  applying  negative  definitions  to  the  divine.  God's  ineffable
being, nature or essence is often referred to with terms such as ὀυσία,  φύσις or
ὑπόστασις (in the pre-Nicene context where this sometimes refers to substance).
What God does is often referred to using terms such as ἐνέργεια, δύναμίς, ἔργον or
ποίημα,  typically  translated  as  activity,  power,  function/work  and
183It is an ongoing discussion to what degree this term signifies a qualitative, essential 
infinitude in Patristic authors. See the part on Gregory of Nyssa below.
184ConEunI. 30.5
185PGL, “ἀδιάστατος”, p. 34
186PGL translates “in need of nothing”. PGL, “ἀνενδεής”, p. 133
187LSJ, “ἄφθαρτος”
188Justin Martyr, Apologia Prima 9
189Justin Martyr, Apologia Secunda 12
190Justin Martyr, Apologia Secunda 13
191PGL, “ἀγένητος”, “ἀγέννητος”, p. 15
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work/doing/making, respectively.
Then  there  is  στέρησις,  'privation'.192 Privation  is  often  the  equivalent  of
negation (ἀπόφασις), though in the sphere of ontology rather than language and
epistemology. This distinction is, however, not always clear (in Aristotle we have a
realist  logic  which  means  that  these  levels  cannot  be  distinguished  clearly).193
Though the opposition between good and evil, being and non-being is amongst the
most radical in Patristic thought, a peculiarity presents itself, in that some of the
apophatic strategies applied in speaking about the divine find their equivalents
when speaking about its opposite. Evil defined as privation, the utter lack of good,
is, of course, the most well-known example of this.
4)  Methodology.  We can also talk  of  methodological  terms that  describe  the
practice  of  negative  theology.  The  term  ἀπόφασις  is  typically  translated  as
negation (from  ἀπό+φᾶσις), literally meaning 'to turn away' or to 'finish off' an
'appearance'  (φᾶσις),  i.e.  completing  something  in  the  sense  of  giving  a  full
judgment. The LSJ defines the verb ἀποφαίνω as 'show forth, display' or 'make
known, declare' and ἀπόφημι as to 'speak out, declare flatly or plainly' or as to 'say
no'.194 The noun  ἀπόφασις means either 'denial, negation' (being “predication of
one thing away from another, i.e. negation of it”) or “sentence, decision”. Hence
the  term  ἀπόφασις has  a  double  meaning  of  negation  as  well  as  decision  or
judgment. In Patristic Greek it can mean a decree or the judgment of God, as well
as negation.195 As a rhetorical figure ἀπόφασις refers to “the raising of an issue by
claiming not to mention it”,196 but as a technical philosophical term its meaning is
more specific. In Aristotle’s logic the term ἀπόφασις is used technically, meaning
logical  negation  in  a  proposition  (in  opposition  to  κατάφασις,  affirmation).197
Negation typically differs from privation (στέρησις) which means that something
lacks a property that it could otherwise have had (e.g. blindness). Hence privation
is  mostly  an  ontological  concept.  Just  as  important  as  ἀπόφασις is  ἀφαίρεσις,
abstraction, literally the taking away of something, or removal (even of, e.g., sins,
hence  the  term  is  not  just  a  technical  epistemological  term).198 The  idea  of
abstraction  or  removal  is  derived  from  geometry  where  the  abstract  form  of
something can be derived at by removing it from its context. Hence though there is
192LSJ, “στέρησις”
193Hence Mortley, with reference to Whittaker, has argued against van Winden that 
'στέρησις' for Aristotle was not only ontological. Whittaker 1969; Mortley 1986, p. 258. 
Mortley refers to Aristotle, Metaphysica 1011b, 1056a
194LSJ, ”ἀποφαίνω”
195PGL, “ἀπόφασις”
196E.g., “I will not mention that ...”. Merriam-Webster, “apophasis”.
197Aristotle 17a25, 1142a
198PGL, “ἀφαίρεσις”
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a  negative  element  in  this  method,  it  does  not  necessarily  produce  negative
definitions.  The  terms  ἀπόφασις and  ἀφαίρεσις  are  often  confused,  however.
Plotinus often used the term ἀφαίρεσις, abstraction or ‘taking away’, more or less
synonymously to the technical sense of ἀπόφασις in Aristotle, denial or negation.199
But even if the terms were used synonymously, they can be used typologically to
distinguish between elements in negative theologies (we will develop this typology
below).
Is there a difference between the via remotionis and the via 
negationis?
From medieval philosophy we know the terms via remotionis (“way of removal”)
and  via  negationis (“way  of  negation”).200 These  two  ideas  can  be  traced  to
concepts in Aristotelian logic,  negation (ἀπόφασις) and abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις).
Drawing on Philo and the (Neo-)Platonists, the subsequent tradition of the Church
Fathers  often  uses  the  terms  ἀπόφασις and  ἀφαίρεσις more  or  less
interchangeably.201 This  does  not  mean that  there  is  no  difference between  an
apophatic and an aphairetic method, however. At least we can distinguish between
two tendencies, one that affirms, e.g., the incomprehensibility of God by means of
abstraction and one that does this by means of negation. The former will often
stress the simplicity  of  God (as in Clement of  Alexandria)  since the method of
abstraction  is  derived  from a  mathematical  method,  while  the  other  will  often
stress  the  infinity  or  formlessness  of  God.  Schematically  speaking,  then,  to
ἀφαίρεσις belongs an idea of abstracting from complexity (compositeness), tending
to simplicity, and to ἀπόφασις an idea of negating finitude, tending towards infinity
(formlessness).  These  things  are  not,  however,  necessarily  incompatible  or
unrelated themes, but tendencies. Again, negative theology is a broad category
under  which  can  be  distinguished  between,  amongst  others,  apophatic and
aphairetic theology.
In  Aristotle  ἀφαίρεσις is  distinguished  technically  from  ἀπόφασις,  being the
method of denying a property in order that other properties may become more
distinct. This is not least a method in mathematics.202 In the tradition of negative
theology,  especially  from  the  Middle-Platonists,  the  term  becomes  gradually
synonymous  with  ἀπόφασις.203 An  example  of  negation  (ἀπόφασις)  is  when
199Wolfson 1952, p. 121
200In Thomas, the via remotionis is a way of clearly distinguishing between Creator, as the
first cause, and creature. Summa Contra Gentiles 1.10-102
201Wolfson 1952, p. 129
202 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1142a; Metaphysica 1061a29
203Wolfson 1957, p. 148
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Aristotle argues that God and the brutes have that in common that they are not
virtuous.204 Neither belongs to the class of  things that can be virtuous or non-
virtuous. This is not a common privative property. It does not mean that they could
have been virtuous but are not,205 and so they are not viceful either. The lack of
virtue in this case only means that God and the brutes are common in not being
describable in terms of virtue or vice. In their actual properties, whether positive
or negative, they can still be completely incomparable. In the same way 'not-man'
is identified as an indefinite noun.206 Gregory of Nazianzus notes that defining God
solely through negations is like saying what two times five is by counting all the
numbers besides ten.207 Mortley suggests that it was such indefiniteness that made
the  apophatic method  unattractive  to  Aristotle.208 Negation  in  this  sense  is
arguably what is going on when, e.g.,  Eriugena claims that God does not have
‘being’. It does not, of course, mean that God does not exist in the same way that
unicorns do not exist.
When  Gregory  talks  about  stillness  as  being  “free  from the  mire  and  noise
without,  and  our  commanding  faculty  is  not  confused  by  illusory,  wandering
images, leading us, as it were, to mix fine script with ugly scrawling, or sweet-
smelling scent with slime”209, he also seems to talk about abstraction.
Negation is not the same as opposition, though these are often confused. As
Mortley notes “common-sense often extends negation into opposition,  though a
coherent  logical  account  would  scarcely  do”.210 That  God  is  not  material,  i.e.,
immaterial, does not make him belong to a class that is 'opposite' to the material.
The Basil quote above balances on the line between these two: God is as far from
material beauty as the dark night is from the light of noonday (opposite?), but He
still belongs to the class 'beautiful', i.e., He is not defined simply as that which is
opposite of what we know.211
Since the term 'apopathic theology'  is  often used synonymously  for  negative
theology,  this  suggests  that  the  term  ἀπόφασις and  its  derived  and  related
equivalents would be the primary term in negative theology. The term is rarely a
part of a technical vocabulary in Patristic literature, however. Hence in Gregory of
204Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1145a
205This would rather be an instance of privation, though it is only in Thomas' definition 
that privation exclusively describes the failure of something to be what it should be. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia 1a, 66, 2. See also Mortley 1986, p. 261
206Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a31-17a25
207Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 9
208Mortley 1981, p. 10
209Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 27 3
210Mortley 1981, p. 9
211Basil of Caesarea 2005, pp. 113-114
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Nyssa who used negative theology extensively the term in its different forms has
only 35 instances.212
As noted, very often terms used in negative theology has a 'privative' alpha as
prefix  (ἀ-).  Though  this  alpha  is  often  referred  to  as  'privative',  it  very  rarely
denotes 'privation' (στέρησις). That God is ineffable does not mean that he 'lacks'
effability, but only that he does either not participate in such a class of things or is
directly opposite to such things. Moreover, the alpha can also be used to give extra
force to the meaning of a word.
Justin  denied that  the words  we use  for  referring to  God are really  'names'
(ὄνομα).  They  are  rather  appellations  or  opinions.213 This  seems  a  natural
conclusion if God is believed to be essentially unknowable. But with Gregory of
Nyssa we see how a theory of names can be worked out so we can apply names to
God even if He is essentially ineffable. Names are formed (produced by conception,
ἐπίνοια), Gregory says, from negative descriptions of a thing with the privative
alpha. Hence Gregory develops a linguistic method that is apophatic, but is it also
aphairetic? In Gregory there seems to be a tension between these two. At times he
defines God relatively to creation, at other times he says that since God does not
depend on anything else he should not be defined relatively to creation.214
Given our  characterization  of  the  Judeo-Christian distinction  above,  it  would
seem  that  theology  based  on  this  is  apophatic rather  than  aphairetic:  The
apophatic method deals in denying that an object belongs to certain classses, while
the  aphairetic method deals in distinguishing the object from these classes. The
former consists, it would seem, in a claim that the object does not belong to this or
that class, while the latter defines the object negatively in relation to the class. A
likely conclusion would be that only the apophatic method adequately reflects the
fact that God is 'differently different'. Things are not that simple however. Clement
of  Alexandria,  for  example,  inspired by the Middle-Platonists,  often unfolds his
negative  theology  in  terms  of  abstraction.215 It  is  equally  clear,  however,  that
Clement does this on the background of the 'Judeo-Christian distinction'. Clement
repeatedly notes that God can only be known in so far as he reveals himself.216
Also, in the case of Gregory of Nyssa we see that he uses the apophatic method of
a way to establish the experience that God is completely ineffable, i.e., it is not
212When searching the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae for ἀπόφασις, ἀποφάσεως, ἀποφάσει, 
ἀπόφασιν, ἀποφάσεις, ἀποφάσεων.
213Justin, Apologia Secunda 6, p. 190
214ConEunII. 535, pp. 303-304
215Mortley 1986, p. 44
216, e.g., Str. 5.11
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grounded in but leads to this notion (e.g., in  On the Life of Moses, where Moses
negates  his  opinions  about  God  and  in  'the  dark  cloud'  realizes  that  God  is
essentially incomprehensible).
Our claim is that what matters is not so much the technical details of a negative
theology, i.e., whether it is  aphairetic  or  apophatic,  but what is given logical and
epistemological priority,  and what ontological framework one's method is based
upon. The main question is whether or not a negative theology presupposes the
Judeo-Christian distinction. That it, despite of this, is not irrelevant to distinguish
between these types becomes clear in moral philosophical contexts where it can be
shown  that  different  ethical  theories  follow  from  different  types  of  negative
theology.
Polemical uses
In polemical contexts, negations are applied to criticize what is perceived to be
wrong perceptions of God. By arguing that God is ineffable in this or that aspect,
the polemicist furthers the claim that a given theory of God in this aspect must be
wrong. As such Paul’s attacks on “the wisdom of this world” in 1 Cor 1:20-21 can
be considered as implying a negative theology, in so far as Paul is saying that none
of the wisdom of this world is adequate for knowing God.217
When applying negative theology for pragmatic purposes, as used polemically or
rhetorically,  we  see  that  negative  theological  discourses  tend  to  incorporate
different kinds of negative theology. If the purpose of negative theological speech
is to discard some positive notion of God’s essence, it matters less if the available
argument  presupposes  that  God  is  unknowable  because  he  is,  e.g,  ‘more’  or
‘opposite to’  nature or whatever.  Hence the two first types,  though they might
seem incompatible, becomes compatible as they meet in polemical practice. In the
apologetic  literature  negative  theology  is  often  applied  as  a  weapon  against
‘philosophy’ and Pagan religion. An example that will be discussed in length can be
found in the eight chapter of The Epistle to Diognetus where the philosophers are
attacked. No one has seen God or made Him known, but He has manifested himself
through faith alone.218 The epistle also contains attacks on Pagan ‘idolatry’ and the
Jewish sacrificial cult, driven by a similar insistence on God’s invisibility and his
lack of need.219 Similar examples can be found in multitudes of apologetic texts,
attacking  Pagan  religion  and  philosophy.  The  example  from  The  Epistle  to
2171 Cor 1:20-21
218AdDiog. 8
219AdDiog. 3.5, in particular.
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Diognetus shows how a negative theology based on the Judeo-Christian distinction
is  embedded  in  a  polemicism  against  Hellenic  philosophy.  God’s  self-revealing
character  is  used  as  an  argument  against  the  belief  that  philosophy  can  give
insights into the character of God. This polemical function exemplifies in itself a
pragmatic  use  of  negative  theology.  Such  polemicism  easily  has  ethical
consequences,  since  the  refutation  of  the  epistemological  and  philosophical
soundness  of  a  practice  will  usually  imply  that  a  negative  normative  value  is
ascribed to the practice.
Hence when the author of  The Epistle to Diognetus  argues against Paganism
and Judaism, he puts the Christian lifestyle as an alternative though this is done in
mostly negative terms, i.e., Christians do not follow these rituals, but they live like
'normal' people (hence the polemical use of negative theology can seem to imply a
certain 'ethics of invisibility' which we will discuss below). A similar account where
the Christian lifestyle is defined in more positive terms are made by Clement in
Alexandria  in  the  context  of  ethical  and  ascetic  exhortation  and  theorizing.
Clement argues that:
“[...]the  most  of  men,  clothed  with  what  is  perishable,  like  cockles,  and
rolled all  round in a ball  in their excesses, like hedgehogs, entertain the
same ideas of the blessed and incorruptible God as of themselves. But it has
escaped their notice, though they be near us, that God has bestowed on us
ten thousand things in which He does not share[...]”220
Just  prior  to  this  Clement argues that  abstraction  is  necessary to  attain  the
correct comprehension of God. But in his critical statements about “the most of
men” we see that it is God himself who has “bestowed on us ten thousand things in
which He does not share”. God has himself revealed his difference from Creation.
This does not negate the fact that “abstraction from the body and its passions” is
an ethical imperative and necessary to the perfection of what he calls the ‘true
gnostic’. This idea is often bound with a particular anthropology or view of the
human soul (see below). 
Though no obviously moral philosophical consequences is drawn from negative
theology, by itself the polemical use of negative theology does have consequences
for religious practices, ritual, liturgy and worship. As such it is often a matter of
establishing and affirming the Judeo-Christian distinction in a critique of religious
forms  that  does  not  seem  to  acknowledge  the  radical  qualitative  difference
between Creator and creation.
220Str. 5.6
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Negative theology and deification
Negative theology as discussed so far does not seem to leave much room for the
well-known idea  that  the  soul  can  'ascend'  to  God,  that  human beings  can  be
assimilated to the divine or become 'like' to God, perhaps even in a process of
deification (θέωσις). This idea can be found in a range of Platonic sources,221 and
similar ideas are richly present in Patristic literature from the second century and
on,  especially  in  those  thinkers  who  are  also  the  most  developed  and  explicit
proponents of negative theology. This might seem strange if negative theology is
really about upholding a qualitative distinction between God and human beings. At
some point, however, negative theology becomes not only a way of upholding this
distinction, but simultaneously a way of overcoming it. Plotinus is a good example
of this when he says that:222
“Our thought cannot grasp the One as long as any other image remains
active in  the  soul  [...]  To this  end,  you must set  free  your soul  from all
outward things and turn wholly within yourself,  with no more leaning to
what lies outside, and lay your mind bare of ideal forms, as before of the
objects of sense, and forget even yourself, and so come within sight of that
One.”223
This development especially takes form with the Platonically influenced thinking
of Clement of Alexandria and reaches its heights in the ascetic and ethical works of
Gregory  of  Nyssa.  A  similar  development  takes  place  in  Middle-  and  Neo-
Platonism.  H.A. Wolfson  argued  that  negative  theology  (apophatic theology  in
Wolfson's terminology) in Middle- and Neo-Platonic authors such as Albinus and
Plotinus can to some degree be traced back to Philo who  was the first to talk of
God as completely unknowable, unnameable and ineffable.224 But where Philo had
used  negative  attributes  about  God  as  a  means  of  expressing  the  “unlikeness
between God and all other beings”, this is not the case in Albinus and Plotinus for
whom there  is no radical  ontological distinction that needs to be bridged from
'above' before the soul can 'ascend' to God (there is a quite radical distinction, yes,
but this distinction can be bridged by human beings through negative theology and
221E.g., Plato, Theaetetus 176a-b; Albinus, Didaskalikos 28; Plotinus, Ennead I.2.1
222Plotinus’ philosophy is often treated as an ontology with ethical consequences, but it 
seems more reasonable to see the ethical endeavour as the cornerstone which must be 
developed by reflections on ontology and logic. The Ennead discussing ethics comes 
first. 
223Plotinus, Ennead 6.9.7. Notice that Plotinus apparently combines an aphairetic 
approach where the soul is first abstracted from its surroundings with an apophatic 
approach where the soul finally negates itself. 
224Wolfson 1952, p. 115
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asceticism).225 Where the aim in traditional Platonism was usually the more modest
one  of  becoming  'like  to  God  as  far  as  possible'226 the  aim is  now to  become
completely assimilated to the divine, not merely to be sinless, but to be God (θέον
εἶναι).227 The  method  for  doing this  seems somewhat  reminiscent  of  a  kind of
negative theology (both apophatic and aphairetic). Abstraction and negation serves
as methods or procedures for helping the soul  rid itself of cruel notions of itself
and  the  divine,  whereby  it  rises  above  matter  and  material  being.228 Plotinus'
method is best identified as aphairetic. This method is not so much applied in order
to affirm the difference between God and Man, but just as much to overcome this
difference.
In the Christian context, the combination of negative theology as the affirmation
of  the difference between God and human beings,  with negative theology as a
method for  overcoming this  difference,  becomes possible  through the Irenaean
dictum that is probably most famous in the words of  Athanasius:  “[Christ] was
made man that we might be made God.”229 In Clement of Alexandria this idea is
developed in  moral  terms  so  that  “[T]he  Word of  God  became man,  that  thou
mayest learn from man how man may become God.”230 Hence we see that through
the incarnation the gap between Creator and creation is bridged so that the Judeo-
Christian distinction is no longer keeping Man from approaching or even becoming
divine.
In so far as negative theology is used in such a process of deification, it differs
from  the  type  described  where  its  function  is  to  uphold  a  radical  distinction
between Creator  and creation.  This  is  the case even if  its  peculiar  statements
about God's nature and activities are the same at face value. Knowing the context
is crucial.231 In other words, there are, in Patristic thought, often two functions of
negative  theology  present  that  each belongs,  so  to  speak,  on each side of  the
incarnation (the one applied to uphold the radical distinction between Creator and
creation,  the  other  one applied to  bridge this  gap,  made possible  through the
atonement).  In  a  sense  this  runs  parallel  to  the  distinction  between  Law and
Gospel in many interpretations,  e.g.,  in Gregory of Nyssa's commentary on the
225Mortley 1984, p. 53
226Plato, Theaetetus 176a-b
227Plotinus, Ennead 1.2.6
228Plotinus, Ennead 6.9.7, tr. Armstrong
229Athanasius, De Incarnatione 54. Irenaeus writes: “[T]he Word of God, our Lord Jesus 
Christ, who did, through His transcendent love, become what we are, that He might 
bring us to be even what He is Himself.” Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5
230Protr.
231E.g., when Gregory of Nyssa calls God invisible this might have a very different 
function from when God is called invisible in The Epistle to Diognetus.
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Song of Songs: The Law is as something exterior the separation wall that keeps
human beings from God, but it is simultaneously the medium through which God
reveals  himself,  and  so  in  an  interior,  spiritual  sense,  when  God  himself  has
reached through the window in the wall, a union becomes possible.232 This union
however  does  not  lead  to  a  positive  theology,  but  a  new  negative  theology,
sometimes similar at face value, but with a different function.  As types the two
functions of negative theology can be abstracted so that we at least in principle
can  talk  of  the  one  form  without  the  other.  The  case  of  much  Pagan  Neo-
Platonism233 also shows that the second kind can work without the first.
With Wissink we can typologically distinguish between two types of negative
theology: While the first form (or function) of negative theology is motivated by a
belief in a self-revealing creator that is qualitatively different from the creation,
and thus ineffable,  the second form is  often centered around a  sort  of  natural
theology.234 But even if there exists two kinds of negative theology, Wissink argues,
the two in practice often take the form of the other: “Philo […], Basilius […], and
Pseudo-Dionysius […] were probably motivated by the Jewish or the Christian faith
to adopt a predominantly negative way of speaking about God, but in doing so used
Middle  Platonic  and  Neoplatonic  thinking.”  It  seems  to  belong  to  the  indirect
character of negative theology as such that the meaning of negative theological
utterances must be sought on a plane below the immediate linguistic one. In doing
so we must take into account the context and function of negative theology. What
this means for our approach to negative theologies in general will be discussed in
our concluding part.
Imitation of God and (in)visibility in ethics
With  negative  theology,  imitation  of  God  or  deification  will  often  consist  in
imitation of God's ineffability and incomprehensibility etc. Hence imitation of God
232Cant. 162, p. 173
233We can distinguish between Christian and non-Christian Neo-Platonism. That a 
Christian author uses elements from, e.g., the Platonic tradition, does not, however, 
make him a ‘Platonist’. The relationship between the Platonic tradition and Christian 
thought is more complex: It was not simply a matter of ‘taking over’ Neo-Platonism or 
construing Christian theology in the terms of a certain philosophical system. Neo-
Platonism was not an all-or-nothing-system, but a batch of ideas, approaches and 
temperaments that could be applied differently depending on contents. Hence some 
elements of Neo-Platonic thought might have fitted well with ‘orthodox’ Christian 
theology while others required and led to a transformation of the Church's teachings. It 
should also be noted that since a strict distinction between Platonism, Middle-Platonism
and Neo-Platonism is often anachronistic, by 'Neo-Platonism' will be meant that broad 
range of thought developed in the Platonic tradition from the 2nd century and on. See 
Catana 2013
234See Wissink 2000
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leads to what we will  call  an 'ethics of invisibility'.  If  God is invisible, so must
Christians be. It  is,  of  course, not obvious that the claim that God is 'invisible'
belongs to a negative theology in the radical sense. But in so far as this claim is
derived from or based on the Judeo-Christian distinction, this is arguably the case:
In The Epistle to Diognetus, the Christians are said to be “distinguished from other
men neither by country, nor language, nor the customs which they observe”, and
they do not “lead a life which is marked out by any singularity.”235 These claims
seem  to  follow  from  a  previous  claim  that  God  is  invisible  (ἀόρατος) and  a
following claim that Christians imitate God. In the third similitude from The Pastor
of Hermas, Christians and sinners are compared to trees in the winter:
“[N]either are the righteous manifest (φαίνονται) in this life (ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι
τούτῳ), nor sinners, but they are alike (ὀμοιοί); for this life is a winter to the
righteous, and they do not manifest themselves, because they dwell  with
sinners: for as in winter trees that have cast their leaves are alike, and it is
not seen which are dead and which are living, so in this world neither do the
righteous show themselves, nor sinners, but all are alike one to another.”236
Christians are not manifest (φαίνονται), Hermas says. Thus we could also talk of
an  ethics  of  non-manifestation.  Hermas does  not  explicitly  say  that  this  is  the
product of the fact that God is invisible or similar. This is almost explicitly the case
in The Epistle to Diognetus, however. What we find in this text could be called an
'ethics of invisibility'. The 'invisibility' of this ethics is not absolute, since Christians
exactly because of the invisibility and immateriality of God does not participate in
Pagan  worship.  As  such  Christians  are  not  distinguished  by  what  norms  they
follow, but by what norms they do not follow. This does not mean that there is no
such thing as a Christian ‘ethics’, besides holding that Christians are or should not
look and behave differently. Both epistles affirm that Christians live as strangers in
this world, by the law of a different city (heaven or the kingdom of God), which
means that they do not pursue power, wealth and so on.237 But it seems that this
foreign citizenship is exactly also what makes the Christian invisible. In Clement of
Alexandria  and  Gregory  of  Nyssa  we  see  these  themes  developed  in  more
philosophical  forms.  In  Clement the perfect  Christian “lives in the city as in a
desert”.238 Such a person lives a life of modesty and asceticism, but the person
cannot be easily distinguished from others. Likeness to God is in important aspects
something hidden. This idea is also developed in Gregory of Nyssa who describes
235AdDiog. 5.2, tr. Lightfoot
236Pastor of Hermas, Pastor 52.2-3, p. 33
237Pastor of Hermas, Pastor 50.1-11; AdDiog. 5.5
238Str. 7.12, p. 545
59
the priesthood as a life self-controlled, tough in appearance, but containing on the
inside what is “hidden and invisible”.239
On the other hand, in concrete practice, when Christians imitate God they can
be discerned as they help the poor, etc. Hence they become visible after all. This
seeming paradox arguably reflects the distinction between  οὐσία and ἐνέργεια,
essence  and  activities,  etc.,  as  implied  by  typical  formulations  of  the Judeo-
Christian  distinction.  God  is  essentially  invisible,  but  can  be  seen  through  his
works. The same thing with Christians. The author of The Epistle to Diognetus and
Hermas' Pastor do not say this explicitly, but there are reasons for seeing this as a
proper explanation. The distinction is more obvious in Gregory of Nyssa:
“If we who are united to Him by faith in Him, are synonymous with Him
whose  incorruptible  nature  is  beyond verbal  interpretation,  it  is  entirely
necessary for us to become what is contemplated in connection with the
incorruptible nature and to achieve an identity with the secondary elements
[virtues] which follow along with it.”240
Again, though it is not said explicitly, this seems to reflect the Judeo-Christian
distinction. Gregory (as Philo) believed the human soul to be ineffable, but also
that imitation of God must have visible consequences.241
Freedom and purification
The author of  The Epistle to Diognetus came close to explicitly claiming that
Christians are not ascetic. They do not “practice an extraordinary life (οὔτε βίον
παράσημον ἀσκοῦσιν”.242 The ethics of invisibility could by itself be understood in
terms of freedom since it implies that there is no particular outward law limiting
the believer (as in some of the Pauline epistles), but that exactly because of this
the believer would simply follow the norms present in one's given context. The
result of this is, taken by itself, not so much an ethics as an anti-ethics. Holding
that God is completely different from anything created and does not need anything
means that one cannot have, and does not need to have, a too high view on created
things. Hence the critique of Pagan and Jewish religion which is often implied by
negative theologies sets the Christian free in relation to worldly dependencies and
religious duties.243
Ideas of freedom are often linked with some sort of asceticism, however. This is
239DeVitMoys. 2.285, p. 127
240DeProf.
241InDiem. 237-239, pp. 523-524
242AdDiog. 5.2. Literally ‘a particularly visible life’.
243Hence the idea of Christianity's desacralizing and secularizing effects.
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not least the case in Gregory of Nyssa who combines an ethics of invisibility with
ideas of asceticism on the one hand, and different ideas of spiritual freedom on the
other.244 In an important passage he writes that:
”[...]liberty (ἐλευθερία) is the coming up to a state which owns no master
(ἀδέσποτόν) and is self-regulating (αὐτοκρατὲς);  it is that with which we
were gifted by God at the beginning, but which has been obscured by the
feeling of shame arising from indebtedness. Liberty too is in all cases one
and the same essentially; it has a natural attraction to itself. It follows, then,
that as everything that is free will be united with its like, and as virtue is a
thing that  has no master,  that  is,  is  free,  everything that  is  free will  be
united with virtue.”245
It is our claim that when such ideas of freedom is linked to negative theology it
will often happen through an idea of abstraction rather than one of negation, i.e.,
freedom is considered as consisting in having a certain degree of distance to one's
surroundings.246 Hence if a negative theology emphasizes abstraction rather than
negation, there is a chance that this will lead to what we could call an aphairetic
ethics, an ethics of abstraction: If God is “unmingled”, so also must the soul be.
This seems to be what is going on when, e.g., Gregory of Nazianzus wrote about
his  spiritual  experiences  that,  “I  penetrated  the  cloud,  became  enclosed  in  it,
detached from matter and material things and concentrated, so far as might be, in
myself.”247 Also,  Clement  of  Alexandria  is  a  particularly  good  example  of  this.
Virtue  and  piety,  Clement  says,  is  “unswerving  abstraction  (ἀμετανόητος
χωρισμός)  from  the  body  and  its  passions.”248 This  has  very  concrete
consequences. For example, Clement criticizes the use of makeup which he sees as
dishonoring the “archetype by assuming foreign ornament”.249 The body should, so
to  speak,  be  abstracted  from foreign  elements.  While  this  could  be  called  an
aphairetic ethics,  at  the  same  time,  Clement  notes,  nothing  created  can  have
(essential) similarity with God.250 Hence in this context, at least, oneness should in
the end be defined  apophatically (rather than  aphairetically), as the negation of
compositeness, so that the good soul and God have that in common of not being
composite, and thus 'one', though this does not make the good soul belong to the
same class as God, in any positive sense.
244Gregory even links these themes with ideas on social-ethical liberty, e.g., in his 
criticism of slavery. See, e.g., Eccl. 335-337 which is also discussed below.
245DeAnRes. 101-105, p. 452
246See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. 64, p. 71, also discussed below
247Gregory of Nazianzus, De Theologia 28 3
248Str. 5.11, p. 460, modified. See the part on Clement.
249Paed. 3.11, p. 287
250Str. 6.18, p. 519
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The relation between negative theology and ethics is especially obvious when
conducted in relation to asceticism. Hence it is the task of the ascetic to attain
independency and self-control. Negative theology and asceticism have a certain
sense  of  ‘other-worldliness’  in  common.  If,  for  example,  negative  theology  is  a
method for 'spiritual ascension' which helps the soul to clean itself of all material
conceptions of the good, the link with some sort of asceticism is obvious. Of course
the  form  taken  by  this  asceticism  depends  on  what,  e.g.,  psychological  and
anthroplogical views one might further hold.
Consequences for moral epistemology
It is not unusual that negative terms applied to God as an instrument of critique
against different forms of idolatry has anti-intellectualistic consequences for moral
views. It is not that we see the fathers argue in favor of ethical particularism or
against  'absolutism'  (a  rather  modern  distinction).  But  we  do  see  a  prevalent
skepticism  against  a  (merely)  theoretical  morality,  as  when  the  writer  of  The
Epistle to Diognetus notes that Christians do not “possess any invention discovered
by any intelligence or study of ingenious men” and that they are not “masters of
any human dogma as some are.”251 The point seems to be that the negation of
Pagan religious practices leads to some degree of indirect affirmation of whatever
norms are present. This is of course different from a direct, positive affirmation of
these norms. What we are dealing with is a kind of double negation that cannot be
translated into a simple affirmation. But behind the claims in such texts as  The
Epistle  to  Diognetus,  that  Christians  do  not  follow  any  particular  customs,  is
arguably reflected a somewhat negative theology that renders abstract (general,
non-contextual) positive statements about the nature of the good dubious. It seems
that  there is,  sometimes,  a  connection between the idea of  the simultaneously
invisible and self-revealing character of God, and the conception of the Christian
life, in these texts. If the invisible God reveals himself, but in his revelation goes
‘under  cover’  in  the  flesh  of  a  servant,  then  some  sort  of  negative,  indirect
definitions seems to be needed in order to talk about the good. And if the life of the
Christian  is to reflect this, then we also to some degree need a sort of negative
meta-ethics to be able to grasp this.
Maybe it could be argued that the apparent 'invisibility' of the Christian life has
to do with the fact that Christian ethics are really a form of virtue ethics rather
than a strictly principled ethics (wherefore it does not interfere with 'customs' or
rules  of  behavior,  at  least  not  directly)?  As  such Christian  ethics  focus  on  the
251AdDiog. 5.3, tr. Lightfoot
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personal (understood to some degree as the private) characteristics of the believer,
rather  than  posing  ethical  and  political  principles.252 The  problem  with  this
explanation is that authors such as those mentioned above never claim that the
Christian lifestyle is only about ‘private’ virtues and not about social ethics – the
contrary is rather the case, since imitating Christ by, e.g., helping the needy, is
valued highly. Rather we need to hold on to the apparent paradoxality of Christian
‘ethics’. Claims about the invisibility of the Christians, such as those quoted, do of
course not by themselves prove that an author had any sense of thought forms akin
to negative theology, or that such theology had any special moral-epistemological
consequences. 
If we instead strengthen the above claims that Christian ethics is an 'ethics of
invisibility', there is a chance that we could arrive at some sort of epistemological
moral skepticism. Not a skepticism with regard to the existence of 'the good' or
our  ability  to  do  'the  right',  but  with regard to our  ability  to  have  (reflective)
knowledge about these things, at all. There is a range of good examples in the
history of theological ethics, that the good Christian should not reflect, and indeed
cannot reflect, upon his/her conduct.253
As a matter of linguistics, the question is how we define terms such as 'good',
'virtue' and 'perfection'. A simple instance of what could be called a negative moral
linguistics in the New Testament is Paul's statements about love (at least some of
them). Love (ἀγάπη), Paul says, “does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. It
does not dishonour others, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no
record of wrongs. Love does not delight in evil […] Love never fails.”254 Of course
there are also some positive definitions of love in between these statements, “Love
is  patient,  love  is  kind”,  so  Paul's  exposition  is  not  wholly  negatively  defined,
unless,  of  course,  it  could be argued that 'patience' or 'kindness'  are implicitly
negative  definitions  (hardly  the  case,  though).  Especially  Gregory  of  Nyssa
develops  such  themes.  Gregory's  philosophy  of  language  reminds  us  that  any
positive description of virtue must implicitly be a negation of non-virtue (liberation,
overcoming of sin), but also that non-virtue must be defined as the negation of
virtue.  We convey “[...]the idea of goodness by the negation of badness, or vice
versa[...]”, Macrina noted according to Gregory in the dialogue On the Soul and
252Others have seen, e.g., the beatitudes, to be evangelical counsels (the standard Roman 
Catholic view that the beatitudes are acts of supererogation for those who desire 
perfection), moral ideals, or rules pertaining to a different age (dispensationalism), 
rather than signs of a peculiar Christian ‘lifestyle’.
253E.g., Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Frygt og Bæven). 
2541 Cor 13, NIV
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Resurrection.255 This of course  implies that 'evil' should  be defined negatively, as
the lack of good (privation, στέρησις). But it also implies that 'good' is synonymous
to 'not-evil' (not the privation of evil, but the negation, ἀπόφασις).
The 'ethics of invisibility' in  The Epistle to Diognetus and the case of Gregory
suggests  that  when  it  comes  to  such  things  as  theological  statements  and
statements about the good, right, virtue, value and so on, a double negation cannot
simply be translated into an affirmation. Praising some virtue is often equal to
saying that it reflects God's being, but God's being can only be comprehended as
the negation of evil. 'Virtue' is really 'not-not-virtue'. But the two are not simply
logically  equivalent.  That  this  does  not  necessarily  have  any  practical
consequences  should  be  obvious.  But  that  there  must  be  epistemological
consequences is equally obvious. What we are dealing with is arguably a kind of
holism where the meaning of concepts are defined in relation to what is not their
extension.  Such things as virtue cannot be defined in the abstract,  but only in
relation to a context,  though negatively. This makes it  hard to conceive of how
ethical  principles  can  look  like.  By  ethical  principles  we  should  understand
generally true propositions that designate moral value to certain objects, e.g., of
the  form 'if  x  is  of  the  class  F,  then x  is  good'.  But  if  moral  value  is  defined
negatively, e.g., by the class F being defined by its negative relation to the whole,
then things are much more complicated. With such a negative, indirect definition
of value ethical principles can hardly be adequate descriptions of, e.g., goodness,
but  must  be  understood as  signs  that  point  to  the  good,  without  describing it
adequately.  According  to  our  definition  of  'adequacy'  and  'truth',256 ethical
principles of this kind can be true, though they are inadequate, since they lead to
or point at value without capturing it propositionally.
Conclusion
We are now ready to go into depths with our three case studies. The primary
hypothesis of the above is that much late antique Christian negative theology is
developed  inside  a  framework  based  on  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction.  The
consequences for theological reflection are such that this will take the form of a
theologia viatorum which cannot be adequate but only true (this is discernible, not
least, in the idea of  epektasis). This is also true for moral epistemology, and thus
for theological ethics.
Our methodology must take this into account, in such a way that even if we
255DeAnRes., p. 436
256In our definition of 'theologia viatorum' above.
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attempt to systematically point out the relationship between the Judeo-Christian
distinction  as  an  idea  with  certain  developments  in  moral  epistemology,  this
relationship  cannot  be  conceived  too narrowly.  We  must  be  aware  of  the
theological and ethical contexts in which negative theologies are developed.
It  is  nevertheless probable that there are fundamental  relationships between
negative  theology  based  on  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  and  certain  moral
philosophical ideas, in such a way that these can be identified through particular
case  studies  that,  despite  contextual  differences,  are  not  completely
incommensurable and can thus be compared. This can happen through different
functions  or  forms  of  negative  theology,  for  example  polemical,  apophatic  or
aphairetic.
But  even  if  there  might  be  technical  differences  between  different  uses  of
negative theology, what is crucial is not so much the particular form it takes, but
its broader context. In other words, what matters is whether or not a negative
theology  and  the  ethics  it  produces  has  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  as  its
framework or not. The following intends to verify this hypothesis.
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Part II. The ethics of invisibility in The Epistle to Diognetus
“Christians are not distinguished from the rest of mankind either in locality
or in speech or in customs. For they dwell not somewhere in cities of their
own,  neither  do  they  use  some  different  language,  nor  practise  an
extraordinary  kind  of  life.  Nor  again  do  they  possess  any  invention
discovered  by  any  intelligence  or  study  of  ingenious  men,  nor  are  they
masters of any human dogma as some are. But while they dwell in cities of
Greeks  and barbarians  as  the  lot  of  each is  cast,  and follow the native
customs  in  dress  and  food  and  the  other  arrangements  of  life,  yet  the
constitution of their own citizenship, which they set forth, is marvellous, and
confessedly contradicts expectation.” (The Epistle to Diognetus, §5.1-4)
Introduction
The Epistle to Diognetus257 is at once straightforward and enigmatic, both clear
and obscure. Written by an unknown author to an almost equally unknown (though
named) recipient, the epistle does not reveal much about the concrete historical
circumstances  of  its  production.  We  do  know,  however,  that  the  epistle  was
probably written in the 2nd century (dating and historical context will be discussed
below). In the prooemium the author presents the text as a respond to a Pagan of
excellence who has inquired about the differences between Christian, Pagan and
Jewish  modes  of  worship.  As  the  reply  to  this  inquiry  unfolds,  we  get  the
impression that in the time of writing, the Christians are still  a minority group,
whose doctrines are unknown to many, while at the same time being subject to
persecution.
It is especially the author's exposition of the relation of the Christians to the
world that has fascinated – and continue to fascinate – modern readers.  Much
rather the epistle has a ‘political’ form and character: Christians are repeatedly
described as belonging to their own peculiar constitution, city or fatherland, while
living in the cities and countries of the world as sojourners.258 The epistle is not
political in the sense of holding certain ‘ideals’ for social ethics, law or constitution
in 'this world' (rather the opposite is the case). But it is undoubtedly political in its
use of analogies and imagery, as well as its ascription to Christians of allegiance to
a different “constitution (κατάστασιν)”259.
257We use Marrou's edition with emendations. Marrou 1965. For quotations in English will
be used Lightfoot, Roberts-Donaldson and Kirsopp-Lake interchangeably, though with 
discussions of the possible interpretations as needed.
258AdDiog. 5.5
259AdDiog. 5.4
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These things can, however, easily overshadow the metaphysical and otherwise
more  fundamental  philosophical  (ontological,  theological)  elements  that  are
implicitly and explicitly present in the epistle. In the second part of the epistle’s
polemical chapters, we see the application of a somewhat negative theology. Here
God's ‘negative’ attributes (e.g. the fact the he does not need offerings) become a
reason for discarding Jewish practices. These themes are further developed in the
critique  of  ‘the  philosophers’,  which  again  works  as  a  negative  premise  for  a
positive claim about God's work in the world. It would be too hasty to regard such
claims as purely polemical.
The claims about God's invisibility plays a key role in the epistle's theology as
well as its ethics. In the broad sense, and in a sense that is relevant for the present
study, such claims can be described as negative theology. This has consequences
for ethics as the author introduces a theme of imitation of God.260 This creates a
relationship of theology to anthropology and ethics, and the presence of an implicit
negative theology through this link explains the ‘invisibility’ of the Christians in the
world.  Such  talk  of  imitation  is  reminiscent  of  a  philosophical  vocabulary  and
thematic.261 To what degree the introduction of such themes merely happens  ad
hoc or  otherwise,  will  be  discussed  to  the  degree  that  it  is  relevant  for
understanding the philosophical background for the ethics of the epistle.
As  such  one  of  the  aims  of  the  following  is  to  discern  how  rhetorical  and
polemical  figures  in  the epistle  might  also  have  had philosophical  content  and
implications for the author, and to which degree this have affected the relationship
of negative theology and ethics (or the ‘politics’ of the relationship between the
Christians and the world). 
A central claim in the following is that the theology applied by the author is
negative, though of a ‘dialectical’ kind (rather than a methodological via negativa),
as it upholds a tension between the ‘hiddenness’ of God and His revelation in the
world. This tension defines the relation of Christians to God and the world. So what
characterizes (or should characterize) the Christians in the world? What are, e.g.,
the ‘virtues’ of the Christians? And how are they ‘invisible’ when they imitate God’s
work of salvation? Finally it will be asked how ethical principles of any kind are
possible with this ethics. As a perspective on this we discuss the epistle's metaphor
of 'the city' as a way of conceptualizing the Christians' relationship to the world.
260AdDiog. 10.4
261E.g. Neo-Pythagorean or Platonic. See below.
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The Epistle to Diognetus
In the following will be discussed first the contextual historical details of the
available manuscript, its possible author(s) and historical context. Secondly we will
discuss the basic points of the epistle in the order they are presented.
The MS(S), dating, author and recipient
The  Epistle  to  Diognetus is  by  many  scholars  regarded  as  one  of  the  first
examples of Christian apologetics. It can hardly be disputed that the epistle at face
value  gives  the  impression  of  having  been  written  in  the  first  centuries.  The
apparent need to explain a Pagan about the peculiarity of the Christian faith (τὴν
θεοσέβειαν  τῶν Χριστιανῶν),262 and the many references  to  what  seems to  be
contemporary persecutions of Christians are examples suggesting that the epistle
was at least written well before the 4th century.
Because of the early dating the epistle has often been counted among the works
of the apostolic fathers, e.g. by Roberts-Donaldson, based on dating as well as the
epistle’s “Pauline spirit” and similarities to the Clementine epistles.263 The writer’s
claim to be a “disciple of apostles” also suggests such classification, though this
claim appears in chapters that did probably not belong to the original epistle. This,
and the apologetic character of the epistle, arguably makes it more reasonable to
group it amongst the apologetic fathers.264
The epistle is never mentioned in other Patristic literature. The oldest known
MS of the epistle was found in the 13th century,  in a codex including writings
ascribed to Justin Martyr. This MS became the possession of J. Reuchlin in the
early 16th century and was passed on to a monastery in Maursmünster, Alsace, in
1560.265 From there it was passed on to Strasbourg in the 1790s, where it was kept
until  its  destruction  when  the  library  burned  in  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  The
epistle survives in several transcriptions, and was copied for print in 1592. The
first copy, which was discovered in Tübingen in 1880, was made by Haus in 1580.
Beurer’s now lost copy is from around 1590 (Freiburg). Two critical collations of
the manuscript were made by Cunitz and Reuss in 1861. These were published in
Otto’s  Corpus Apologeticum.  The Strasbourg-MS had been damaged before the
first  copies  was  made,  though,  especially  in  the  middle  of  the  text,  where
approximately two lines are missing. Since all copies of the MS are based on the
Strasbourg-MS, these parts of the text should be considered lost.
262AdDiog. 1.1
263Roberts-Donaldson 1885, p. 23.
264Kirsopp Lake 1912, p. 348
265Meecham 1949, p. 68
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It  has  often  been  argued  that  only  §1-10  of  the  epistle  can  be  considered
original,266 though  some  have  claimed  that  the  text  should  be  considered  one
coherent whole by one author.267 Barnard lists a range of reasons rendering the
latter claim dubious.268 Not least, the alleged recipients are clearly different: §1-10
are addressed to a Pagan, presumably without any knowledge of Christianity, while
§11-12  seems  more  like  to  have  been  addressed  to  catechumens  or  a  similar
audience with a more intimate knowledge of Christian doctrines. Moreover, there
is a difference in the attitude towards Judaism. §1-10 is mostly negative, while §11-
12 describes Old Testament prophecy in more favorable terms. No New Testament
quotations are present in §1-10, in contrast to §12.5, and the literary style of §11-
12 differs from the preceding, for example by its sparse use of particles. Barnard
argues, however, that this should not lead to the traditional conclusion that the
epistle  has  two  different  authors.  Rather,  the  sections  have  been  written  on
different occasions, but by the same author. We do not need to go into the details
of  Barnard’s  (counter-)arguments  here,  since  the  following  discussions  will
primarily focus on elements in §1-10. For this discussion, what is relevant is the
identification of the rhetorical situation and thus an approximate dating for §1-10.
Hence, it will be sufficient to note that assuming a difference with regards to the
recipient and rhetorical context of the two sections of text can account for much of
the internal differences.
For §1-10, most scholars have, for the above reasons, argued for a dating in the
early 2nd century. Harnack has argued for a slightly later dating, between 170-
400, while Zahn gives an even later dating between 250-310. Overbeck goes so far
as calling the writing post-Constantinian.269
Because of the context of the MS in a codex ascribed to Justin Martyr, the author
of §1-10 has traditionally been believed to be Justin. Others have argued that the
similarities  with  the  apology  of  Aristides  makes  him  the  probable  author.
Bonwetsch argues that Hippolytus was the author of §11-12.270 It is now generally
agreed that the author of §1-10 must be considered unknown (the same is the case
with §11-12).271
It has also been suggested that, since the style is “rhetorical in the extreme”272,
the  epistle  could  be  an  “academic  treatise”  or  “the  exercise  of  some  young
266Meecham 1949, p. 66
267Marrou 1965, pp. 219-229; Thierry 1966, p. 146
268Barnard 1965, p. 131
269Overbeck 1872
270Bonwetsch 1902
271Foster 2007
272Kirsopp Lake 1912, p. 348
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theologian”273.  This  would  also  explain  why  the  epistle  has  been  unknown  in
Patristic  and  medieval  literature.  But  at  any  rate,  the  exact  dating  and
identification of the author(s) of the epistle is, mostly, not of primary relevance for
the  present  study.  The  following  discussion  will  be  based  on  a  reading  of  the
possible negative theology and ethical elements of §1-10, as these relate to certain
theological,  epistemological,  as  well  as anthropological  aspects of  the text.  For
these purposes it is sufficient to presuppose that the text was written before the
4th century  with largely  rhetorical  purposes,  though still  containing significant
theological and philosophical points. Since the author of the epistle is unknown,
(s)he will be referred to simply as 'the author'.
Fundamental structure, claims and arguments
The following summarizes the structure and claims in the epistle in so far as
they are relevant for further discussions, in order to give an overall view. Hence
important points will be dealt with in more detail below.
The author opens the epistle with an address to “the most excellent Diognetus
(κράτιστε Διόγνητε)”, a Pagan who has allegedly asked for information about the
Christian “mode of worshiping God (τὴν θεοσέβειαν τῶν Χριστιανῶν)”. After this
short prooemium the author sets out to refute the Pagan worship of idols, in a
manner  sometimes  reminiscent  of  Jewish  prophetic  literature,  e.g.  Isaiah  2:8.
Where other early Christian apologetics often apply philosophical, theological and
ethical  arguments  by  attacking  the  lack  of  true  divinity  (e.g.  the  mortality  or
mutability)  and  the  corrupt  morality  of  the  Hellenistic  gods  (e.g.  in  Aristides,
Barnabas, etc.), the author focuses strictly on the corporeality of the idols (i.e. the
statues)  themselves  and the  absurdity  of  worshiping such idols.  By worshiping
statues  and  images  made  of  dead,  mutable  “materials  (ὕλης)”274 the  Pagans
become enslaved, and finally like (ἐξομοιοῦσθε), to these.
Having exposed the absurdity of the Pagans’ (alleged) worship of images and
statues,  the  author  turns  to  Jewish  modes  of  “worship  (λατρείας)”275.  Jewish
worship  has the  advantage of  not  being centered on dead images.  Hence,  the
author in this polemic focuses more strictly on the practices and rituals of Jewish
worship  than  their  immediate  object.  These  practices  are,  however,  as
condemnable as the Pagans’, since they, according to the author, presuppose that
God is in need of sacrifices, circumcision and the keeping of certain days. It is not
273Kirsopp Lake 1912, p. 348
274AdDiog. 2.3
275AdDiog. 3.1-4.6
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least  the  “meddlesomeness  (πολυπραγμοσύνης)”276 reflected in  Jewish  practices
that is subject to critique.
Though  the  author's  criticisms  of  Pagan  and  Jewish  worship  differ,  both
instances build upon certain implicit philosophical and theological premises. These
questions will be discussed in detail below.
Having made his stand on Pagan and Jewish worship clear, the author moves
from the polemical  to a somewhat more positive clarification of  what Christian
religion  consists  in.277 But  only  somewhat,  since  a  central  point  of  §5  is  that
Christian worship differs from Pagan and Jewish in being indistinguishable from
others. The “godliness (ἡ θεοσέβεια)” of the Christians is “invisible (ἀόρατος)”.278
As  such  it  cannot  be  described  in  positive  terms,  though  it  is  “confessedly
contradicting  expectation”  ὁμολογουμένως  παράδοξον  ἐνδείκνυνται)”279.  Hence
the situation of Christians in the world is described in paradoxes280. Christians love
all  men but are persecuted by all,  ignored and yet condemned, dishonored but
glorified,  etc.281 Many of  these paradoxes share a structural  similarity  with the
Beatitudes in Matt 5:3-12 and Luk 6:20-22, by contrasting condition and result.282
But the most  striking paradoxes are found in  the continuous allusions to what
could be called the Christians’ ambassadorship in the world. In a manner much
similar  to  1  Peter,283 the  author  notes  that  the  Christians  “dwell  in  their  own
countries, but only as sojourners”, and that for them “[e]very foreign country is a
fatherland”, but “every fatherland is foreign”284. The Christians “pass their days on
earth, but they are citizens of heaven”285 and while they “obey the established laws
[...] they surpass the laws in their own lives.”286 In §6.1-6.9 the author unfolds this
theme  by  analogizing  the  situation  of  the  Christians  (what  we  have  called
‘ambassadorship’) with the relation of the soul to the body. The author notes that
the Christian religion (θεοσέβεια) is invisibly present in the world, as the soul is
invisibly  present  in the body,  and that as the soul  holds the body together,  so
Christians hold the world together.287
276Or “fussiness”, tr. Kirsopp Lake. AdDiog. 4.6
277AdDiog. 5.1-6.10
278AdDiog. 6.4
279AdDiog. 5.4
280See below for a discussion of this term.
281AdDiog. 5.11; 5.12; 5.14
282For example: “Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all
kinds of evil against you because of me.”, Matt 5:11, NIV)
283For example: “Beloved, I beseech you as sojourners and pilgrims (ὡς παροίκους καὶ 
παρεπιδήμους)”. 1 Pet 2:11, ASV
284AdDiog. 5.5, tr. Lightfoot
285AdDiog. 5.9, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
286AdDiog. 5.10, Lightfoot
287AdDiog. 6.4, 6.7
71
Below it  will  be argued that these ‘paradoxes’  of  Christian ‘ambassadorship’
form what could be called an ‘ethics of invisibility’. Moreover it will be discussed to
what degree the use of the soul-body analogy reveals a certain anthropology or
whether its use is more narrowly rhetorical, in order to make it clear what exactly
the analogy consists in (e.g. is it the whole Christian ‘person’, body, spirit and soul
etc., that can be compared to the soul?). This should help to clarify the possible
contents of the epistle's ‘ethics of invisibility’.
In §7 the author deals with how the “Invisible God Himself”288 revealed the Son,
“the very Artificer and Creator of the Universe”289. An important point here is that
the Son did not come to “establish a sovereignty, to inspire fear and terror”290, but
“in gentleness [and] meekness [...] using persuasion, not force”291. After a lacuna in
the text (in §7.6) and some further remarks about the situation of the Christians in
the  world,  the  author  continues  in  §8  with  a  polemical  excourse  against  the
'philosophers'  and human wisdom in general.292 No man has seen God,  but  He
revealed himself through faith.293 Hence ‘invisibility’ is arguably used as a general
(anti-)epistemic term, more or less synonymous, we might assume, to 'unknowable'
or 'ineffable' in other texts.
After this follows logically §9 which is mostly Christological and soteriological.
God had from the beginning planned to send his Son, but God let humanity abound
in sin, so that it would be clear that we could not be made worthy to life by our
own  deeds,  the  author  argues.294 As  in  §7-8,  these  points  have  somewhat
epistemological implications, or as we might put it ‘meta-noetical’ (having to do
with repentance), as when the author notes that “having made clear our inability
to enter into the kingdom of God of ourselves, [we] might be enabled by the ability
of God”295. §7-9 are relevant for the discussion of negative theology in the epistle.
The theology in these chapters could in a certain sense be called ‘dialectical’.
The last (known) chapter of what is generally considered as the original epistle
(as  discussed  above),  is  somewhat  more  parenetic.  Hence  §10  starts  with  a
personal invitation to apprehend “full knowledge of the Father”296. By gaining such
knowledge Diognetus (or whoever the recipient is) will be filled with joy and love
for God which will eventually make him “an imitator of His goodness”, an “imitator
288AdDiog. 7.2, tr. Lightfoot
289AdDiog. 7.2, tr. Lightfoot
290AdDiog. 7.3, Lightfoot
291AdDiog. 7.4, Lightfoot
292AdDiog. 8.2
293AdDiog. 8.5-8.6
294AdDiog. 9.1
295AdDiog. 9.1, tr. Lightfoot
296AdDiog. 10.1, tr. Lightfoot
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of God”297. Such imitation is by the author described as analogical (though not in
the technical sense) to God’s love for humankind. Imitation of God consists in love
for one’s neighbor, and through such love one becomes a god to others. §10 is
especially relevant with its talk of imitation, since this suggests that the theology
of the epistle has ethical consequences in a way which seems to create a tension
with the ‘ethics of invisibility’ (should Christians, e.g., in some way imitate God’s
self-revealing  character?).  To  what  degree  the  negative  theology  and
epistemological  points  of  especially  §9 plays  a  role  in  such ethics will  also  be
discussed.
Finally we have the merged §11-12. In these the author claims to be a “disciple
of  apostles”.  There are  undoubtedly  some conceptual  and structural  likenesses
with  the  Pauline  letters,  but  there  are  obvious  differences  in  theology  and
terminology as well. Though the epistle is not as ‘Pauline’ as might be expected, it
shares central elements. This is especially the case for those elements which are
relevant  for  the  present  purpose.  In  §12.3-12.8  the  author,  based  on  Gen  2:9,
discusses  the  relationship  between  “knowledge”  (γνῶσις)  and  “true  life  (ζωῆς
ἀληθοῦς)”. There is no knowledge without true life, and  vice versa.298 Hence the
author  beseeches:  “Let  your  heart  be  your  wisdom;  and  let  your  life  be  true
knowledge inwardly received.”299 The theology in §1-10 and its ethical implications
can be treated adequately without mention of §11-12. Hence these chapters will
not be discussed further.
Negative theology as polemical strategy
The following discusses the arguments applied by the author in his polemics
against Pagan and Jewish religion. What is interesting here is not so much the
arguments themselves, as the premises which they are implicitly based on.
Arguments against Pagan worship
The  author's  polemics  against  Paganism300 starts  with  an  exhortation  for
Diognetus to “clear (καθάρας)” himself from “all the prepossessions which occupy
thy mind” (προκατεχόντων σου τὴν διάνοιαν λογισμῶν),  and to “throw off the
habit which leadeth thee astray (ἀπατῶσάν σε συνήθειαν ἀποσκευασάμενος)”.301
Of course such admonitions are common as a rhetorical strategy. But nevertheless
297AdDiog. 10.4, tr. Lightfoot
298AdDiog. 12.4
299AdDiog. 12.7, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
300Non-Judeo-Christian culture, religion and philosophy at large.
301AdDiog. 2.1, tr. Lightfoot
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we see that the polemics from the start has an indirect, negative epistemological
content, which might prove to be more than just rhetorically relevant. We should
note that “clear (καθάρας)” is in adjective form, genitive, making the verb implicit.
Roberts-Donaldson  translates  as  “after you  have  freed  yourself  [...]  come  and
contemplate”,  while  Lightfoot  has  the  imperative  “clear thyself  [...]  see”.
Lightfoot’s translation seems the more reasonable, since the adjacent criticism of
the Pagan gods (starting in §2.2) could be thought of as this clearance itself (or
analogous to), as a process, rather than being a discursive insight following upon
clearance, and as such as independent thereof (the criticism is the clearance).
In  §2.2-2.4  the  author  makes  an  unfavorable  characteristic  of  the  Pagan
sculptures used for worship, “those whom ye declare and deem to be gods (ἐρεῖτε
καὶ  νομίζετε  θεούς)”302.  These  are  all  “perishable  matter  (φθαρτῆς  ὕλης)”303,
capable of change. Now the author is hardly talking about an opposition between
the  imperishable  God  and  perishable  matter  as  such  (matter  understood  as  a
metaphysical  category).  Rather ‘matter’  here simply refers to the material  that
sculptures were formed from. It is the fact that this material is still changeable, so
that the sculptures can be turned into vessels again, which proves the gods to be
perishable.304 So this point is more practical than metaphysical, so to speak.
It seems fairly obvious that followers of  late ancient Hellenic religious cults did
not usually believe that the statues used for worship were themselves gods, rather
than  being  means  of  communicating  with  the  gods.  But  the  author  seems  to
presuppose that Pagans believed the statues to be, in some way, gods in the very
concrete sense. The object of the polemics in the argument of the author might as
such seem to be a very obvious straw-man. But this strategy says more about the
theological views of author than is obvious at first instance, and serves mainly as a
means of introducing the theology of the post-polemical chapters of the epistle.
What is critical here is the sharp distinction between the divine and the corporeal
(and, might we assume, everything else created),  which makes all mediation or
‘iconicity’  impossible.  This  is  arguably  an instance of  what  we have called the
‘Judeo-Christian distinction’.
The Pagan statues are described primarily with negative definitions. In addition
to being perishable the Pagan gods are described as being “dumb (κωφὰ)” “blind
(τυφλά)”,  “soulless  (ἄψυχα)”,  “senseless  (ἀναίσθητα)”  and  “motionless
(ἀκίνητα)”.305 It  is  somewhat  obvious  that  these  are  all  terms  that  describe
302AdDiog. 2.2, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
303AdDiog. 2.3, tr. Lightfoot
304AdDiog. 2.4
305AdDiog. 2.4
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negative qualities in the sense of privation, i.e. the lack of certain properties. This
is more than simply negative definitions (it is  στέρησις rather than ἀπόφασις or
ἀφαίρεσις). The author does not explicit claim this, but the privative alpha present
in three of the terms, and the rhetorical situation as such (designed to diminish the
worth of the Pagan gods) suggests that this is the case. In contrast, the Christian
God is described as having “sensibility (αἴσθησιν)” and “reason (λογισμόν)”, terms
that are hardly negative definitions.306
This polemicism does not mean that the Christian concept of God is not also in
some way defined in negative terms. Palmer argues that the author's polemical use
of  negative definitions when referring to the Pagan gods is “a sort  of  inverted
negative theology”, but that this does not mean that the Christian definition of God
is positive. It might as well be implicitly negative: “The implications of this critique
for a Christian concept of God-namely, that God is immaterial, imperishable, etc.-
are not spelled out.”307
Hence it seems that there are no explicit signs of ‘negative theology’ in §2, if by
this  we  understand  the  linguistic  strategy  of  using  negative  definitions  when
describing God. What we do find, however, is what could be called a rhetorical
apophaticism.308 By criticizing and negating the value of the Pagan gods the author
enables the coming introduction of  his  own positive doctrines.  This  strategy is
somewhat explicit, due to the remarks in §2.1, especially if these are interpreted
(as  suggested  above)  as  an  exhortation  to  partake  in  a  process  of  intellectual
clearance, a process realized in the rest of §2. So while these chapters does not
represent  a  negative  theology,  they  represent  rather  a  structural  apophaticism
that at least allows such theology to be introduced. As we shall see, it is exactly the
revealed, positive properties of God that are somewhat paradoxically accompanied
by his invisibility, which shape the relationship of the Christians to the world (the
negation of the Pagan gods’ privative properties by the positive properties of God
in §2 is implicitly also a negation of the Pagan gods’ positive properties by the
negatively defined properties of God).
In the remaining sections of §2, the author shifts focus from the criticism of the
Pagan gods themselves to the Pagan practices and handling of their  gods. The
author basically presents two critical states of affairs, namely, on the one hand,
that the Pagans have to guard their gods to protect them, and thereby actually
insult them, and, on the other, that no sensible person would accept the sacrifices
306AdDiog. 2.9
307Palmer 1983, pp. 238-239
308By ἀπόφασις we mean here saying something indirectly through negation, not the 
rhetorical figure ἀπόφασις in the strict sense.
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offered to the gods, whereby the Pagans implicitly acknowledge the insensibility of
their gods.309 Whether or not these criticisms are logically ‘sound’ they imply the,
for the present purpose, interesting assumptions that 1) the ontological character
of one’s god has direct behavioral consequences, and 2) the Pagan practices imply
their  own  criticism.  If  successful,  these  two  points  form both  a  practical  and
theoretical (if not narrowly ‘logical’) reductio ad absurdum.
Arguments against the Jews
Since the recipient (Diognetus) is allegedly a Pagan, it can seem strange that the
polemics against Judaism (§3.1-§4.6) is more extensive than that against Paganism.
One explanation could be that Diognetus, as a Pagan, is likely to carry a dislike of
Judaism, and that distinguishing Christians from Jews is therefore crucial before a
positive  apologetic  can  be  carried  out.  Another  explanation  could  be  that  the
audience is in fact Christians, and therefore need to define themselves negatively
in  relation  to  Judaism.  At  any  rate,  the  arguments  against  Judaism  carries
important theological premises.
In the polemics against Judaism the author acknowledges the fact that Jews
“deem it proper to worship one God as being Lord of all”310. Soon, however, the
Jews are criticized for worshiping in modes similar to the Pagan, which the Jews
ought to count as “folly (μωρίαν)”.311
The arguments against Judaism are, like those against Paganism, designed to
expose  the  inconsistencies  and  irrationality  of  Judaism,  hence  to  refute ad
absurdum.  Where  Pagan  worship  is  absurd  because  the  Pagan  gods,  being
senseless, are not able to accept sacrifices, Jewish worship is absurd because God
does not need any sacrifices.312 To reject some of God’s creations as useless is
impious,  and  God  does  not  forbid  doing  good  on  the  sabbath.313 The  Jewish
“observance of months and of days” is a product of “their own impulses (αὐτῶν
ὁρμάς)”314. But since God is in need of nothing (“τῷ μηδενὸς προσδεομένῳ”315), the
practices of the Jews must be build on “superstition (δεισιδαιμονίαν)”316.
Now what is meant by the term  δεισιδαιμονίαν? Obviously,  though the term
etymologically refers to 'religion' in the sense of respect or fear for ‘daemons’,317 it
309AdDiog. 2.7, 2.9
310AdDiog. 3.2, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
311AdDiog. 3.2, 3.3
312AdDiog. 3.5
313AdDiog. 4.2, 4.3
314AdDiog. 4.5, tr. Lightfoot
315AdDiog. 3.5
316AdDiog. 4.1, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
317For example 'δεισιδαιμονεστέρους' is often translated as 'religious' in Acts 17:22
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is unlikely that the author believes something like this to apply to Jewish worship.
As noted the author criticizes the Jewish observance of months and days for being
a product of “their own impulses” (αὐτῶν ὁρμάς). But the ‘superstition’ of the Jews
does not so much result from a fear of something external (e.g. daemons), as from
‘pride', or perhaps the ‘projection’ of values (something internal), to use modern
psychological lingua. A central point of criticism against the Jews is their pride and
“πολυπραγμοσύνης”.318 How  are  we  to  understand  this  term,  which  basically
means something like being busy, or going about with, many activities or things?
Translations  suggest  “busy-body  spirit”  (Roberts-Donaldson),  or  “fussiness”
(Lightfoot,  Kirsopp  Lake).  In  late  antiquity  the  term also  had  the  meaning  of
curiosity or search for knowledge.  But such an understanding seems to be too
intellectualistic.  Rather,  the  ‘superstition’  (“δεισιδαιμονίαν”)  in  §4.1  should  be
kept  in  mind.  Maybe  the  plurality  of  ‘daemons’  correspond  to  the  plurality  of
‘things’?  Moreover,  in  the  context  (”τῆς  Ἰουδαίων  πολυπραγμοσύνης  καὶ
ἀλαζονείας”), we see the term related to ‘pride’ (Lightfoot) or ‘vainful boasting’
(Roberts-Donaldson), which suggests some degree of public aspect to the Jews’
going about with many things (πολυπραγμοσύνης). Hence ‘officiousness’ might be
the more fitting term.
The main criticism against the Jews is not, as one might have thought, their
rejection of Jesus of Nazareth as Christ, but their superstition. That the former is
not mentioned in the polemical chapters against the Jews is reasonably due to the
fact the recipient, being a Pagan, would have considered such points nonsensical,
or an irrelevant internal discussion between Christians and Jews (which of course
counts in favor of the view that the epistle is actually addressed to Diognetus). The
unqualified  rejection  of  Jewish  ‘superstition’  is  noticeable,  since  this  seems  to
imply a total rejection of the Old Testament canon and the idea of the Jews as
God’s chosen people in a covenant governed by the Law as revealed by God. This is
in itself a reason for not dating the epistle too early, to a time when Christianity
was still  closely  associated with  Judaism,  but  to  a  later  time where Christians
where clearly distinguished from their Jewish origins.
For the present purpose what is particularly relevant is that this ‘superstition’
seems to be, for the author, the direct result of ‘officiousness’ (and ‘pride’). Though
the  most  proper  translation  of  ‘πολυπραγμοσύνης’  is  perhaps  not  the  overtly
intellectualizing ‘curiosity’, it is still reasonable to think of the author's criticism as
having  a  basically  moral-epistemological  content.  The  author's  point  is,  so  to
318AdDiog. 4.6
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speak, that there is nothing to set a limit to the proud officiousness of the Jews.
From this results superstition and, most importantly,  a range of all too ‘visible’
practices (visibility vs. invisibility is no explicit concern in §3-4 but it  obviously
becomes so in immediate connection hereto).  The Jews do have correct beliefs
about God, but this does not keep them from making up superstitious practices. So
what  we  see  here  is  not  so  much,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Pagans,  how certain
theological assumptions produce a specific ethics. What we see is rather how the
lack of certain limiting assumptions (something of whatever kind that sets a limit
to  pride,  e.g.  revelation)  may  be  an  enabling  condition  for  certain  practices,
despite of actually held, correct theological assumptions. These negative ‘limiting
assumptions’ should be kept in mind when we deal with the apologetic chapters of
the epistle.
A remark on the mystery of Christian religion
One could reasonably think that after such polemics against Pagan and Jewish
religion,  would come a positive (in  the sense  of  affirmative)  description of  the
qualities  of  Christian  religion.  The author  closes  §4,  however,  by  noting about
Christians, that “as regards the mystery of their own religion, expect not that thou
canst  be  instructed  by  man  (ἀνθρώπου).”319 Roberts-Donaldson  translates
ἀνθρώπου as “any mortal”320. The reason seems to be that this would imply that
only God can reveal the Christian mysteries. There is nothing suggesting, by the
way, that the author does not include himself in this category.
The author  mentions “the mystery  of  their  own religion”  rather  than simply
“their own religion”, which could be interpreted as saying that while the mystery
‘beneath’ the Christian religion cannot be described (whatever that mystery might
be), this need not be the case for Christian religion as a visible practice or similar.
But the context makes this implausible, since, as we have seen, Christian religion
is contrasted with Pagan and Jewish beliefs as well as practices in their entirety.
Hence accordingly ‘mystery’ probably refers to the Christian religion in general. As
will be clear from the following, the description of Christian religion in §5-6 clearly
supports this claim.
The remark in §4.6 seems to have two functions having to do with the apophatic
strategy mentioned. The first is a fairly obvious example of negative theology, in
that the claim that it is not possible to “be instructed by man”, easily yields the
notion that the only true instruction can come from the revelation of God himself,
319AdDiog. 4.6, tr. Lightfoot
320AdDiog. 4.6, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
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though this is of course not claimed explicitly (yet!). The second function rather
establishes what we could call a ‘pre-apophatic structure’, so to speak (hinted at
above). The claim that instruction is not possible from man seems to contradict the
author's  readiness  in  §1.1  to  answer  Diognetus’  curiosity  to  “understand  the
religion of the Christians”321. But §4.6 could be interpreted as claiming that such
understanding cannot come by any directly positive instructions. In other words,
the tension created by the combination of §1.1 and §4.6 establishes a ‘structure’
which means that the subsequent description of the Christians’ invisibility in the
world will easily be interpreted as more than a simple negation of the possibility of
knowledge about Christian religion.  This  structure,  in other words,  creates the
context that is necessary for a negative theology to take place.
As for now, we should take it for granted that the remark in §4.6. means that the
premise  of  the  following  exposition  of  Christian  religion  is  that  it  cannot  be
described in positive terms.
The dialectics of knowledge and faith
Throughout the epistle is repeatedly upheld a clear distinction between revealed
truth and human doctrines. For example when the author notes that Christians do
not possess “any invention discovered by any intelligence or study of ingenious
men (ἐπινοίᾳ τινὶ καὶ φροντίδι πολυπραγμόνων ἀνθρώπων)”322. This is evident in
the polemical  sections as well  as  in the apologetic  sections (ethical  as well  as
Christological). The point seems to be that there can be no positive, true theology
without  revelation.  In  this  sense  negative  claims  about  theological  knowledge
becomes the presupposition for a revelation theology.
After his polemics against Pagan and Jewish modes of worship the author in a
set of paradoxical statements exemplifies how the Christians are invisible in the
world. This will be discussed in detail below, but first we will discuss the polemics
against philosophy in §8. In §8 the author resumes his polemics,  which is now
directed against the “pretentious philosophers (τῶν ἀξιοπίστων φιλοσόφων)”323.
The mere plurality  of  philosophical  views is  here used as an argument against
philosophy as such, though the author especially seems to have natural philosophy
in  mind.  If  any  of  these  theories  (“λόγων”)  are  plausible  (“ἀπόδεκτός”),  then
anything in creation might potentially be divine. But the invisibility of God is again
held  up as an argument:  “no man has  either  seen or  recognised Him,  but  He
321AdDiog. 1.1, tr. Lightfoot
322AdDiog. 5.3, tr. Lightfoot
323AdDiog. 8.2, tr. Lightfoot
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revealed Himself (οὔτε <εἶδεν> οὔτε ἐγνώρισεν)”324.
Only through faith can God be seen or recognized. In other words, the ‘medium’
of  God’s  revelation  is  faith,  i.e.  God  reveals  through  faith  (“Ἐπέδειξε  δὲ  διὰ
πίστεως”325).  Hence  we  are  far  from,  e.g.,  the  idea  of  faith  as  a  “voluntary
preconception”  leading  to  knowledge.326 It  is  not  that  we  find  any  particular
‘doctrine’ of faith in the epistle, the author only uses the word twice. The second
instance is in §10.1, where we get the impression that the precondition of faith is
“knowledge (ἐπιγνώσῃ)”327, though ‘recognition’ or ‘acknowledgement’ might be a
more  suitable  interpretation  (due to  the prefix  ἐπι-).  This  priority  of  ἐπιγνώσῃ
before  τὴν  πίστιν,  by  the  way,  seems  more  or  less  to  be  the  opposite  of  the
Alexandrian (Clementine)  scheme,  where  γνώσις is  a  particularly  high state  of
knowledge following upon faith (”voluntary preconception”).
It is important that this positive notion of knowledge (“ἐπιγνώσῃ”) in §10.1 is
introduced as following upon the many unfavorable expositions of  the theories
(“λόγους”) of the philosophers, and human doctrine and wisdom in general in §8-
9.328 The point seems to be that this positive knowledge about God does not come
about until human wisdom has been proved to be ineffective. God has “kept and
guarded His wise design as a mystery”329 until it was revealed through his Son. The
purpose of this is to prepare us for conversion:
“[...]being convicted in the past time by our own deeds as unworthy of life,
we might now be made deserving by the goodness of God, and having made
clear our inability to enter into the kingdom of God of ourselves, might be
enabled by the ability of God.”330
Again we see a  close connection  between doctrine and practice.  Because  of
having wrong notions about God (and whatever else), the practices of humanity
were shaped in a way leading to death. By this result humankind is proven to be
'unworthy  of  life'.  Death  and  life  is,  so  to  speak,  the  pragmatic  measure  of
knowledge. Not having the right knowledge leads to death, but only then is the
'wrongness'  of  one's  conceptions  made  clear.  An  important  term  here  is
‘ἐλεγχθέντες’,  translatable  as  ‘convicted’  (Lightfoot),  ‘convinced’  (Roberts-
Donalson),  ‘proved’  (Kirsop-Lake).  The  construction  of  the  sentence  seems  to
324AdDiog. 8.5, tr. Lightfoot
325AdDiog. 8.6
326This is the idea of Clement of Alexandria. See Str. 2.2
327AdDiog. 10.1, tr. Lightfoot, Roberts-Donaldson
328This might very well be a reference to the sophists whose doctrines according to Plato 
was on words (λόγοι) rather than things. Plato, Gorgias.
329AdDiog. 8.10, tr. Lightfoot
330AdDiog. 9.1, tr. Lightfoot
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construe this ‘conviction’ as a more or less passive state or event, resulting from
the sheer inevitable fact of the reality of death in human life. On the other hand,
“having made clear our” (ἑαυτοὺς φανερώσαντες) might seem to suggest an active
side to the coming to being of this conviction, though it could just as well be God
who is the subject of this 'making clear'. The author's words §9.6 also suggests that
this is the case:
“Having then in the former time (πρόσθεν χρόνῳ) demonstrated (Ἐλέγξας)
the inability  (τὸ  ἀδύνατον)  of  our  nature  to  obtain  life,  and having now
revealed a Saviour able (δυνατὸν) to save even that which have no ability
(τὰ ἀδύνατα),  He willed  that  for  both  reasons  we should believe  in  His
goodness  and  should  regard  Him  as  nurse,  father,  teacher,  counsellor,
physician, mind, light, honour, glory, strength and life.”331
Notice that there seems to be no negative names of God in this passage. The
reason for this is, arguably, that all these names refer to God's activities, and not
his essence. This seems to presuppose the Judeo-Christian distinction (see below).
As a side remark we could notice that the author's words in §9.6 might seem
similar to Irenaeus who writes that:
“God  had  mercy  upon  His  creation,  and  bestowed  upon  them  a  new
salvation  through His  Word,  that  is,  Christ,  so  that  men might  learn  by
experience that  they cannot attain to incorruption of  themselves,  but  by
God's grace only.”332
The similarity consists in this that it is by experience that human beings come to
know both their own inadequacy and the grace of God, and that both elements of
the Gospel. There is an important difference between the two, though. Irenaeus
seems to be claiming that it is the positive revelation of Christ that itself leads to
knowledge of the negative point, that humankind cannot save itself. In contrast to
this the author  seems to be saying that this negative knowledge is brought about
“in the former time (τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ)”333, i.e. before God’s revelation of his Son.
Now, it seems fairly obvious that it is God who “demonstrated” (Ἐλέγξας) the
inability of human nature to obtain life by itself. This ‘demonstration’ is not neutral,
since ἐλέγχω means to demonstrate in the negative sense, reproof, refute or even
to disgrace.334 But God does not reproof actively, but by holding back, by hiding
himself.  Hence  God  demonstrates  the  inability  of  humankind  to  save  itself
331AdDiog. 9.6, tr. Lightfoot, modified
332Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5. 21.3
333AdDiog. 9.6
334LSJ, ”ἐλέγχω”
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passively,  so  to  speak,  by  not  saving  it.  While  it  is  still  God  himself  who
demonstrates  the  inability  of  humankind,  this  seems  to  allow  for  a  greater
emphasis on the activity of humankind, who must be the one who acts and gains
experience, albeit in vain attempts at attaining life by its own deeds.
It is also God that ‘shows forth’ (δείξας) the alternative, the savior who is able to
save “creatures which have no ability” (Lightfoot)  (τὸν σωτῆρα δείξας δυνατὸν
σῴζειν καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα). This could also be given the more pointed translation as
“able  to  save  even  those  things  which  it  was  [formerly]  impossible  to  save”
(Roberts-Donaldson),  or  even  simply  that  God  has  revealed  (brought  to  light,
δείξας) a savior able to save 'the impossible'. But where God demonstrates the
negative  fact  of  humankind’s  inability  by  not  acting,  this  ‘showing  forth’  of  a
positive fact is an active doing by God.
It is this almost paradoxical two-foldedness that is the object of the knowledge
which is the precondition of faith. The demonstration of the inability of human
nature to obtain life by itself is the content of God's all-embracing judgment over
humankind, while his revelation of a savior is the revelation of salvation for the
self-same humankind. Notice again that we are talking about knowledge in the
sense of  'acknowledgement'  (ἐπιγνώσῃ).  Hence we do not  necessarily  (hardly!)
have to do with propositional knowledge, from which is 'deduced' faith. The author
does not speak about this two-foldedness as premises from which we deduce a
conclusion,  but  he  simply  says  that  out  of  both  (ἐξ  ἀμφοτέρων)  God  willed
(ἐβουλήθη)  us  to  come  to  faith  (πιστεύειν).  Neither  are  we  talking  about  an
intuitive insight into the mysteries of God (would not such insight be a 'gnosis'
rather than an 'epi-gnosis'?). If such insights come, they only come later, as a result
of faith and the imitation of the divine love (as in §10.7, see below).
Rather,  we  are  talking  about  the  dialectical  mechanisms  that  produce  the
epistemological preconditions of faith. The elements of this mechanism is reproof
(from  ἐλέγξας)  and  proof  (from  δείξας),  to  put  it  squarely.  As  soon  as  both
elements have been established we find an apophatic (indirect through negation)
structure similar to that discussed in relation to the first polemical chapters. This
means that  the knowledge of  God’s  positive revelation in  some way implies or
‘contains’ the negative knowledge of God’s reproof and vice versa. It is, to be sure,
only after the establishment of this structure that apophaticism becomes possible.
Negative  theology  is,  in  the  epistle,  not  a  way  of  doing  natural  theology  with
alternative means, but the presupposed structure for a revealed theology.
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The  immediate  result  of  the  attainment  of  the  “full  knowledge”  is  “joy
(χαρᾶς)”335, which is (it seems) basically a form of love for God: “Or, how will you
love Him who has first so loved you?”336, the author asks rhetorically. It does not
seem to be the case, however, that this love follows mechanically,  by necessity,
since  the  author  says  that  God  willed  (“ἐβουλήθη”)  “that  for  both  reasons  we
should believe”. There is some need for voluntary acceptance of this knowledge,
which also fits with the claim that by sending his Son, God sought to “persuade,
not to compel us”337, though maybe not so much in the active, Clementine sense of
faith as prolepsis. The author's claims in §10.3 seems to imply that the love for God
rises with at least some degree of spontaneity from the knowledge of Him. Hence
the role of the human will in faith arguably has to do with more or less passively
accepting this spontaneity (maybe as not ‘fighting against’) rather than an active
voluntary choice to have faith.
Imitation of God, Christian virtues and the character and 
possibility of ethical principles
The following chapters discusses what we might understand by Christian ethics.
The first part will deal with the question of what the actual contents of imitation
(“μιμητὴς [...] Θεοῦ”338) is in the epistle. By doing this we turn the chronology of
the epistle on its head. In the epistle the 'lifestyle' of the Christians is described
before the more specific claims about their imitation of God is put forth. This has a
rhetorical advantage, but for systematic reasons we will start with considering the
idea of imitation before discussing its concrete consequences. In other words we
will start with meta-ethics, before discussing ethics.
When we have some idea of what the Christian virtues might look like, we also
become able to address the question, of whether or not the Christians does really
only live by the rules, customs and laws of the world, or whether it is possible to
formulate an ethics (a set of ethical principles) on the background of the proposed
virtues. If it is, then the question immediately raised is to what degree such ethics
is compatible with the customs, norms and laws of the world?
Again the negative character of the Christian theology is central. On the one
hand Christians are to be known exactly by the fact that they are ‘invisible’. On the
other  they are to  imitate  the  incarnate  logos  as it  reveals  itself  in  a  concrete
history and relatedness to human beings in the world.
335AdDiog. 10.3, tr. Lightfoot
336AdDiog. 10.3, tr. Lightfoot
337AdDiog. 7.4, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
338AdDiog. 10.4
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Imitating God
From the love that grows from the knowledge (“Ἐπιγνοὺς”339) of God's saving
works follows  imitation (§10.4-6). Hence we turn to the theme of imitating God
(“μιμητὴς [...] Θεοῦ”). This is a central theme in the epistle, since the author seems
to equate ‘happiness’ with imitation of God.340 The latter is not simply a means to
happiness, soon to be thrown away, or an optional element in the Christian life,
suitable for some, but rather the whole point of the Christian ‘mode of worship’ as
such.
Of course we cannot take for granted that the author presupposes the 'standard'
eudaimonistic idea of happiness as the purpose of human life and the aim of human
practices and ethics. That the author does mention happiness can simply be due to
the fact the he expects the recipient to be familiar with a eudaimonistic framework
and terminology.
That  to  be  happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν)  is  closely  related to  imitation  of  God is  not
something that the author states expressly in positive terms. But in §10.5 he lists a
range of activities, practices, and so on, that are identified with not ‘to be happy’:
“For  it  is  not  by  ruling  over  his  neighbours,  or  by  seeking  to  hold  the
supremacy  over  those  that  are  weaker,  or  by  being  rich,  and  showing
violence  towards  those  that  are  inferior,  that  happiness  is  found
(εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστίν); nor can any one by these things become an imitator of
God (τις μιμήσασθαι Θεόν).”341
Hence in §10.5 the closest we get to a definition of happiness is in negative
terms. In §10.6 we get a positive definition of what it means to imitate God, but
happiness is not mentioned. It seems reasonable to presuppose, however, that as
§10.5 identifies not to be happy with not imitating God, a symmetric identification
is implied in §10.6,  so that happiness is conceived as consisting in imitation of
God.342
Before discussing the actual contents of imitation, we might ask what exactly it
means  to  ‘imitate’  something,  according  to  the  author?  Already  during  the
polemics against Paganism the author utilized an idea of  likeness,  though in a
polemical, negative sense. In §2 the author claimed that Pagan worshipers become
339AdDiog. 10.3
340AdDiog. 10.5-10.6. Being happy, “εὐδαιμονεῖν”.
341AdDiog. 10.5, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
342To put it squarely, even though ~a=>~b does not mean that a=>b (that not imitating 
God does not lead to happiness does not logically mean that imitating God leads to 
happiness), the rhetorical context seems to imply such an inference, or at least claim, 
however.
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“altogether like unto (τέλεον δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐξομοιοῦσθε)”343 the sculptures that they
worship,  i.e.  subject  to  change,  “dumb  (κωφὰ)”  “blind  (τυφλά)”,  “soulless
(ἄψυχα)”,  “senseless (ἀναίσθητα)” and “motionless (ἀκίνητα)”.344 Hence we see
that a theme of  likeness is  introduced already in the polemical  sections of  the
epistle. But it is only in §10.4 that such a theme is introduced in a positive sense, of
imitating God.
Such  language  seems  to  have  an  origin  not  in  Biblical  literature,  but  in
philosophical  traditions, especially Platonism and Pythagoreanism, as well  as in
Philo.345 As such the language of imitation was common, as was the vocabulary
based in conceptions of eudaimonia.
Heintz concludes that “[...]the idea as found in The Epistle to Diognetus seems
less dependent upon either Paul or Ignatius than upon ideas current in Hellenistic
philosophy.”346 Heintz nevertheless argues that “a subtle shift” takes place in the
way the language of imitation of God is applied in the epistle. Imitation of God,
Heintz notes, is  in the epistle not a question of imitating a disembodied divine
impassibility, but of following the incarnated Logos. Heinz is arguably right, even if
the author gives God the names “Nourisher, Father, Teacher, Counsellor, Healer,
our Wisdom, Light, Honour, Glory, Power, and Life”347. These names might seem
like  abstract  properties  of  the  divine  nature  as  such.  This  is  hardly  the  case,
though. They are something that we can only apply to God, when we acknowledge
that  he  has  revealed  his  plan  of  salvation  (before  this  he  seemed to  be  quite
different, not caring).348 Hence all these names refer to particular activities of God
in relation to us, not abstract properties. This means that imitation of God does not
mean acquiring characteristics in the abstract or essentially, but is always related
to a concrete context and narrative.
Imitation of God means attaining a likeness to the incarnate Logos, the concrete
actions of God in the life of Jesus Christ. What facilitates such imitation is not a
self-disciplined growth in virtue, but the intervention of God himself in the Logos.
To what degree the possibility of imitation depends on the will of God or the will of
the  imitator  himself  is  not  very  clear,  however.  The  author  simply  states  that
“δύναται, θέλοντος αὐτοῦ”, which can be translated as “He can, if  God willeth
343AdDiog. 2.5, tr. Lightfoot
344AdDiog. 2.3, 2.4
345See Heintz, Michael: Journal of Early Christian Studies, Volume 12, No. 1, 2004, pp. 
107-119
346Heintz 2004, p. 118
347AdDiog. 9.6, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
348AdDiog. 9.6
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it”349 or “if God wills it, it is possible”350, but is more precisely translated as “He
can, if he is willing”351, which is much more ambiguous. Other translations even
suggest “he can if he himself is willing”352.  Now, this is of course important for
establishing a proper understanding of  the role of  the will  of  human beings in
salvation.
Heintz  argues  that  in  the epistle,  “[m]oral  living (living in  imitation  of  God)
depends upon the knowledge of God revealed in his Son”, and that “neither moral
living nor the knowledge of God is the product of human insight or effort”353. God
acts before human beings can do anything. This does not mean that God's will is
absolutely determining, however. In §9.6 the term used for ‘will’ is ἐβουλήθη which
is arguably a less determined notion of will than the θέλοντος in §10.4. It seems
that in §9.6 God wills, in the sense of wishes,354 that human beings come to faith as
a result of the two-folded knowledge of their own inability to attain life, and God’s
plan  of  salvation.  But  he  does  not  determine  the  will  of  human beings  by  an
irresistible  force,  as in  the later  radically  anti-Pelagian,  Augustinian account.355
This would also seem to contradict the author's claim that God uses “persuasion,
not force”356. It might seem that something of the 'Augustinian' kind is rather the
case in §10.4. But even if the will of God is understood in a more determinate sense
(maybe  as  decree)  here,  it  is  crucial  that  it  is  only  the  possibility  or  ability
(δύναται) of imitation that is willed by God. Even if the human will  is to some
degree free to choose to imitate God, the author does not hold a ‘moralistic’ view
of imitation. He does not set up imitation as a possibility that must be actualized by
following a certain set of moral norms (with or without ‘efforts’). Rather imitation
seems to follow spontaneously from the love for God that follows from faith, which
again  (if  not  resisted,  as  argued)  follows  from  the  twofolded  knowledge
(ἐπίγνωσις) of God.
Now, if we are right in claiming that the epistle in some sense presupposes the
Judeo-Christian  distinction,  then  this  would  arguably  form  the  fundamental
structure of what it means to imitate God. If it is true that the Creator is essentially
different from everything else, in such a way that He can be known only through
his  revelation,  then should  we not  expect  this  structure  to  be  reflected in  the
349AdDiog. 10.4, tr. Lightfoot
350AdDiog. 10.4, tr. Heintz 2004
351AdDiog. 10.4, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
352My translation of Marius Th. Nielsen, Oldkirkens Ældste Forkyndelse.
353Heintz 2004, p. 117
354As “ἐλθεῖν” in 1 Tim 2:4
355E.g. Augustine, Retractiones 2.61
356AdDiog. 7.4, tr. Lightfoot
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author's idea of imitation of God? This at least seems to be the case if we re-read
§5.1  (the  claim  that  Christians  are  not  distinguished  from  others)  and  the
subsequent chapter in the light of §10.4 (the claim that Christians imitate God). We
shall for now at least assume the plausibility of the idea that Christians in essence,
so to speak, imitate the divine essence by being invisible, while in action imitating
the divine activities (the incarnate Logos), through neighborly love. This is in a
sense verified by the statements in  preceding chapters:  Our hypothesis  is  that
imitation of God must lead to certain characteristics, which we can find described
earlier in the epistle.
Imitation and the epistle’s view of the atonement
We cannot simply reduce the epistle's concept of imitation of God to a matter of
imitation of the divine essence versus imitation of the divine activities in general.
The significance of the incarnation is to central for this. Rather, in the epistle these
two aspects play together in a history of salvation. It is this history that must be
imitated. Hence we shall briefly consider the view of the atonement present in the
epistle, and how this relates to other aspects in the texts. Because of its theological
implications, having a grip on the epistle’s view of the atonement might help us
deepen our understanding of what it  means to imitate God, and what Christian
virtues and thus ethics might be like.357
Imitation of God is about imitating God's work of salvation. As the Son forsook
power and became a servant to help those in need, Christians should not pursue
power, but help those in need.358 The author's claims in §10.5-10.6 can easily be
compared to Jesus' words in Matt 20:25-28, where the conduct of the disciples in
relation to (political) power is, as in The Epistle to Diognetus, to be shaped after
the works of God in the atonement. As the Son did not come to rule but to give his
life as a ransom, so the disciples should not pursue power.359 Similarly the epistle
talks of the atonement in terms of ransom (λύτρον).
Hence  it  would  be  no  surprise  that  in  so  far  we  could  find  an  idea  of  the
atonement,  then  it  would  be  the  version  of  the  'classical  view'  known  as  the
'ransom theory'.360 In the ‘classical’ view God does not require an offering to satisfy
357We are not here assuming that there was anything like a codified 'Christian virtue 
ethics' in the 2nd century, comparable to that of, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica 1a2ae
358AdDiog. 10.5-10.6
359Matt 20:28
360According to Gustaf Aulen this was the typical view before Anselm, who in Cur Deus 
Homo?, held that Christ died as an offering (directly) to the Father, satisfying His 
righteous anger against the sins of humankind from ‘below’ (i.e., as a man). Aulen 1931.
Aulen argued that Clement, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, amongst others in the Greek 
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his anger, as in later theologies, but sends his Son out of love for humankind. By
his incarnation, life and death Christ defeats the (cosmic) powers of death, sets
humankind free and thereby atones from ‘above’ (as God). The version of this idea
known as the 'ransom theory' holds that Christ was paid as a ransom to death or
the  devil  (rather  than  as  an  offering  to  God),  who  rightly  held  powers  over
humankind,  who had sold itself  by turning from God in sin.  Often the ‘ransom
theory’ (though maybe not so much a theory as a metaphor) is formulated on the
background of some idea of  ‘fairness’.  By sinning humankind had sold itself  to
death, which now has a legitimate claim to humankind. But rather than using force
to regain his property God plays ‘by the rules’ and pays death with His Son.361
The ransom theory seems to be the form of the classical view held by the author
of The Epistle to Diognetus. God, the author says, was not angry, but send his Son
as a ransom (λύτρον). This also fits with the high regard the author seems to have
for the laws and customs of the world. Even if the world persecutes Christians
these laws and customs are not illegitimate, and should be followed even if they
are  not  made  by  God,  but  by  sinful  human  beings.  Of  course  there  is  a  big
difference between Christians following the laws of the world and God following
some sort of ‘cosmic fairness’ in the atonement. But if we consider the chapters on
the Christians’ way of life in §5 in the light of the idea of imitation in §10.4-10.6 the
alleged Christian attitude towards the laws and customs of the world described
could arguably be read as an expression of such imitation. And with the author's
view of the atonement as ransom in mind, such a reading could also shed light on
the claim that while Christians “obey the established laws” they at the same time
“surpass the laws in their own lives”362. As Christ so to speak went ‘under cover’,
taking  on  human  flesh,  in  order  to  conquer  death,  albeit  in  a  ‘lawful  way’
(borrowing a term from Gregory of  Nyssa),  the Christians overcome the world
exactly when they obey the laws of the world. Imitating God means to submit to
the powers of the world, as Christ did, but it also means to defeat these exactly by
submitting to them (the apparent paradoxes in §5).
What characterizes the classical view of the atonement, and the ransom theory
in particular, is that it is non-violent.363 This fits well with the ethics in §10.5, where
tradition, as well as Augustine, held the ransom theory, while the ransom view cannot 
be explicitly found in for example Athanasius.
361Hence Gregory of Nyssa writes that: “There was a kind of necessity for Him not to 
proceed by way of force, but to accomplish our deliverance in a lawful way.” OrCat. 22. 
Similarly the author of The Epistle to Diognetus stresses that Christ used “persuasion, 
not force”. AdDiog. 7.4, Lightfoot
362AdDiog. 5.10, tr. Lightfoot
363See Weaver 2001
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power (political rule), wealth and violence are all denounced as being foreign to
God. And in so far as the lack of these attributes in God are seen in the light of the
atonement, rather than in the abstract, this again affirms that the imitation of God
is not an imitation of abstract properties but of the incarnate Logos as it acts in the
person of Jesus Christ.
As we have seen, the author of the epistle understands Pagan worship to imply
enslavement to dead things.364 Divine revelation (or rather the epistemologically
negative fact that  God chooses to hide himself)  convicts  this as an instance of
humanity’s desperate attempt at gaining life by it’s own deeds. But thereby is also
paved the way for the revelation of the divine  logos,  the Son who by paying a
ransom to death frees humanity from its sins. If Christians are to imitate, not God
in the abstract, but the incarnate the logos, then this narrative must be central for
imitation.
Describing the ethics of imitation
So how are we to describe the character of  the Christians? If  we are to be
consequent in following the author's claim in §10.6, that “whosoever by supplying
to those that are in want possessions which he received from God becomes a God
to  those who receive”365,  are we not  to  conclude that  such giving ('supplying')
should  structurally  resemble  the  revelation  of  the  Logos?  If  so  imitating  God
should resemble the dialectics of ignorance and revelation discussed above. As
God is invisible in a radical (epistemological) sense, but reveals himself, Christians
should, by imitating God, paradoxically express their invisibility when practicing
love for their neighbors.
The author  rejects  a  consequentialistic  idea  of  virtue,  also  the  common one
implied by much virtue ethics, where virtue is a means to happiness. Imitation of
God follows more or less spontaneously from the acknowledgment of the Gospel,
happiness being a by-product hereof.366 But this means also that even if imitation of
God is (partly) invisible, happiness can be an indirect sign that such imitation takes
place.
As quoted above, the author introduces the theme of imitation by correlating
this with a negative definition of happiness. The characteristics mentioned in §10.5
and  defined  as  foreign  (ἐκτὸς)  to  God’s  majesty  (μεγαλειότητος),  and  as
incompatible with happiness, can be summed up as power (”lordship over one's
364AdDiog. 2.5
365AdDiog. 10.6, tr. Lightfoot
366Hence the author follows a common Christian notion of works as the ‘fruits’ of faith., 
e.g. Matt 7:17; Rom 5:1-5
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neighbours”), wealth (”desiring to have more than weaker men, nor in possessing
wealth”)  and violence (”using force to inferiors”).367 What is  most  important in
§10.5  is,  however,  that  all  these  belong  to  a  certain  type  of  relation  between
persons,  namely  that  of  superiority  and inferiority.  As  such what  we  have  are
relational rather than essential definitions. This fits well with the claim above, that
Christian ethics, being an imitation of the incarnate Logos, is related to a certain
narrative (the atonement), and thus concrete. When the author gives a positive
definition of imitation in §10.6 the same thing is the case:
“[...]he who takes upon himself  the burden of  his neighbour;  he who,  in
whatsoever respect he may be superior, is ready to benefit another who is
deficient;  he  who,  whatsoever  things  he  has  received  from  God,  by
distributing these to the needy, becomes a god to those who receive [his
benefits]: he is an imitator of God.”368
One thing that is immediately striking here is that imitating God is equated with
becoming a god to others. Hence imitating God results in the imitator to become a
god.  This  might  seem  to  resemble  the  later  language  of  deification.369 But
deification is for the author not as much a matter of ‘growing’ in virtue or in other
ways becoming ‘divine’ as it a matter of relating to others in certain manner.  We
are not talking about becoming any ‘god’ in the abstract. The author talks about
becoming “a god to those who receive”,  so being a god is relationally defined.
Understanding what it means to become ‘a god’ to others always presupposes the
narrative  of  the  incarnate  logos,  the  Son  of  the  patient  and  loving  God,  that
becomes a  servant  for  humankind.  As  God became a  servant,  the  servant  will
become a god, we might say.
As noted the author describes God with the names “Nourisher, Father, Teacher,
Counsellor, Healer, our Wisdom, Light, Honour, Glory, Power, and Life”370. These
are,  of  course,  all  ‘biblical’  terms.  But  what  does  it  mean  to  imitate  these
properties? If we are right that they are not abstract properties, but refer to God’s
activities in the world, then in general imitation of these must mean that in its
positive  aspect,  imitation  of  God is  always  a  relational,  concrete  matter.  In  its
negative  aspect,  imitation  means  in  some  way  staying  invisible  even  as  these
relations unfolds.
If  Christians  are  to  imitate  not  only  the  positive  saving  work  of  God,  his
367AdDiog. 10.5, tr. Lightfoot
368AdDiog. 10.6, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
369For example Irenaeus’ notion that God became man so that Man can become god.
370AdDiog. 9.6, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
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‘philantropy’371,  then the invisibility  of  God should  mean that  Christians are to
eschew  all  positive  definitions  ‘as  such’.  No  “human  dogma  (δόγματος
ἀνθρωπίνου)”,  “invention  (ἐπινοίᾳ)”372 etc.  can  capture  the  Christian  mode  of
worship.373 So  it  is  arguably  the  case  that  imitation  of  God  also  implies  the
imitation of  God’s  negative  (invisible)  qualities.  At  least  this  would explain  the
behavior of Christians described in §5.
The dialectics  in  §9.6 is  arguably  reflected in the Christian imitation of  God
which  is  simultaneously  invisible  (in  terms  of  the  impossibility  of  capturing
Christian worship) and visible (in terms of the relationality created by the imitation
of  God’s  ‘philanthropy’).  The  Christian  way  of  life  is  “is  marvellous,  and
confessedly  contradicts  (παράδοξον)  expectation.”374 In  other  words,  what  we
might call ‘visible invisibility’ and ‘invisible visibility’ is a central Christian virtue.
Imitating  God  means  being  invisible  while  simultaneously  doing  “philanthropy
(φιλανθρωπία)”.375
The possibility and character of ethical principles
The following discusses how radically we should understand the author's claim
that Christians do not follow any particular ‘customs’ or ‘arrangements of life’, on
the background of the above.376 Where does this leave the possibility of formulating
an ethics (with moral principles, guidelines or something similar), whether positive
or negative? What is the fundamental structure of ethical principles if the above
idea of Christian ethics and virtue as the imitation of God is taken for granted?
It is important to grasp how the imitation of God, and as such Christian ethics in
general, relates to what we above have called the idea of ‘ambassadorship’, that
Christians are in but not of the world. The positive ethics sketched above is not
some sort of abstract ideal to be realized in Christian worship or modes of life (it is
indicative  rather  than  imperative).  Rather  Christians  are  first  of  all  supposed
simply to be present in the world, as the soul is present in the body.377 When thus
contextualized in a concrete relationship with the surrounding world, imitation of
God will have consequences in actual practices.
We  regularly  find  that  the  themes  of  the  epistles  are  structured  around  a
371AdDiog. 8.7; 9.2
372Or 'conception'. This was the term so central for Gregory of Nyssa. Exactly because 
God is incomprehensible, we need to make up words. But Gregory is, of course, not talking 
about making up new dogmas. See below.
373AdDiog. 5.3
374AdDiog. 5.4, tr. Lightfoot
375Philanthropy was also a central concept in Philo. See Heintz 2004
376AdDiog. 5.1-5.2
377AdDiog. 6.1-6.9
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framework where negative theology and revelation are inseparable. This suggests
that we should also introduce the consideration of ethics with an account of the
epistle’s negative claims about customs, moral norms, law, etc. as the natural or
even necessary presupposition for considering the epistle’s positive claims. The
question is, is there such a thing as moral principles in Christian ethics, and if so
what then is the relationship between negative and positive definitions?
First  we  will  consider  the  author's  claims  about  the  “officiousness
(πολυπραγμοσύνης)” of the Jews, their “inventions (ἐπινοίᾳ)”, “impulses (ὁρμάς)”
and  “dogma  (δόγματος)”.378 It  should  be  noted  that  the  term  used  for  the
‘officiousness’ (πολυπραγμοσύνης) of the Jews, appears again in §5.3 as adjective
(πολυπραγμόνων),  translated  as  “ingenious”  by  Lightfoot  and  “inquisitive”  by
Roberts-Donaldson.  Hence,  the  ‘invention’  (ἐπινοίᾳ,  which  Christians  do  not
posses)  might  very  well  refer  to  Jewish  rules.  As  such  ‘invention'  would  most
probably be the product of the ‘impulses’ (ὁρμάς) that the author claims that the
Jews are ruled by.379 Whether ‘dogma’ (δόγματος) refers to Jewish beliefs is more
questionable, since this term usually have either a more philosophical or political
meaning  (doctrine,  ordinance,  decree).380 Being  aware  of  the  rhetorical  and
polemical context we should be cautious of interpreting such terms too technically.
It is not impossible that by both ‘invention’ and ‘dogma’ is meant ‘human wisdom’
as such. On the other hand the context suggests a more practical or ‘political’
emphasis (as argued above). If ‘invention’ and ‘dogma’ has a broader meaning than
Jewish beliefs in particular, at least the emphasis should be on specific (human)
laws, rules or ethical principles, since the lack of such is posed as an explanation
for why the Christians live after the same customs as others.
In §5.1-5.2 the author establishes a practical or customary similarity between
the Christians and “the rest of mankind (τῶν λοιπῶν [...] ἀνθρώπων)”381. But what
is  meant  by  “customs  (ἔσθεσι)”  and  what  does  it  mean  to  “practice  an
extraordinary kind of life” (which the Christians do not)? Now, the word used for
“practice (ἀσκοῦσιν)” literally means to practice in the sense of exercising, from
which we have asceticism, or even to dress up or form something by art.382 Now, if
this means that Christians are not ascetic, this is of course important for ethics.
Another term is “διαίτῃ”383,  from ‘δίαιτα’ which can be translated as dwelling,
378AdDiog. 4.6; 4.5
379AdDiog. 4.5
380LSJ, ”δόγματος”
381AdDiog. 5.1
382LSJ, ”ἁσκέω”
383AdDiog. 5.4
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lifestyle, or simply diet, which seems to be the proper translation here, because of
its connection with “ἐσθῆτι”, clothing or appearance. It  seems that “ἐσθῆτι καὶ
διαίτῃ” has a rather non-formal meaning. To be sure everything is included the
author adds “τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ”.
Now, is it possible to delineate a graded spectra of such practical terms, from
the non-formal native customs, “τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις ἔθεσιν”,  through the regulated,
though not wholly formal, 'ἀσκοῦσιν' to the perhaps more formal 'νόμοις'? If so,
we  see  that  the  author  covers  the  whole  spectrum  of  concepts  referring  to
practice,  leaving  no  room for  “τὴν  κατάστασιν  τῆς  ἑαυτῶν  πολιτείας”  in  this
spectra. In other words, the 'way of life' or 'constitution' of their own city is on a
different plane than the customs of the world.  Whether the variation of terms used
is consciously aimed at making this obvious or not, at any rate the variety of terms
ensures the ‘paradox’: Since there is no room for the Christian 'way of life' in the
spectra, it can only be paradoxically present alongside the customs of the world.
Still, imitation of God, also in the positive sense, is central to the ethics of the
epistle. If any ethical principles can be formulated at all the on basis of the above
account, such should in some way reflect the described tensions, whether explicitly
or implicitly. For example, it seems reasonable to formulate a positive principle
that says that imitators of God ought to (or ‘does’, to stay in the indicative) give to
those who are less well of. But even if this claim is really more indicative than
imperative (imitation following spontaneously from the love of God, rather than
being a matter of asceticism), this can never serve as a general, abstract criteria
for recognizing Christians in the world. Such descriptions can only be given in the
concrete so that we, in the case of the example, can talk about specific instances of
giving  or  helping  the  needy.  Only  in  particular  narratives  can  positive  ethical
principles play a more substantial role. This follows from the notion that imitation
of God in the positive is a relational, not an essential, thing (having to do with
activities, not essence).
Nevertheless it seems obvious that it is at least possible to distinguish between
different types of relating,  based on §10.5-6. Any kind of relationship based on
domination is ungodly, it  seems.384 Only by becoming a servant can one imitate
God. But exactly by becoming a servant (as opposed to master) one also becomes
‘invisible’, just as the Logos went ‘undercover’ in the incarnation. Hence it is easier
to say what an imitator of God does not look like in general, than saying something
384As such the gospel-accounts of ‘discipleship’ are not about imitating ‘the cross’ as a 
general ethical or existential category (for example self-denial in general). Imitating ‘the
cross’ means relating to political power in a specific way. See Yoder 1994
93
about  what  such a  person actually  looks like.  If  someone executes  power in  a
direct,  violent  way,  this  person  is  hardly  an  imitator  of  God.  But  one  is  not
necessarily  an imitator  of  God simply by not  executing power or even being a
servant. There is a problem of under-determination: Only if a person could have
acted otherwise, as God could have executed his power differently, and only if this
person acts out of the love for God that follows from faith and knowledge, is this
person an imitator of God. But whether someone's actions or lack of actions is the
result of this person being an imitator of God or not is uncertain.
As noted above the normatively negative properties that are described in §10.5,
and which the Christians lack, can be summed up as power, wealth and violence.
Concepts like these might be used in ethical principles to describe what imitation
of God does not look like. But it seems that because of their relational significance,
they only gain their full meaning from their propositional context (the principle and
the context in which it is applied), rather than the other way around. Violence is
not an abstract property of an action or the character of a person, that can be
pointed out and then be described as ‘wrong’. Rather the meaning as well as the
‘wrongness’ of violence follows from the fact that it is an instance of a certain type
of relationship. Only by seeing violence as opposite and incompatible with God’s
self-sacrificial love in the history of the atonement can we grasp the full meaning of
this phenomenon. Hence also negative ethical principles can only be understood as
they relate to a larger narrative context (God’s plan of salvation).
The  dialectics  of  this  is  that  such  negative  ethical  principles  if  understood
properly  automatically  implies  positive  statements.  That  domination  is  wrong
stems from the fact that God became a servant, and as such this negative fact is
parasitical on a positive theological claim.
The paradoxical ‘ethics of invisibility’ brings us back to the theme of §5-6. As
such §10.4 can be considered a central key to understanding the relationship of the
polemical chapters (§2-§4) with the indicative chapters (§5-§6).
The Christians and the World
We now have some notion of the fundamental idea of what characterizes the
Christians according to the epistle. This idea can be applied when we study the
author's descriptions of the Christians in the world.
In, but not of, the world
The  polemical  chapters  dealt  with  above  are  in  a  way  mostly  preliminary
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introductory  remarks,  meant  to  clear  the  possible  prejudices  held  by  the
recipient.385 In §5-6 we get to  what §1.1 seems to suggest  would be a positive
exposition of Christian religion. But after the remark in §4.6 we should expect an
account with a more indirect, negative character. Fundamentally these chapters of
the  epistle  deals  with  a  tension  or  paradox  between  visibility  and  invisibility:
Central is the claim that “Christians are recognised as being in the world, and yet
their religion remaineth invisible.”386
The ‘apophatic structure’ formed by the remarks in §1.1 and §4.6 is in §5-§6
filled  out  by  the  notion  that  Christians  are  in  some  way  ‘resident  aliens’,
“sojourners (πάροικοι)”387 living in a foreign country. This idea that Christians live
as strangers in the world is not unique to The Epistle to Diognetus. The notion is
traditionally expressed in the popular dictum that Christians are ‘in but not of the
world’, a paraphrase of such New Testament passages as Jn 17:15-16, Jn 18:36.
This ‘dictum’ is also (almost) expressly confirmed by the author when he notes that
“Christians dwell  in the world,  yet  are not of  the world (Χριστιανοὶ  ἐν κόσμῳ
οἰκοῦσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου)”388.
Christians are like sojourners in a foreign country. But the reason that it is not
possible to be instructed in the Christian religion by any man is,389 that Christians
live in accordance with the “customs (ἔσθεσι)”390 of the world: “For Christians are
not distinguished from the rest of mankind either in locality or in speech or in
customs.”391 Christians do not dwell in their own cities (a hint of political lingua).
Nor do they use a particular language, and they do not “practise an extraordinary
kind of life (βίον παράσημον ἀσκοῦσιν)”392.
The claims in §5.1-§5.2 follow immediately after the remark in §4.6, and as such
come to serve as the ‘explanans’ for which §4.6 is the ‘explanandum’ (that it is not
possible to be instructed by any man about the Christian religion). The author's
description  in  §5.3  seems  to  serve  as  further  explanation  for  the  Christians’
customary similarity with the world. Here the author notes that Christians do not
possess “any invention discovered by any intelligence or study of ingenious men
(ἐπινοίᾳ  τινὶ  καὶ  φροντίδι  πολυπραγμόνων  ἀνθρώπων)”,  nor  are  Christians
“masters of any human dogma (δόγματος ἀνθρωπίνου προεστᾶσιν)”.393 There is an
385AdDiog. 2.1
386AdDiog. 6.4, tr. Lightfoot
387AdDiog. 5.5, tr. Lightfoot
388AdDiog. 6.3, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
389AdDiog. 4.6
390AdDiog. 5.1, Lightfoot
391AdDiog. 5.1, Lightfoot
392AdDiog. 5.2, tr. Lightfoot
393AdDiog. 5.3, tr. Lightfoot
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obvious similarity with this claim and the polemics against the Jews, which might
prove relevant for the possibility of ethics as such on the grounds of the authors
epistemology. The invisibility of the Christians is explained by the lack of 'dogmas'
and 'inventions'. What is crucial is  of course what creates this lack. As argued
above this stems from the fact that Christians imitate the invisibility of God.
A ‘political’ paradox?
There is more to say about the epistle's use of 'political' metaphors. Hence we
will return to §5.4 and §5.9, the latter in which the author notes that the Christians
“pass  their  days  on  earth,  but  they  are  citizens  of  heaven  (ἐν  οὐρανῷ
πολιτεύονται)”394. But as suggested, already the claim that Christians do not dwell
in their own cities has a political significance (though the claim is without a direct
reference to their ‘heavenly citizenship’). This significance becomes clear as it is
further developed in §5.4. Here the author has the following important observation
about the Christians:
“But while they dwell (Κατοικοῦντες) in cities of Greeks and barbarians as
the lot of each is cast, and follow the native customs in dress and food and
the other arrangements of life, yet the constitution of their own citizenship
(τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πολιτείας), which they set forth, is marvellous,
and confessedly contradicts (παράδοξον) expectation.”395
As in §5.1 we see a reference to “customs (ἔθεσιν)”. But in §5.4 the author adds
“and the other arrangements of life (τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ)”, which seems to cover pretty
much everything else that has to  do with lifestyle,  or  'bodily'  or  'practical'  life
(βίῳ).  Against  this  is  posed  “the  constitution  of  their  own  citizenship  (τὴν
κατάστασιν  τῆς  ἑαυτῶν πολιτείας)”.  Allusions  to  heavenly  citizenship  like  this
inserts a political imagery into the ‘in but not of the world’-structure, and reflect
such NT passages as Phil.  3:20 (“our citizenship is  in heaven”396).  But what  is
exactly  meant  by  ‘κατάστασιν’,  translated  by  Lightfoot  as  “constitution”,  and
‘πολιτείας’,  translated  as  “citizenship”  (though  both  terms  can  actually  be
translated as ‘constitution’)?  Roberts-Donaldson translates ‘τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς
ἑαυτῶν  πολιτείας’  as  “their  […]  method  of  life”,  which,  however,  is  close  to
swallowing up any political significance. On the other hand ‘πολιτείας’ does have a
broader meaning than simply ‘citizenship’ in the political sense, in that it can also
mean the concrete collection of citizens, as well as the daily life of the citizen.397
394AdDiog. 5.9, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
395AdDiog. 5.4, tr. Lightfoot
396Phil. 3:20, NIV
397LSJ, “πολιτεία”. The LSJ refers to Arist. Pol. 1292a34.
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Also  ‘κατάστασιν’  tends  to  have  a  slightly  more  concrete  meaning  than
‘constitution’ (in the judicial-political sense) in some contexts, meaning ‘condition’,
‘settlement’, ‘position’ (military) etc.398
This “constitution of their [...] citizenship” is contrary to expectation, a paradox
(παράδοξον), though of course not in the common modern sense of a logical self-
contradiction or absurdity. Rather 'paradox' here means something that is besides
what is apparent. But not only is the Christian religion (if we can equate this with
the  “constitution  of  their  [...]  citizenship”)  contrary  to  expectation,  it  is  also
“marvellous  (θαυμαστὴν)”.  Hence  it  seems  that  the  Christian  religion  is  not
altogether  invisible.  This  is  also  suggested  by  the  fact  that  A  describes  it  as
something that the Christians “set forth” (ἐνδείκνυνται), or ‘exhibits’, ‘displays’,
‘declares’, ‘proves’. Again, this makes it reasonable to think of 'the paradox of the
Christian religion' (as we might call it) in terms of invisibility and visibility.
In §5.5 we get the impression that the 'paradox' discussed above consists in the
fact that Christians simultaneously live as ordinary citizens as well as if they were
strangers.
“They dwell in their own countries, but only as sojourners; they bear their
share in all things as citizens, and they endure all hardships as strangers.
Every  foreign  country  is  a  fatherland  to  them,  and  every  fatherland  is
foreign.”399
Hence Christianity  is  hardly  thought  of  here  as just  a  'parallel  culture',  but
rather  as  a  specific  attitude  towards  the  dominant  culture.  This  attitude  is
characterized by a certain detachment, made possible through the adherence to a
different 'constitution'.
In §5.10 the author notes that the Christians surpass (νικῶσι) the laws (νόμοις).
This seems to contradict the claim that Christians do not practice (or ‘exercise’)
any extraordinary kind of life. Hence what this ‘surpassing’ consists in, in political
or judicial terms, is not completely clear. This partly has to do with the fact that it
is not clear either what the author means by law, and what the purpose of the
worldly law is (whether actual or ideal). But the author does give us a range of
examples of how the life of Christians “contradicts expectation”. Especially from
§5.11-§5.17 (following the claim about the surpassing of the laws) these examples
exhibit a ‘paradoxical’ character, generally by exposing an asymmetry between the
Christians’ approach to the world and the world’s response, and vice versa, e.g.:
398LSJ, ”κατάστασις”
399AdDiog. 5.5
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“They are ignored, and yet they are condemned. They are put to death, and yet
they are endued with life.”400 The ‘law’ and the Christians’ relationship to this does
not seem play any role in these examples, however.
Though political lingua has a central role, especially in §5, it might seem that the
point of the author is not ‘political’ (judicial or constitutional) as such. Still, it is
obvious that the epistle points out a paradoxical or asymmetrical tension between
the Christian religion and the ‘laws’ and ‘customs’ of the world. It is paradoxical
since Christians are invisibly present in the world. This tension has a ‘political’
significance (though it might not as such be ‘political’ in the sense of having to do
with political philosophy or a certain political project), which is also present when
the author applies the soul-body analogy in §6. We will now move on to discuss this
analogy.
The context of the Christians’ presence in the world is the city. This means that
imitation of the incarnate logos has a certain ‘political’ meaning. The city (as a
broad concept) is where the powers of the world converge. Whether or not the
constitution  or  laws  of  the  city  is  the  result  of  such  power,  or  such  power  is
possible  because  of  the  formal  structures  present  in  the  city  is  a  matter  of
secondary  importance  (for  this  study  anyway).  What  is  important  is  that  the
Church  is  specifically  present  here  rather  than  elsewhere,  for  example  in  the
desert as some groups of Christians did in the centuries that followed. Not that
Christians cannot live in the desert, but such desert-dwelling would be relatively
unimportant compared to the Church’s task in the city. Christians are to imitate
God’s self-sacrificial  love where it  most clearly contradicts the norm. Not  by a
moralistic or political attempt to change to norms of power, and the rules and laws
of the world, but Christians are to “surpass the laws in their own lives”401. It is as
such that the life form of the Christians can be truly described as “paradoxical”402.
The soul-body analogy and ecclesiology
The use of political lingua and imagery might be more an allegory than an actual
depiction of the Christians’ relation to the world. This seems to be the case when
the author in §6.1-§6.9 goes on to use the relationship of the soul to the body as
analogy:  “In a word,  what  the soul  is  in a body,  this the Christians are in the
world.”403
There  are  of  course  rhetorical  purposes  for  the  invocation  of  the  soul-body
400AdDiog. 5.12, tr. Lightfoot
401AdDiog. 5.10, tr. Lightfoot
402AdDiog. 5.4
403AdDiog. 6.1, tr. Lightfoot
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relationship (rather than other analogies). Speaking of the Christians in the world
as the soul in the body would immediately invoke connotations in the audience,
who would typically share some basic notions of the soul as the invisible essence or
life  of  the  body.  Hence we should  not  necessarily  expect  to  find any coherent
‘anthropology’ (to use a modern term), or a ‘metaphysical theory’ of the soul or the
body,  simply  because  these  terms  are  used.  There  are,  however,  some  rather
explicit  presuppositions  about  the  soul  present  in  §6.  For  understanding  the
analogy  fully,  it  is  helpful  to  get  a  precise  overview of  these.  Moreover,  these
presuppositions might also prove to affect the way the author construes the notion
of “happiness (εὐδαιμονεῖν)” as consisting in the imitation of God.404
So what does the author say about the soul and the body? The soul is “spread”
(Lightfoot) or “dispersed” (Roberts-Donaldson) “through all  the members of the
body” (Lightfoot); the soul “dwells in the body, yet is not of the body” (Roberts-
Donaldson); the soul is invisible, but guarded in the body which is visible; the soul
is enclosed in the body, but holds the body together; the soul is immortal, while the
body is mortal .405 The term used for “spread” is ‘ἔσπαρται’, which can also mean
‘sown’ or even ‘begotten’.406 Interpreted as ‘sown’ this allows for the idea that the
Christians have been placed in the various cities of the world, though in a rather
non-systematic manner, which also fits with §5.4’s “as the lot of each is cast”.407
In §6.7 the author most importantly notes that as the soul “holdeth the body
together”, so the Christians “hold the world together”408.  From §6.8 we get the
impression that this is due to the fact that while the body is mortal, the immortal
soul can in some way communicate its life to the body. The author does not say this
explicitly, though, but since this was a common view of the soul’s role, the notion is
arguably implied to some degree in §6.7-§6.8.
The claim that Christians in some way preserve the world can from a modern
perspective easily sound like what might be termed ‘conservative’. Even if such
terminology is  anachronistic,  there might  had been some plausibility  to  such a
characteristic if the claim was made in a post-Constantinian context (as Overbeck
would  have  it).  But  since  the  epistle  was  probably  written  in  a  period  where
Christians were hardly likely to identify themselves as the protector of the political
404AdDiog. 10
405AdDiog. 6.2; 6.4; 6.7; 6.8
406LSJ, ”σπείρω”
407AdDiog. 5.4, tr. Lightfoot. That the cities of the world are like the members of the body 
easily yields the impression of the world as one organism. According to the logic of such
NT-passages as Rev. 13; 1 John 4:3, ‘Antichrist’ (or similar agents) would be the head of 
this body. But the author keeps the descriptions of the customs of the world in a neutral 
language (maybe due to the allegedly Pagan audience).
408AdDiog. 6.7, tr. Lightfoot
99
status  quo,  the  ‘conservative’  political  interpretation  is  unwarranted.  A  more
ontological  and  paradox-driven  understanding  seems  more  plausible:  The
Christians hold the world together despite of the conflicting political and spiritual
forces that is on the verve of tearing the world (and the Christians) apart. They do
so by simply by being present in every city of the world.
That the application of  the soul-body analogy in §6 comes after the political
imagery  in  §5  does  not  mean that  a  ‘metaphysical’  understanding  is  closer  to
reality than a ‘political’ one, but rather that reality can only be described in such
and  similar  analogies.  If  anything,  the  opposite  is  the  case  since  §6.1  clearly
suggests that the soul-body analogy is applied to make the political situation of the
Christians clear. The final remark in §6.10 also points in this direction: “God has
assigned them this illustrious position (τάξιν), which it were unlawful (οὐ θεμιτὸν)
for them to forsake.”409 The “position” mentioned could very well refer to the fact
that the Christians, as the soul in the members of the body, are “spread” through
the cities of the world (6.2). Hence the claims made during the use of the soul-body
analogy in §6 is finally tied up again to the political imagery in §5. By doing this the
author answers Diognetus’ question of how (in what way) the Christians worship
God (πῶς θρησκεύοντες αὐτὸν).410
Finally it should be remarked that the theme of the invisibility of the Christians
in the world is of course continuously present through the use of the soul-body
analogy, most explicitly in §6.4. In §6 the emphasis is, however, not so much on the
paradoxical  character of  the Christian religion,  as it  is  on the asymmetry (also
noted above) between the Christian’s attitude towards the world and  vice versa,
e.g.: “The soul loveth the flesh which hateth it, and the members: so Christians
love those that hate them.”411 It seems plausible, however, that 'love' and 'hate' in
this context should not be understood merely as attitudes or sentiments, but also
as activities.
Finally we should ask how an ecclesiology is possible given the above? How is
the Christian community related to itself? The above implies that the author's use
of the soul-body analogy means that the term ‘Christians’ must refer to the unity of
believers rather than simply the collection of individual Christians. As such §5-§6
arguably  implies  some  sort  of  ecclesiology.  The  soul-body  analogy  suggests  a
collective  understanding  of  the  Christians  in  such  a  way  that  the  plural  term
‘Christians’ is not just a reference to the sum total of individual believers. This is
409AdDiog. 6.10, tr. Roberts-Donaldson
410AdDiog. 1.1
411AdDiog. 6.6, tr. Lightfoot
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hardly controversial in a pre-modern context, but it should be noticed anyway, at
least  in  order  to  ward  of  modern  ‘existentialistic’  interpretations  or  similar
anachronisms inclined to an individualistic notion of faith. One obvious reason that
the  soul-body  analogy  goes  against  such  readings  is  that  the  plural  of  the
‘Christians’  is  analogized  with  the  singular  of  ‘the  soul’.  Most  recipients
(Diognetus), despite of their specific philosophical affiliations, would probably have
held to a notion of the soul as the essence of the body in a way that implies its
unity (even if one held to a view of the soul as composite). There is, on the other
hand, no hints of a hierarchical or corporative idea of the Church. Different ideas
of functions in the soul could have been utilized for such purposes, but the author
primarily uses the soul as a metaphor for invisibility. Hence this does not leave
much  room  for  distinctions  in  the  descriptions  of  the  Christians  (maybe  a
perspective from the 'inside' would look different). But also, the author's emphasis
that  Christians does not pursue power might  be a sign that  a too hierarchical
ecclesiology is foreign to the author.
Conclusion
The point of the above have been to show how the Judeo-Christian distinction
between  Creator  and  creation  structures  the  arguments  of  The  Epistle  to
Diognetus.  This  distinction  means  that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  about  God
unless he reveals himself. God is essentially ineffable, but comprehensible in his
activities.  Since imitation of God is a central ethical concern in the epistle,  we
expected to see this to affect the author's claims about Christian conduct.
It has been argued that the imitation of God for the author is simultaneously
imitation of the invisibility of God and of God as he reveals himself in the concrete
history  of  salvation.  Invisibility  has  for  the  author  a  general  epistemological
meaning.  That  God  is  invisible  means  that  he  is  completely  inaccessible  to
philosophy.
Invisibility is to be understood in a radical sense. This is why Christians are
somewhat paradoxically on the hand invisibly present in the world, following the
customs of whatever city they live in, while they on the other hand do not pursue
power and wealth. Rather Christians, while staying invisible, exercise philanthropy,
love  for  neighbor,  by  giving  to  those  in  need.  Philanthropy  is  relational,  not
essential. Love is not an abstract property of neither God nor the Christians, but
something that God and his imitators, the Christians, do in the world. Because of
its concrete character positive Christian ethics can only be unfolded in a particular
historical  context.  As such what makes ethical  principles possible is the actual
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setting of the Christian life. The imitation of the incarnate logos always implies the
tension of ‘not being of the world’ and thus being invisible and removed (even in a
sense abstracted) from the world, and at the same time ‘being in the world’ which
is  something  visible  and  relative  (and  thus  concrete).  Precisely  because  of  its
concrete  character,  the  latter  aspect  is  not  some general  characteristic  of  the
Christians, but must unfold in a specific context.
Imitation of God does not mean imitation in the abstract, but of the incarnate
Logos, Jesus Christ. As God’s philanthropy and goodness are only revealed in His
concrete  relationship  with  humankind  as  he  displays  his  plan  of  salvation,
Christian ‘virtues’ are not intrinsic (unrelated) properties of the human person as
much as they are descriptive of the Church’s (the Christians’) relation to itself and
the world. On the one hand Christian ethics are thus concrete, but on the other
hand this does not mean that imitation of God as the incarnate Logos is a one-to-
one  reflection  of  the  life  of  Jesus.  Christians  are  not  to  stay  celibate  or  be
carpenters,  as  Jesus,  but  to  imitate  the  dialectics  exhibited  in  God’s  plan  of
salvation.
The themes of custom and law are for the author bound up with a concrete
relationship with the city (used as a broad, generic term). The epistle repeatedly
refers  to  ‘constitution(s)’.  The  city  and  its  constitution  is  the  locus  for  the
regularities of the world, and the concrete context of the Christians’ relation to the
world. The city is where the Christian community is simultaneously invisible and
visible. Hence Christian ethics need always be unfolded on the background of a
certain historical and political narrative.
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Part III. Clement of Alexandria
“[I]n the case of people who are setting out on a road with which they are
unacquainted, it  is  sufficient merely to point out the direction. After this
they must walk and find out the rest for themselves.”  (Clement,  Stromata
4.2.4.4)
Introduction
Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) was most likely the head of the catechetical
school  of  Alexandria.412 Alexandria  was  a  melting  pot  for  Hellenic  culture  and
Jewish mysticism. Clement lived in a time where persecutions of Christians were
still  common,  and  where  clashes  with  strains  of  Gnosticism  shaped  Christian
thought. Clement might have been active in Caesarea in Cappadocia as well.
Clement is a good example of when Christian theology started to take over the
Platonic and similar ‘philosophical’ ideals of knowledge, ideals where such things
as virtue and ethical perfection are closely related to intellectual knowledge. In
The Instructor  Clement promised a coming work in systematic theology. Such a
work  never  came,  but  the  Stromata  is  the  likely  substitute.  Far  from being  a
systematic work of philosophy and theology, however, the Stromata is an eclectic
mixture of philosophical and theological remarks and reflections. As such Clement
falls into the same category as Philo of whom Dodds said that “his eclecticism is
that of the jackdaw rather than the philosopher”413. Clement explains that this is
fully intentional. And as we will argue, his way of writing in the Stromata reflects a
deeper connection between negative theology and moral philosophy, namely the
fact that theology (and theological ethics) for the true ‘Gnostic’ must always be
what we have called a theologia viatorum, a theology that  can be true, though a
final, adequate system is not attainable.
Because of the radical distinction between Creator and creation there can be no
'positive'  participation  in  the divine  being.  Imitation  of  God as a  way of  being
means being simple, as God is simple. This means being abstracted from all other
things. Imitation of God, as a matter of being in a certain state, is a negative state
of affairs. This does not mean that no positive form of participation or imitation is
possible. In acting and becoming (as distinguished from being) it is possible for the
abstracted and thus simple Gnostic to participate in or to imitate the works of God.
The Gnostic is a “living image of the Lord”, a symbol of God's power in deed and
412Osborn 2008, p. 19
413Dodds 1928, pp. 129-42
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preaching. This is always a matter of concrete action. For moral epistemology this
means  that  only  a  negative  or  abstractive  ethics  is  possible  generally,  while  a
positive, directly descriptive ethics is only possible in the concrete, particular.
Clement is often thought of as the first Christian author to systematically use
negative theology,414 though there are instances of proto-negative theology in the
New Testament, while Justin Martyr and others use language similar to Philo’s.
Moreover,  a broadly pragmatic kind of negative theology is also present in the
apostolic and apologetic fathers, albeit in a more polemical form.415 In Clement a
broader and deeper form of negative theology seem to blend in his philosophical
endeavors. Clement's negative theology leads him to a somewhat ‘esoteric’ view on
language, where symbolism and enigma plays a large role. This is where things
start becoming complicated, but also interesting for moral epistemology.
Franz Overbeck considered Clement of Alexandria's thinking a crucial point in
the development of Patristic philosophy. With him it had arrived at the essential
conditions  for  its  further  unfolding.416 Salvadora  Lilla  has  pointed  out  that
Clement’s  “system”  represents  the  “meeting-point  of  three  distinct  streams”,
namely Jewish-Alexandrine philosophy (Philo), (Neo-)Platonism and Gnosticism.417
As Adolf Harnack before him Lilla represents the idea that Clement’s philosophy is
in a sense a “philosophical system”. Runia, Osborn, and others have criticized this
idea,  an idea which also seems to contradict  Clement’s  own description of  his
method  in  the  Stromata.418 Choufrine  criticizes  Lilla  for  not  putting  enough
emphasis on Clement’s ideal of deification. According to Choufrine, Clement could
not have arrived at this ideal through the Platonic idea of “assimilation to God as
far as possible”419. This idea was rather derived from Irenaues or similar. Clement,
Choufrine adds, did not only see Jesus as an example to be followed, but as the
ontological  ground for  the  possibility  for  human beings  of  participating  in  the
divine.420
While not opposed to, e.g., Choufrine’s emphasis on deification, the following is
more in line with the approach found in Raoul Mortley's work on the development
on negative theology. While it is certainly true that deification (in some sense) is a
leading motif in Clement, it should be understood on the background of his theory
of concealment and his negative theology. This relativizes the idea of deification in
414See Mortley 1986; Hägg 2006
415See our discussion above.
416Overbeck 1882, p. 70
417See Lilla 1971
418Runia 1993, p. 153
419Plato, Theaetetus 176b
420Choufrine 2002, p. 7
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a crucial way, as we will see. The following will summarize Clement’s points in a
somewhat orderly manner (Clement’s intentionally fragmented style makes such
order hard to attain, though, if possible at all). It will not be a general resumé of
his works, but a discussion of his statements as far as they can be made relevant
for the link between his negative theology and ethics. Such a link is problematic
enough to establish in any systematical way. Only in the last chapters will we take
up the discussions hinted at here, not least Choufrine’s discussion of Clement’s
notion of deification.
In his negative theology there is particularly two important elements, namely 1)
the notion of God as the first principle (ontologically and epistemologically), 2) the
notion  of  God’s  simplicity.  There  is  particularly  four  elements  in  Clement’s
epistemology  (and  its  ontological  grounds)  that  we  shall  focus  on,  namely  1)
abstraction as a way of approaching negative theology, 2) the relationship between
dialectic  and revelation,  and 3) the role of  the Logos,  4)  faith and anticipation
(prolepsis). All these seem to play specific roles in Clement’s thinking. Though the
purpose of the present study is to describe the connections between his negative
theology and his ethics (moral epistemology), these elements should be noticed.
Our central claim is that imitation of God for Clement can never in any positive
sense  be  a  matter  of  'being',  since  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  bars  any
similarity  of  Creator  and  creation.  Imitation,  however,  can  take  place  in
anticipation and as a matter of becoming, where a positive imitation of the works
of Jesus Christ is possible, as concrete action.
Clement's approach to philosophy and Pagan culture
The eclecticism of Clement has earned him the reputation of an ambitious, but
unfocused thinker. But as Hägg has argued:
“The  so-called  inconsistencies  in  Clement  are,  no  doubt,  intended.  His
reflections  on  language  and  its  inadequacy  and  his  use  of  symbols  and
enigmas as alternative ways to represent ultimate reality are the result of a
conscious choice.  Far from cultivating paradox ‘for  the sake of  paradox’,
Clement turned to the use of paradox as a last resort.”421
When Clement weaves together highly different topics from Pagan philosophy
and culture we should be careful not to discard this as mere syncretism. There is,
it turns out, particular theological reasons for his style. Also we should not forget
that much of Clement's thinking is developed in opposition to strands of gnosticism
421Hägg 2006, p. 29
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(Valentinus  and Basilides).  Hence we should  not  expect  to  find a too coherent
system in Clement. Moreover, understanding his eclecticism, might prove to be if
not the only way into his thinking, then at least a fruitful approach.
Clement's eclecticism
For Clement eclecticism is made possible by the fact that “the Greeks” knew
God,  “[...]not  by  positive  knowledge,  but  by  indirect  expression  (κατὰ
περίφρασιν)”422.  This  we  might  call  indirect  or  ‘periphrastic’  theology.423 The
Christian scriptures are not the only way to knowledge about God. This idea often
blurs  the  fact  that  Clement’s  theology  should  be  described  as  a  ‘revelation
theology’. As Choufrine notes, while for Irenaues the incarnation did not first of all
have a revelatory function, this is the case in Clement as it is in Paul.424 We can
only know something about God if it is revealed to us.
However,  philosophy  was  not  discovered  by  the  Greeks  through  “human
understanding (σύνεσιν ἀνθρώπων )”425, but “[...]understanding is sent by God (τὴν
σύνεσιν θεόπεμπτον εἶναι).”426 Hence Greek philosophy can reflect the truth, at
least partly, or it has, as Clement poetically expresses it, “a dream of the truth”427.
Large portions of Hellenic philosophy were given by the Christian God. By an order
of angels it were distributed among the nations.428 But the knowledge of divine
things takes form after national and ethnic peculiarities:  “God was known by the
Greeks in a Gentile way, by the Jews Judaically, and in a new and spiritual way by
us (ἡμῶν καὶ πνευματικῶς γινωσκόμενον).”429
With allusion to Philo, Clement defines philosophy as the study of wisdom, and
wisdom as the knowledge of things divine and human, and their causes.430 Clement
is a true eclectic: Whatever has been well said by the sects of philosophy, “which
teach righteousness along with a science pervaded by piety, - this eclectic whole
(σύμπαν τὸ ἐκλεκτικὸν) I call philosophy.”431 Hence Clement also denounces those
who claim that  philosophy “was set  a-going by the devil  (ἐκ  τοῦ διαβόλου τὴν
κίνησιν).”432 But even if it “came stolen, or given by a thief”, this does not make it
422Str. 6.5.39.1, p. 489
423Assuming that all negative theology is in some sense indirect, this must be an even 
broader category.
424Choufrine 2002, p. 200
425Str. 6.8.62.4, p. 206
426Str. 6.8.63.1, p. 494
427Protr. 5, p. 190
428Str. 7.2
429Str. 6.5.41, p. 489
430Str. 1.1, p. 306. Philo, De Congressu Eruditionis
431Str. 1.7.37, p. 308. Clement’s conception of ‘righteousness’ will be discussed below.
432Str. 1.16.80, p. 318
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less useful.433 Among the philosophers it  is,  not surprisingly,  especially (but far
from exclusively) Plato whom Clement refers to.
Because of  his  similarities  with Albinus (e.g.  his  use of  the term  ἀφαίρεσις)
Clement is often grouped among the Middle-Platonists.434 His approach to and use
of Plato (Platonic logic and ontology, ethics etc.) alone gives some credential to
such categorization. Clement refers to Plato as the “truth-loving (φιλαλήθης)”435,
and in his Exhortation to the Heathen Clement writes that:
“I seek after God, not the works of God (θεὸν ἐπιζητῶ, οὐ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ).
Whom shall  I  take as a helper in my inquiry? We do not,  if  you have no
objection, wholly  disown Plato.  How, then, is  God to be searched out,  O
Plato?” 436
Clement then quotes Timaeus 28c, in which Plato notes that “[...]it is impossible
to declare Him to all. For this is by no means capable of expression, like the other
subjects of instruction”.437 Clement praises Plato for being aware that God is (more
or less) unknowable. Hence this is an example that his use of Hellenic philosophy
turns out to have a negative function, and that this thinking is reworked into a
framework  that  is  somewhat  different  from  the  Platonic  (where  God  is  not
primarily  unknowable).  Another  example  is  when  Antisthenes  is  quoted
approvingly for saying that “God is not like to any (θεὸν οὐδενὶ ἐοικέναι)”, and
Xenophon  for  saying  that  “what  He  is  in  form is  not  revealed  (ὁποῖος  δέ  τις
μορφήν, ἀφανής).”438
Though Clement seems to  be saying that  the Greeks had a  positive,  though
fragmented, ‘insight’ into the mysteries of God, it soon turns out that in Clement’s
use,  Greek  philosophy  has  a  primarily  negative  (or  indirect,  ‘periphrastic’)
function. For example his famous claim, that one should at least do philosophy in
order  to  know  why  not  to  do  it:  “[...]even  if  philosophy  were  useless,  if  the
demonstration (βεβαίωσις) of its uselessness does good, it is yet useful.”439 Also,
we cannot condemn opinions that we do not understand.440
A similar thing is true in practical contexts. Especially the comic writers’ attacks
on traditional religion is useful for Clement.  In his  Exhortation to the Heathen
Clement exclaims: “Let the strictures on your gods, which the poets, impelled by
433Str. 1.17.81, p. 319
434Mortley 1986, p. 8
435Str. 5.12.78.1, p. 175
436Protr. 6.67.2, p. 191
437Plato, Tim 28c
438Protr. 6.71, p. 192
439Str. 1.2.19, p. 303
440Str. I.I, p. 303
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the force of truth, introduce in their comedies, shame you into salvation.”441 He
then  goes  on  to  quote  Menander,  Antisthenes,  Homer,  Euripides  and  others.
Throughout the Stromata, Clement’s use of Pagan philosophy and culture becomes
of a still more critical kind. Where he had praised philosophy to start with, he ends
up  using  poetry.  Also,  it  turns  out  that  often  Clement  believes,  that  the  more
obscure  and  enigmatic  Pagan  philosophy  is,  the  better.  There  is  a  range  of
theological and epistemological reasons for this that we shall look into later.
What is truth, wisdom, knowledge?
Despite  of  his  own acknowledgment  of  the  lack  of  system in  the  Stromata,
Clement  describes  his  subject  as  “skilfully  ordered  Wisdom  (ὀρθῶς  σοφίαν
τεχνικήν)”442 in contradistinction to the sects of philosophy. So Clement is not, in
the Stromata, saying that wisdom is not a coherent system. Wisdom is a “certain
knowledge (ἔμπεδον γνῶσιν), sure and irrefragable apprehension of things divine
and  human,  comprehending  the  present,  past,  and  future[...]”443.  But  the
presentation of wisdom must be done in a fragmented way, it seems. There are
aspects of Wisdom: 
“[...]in one aspect it is eternal (αἰώνιός), and in another it becomes useful in
time (δὲ χρόνῳ λυσιτελής). Partly it is one and the same, partly many and
indifferent – partly without any movement of passion, partly with passionate
desire – partly perfect, partly incomplete (ἣ μὲν τέλειος, ἣ δὲ ἐνδεής).”444
The 'μὲν … δὲ' construction allows us to entertain the idea that wisdom is on the
one hand perfect,  and on the other  imperfect.  In  one sense it  can be fully  so
simultaneously (not just partly the one, and partly the other).
As  Christ  is  from  the  perspective  of  the  Father  perfect  unity,  from  our
perspective He can only be grasped through parables, enigmas and symbols, etc.
(concealment).
Clement’s own explanation for the fragmented style of the Stromata is that the
mysteries should be delivered mystically. That which is spoken is not in the voice of
the speaker, but in his understanding.445 The point seems to be that speaking and
writing, at least in the style that Clement has chosen, only indirectly reveals the
truth.  The  form  of  the  Stromata are  in  Clement’s  own  words  “promiscously
441Protr. 7.75.1, p. 193
442Str. 6.7.54.1, p. 493, modified. “ὀρθῶς … τεχνικήν” should not be “strictly systematic”, 
but “skilfully ordered”. This is a good example that Palmer's criticism is legitimate (as 
mentioned above). See Palmer 1983, p. 236
443Str. 6.7.54.1
444Str. 6.7.54.3, p. 493
445Str. 1.1, p. 302
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(ἀναμίξ) variegated (ποίκιλται) like a meadow (λειμῶνος)”446.
The  Stromata are notes meant to serve “kindling sparks (ζώπυρα)”447.  This is
why Clement says that:
“The Stromata will contain the truth mixed up in the dogmas of philosophy
(ἀναμεμιγμένην τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῖς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι), or rather covered
over and hidden (ἐγκεκαλυμμένην καὶ ἐπικεκρυμμένην), as the edible part
of the nut in the shell.”448
The question is if  such ‘esotericism’ or ‘mysticism’ was Clement’s intentional
purpose to start with? Or is it just an explanation made up  ad hoc,  designed to
excuse that it was not possible for Clement to work out the systematic philosophy
he had promised? Is Clement himself a half-way ‘Gnostic’ who is only in a process
of gaining knowledge, a knowledge that is by nature enigmatic and fragmented?
Even if it  were possible to formulate a coherent theological system, Clement
repeatedly insists that it is Christ himself that is the truth: “Our knowledge, and
our spiritual garden, is the Saviour Himself”449. Hence Clement notes that “[...]a
considerable number of people occupy themselves with the truth, or rather with
discourse concerning the truth (τὸν περὶ ἀληθείας λόγον)”450. This seems to imply
that the latter is not identical to the former. It would probably be too radical to
interpret this as excluding discursive thinking. But it is at least obvious that truth,
for Clement, is not so much a feature of our beliefs about the world, but something
external to our beliefs, doctrines, as well as parables and symbols. On the other
hand  (supposing  that  ‘truth’  and  ‘wisdom’  are  at  least  parallel  matters),  it  is
precisely because “Christ Himself is Wisdom (αὐτόν τε τὸν Χριστὸν σοφίαν)”, that
the gnosis “imparted and revealed by the Son of God, is wisdom.”451
What  is  crucial  is,  that  the  truth,  wisdom,  etc.  of  our  theological  system is
always derived from its object, God or Christ himself, by which it is revealed.
“One speaks in one way of the truth, in another way the truth interprets
itself (ἄλλως τις περὶ ἀληθείας λέγει, ἄλλως ἡ ἀλήθεια ἑαυτὴν ἑρμηνεύει).
The guessing at truth is one thing, and truth itself is another. Resemblance
is one thing, the thing itself is another. And the one results from learning
and practice, the other from power and faith. For the teaching of piety is a
gift, but faith is grace.”452
446Str. 6.1.2.3
447Str. 6.1.2.2, p. 480
448Str. 1.1.18.1, p. 303
449Str. 6.1.2.4, p. 480
450Str. 6.17.149.3, p. 515
451Str. 6.7.61.1
452Str. 1.7.38.4
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Theological speculation according to Clement can arguably not be adequate in
the sense we have defined adequacy, though it can be true, or at least stand in a
relation to truth.
The righteousness of the heathen
We need to do philosophy in order to know if it is useless or not.453 While this is
of course a reasonable claim to intellectual ‘fairness’ there also seems to be more
going on. Philosophy has a purificative function as well.454 As such Philosophy also
has a deeper ethical function: “[...]the Greek philosophy, as it were, purges the
soul,  and prepares it  beforehand for the reception of faith, on which the Truth
builds up the edifice of knowledge.”455 Hence philosophy has for the Greeks the
same function as the Old Testament and the Mosaic Law had for Israel, though at
times it  seems that  it  is  just  as much the other  way round,  as when Clement
understands the Sabbath as symbol for self-control.456 At any rate, philosophy was
“a schoolmaster (ἐπαιδαγώγει)”457 to bring “the Hellenic mind” to Christ. Hence in
a famous and controversial passage, Clement states, that “before the advent of the
Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness”458. Now we must
be careful about how we understand ‘righteousness' (δικαιοσύνη)   when judging
such claims. Clement does not hold the concepts of law and righteousness that is
implied  in  later  more  judicial  theologies.459 Righteousness,  for  Clement,  often
seems simply to mean virtue.
Clement adds that there are “several ways of salvation (πλείονας σωτηρίους)”460.
But this is not equivalent to anything akin to modern religious pluralism, of course.
Clement  is  not  saying  that  Christ  is  just  one  of  many  ways  to  God  (neither
epistemologically  or  soteriologically).  As  noted  above,  “the  true  philosophy
(φιλοσοφίας ἀληθοῦς)” is not something which the human mind discovers on its
own,  but  rather  something  which  it  receives  “from the  truth  itself  (αὐτῆς  τῆς
ἀληθείας).”461 If  philosophy  can  do  anything  on  its  own,  without  revelation,  it
would be because  secular  philosophy can work as “preparatory (προπαιδείαν)”
training for receiving this truth.462 The “several ways of salvation” are not positive
453Str. 1.2.19
454Much similar to Plato, Phaedo 69b-69c
455Str. 7.3.20.2, p. 241
456Str. 4.3.8.6, p. 116
457Str. 1.5.28.3
458Str. 1.5.28.1, p. 305
459E.g. Anselm’s theory of atonement (Cur Deus Homo?), or later magisterial 
Protestantism.
460Str. 1.5.29.3, p. 305
461Str. 1.5.32.4, p. 307
462Str. 1.5.32.4
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and  ‘continuous’.  Rather,  they  are  negative,  'discontinuous'  ways,  means  of
purification that makes the addition of revelation possible.
In the first book of the Stromata Clement notes that “[r]ighteousness [...] is not
constituted without discourse (ἡ δικαιοσύνη γοῦν οὐ χωρὶς λόγου συνίσταται)”463.
What does he mean by this? Clement continues:  “[...]as the receiving of good is
abolished if we abolish the doing of good; so obedience and faith are abolished
when neither the command, nor one to expound the command, is taken along with
us.”464 Hence by discourse he seems to mean “the command”, which goes before
obedience. So in this passage righteousness is defined as obedience (rather than
virtue  as  suggested  above).  So  when  he  argues  that  Greek  philosophy  was
necessary  for  righteousness,  he  seems  to  be  saying  that  it  was  necessary  for
obedience. Again, this fits well with his claim that philosophy “purges the soul” and
prepares “the reception of faith”. And “faith is the ear of the soul (πίστις δὲ ὦτα
ψυχῆς)”465. Righteousness is obedience, and obedience is the reception of faith.
The problem with “those who believe not, as to be expected” is that they “drag
all down from heaven, and the region of the invisible, to earth”.466 This is what
happens when the mind is not purified by philosophy. What the Pagans can and
should know outside the actual positive knowledge of God given in revelation, is
that nothing in this world is God, to put it sharply.
As will become clear later, for Clement philosophy (Hellenic), but also Egyptian
mysteries,  the  Hebrew scriptures  and so  on,  is  like  a  veil  that  simultaneously
presents  and  conceals  the  truth.  This  links  Clement’s  discussion  of  Hellenic
philosophy to his negative theology. But for now it is enough to be aware of the
purificative function of philosophy.
Clement’s somewhat positive approach to Hellenic culture and philosophy might
give  rise  to  the  question,  of  whether  his  teachings  imply  a  form of  synergism
(cooperation of human and divine powers in salvation) or (semi-)Pelagianism (to
use  a  later  term).  Clement  says  at  one  instance  that  “[...]since  what  the
commandments enjoin are in our own power, along with the performance of them
(σὺν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν), the promise is accomplished.”467
Do  human  beings  cooperate  with  God  in  salvation  (e.g.  by  being  prepared
through philosophy), or is salvation the work of God only (for example through the
463Str. 1.10.47.1
464Str. 1.10.47, p. 310
465Str. 5.1.2, p. 444. Later Clement defines faith as voluntary preconception, this we will 
return to.
466Str. 2.4.15, p. 350
467Str. 7.7.48.4, p. 251
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Church)? The answer might turn out to be relevant for our discussion of negative
theology and ethics in Clement, since it must presumably produce some insights on
his epistemology, and his understanding of dialectics, ethics and ontology.
Clement's  discussion  of  the  usefulness  of  Pagan wisdom and the  insights  of
Hellenic philosophy at times revolves around a question of causality. These things
Clement discusses especially in the first and the eighth book of the Stromata. For
example he discusses whether Pagan philosophy is the direct cause of insight into
the mysteries of God, or only an indirect occasion. Was philosophy sent by God or
the Devil? For Clement this question is really of lesser importance. The possible
evil use of knowledge made by the philosophers, does not make God the cause of
this evil use, even if He is the original source of knowledge.
“I know that many are perpetually assailing us with the allegation, that not
to prevent a thing happening, is to be the cause of it happening. For they
say, that the man who does not take precaution against a theft, or does not
prevent a thing happening, is to be the cause of it[...]”468
Clement’s  response  is  that  “causation  is  seen  in  doing,  working,  acting  (τὸ
αἴτιον  ἐν  τῷ  ποιεῖν  καὶ  ἐνεργεῖν);  but  the  not  preventing  is  in  this  respect
inoperative (ἀνενέργητον).”469 Causation attaches to activity. When Achilles did not
prevent Hector from burning the Greek ships, he was the “concurring (συναίτιος)
cause”470 not  the  cause  as  such.  The  idea  seems  to  be  that  philosophy  is  a
concurring cause for insight into the divine mysteries, not the cause sine qua non.
God is not responsible for evil, since that “[...]which does not hinder cannot be a
cause.”471 Clement argues that God is not the cause of evil or sin, since sin is an
activity following from the free choice of those who commit the sin: “[...]sin is an
activity (ἐνεργείᾳ), not an existence (οὐσίᾳ): and therefore it is not a work of God
(ἔργον θεοῦ).”472 Thus the distinction between activity (ἐνέργεια) and existence or
being (οὐσία) becomes morally relevant.473 God is not responsible for evil, but God
can use evil and sin to bring about good. Providence guides the activities of evil
men, to ensure “[...]that what happens through the evils hatched (διὰ κακῶν τῶν
ἐπινοηθέντων)  by  any,  may  come  to  a  good  and  useful  issue,  and  to  use  to
468Str. 1.17.82, p. 319
469Str. 1.17.82.3
470Str. 1.17.83.2
471Str. 8.9.28.1, p. 565
472Str. 4.13.93.3, p. 135. Clement talks of οὐσία, which in other circumstances would be 
translated as 'essence'. We will stick with 'existence', however, since it fits with the 
context and our purpose.
473Below we will relate this to the question of whether the Gnostic imitates God in being 
or only in action. Clement argues at one point that “[...]no action is a habit (οὐδεμία δὲ 
ἐνέργεια ἕξις)”.
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advantage those things which appear to be evils”474. This does not mean that evil
can ever be “the efficient cause of good (ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν).”475
Clement’s distinction between causes also seems to be present in his discussion
of the use of philosophy for attaining righteousness (epistemological grounds and
material causes seem to behave similarly).
“I do not think that philosophy directly declares the Word, although in many
instances  philosophy  attempts  and  persuasively  teaches  us  probable
arguments; but it assails the sects.”476
Again, we see that it is the critical, negative use of Hellenic philosophy that is
primary.  Philosophy  is  useful  as  a  weapon  against  heresy.  Also,  in  a  classical
Socratic  manner  (and  with  reference  to  Alcibiaedes)  Clement  affirms  the
usefulness of the knowledge of ignorance, “the first lesson in walking according to
the Word (τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστι μάθημα τῷ κατὰ λόγον βαδίζοντι).”477 It is in this way
that philosophy contributes to the comprehension of truth.
“[...]philosophy,  being  the  search  for  truth,  contributes  to  the
comprehension of truth; not as being the cause of comprehension (οὐκ αἰτία
οὖσα καταλήψεως),  but  a  cause along with other things,  and cooperator
(συνεργός); perhaps also a joint cause (συναίτιον).”478
While  truth  is  one,  “many  things  contribute  to  its  investigation  (πολλὰ  τὰ
συλλαμβανόμενα πρὸς ζήτησιν αὐτῆς).”479 On the other hand, “its discovery is by
the  Son  (ἡ  δὲ  εὕρεσις  δι'  υἱοῦ).”480 These  “many  things”  are  only  cooperating
causes, it seems, while the only primary cause of discovery is the Son himself. One
way  of  interpreting  this  is,  that  truth  comes  by  revelation,  but  there  can  be
cooperating causes present when revelation occurs. What does Clement mean by a
‘cooperating cause’? Clement writes that,
“[...]that which acts in conjunction with something else (μεθ' ἑτέρου ποιεῖ),
being  of  itself  incapable  of  operating  by  itself  (ἀτελὲς  ὂν  καθ'  αὑτὸ
ἐνεργεῖν),  we  describe  as  co-operating  (συνεργόν)  and  concausing
(συναίτιον), and say that it becomes a cause only in virtue of its being a
joint-cause (ἀπὸ τοῦ σὺν αἰτίῳ αἴτιον)[...]”481
474Str. 1.17.86.3, p. 320
475Str. 4.5.23.1, p. 413
476Str. 1.19.95, p. 322
477Str. 5.3.17.1, p. 448
478Str. 1.20.97, p. 323
479Str. 1.20.97.3
480Str. 1.20.97.3
481Str. 1.20.99, p. 323
113
A cooperating cause is not a necessary part of truth (if a part at all). The Word is
not rendered incomplete by the abstraction (ἀφαίρεσιν) of such a cause.482 Rather
a ‘cooperating cause’  is  the means whereby truth is revealed. At least so as a
negative  cause,  that  helps  thought  from going  ‘astray’.  Perspicuity  (σαφήνεια)
cooperates (συνεργεῖ) to communicate truth, while dialectics (διαλεκτικὴ) prevents
us from falling under heresies.483 Again it seems that philosophy, as a ‘cooperating
cause’,  has  a  negative  function,  even  if  Clement  not  explicitly  says  so  in  his
definition of ‘cooperating causes’ (supposedly such causes can be both positive and
negative).
We can now attempt to answer the question, of whether philosophy for Clement
can really ‘justify’ anyone. Being a cooperating cause, philosophy can hardly be
conceived as a cause of righteousness in any traditional sense of ‘cause’. Rather it
must be considered a (in modern terms) contingent, enabling condition, or rather
the negation of a contingent,  disabling condition.484 But not a cause as such. The
cause of righteousness is revelation or truth itself (Christ himself), but revelation is
contingently  (in  some contexts)  made  possible  by  the  philosophy  that  leads  to
obedience.
Faith, according to Clement (and against Valentinus), is the result of free choice,
not  a  product  of  nature.485 On  the  other  hand,  since  God  is  one  and  beyond
predicates,  “we  understand,  then  the  Unknown,  by  divine  grace  (δὴ  θείᾳ
χάριτι)”486. The “power of the word (ἰσχὺς τοῦ λόγου)”487 is given to us, and “draws
to itself  secretly  and invisibly  (ἐπικεκρυμμένως τε καὶ ἀφανῶς)  every one who
receives  it”488.  Hence  it  seems  that  there  can  be  no  revelation  without  divine
initiative. Often ‘synergism’ is understood as salvation being something happening
when God and Man meet in common efforts on the mid-way. But in Clement there
is no salvation without there first being grace, it seems. Rather “the things which
are in our own power” must be considered ‘cooperating causes’, as defined above.
This means that grace (revelation) can be the complete or only efficient cause,
while the works of human beings are nevertheless cooperating causes. 
Though faith is voluntary, Clement likens it to the power of the Siren’s song that
worked “almost  against  (σχεδὸν ἄκοντας)”  the will  of  those  that  came near.489
482Str. 1.20.99.3, p. 323
483Str. 1.20.100.1, p. 323
484This vocabulary is partly derived from Dancy 2004
485Str. 2.3, p. 349
486Str. 5.12.82.4, p. 464
487Str. 5.12.80.9
488Str. 5.12.80.9, p. 463
489Str. 2.2.9.7, p. 348
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Hence the virtues490 needed for building up knowledge on faith are, so to speak,
disabling  conditions  that  helps  to  disable  other  disabling  conditions  (whatever
works against faith). As such the virtues are cooperating causes, while faith by free
choice is the efficient cause.
But what about unbelief, the lack of faith? The reason for skepticism, Clement
says, is on the one hand the “changefulness and instability of the human mind
(πολύτροπον  καὶ  ἄστατον  τῆς  ἀνθρωπίνης  γνώμης)”, and  on  the  other  “the
discrepancy which is in things (ἡ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι δια φωνί)”491.
All opinion, judgment and knowledge is assent, Clement argues.
“And unbelief being defection (ἀπόστασις) from faith, shows both assent and
faith to be possessed of power (δυνατὴν); for non-existence cannot be called
privation (ἀνυπαρξίας γὰρ στέρησις οὐκ ἂν λεχθείη).”492
Besides for the obviously interesting ontological implications of this statement
(which we will return to below), Clement’s words seems to mean that unbelief is
the non-existence, but not a privation, of faith. This does not mean that unbelief is
not possessed of some sort of power. It seems that for Clement negative states (or
the lack of certain conditions) can be the cause of other negative states (the lack of
other  conditions):  “What we do not,  we do not  either  from not  being able (μὴ
δύνασθαι), or not being willing (μὴ βούλεσθαι) – or both.”493
The  above  shows  that  Clement’s  reflections  on  causality  in  relation  to  such
questions of faith, belief, righteousness and so on, implies some complex issues
relating to the epistemological and ontological role of ‘negativity’ (whether as non-
existence, privation or causality). It  will be useful to keep these issues in mind
when we come to discuss the possible relationship between Clement’s negative
theology and his ethics.
Negative theology and language in Clement
Traditionally,  the  main  concepts  associated  with  negative  theologies  are
ἀπόφασις, ἀφαίρεσις and στέρησις, all carrying a sense of 'negation'.494 Of these it
is  especially  ἀφαίρεσις (abstraction) that is important i  Clement. Mortley notes
about Clement, that:
“Clement is  thus a Christian representative of  the method of abstraction
490Fear, patience, long-suffering, temperance. Str. 2.6.31, p. 354
491Str. 8.7.22, p. 564
492Str. 2.12.55, p. 360
493Str. 2.17.77.2, p. 364
494See above.
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which we have seen developed in contemporary Greek Middle Platonism.
His  interest  in  it  is  traditionally  expressed,  combining  a  definition  of
abstract  thinking  with  an  interpretation  of  the  various  unities  of  Plato’s
Parmenides.”495
But Clement's abstractive thinking is based on a radical negative theology, that
shapes  his  view  of  language  and  epistemology.  Clement  “[...]tends  to  see  all
language  as  requiring  interpretation,  as  being  in  need  of  a  hermeneutic.”496
Language is a veil that needs “negative deconstruction”, and negative theology is
needed in order to penetrate the mysteries. In a way all language is a parable of
the divine mysteries. While it is certainly true that Clement interprets the Christian
and  Hebrew  tradition  in  light  of  and  as  expressions  of  philosophical  truths,
philosophical truth itself is only a parable for the divine mystery revealed in Christ.
Proleptic epistemology in the Stromata
Two  of  the  most  important  concepts  in  Clement  is  knowledge  (γνώσις and
ἐπιστήμη)  and faith.  Epistemology  is  central  in  this  thinking.  But  epistemology
naturally relates to ontology. The word for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as well as for
faith (πίστις) is derived from 'στάσις', Clement argues. Both has to do with the
soul  settling  in  “that  which  is”497.  In  Eucledian  manner  Clement  argues  that
demonstration presupposes indemonstrable, self-evident premises (axioms).498 To
hold such premises is to have indemonstrable faith, i.e. to hold something as self-
evident is to have faith. Only on the foundation of such faith can knowledge be
build (through demonstration).
In  the  second book  of  the  Stromata,  Clement  notes  that  “[...]there  are  four
things in which the truth resides –  Sensation (αἰσθήσεως), Understanding (νοῦ),
Knowledge  (ἐπιστήμης),  Opinion  (ὑπολήψεως)”499. For  human  beings,  sensation
comes first, by which is formed opinion. For this reason “the organization of the
senses tends to knowledge (τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὀργανοποιίαν πρὸς γνῶσιν)”500.
When understanding is added to sensation, and opinion removed, knowledge is
formed. This means that knowledge is essentially sensation and understanding.
Understanding  is  (defined  in  another  context)  “a  faculty  of  the  soul  (δύναμις
ψυχῆς), capable of studying existences (ὄντων), - of distinguishing and comparing
495Mortley 1986, p. 44
496Mortley 1986, p. 40
497Str. 9.22, p. 435
498Str. 13.3, p. 559
499Str. 2.4.13.2, p. 350
500Str. 4.26.163.1, p. 439
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what succeeds as like and unlike (τοῦ ἀκολούθου ὁμοίου τε καὶ ἀνομοίου)[...]”501.
Understood as an activity this is more or less also the definition of dialectic (see
below).  The transition  from sensation  to  knowledge  is  made  possible  by  faith.
Knowledge is, moreover, “an intellectual state (ἕξις), from which results the act of
knowing  (ἐπίστασθαι),  and  becomes  apprehension  irrefragable  by  reason”502.
Ignorance, on the other hand, is “a receding impression, which can be dislogded by
reason.”  In  other  words  ignorance  is  not  defined  negatively  in  reference  to
knowledge, but as a positive ‘something’ (or it might be a privation?).
Again, there is a close connection between epistemology and ontology. The first
cause of the universe can be apprehended by faith alone, since first principles are
incapable  of  demonstration.503 This  is  especially  important  when  considering
theology  (we will  return  to ontology  below).  In  the fifth  book  of  the  Stromata
Clement seems to be rather critical of any idea that a proof of God’s existence can
be  given.  The  many  demand  “demonstration  as  a  pledge  of  truth”504 Clement
complains,  and  “there  are  those  that  deserve  punishment,  as  to  ask  proofs
(ἀποδείξεις)  of  the  existence  of  Providence.”505 Demonstration  is  “discourse,
agreeable  to  reason,  producing  belief  (πίστιν)  in  points  disputed  from  points
admitted.”506 Demonstration is a syllogism resting on true premises. Faith is the
presupposition of knowledge, and if faith is based on revelation from God, “[...]this
faith becomes certain demonstration (ἀπόδειξις βεβαία); since truth follows what
has  been  delivered  by  God.”507 But  faith  itself  cannot  be  the  product  of
demonstration,  since  that  would  require  a  more  fundamental  faith.  Hence
presupposing Clement’s  link  between epistemology and ontology,  attempting to
give proof by demonstration for the existence of God, seems to be equivalent to
saying that God is not the first principle. If there could be given a proof (in the
sense of demonstration) for the existence of God (or providence), then there would
be something more fundamental than God (corresponding to premisses that are
not products of faith in God, but something more basic), which would serve as the
basis for that demonstration.
But Clement also notes, that that providence exists is “evident from the sight of
all its skilful and wise works which are seen”508. But again, Clement’s is no ‘natural
501Str. 6.17.154.4
502Str. 2.17.76.1, p. 364
503Str. 2.4, p. 350
504Str. 5.3.18.3, p. 448, modified
505Str. 5.1.6.1, p. 445
506Str. 8.3.5.1, p. 559
507Str. 6.8.70.3, p. 496, modified
508Str. 5.1.6.2
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theology’.  If  God can be known through ‘nature’,  it  is  only  because he reveals
himself  there (or through that,  as a cooperating cause?).  Hence ‘evidence’  and
‘proof’  is  obviously  not  the  same  to  Clement.  Probably  proof  has  to  do  with
demonstration,  while  evidence  is  that  which  is  clear  without  any  discursive
reasoning. Asking for proof for something that is evident in this way is simply to
ignore what is clear. We ought to have faith in the power of God, which is able to
save  “without  proof,  by  mere  faith  (ἄνευ  τῶν  ἀποδείξεων  διὰ  ψιλῆς  τῆς
πίστεως)”509.
Proofs  from scripture  is,  it  seems,  only  proofs  “to  those  who have  believed
(πιστεύσασι).”510 Knowledge presupposes faith, but on the other hand Clement also
notes that “[...]Aristotle says that the judgment which follows knowledge is in truth
faith. Accordingly, faith is something superior to knowledge, and is its criterion.”511
This  seems  to  contradict  Clement’s  former  claims.  But  rather,  both  is  true:
“[...]neither is knowledge without faith (ἡ γνῶσις ἄνευ πίστεως), nor faith without
knowledge.”512
Clement argues that:  “Knowledge,  accordingly,  is  characterized by faith;  and
faith,  by  a  kind  of  divine  mutual  and  reciprocal  correspondence  (θείᾳ  τινὶ
ἀκολουθίᾳ τε καὶ ἀντακολουθίᾳ),  becomes characterized by knowledge.”513 The
reason for this reciprocity is partly Christological: Faith has reference to the Son,
but in order to believe in the Son we must believe that He is the Son.514 To know
the Father we must believe in the Son, “for from faith to knowledge by the Son is
the Father (ἐκ πίστεως γὰρ εἰς γνῶσιν, διὰ υἱοῦ πατήρ).”515 The knowledge of the
Son and Father is “the attainment and comprehension of the truth by the truth
(ἀληθείας διὰ τῆς ἀληθείας)”516.
Having mentioned Aristotle  in  the  passage quoted above,  Clement  continues
with  Epicurus.  In  Clement’s  words  Epicurus  defines  “[...]faith  to  be  a
preconception (πρόληψιν) of the mind (διανοίας); and defines preconception to be
a grasping (ἐπιβολὴν) at something evident, and at the clear understanding of the
thing”517. Without preconception, no one can inquire, doubt, judge, or argue. It is
509Str. 5.1.9.2
510Str. 7.1.1.3, p. 523
511Str. 2.4.15.5, p. 350
512Str. 5.1.1.3, p. 473
513Str. 2.4.16.2, p. 350
514Str. 5.1, p. 444
515Str. 5.1.1.4
516Str. 5.1.1.5, p. 444. While there are sometimes hints of subordinarianism in Clement 
(the Son being ontologically second to the Father), this suggests a doctrine close to 
later orthodox trinitarianism (homoοὐσίαnism).
517Str. 2.4.16.3, p. 350. See also Epicurus, De Rerum Natura
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not possible to learn anything about an object without a “preconceived idea” of
what  one  is  aiming  after.  Learning  consists  in  turning  preconception  into
comprehension.  Clement  seems  to  wholeheartedly  take  over  this  element  of
Epicurean  (and  Stoic)  epistemology:518 “[...]faith  is  nothing  else  than  a
preconception (πρόληψίς) of the mind (διανοίας) in regard to what is the subject of
discourse”519. Hence no one learns anything with faith, since all opinion, judgment,
supposition and knowledge “is an assent (συγκατάθεσίς);  which is nothing else
than faith.”520 
It  is  crucial  for  Clement’s epistemology that he emphasizes free choice as a
precondition  for  faith:521 “Faith  is  the  voluntary  (ἑκούσιος)  supposition  and
anticipation  (πρόληψις)  of  comprehension  (καταλήψεως).”522 It  is  not  “a  mere
human custom (ἐπιτήδεμα), as the Greeks suppose”523. Clement notes that “since
choice is the beginning of action, faith is discovered to be the beginning of action
(ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ἀρχὴ ἡ προαίρεσις, πίστις εὑρίσκεται ἀρχὴ γὰρ πράξεως )”524.
Because of  its connection with the will,  for  Clement faith has just  as much an
ethical as an epistemological significance. There seems to be a completely natural
connection between faith and ‘life’: “to disbelieve truth brings death, as to believe,
life;  and  again,  to  believe  the  lie  and  to  disbelieve  the  truth  hurries  to
destruction.”525 This is not to say that the epistemology of faith is itself a matter of
ethics. Rather ethics plays out on the scale between faith and perfection in faith:
“perfection (τελειότης) in faith differs, I think, from ordinary faith.”526 This is a
matter of the character of the ‘true Gnostic’, whom Clement speaks of frequently
in the Stromata.
God and Clement’s negative theology
Clement frequently uses negative definitions when referring to God’s properties:
God is “not circumscribed by place (οὐδὲ ἀπεικονίζεταί)”, not “represented by the
518It is not, however, clear whether his theory of names and language is kata thesis or 
kata physis (as the Epicurean). At one point he says that predicates are expressed 
“either from what belongs to things themselves (τῶν προσόντων αὐτοῖς), or from their 
mutual relation”. But this is exactly why the ineffable God cannot be predicated. Str. 
5.12.82.1.
519Str. 2.4.17.3, p. 351
520Str. 2.12.55.1, p. 360
521This is relevant for his polemics against those Gnostics who saw faith as something 
predetermined by nature or God.
522Str. 2.6.27.4, p. 353, modified
523Str. 2.6.30.1, p. 354, modified
524Str. 2.2.9.2
525Str. 4.3.8.4, p. 410
526Str. 4.16.100.6, p. 427
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form of a living creature (ζῴου σχήματι)”.527 God, not being mortal, has no wants
and is not affected by passions (notice that these features for Clement seems to be
related  to  mortality).  God  is  “without  beginning  (ἄναρχος)”,  but  himself  “the
perfect beginning of the universe, and the producer of the beginning (ἀρχὴ τῶν
ὅλων παντελής, ἀρχῆς ποιητικό).”528 The biblical story of Moses entering the thick
darkness where God was,  shows that  “God is  invisible  (ἀόρατός)  and ineffable
(ἄρρητος).”529 Clement’s  use  of  the  story  of  Moses  is  somewhat reminiscent  of
Philo, whom he also quotes and discusses.530 Clement likewise finds passages in
the  New  Testament  suitable  for  being  interpreted  as  specimens  of  negative
theology,  e.g.  Jn 1:18 and Paul’s address to the Athenians about the “unknown
god”531. Also, Paul’s words about the “third heaven”532, refers to “God's ineffability
(τὸ ἄρρητον τοῦ θεοῦ)” and that the divine “cannot be spoken by human power”.533
Invisibility and ineffableness is “the bosom of God”,  which seems to mean that
every divine mystery is confined or enveloped in these.534
We find a range of (seemingly) positive definitions. God is being (οὐσία), mind
(νοῦς),  and  the  first  principle  (ἀρχὴ)  of  “the  department  of  action”,  morals,
reasoning  and  judgment  (“τοῦ  λογικοῦ  καὶ  κριτικοῦ  τόπου”).535 But  most
importantly, in his theology Clement radically upholds the distinction between God
and creation. Not even in the dark cloud on mount Sinai can God be found: “God is
not in darkness or in place, but above (ὑπεράνω) both space and time, and qualities
of  objects.”536 Being ungenerate/unbegotten (which follows from God being the
first principle), God is “in essence remote (ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς μακρὰν ὢν ἐγγυτάτω)”537.
Having made human beings  of  nothing,  God “has  no natural  relation (φυσικὴν
σχέσιν) to us”538. Matter is “totally distinct from God”539, and God has “bestowed
on us ten thousand things in which He does not share (ἀμέτοχος): birth, being
Himself unborn; food, He wanting nothing[...]”540 Hence God's negative properties
are  derived  from  his  distinctness,  though  Mortley  first  of  all  reads  these
527Str. 7.6.30.1, p. 531
528Str. 4.25.162.5
529Str. 5.12.78.3, p. 463, modified
530E.g. Philo, De Vita Mosi
531Acts 18:22-23, NIV
5322 Cor 12:2-4
533Str. 5.12.79.1, p. 463, modified
534Str. 5.12.79.1, p. 463
535Str. 4.25.162.5, p. 439. Notice that mind is not identified with the second hypostasis as 
it is in Plotinus.
536Str. 2.2.6.1, p. 348
537Str. 2.2.5.4, p. 348
538Str. 2.16.74.1
539Str. 2.17, p. 364
540Str. 5.11.68.2, p. 460
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statements  as  expressions  of  anti-anthropomorphism,  rather  than  a  full  blown
negative theology. But they could just as well be seen as expressions of the Judeo-
Christian distinction from which follows both anti-anthropomorphism and the need
for more radical forms of negative theology. 
Clement also notes that God dwells in an “unapproachable sanctity (ἀπροσίτῳ
ἁγιότητι)” and is separated “from even the archangels”541. This is similar to when
Clement in one of the above passages says that ‘ineffability’ is the bosom of the
Father. It is not clear how far we can take these last metaphors, but they seem to
imply that God is not as such ineffable,  but there is some sort of gap or layer
between us and God that makes God ineffable. God’s ineffableness could in this
case be seen as a product of the radical distinction between creator and creation,
but Clement does not say that clearly.
At any rate, all this means that God can only be known through his revelation.
This might seem to contradict Clement’s idea that Hellenic philosophy also, though
only partly,  contains true philosophy. But then we should remember, that if  the
Greeks have some degree of indirect access to the mysteries, it is only because
“understanding is sent by God (σύνεσιν θεόπεμπτον εἶναι).”542 Clement is quite
clear in upholding a ‘revelation theology’ that corresponds to his radical distinction
between Creator and creation: “God is not capable of being taught (διδακτὸν) by
man, or expressed in speech (ῥητὸν), but to be known only by His own power (μόνῃ
τῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ δυνάμει γνωστόν).”543
Nothing in the universe has any power in itself.  Animate things derive their
power from God: “[...]by the universal providence of God, through the medium of
secondary causes, the operative power (ἐνέργεια) is propagated in succession to
individual objects.”544
This is probably also why the existence of providence is “evident from the sight
of all its skilful and wise works which are seen” (as discussed above). This does not
mean that  God reveals  much of  himself  (except  for  his  existence)  through  his
powers, at least not in any obvious way: “[...]it is the nature of the divine power to
work all things secretly (ἐπικεκρυμμένως)”, Clement states as an argument against
anyone  who  “alleges  that  he  has  conceived  (ἐπινενοηκέναι)  or  made  anything
which pertains to creation”.545
As hinted at above Clement defends a degree of voluntarism when it comes to
541Str. 6.7.57.5, p. 493
542Str. 6.8.63.1, p. 494
543Str. 5.11.71.5, p. 461
544Str. 6.16.148.6, p. 515
545Str. 6.16.148.6, p. 515
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faith. The same seems to be the case in matters of theology. Pondering on how
prayer affects God, Clement notes that God is not “involuntarily good, as the fire is
warming; but in Him the imparting of good things is voluntary (ἑκούσιος δὲ ἡ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν μετάδοσις αὐτῷ)”546.
Hence we might deduce that God’s goodness is not an essential property as
such, but something God ‘does’. Implicit  (if  not almost explicit)  in much of the
above seems to be a distinction between God's  οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. God is good,
but it is more specifically his works in relation to us that are good. When speaking
of epistemology, it is not God as such that is known, but God “by His own power”.
Often we know things by their “powers and properties”, but not by their essence.547
Knowledge  of  the  powers  of  things  does  not  necessarily  lead to  knowledge of
essence. With God, his “own power” does not make it possible to put God himself
into expression:
“[...]the God of the universe,  who is above all  speech, all  conception,  all
thought, can never be committed to writing, being inexpressible even by His
own power (ἄρρητος ὢν δυνάμει τῇ αὑτοῦ).”548
So what we can know by revelation, it seems, is the powers of God. Hence it
does  indeed  seem  that  we  can  apply  the  Philonic  distinction  between  God's
essence and his activities to Clement’s theological thinking. But it is crucial that
God’s oneness is a core point in this. While God is essentially one, through his Son
his powers become plural (see below on the Son). This is how essence relates to
works.
It  is  also the ‘oneness’  of God that lies at the root of the need for negative
theology.  The  Father  is  the  One  and  as  such  “incapable  of  being  declared
(ἀπαρέμφατος)”.549 In an important passage Clement argues that:
“[...]since  the  first  principle  (ἀρχὴ)  of  everything  is  difficult  to  find  out
(δυσεύρετος),  the  absolutely  first  and  oldest  principle  (πρώτη  καὶ
πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ), which is the cause of all other things being and having
been,  is  difficult  to  exhibit  (δύσδεικτος).  For  how can that  be expressed
which  is  neither  genus,  nor  difference,  nor  species,  nor  individual,  nor
number; nay more, is neither an event, nor that to which an event happens?
No one can rightly express Him wholly. For on account of His greatness He
is ranked as the All, and is the Father of the universe. Nor are any parts to
be predicated of  Him.  For the One is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἕν);
546Str. 7.7.42.4, p. 534
547Str. 8.4.14.4, p. 562
548Str. 5.10.65.2, p. 460
549Str. 4.25.1.156, p. 438
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wherefore  also  it  is  infinite  (ἄπειρον),  not  considered  with  reference  to
inscrutability  (ἀδιεξίτητον),  but  with  reference  to  its  being  without
dimensions  (ἀδιάστατον),  and  not  having  a  limit  (μὴ  ἔχον  πέρας).  And
therefore it is without form and name (ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἀνωνόμαστον).”550
What Clement says in this passage is quite similar to,  e.g.,  Philo,  Justin and
Theophilus.  But  Clement  goes  a  bit  further.  Clement  mixes  Aristotelian  logic
(”genus”, “species”, “individual” etc.), with a Pythagorean and Platonic idea of the
One,551 which he also identifies as the first principle of things. God is “the good
Monad (τὴν ἀγαθὴν μονάδα)”552.  To this he adds the claim that God is infinite,
which he seems to derive from the fact that God is indivisible. Simplicity entails
infinity.553
As Choufrine notes, for Clement it  is rather the indivisibility of the One that
makes it without any limit (πέρας), and thus infinite.554 Infinity here neither seem
to mean actual ‘qualitative’ or ‘quantitative’ infinity.555 It simply means that there
are no forms that can circumscribe God. Particulars “are infinite”, Clement says,
and so there can be “no scientific knowledge (ὄντων μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην)”556 of
such. Infinity entails (or is synonymous with) formlessness and namelessness. This
means, that God’s ineffability does not just follow from the imperfections of human
understanding, but is characteristic of God himself. God is “invisible (ἀόρατον),
and incapable of being circumscribed (ἀπερίγραφον)”, which is linked to the fact,
“that God is one”.557 But not only is God himself incapable of being declared, but
God’s  philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία) is  ineffable (ἄρρητος),  and his  hatred of  evil
(μισοπονηρία)  is  inconceivable.558 Hence  at  least  some  of  his  works  are  also
ineffable.
If  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  is  really  what  drives  Clement's  negative
theology, then we should ask if not simplicity in itself is a negative definition,559 so
that God's simplicity is derived from His being different from created things, which
are composite?
The simplicity and infinity of  God has profound consequences for theological
550Str. 5.12.81.4, pp. 463-464
551Plato, Parmenides
552Protr. 9.88.3, p. 197
553The One is infinite since it has no parts. See Plato, Parmenides 142b-155e.
554Choufrine 2002, p. 167
555Whatever that is, think of, e.g., Mühlenberg’s claim that Gregory of Nyssa was the first 
to describe God as qualitatively or essentially infinite. See the discussion of Gregory of 
Nyssa below.
556Str. 8.8, p. 564
557Str. 5.11.74.4, p. 462
558Protr. 10.104.3, p. 201
559Aristotle defines 'unit' negatively. See Aristotle, Metaphysica 1016b
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language. Following upon his argument, that since God is infinite, then God must
be completely without form or name, Clement argues that:
“[...]if we name (ὀνομάζωμεν) it, we do not do so properly, terming it either
the One (ἓν), or the Good (ἢ τἀγαθὸν), or Mind (ἢ νοῦν), or Absolute Being
(τὸ ὂν), or Father (ἢ πατέρα), or God (ἢ θεὸν), or Creator (ἢ δημιουργὸν), or
Lord. We speak not as supplying (προφερόμενοι)  His name; but for want
(ἀπορίας),  we use good names (ὀνόμασι καλοῖς),  in  order that  the mind
(διάνοια) may have these as points of support (ἐπερείδεσθαι), so as not to
err in other respects. For each one by itself does not express God; but all
together  are  indicative  of  the  power  of  the  Omnipotent.  For  predicates
(ῥητά) are expressed either from what belongs to things themselves (τῶν
προσόντων  αὐτοῖς),  or  from their  mutual  relation  (ἐκ  τῆς  πρὸς  ἄλληλα
σχέσεως). But none of these are admissible in reference to God. Nor any
more is he apprehended by the science of demonstration. For it depends on
primary and better known [principles]. But there is nothing antecedent to
the  Unbegotten  (ἀγεννήτου).  It  remains  that  we  understand,  then,  the
Unknown, by divine grace, and by the Word alone that proceeds from Him
(θείᾳ χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον νοεῖ);”560
There  are  many  themes  condensed  in  this  passage.  Clement’s  words  on
demonstration are reminiscent of what we have already discussed in relation to
faith and anticipation. Also, Clement’s claim that we alone understand God “by the
Word” expresses the need for revelation noted above. What is new in this passage
is  Clement’s  notions  about  language.  From  the  infinity  of  God  follows  that
predicates are useless when speaking directly of God. Rather, the names for God
are  “points  of  support”  for  the  mind,  and  as  such  seem  to  have  a  non-
representative semiotic quality, i.e. they point towards God, without representing
Him in any adequate manner. Names do not express God himself, but are indicative
of the power of God. But only when they are put “all together”. There is probably
an implicit Christological claim in this (Christ being the unity of God’s powers), as
we shall see in the following chapter.
The oneness of God also has an important ethical meaning, which we will look
into  more  extensively  below.  Also,  we  shall  return  to  the  link  between  God’s
oneness, his infinity, and the special character of theological language. 
But first, some remarks on Clement's understanding of the ontology of evil and
non-existence. How does Clement understand the concept ‘privation’? As quoted
above,  Clement  notes  that  “non-existence  cannot  be  called  privation.”561 The
context has to do with faith and unbelief, but can his statement be understood in a
560Str. 5.12.82.1, modified
561Str. 12.1, p. 360
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more  fundamentally,  in  order  to  give  us  an  impression  of  what  he  means  by
‘privation’ and ‘non-existence’? Perhaps the answer to the latter would also give us
some clues about his idea of evil, in so far as evil is, as is well-known, often defined
as non-existence.
The most obvious interpretation of the passage is that evil, matter or whatever
we define as the non-existent, is not a privation of something else, e.g. being or the
good. Rather evil is radically non-existent. It does not even exist as ‘parasitic’ on
the good (a typical way of expressing the idea that evil is privation).
This might explain why we do not in Clement find the suggestion that the good
must be defined negatively in relation to evil (e.g. as the ἀπόφασις of  στέρησις).
God is so different from everything else, it seems, that he cannot even be defined
by negating known categories (which would still  be to define God in relation to
these categories). This might be one reason why abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις) is more
central to Clement than negation (ἀπόφασις).
Clement’s negative theology seems to keep him from holding a positive, abstract
definition  of  ‘the  good’.  But  neither  does  he  talk  much  in  terms  of  negative,
abstract  definitions  of  ‘the  good’.  Rather,  what  is  central  in  Clement  is  what
characterizes the  Gnostic.  As  such righteousness,  virtue and similar  issues are
more important than abstract ontological definitions of the good. Likewise is sin,
conceived as action, more important than evil as an ontological class.
Maybe the reason is Christological, since such abstract ontological definitions
would, it seems, bypass the Son. But only through the Son can we understand good
and evil, sin and virtue.
Christology
The  Son,  the  Word,  is  the  image  of  God.562 But  the  Son  is,  of  course,  also
incarnated in Jesus of Nazareth. In the incarnation, the Son reveals the “Father’s
character to the five senses by clothing Himself with flesh.”563
In one of the above quoted passages Clement notes that God can only be known
“by His  own power  (παρ'  αὐτοῦ  δυνάμει)”564.  Clement  adds  that  “the  grace  of
knowledge is from Him by the Son”565. Moses when writing that “He said, and it
was  done”,  describes  the  word  of  God  as  being  “marked  out  by  his  work
(διαγράφοντος ἔργον)”.566 These passages are compatible with conceiving the Son
562Protr., p. 199
563Str. 5.6.34.1, p. 452
564Str. 5.11, p. 461
565Str. 5.11.71.5, p. 173
566Str. 5.14.99.3, p. 468
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as  a  power  or  activity  of  God,  which  is  confirmed in  the  seventh  book  of  the
Stromata: “[...]the energy of the Lord has a reference to the Almighty; and the Son
is, so to speak (εἰπεῖν), an energy (ἐνέργεια), of the Father.”567
Above we have mentioned that Clement claims that God’s love is ineffable. We
suggested that ‘love’ is an ἐνέργεια of God, from which follows that at least some
of God’s works are ineffable,  as God is himself.  But rather,  it  seems that what
Clement was saying is, that even if we can know God through his works, this does
not make him less ineffable. In the forth book of the Stromata, Clement writes that,
“[...]all  the  powers  (δυνάμεις)  of  the  Spirit,  becoming  collectively
(συλλήβδην) one thing (ἕν τι πρᾶγμα), terminate (συντελοῦσιν) in the same
point – that is, in the Son. But He is incapable of being declared, in respect
of the notions of each one of His powers (τῶν δυνάμεων ἐννοίας).”568
From the context it seems that “He” refers to the Father (it is not the Son that is
incapable of being declared). The Son is the unity of the powers of the Father, “the
circle of all powers (δυνάμεων) rolled and united into one unity (εἰς ἓν)”569.
God, the Father, is One and as such “incapable of being declared”. This is not
the case with the Son, exactly because the Son is not the One or simplicity but a
unity of characteristics: “[...]the Son is neither simply one as one thing (ἓν ὡς ἕν),
nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things (ὡς πάντα ἕν); whence also
He is all things.”570
There are obvious parallels to Neo-Platonism. If Clement account of the Father's
oneness is reminiscent of Plotinus, is not this idea of the Son similar to Plotinus’
idea of Nous? As the Intellect in Plotinus produces the Soul when it contemplates
the One, God creates the world through the Son:
“[...]as the Son sees the goodness of  the Father,  God the Saviour works,
being called the first principle of all things (ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή), which was
imaged forth  (ἀπεικόνισται)  from the invisible  God first,  and before  the
ages,  and  which  fashioned  all  things  which  was  came  into  being  after
itself.”571
As such it  seems that the Son is the boundary between the simplicity of the
Father (the One), and plurality (creation). The Son can be viewed, it seems, from
‘above’ and from ‘below’. From God’s point of view, the Son is never displaced,
567Str. 7.2.7.7, p. 525
568Str. 4.25.156.1, p. 438, modified
569Str. 4.25.156.1, p. 438
570Ibid.
571Str. 5.6.38.7, p. 453
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divided, severed or passing from place to place, but he is “[...]always everywhere
(πάντῃ δὲ ὢν πάντοτε καὶ μηδαμῇ περιεχόμενος), and being contained nowhere;
complete mind, the complete paternal light;”572 Where mind was above identified
with  the  Father,  here  it  is  identified  with  the  Son.  This  might  sound  as  a
contradiction, but it might also simply remind us that Clement is not that far from
trinitarian orthodoxy (i.e. the Father and the Son shares their characteristics).
Humanly speaking, from ‘below’, the Son is the revelation of God. As a matter of
epistemology,  the  knowledge  of  “the  word”  is  “the  beginning  of  faith”.  That
knowledge of the word is the beginning of faith seems to contradict the notion of
faith as voluntary  prolepsis and the ground of knowledge, but according to our
distinctions such knowledge could be seen as a co-operating cause for faith. 
True wisdom, Clement says, does not trust in “mere words (λόγοις ψιλοῖς) and
oracular utterances”573 but devotes itself to divine commands, by which it “receives
a  divine  power  according to  its  inspiration  from the  Word.”574 Clement’s  point
seems to be, that without a spiritual, non-discursive inspiration from God (or the
Logos), there can be no real wisdom or knowledge. Clement makes it clear that
“the Word” is not to be given to those who are “reared in the arts of all kinds of
words, and in the power of inflated attempts at proof”575. Of course this excludes
all kinds of sophistry, but is it not an attack on all discourses not dealing with “the
Word” on the basis of its self-revelation? Clement says that “the Word” is not to be
committed to those “whose minds (ψυχὴν) are already preoccupied, and have not
previously been emptied”576. Knowledge of “the Word” does not build upon other
previously achieved knowledge, but must be its own precondition. Hence we are,
to be sure, not dealing with an epistemological continuity between the ‘natural’
and  the  ‘divine’.  Also,  Clement  goes  as  far  as  saying  that  “the  conceptions
(ἐπίνοιαι) of virtuous men are produced through the inspiration of God (ἐπίπνοιαν
θείαν)”577.  Notice,  however,  that  Clement  is  not  saying  that  such  conceptions
(ἐπίνοιαι) are themselves given directly by God or identical to God's own thoughts.
Language and concealment
In a passage that also contains a distinction between God’s essence and powers,
as discussed above, Clement notes that:
572Str. 7.2.5.5, p. 524
573Str. 2.20.122.1
574Str. 2.20.122.1, p. 373
575Str. 1.1.8.1
576Ibid.
577Str. 6.17.157.4, p. 517, modified
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“[...]human speech is by nature feeble (ἀσθενὴς), and incapable of uttering
God. I do not say His name. For to name it is common, not to philosophers
only,  but  also  to  poets.  Nor  [do  I  say]  His  essence  (οὐσίαν);  for  this  is
impossible, but the power (δύναμιν) and the works (ἔργα) of God.”578
Clement’s point here seems to be that God is, again, essentially unutterable, i.e.
even if  humans had no lack of  capacity God would be impossible to utter.  But
moreover, because of the ‘feebleness’ of human speech neither can his powers be
uttered.  The  difference  between  the  two  seems  to  be  that  the  latter  is  not
essentially unutterable. But both can be named, Clement says, which supposedly
means that even if we cannot put either God’s essence or his work into speech, we
can, however, put a name on these, as a means to referring to these. But while the
name  has  an  extensional  (referential)  quality,  it  does  not,  it  seems,  have  any
intentional quality (descriptive, predicative meaning).579
Clement discerns three levels of language, “names (τὰ ὀνόματα)” “thoughts (τὰ
νοήματα)” and “subject-matters (τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα)”.580 Subject-matters are
the things that impress thoughts (νοήματα) in us. Thoughts are the likeness of
such  subject-matters,  and  produces  the  same  impression  in  all,  i.e.  they
correspond strictly to the nature or impression of things. Names are the symbolic
representations of thoughts (νοήματα).
Now, if we compare this three-fold distinction to Clement’s ontology, then if the
subject-matter is the Father, the One ineffable God, who reveals himself through
the Son, then it seems that thoughts (νοήματα) about God must be produced in the
encounter with the Son. Clement at one instance claims, that those who learn from
God “with difficulty attain to a conception of God (ἔννοιαν ἀφικνοῦνται θεοῦ)”581.
At another instance he says that Man is by creation “endowed with a notion
(ἔννοιαν) of God.”582 Such notions does hardly reveal God in any positive, direct
sense.  Hence  the  names  that  we  make  up  to  describe  the  notions  produced
through the Son’s revelation of the Father, does not work as positive predicates for
the Father. Rather they are, as Clement says, “points of support, so as not to err in
other respects”583.
As we have seen it is impossible to predicate something about God. But names
or notions for God’s essence and work still refer to God, and when names are put
together in a ‘systematic’ theology or philosophy they become a parable of God’s
578Str. 6.18.166.2, p. 519
579Str. 5.12.82. See the quotation above.
580Str. 8.8.23.1, p. 564, modified. “νοήματα“ should be 'thoughts' not 'conceptions'.
581Str. 6.18.166.3, p. 519
582Str. 7.2, p. 525, modified. “ἔννοιαν” should be 'notion', not 'conception'.
583Str. 5.12.82
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mysteries. It is not completely true, however, to say that for Clement all names for
God are incorrect, as Osborn does.584 Rather the ‘correctness’ of names for God
consists in their ability to refer to God when they come together to form a parable
of the divine mysteries.
Such indirect speaking Clement discusses frequently in terms of ‘concealment’:
“For  speech  (ὁ  λόγος)  conceals  much  (πολυκευθὴς  γὰρ).”585 Concealment  (or
veiling) can be used to hide the truth from “those who are unfit to receive the
depth of knowledge (τὸ βάθος τῆς γνώσεως)”586. But it also has a positive function:
“Very  useful,  then,  is  the  mode  of  symbolic  interpretation  (συμβολικῆς
ἑρμηνείας) for many purposes; and it is helpful to the right theology, and to
piety, and to the display of intelligence, and the practice of brevity, and the
exhibition of wisdom.”587
As is common in the tradition from Philo (who drew on Stoic approaches to
Greek classics), and as we have seen above, Clement reads Moses’ experience in
the dark cloud on Sinai as an expression of this truth. The thick darkness is where
“the  inaccesible  and  invisible  notions  respecting  Existence  (τὰς  ἀδύτους  καὶ
ἀειδεῖς περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἐννοίας)”588 must be found. The point of all this is that only
through faith can the knowledge of God be attained. After these initial statements
in the second book Clement goes on to his definition of faith as prolepsis. It is faith
that makes it possible to read texts allegorically, and to break through the symbols
and enigmas that conceal the mysteries.
Not only are allegorical readings of Scripture useful. Symbolic interpretations of
Hellenic  philosophy  and  culture  is  useful  as  well.  In  the  second  book  of  the
Stromata,  Clement  lets  us  know  that  it  is  “especially  what  is  concealed
(ἐπικεκρυμμένον) in the barbarian philosophy” that “shall be embraced”.589 By “the
concealed  (ἐπικεκρυμμένον)”  Clement  here  understands  “the  department  of
symbol  and  enigma”.590 Not  that  Clement  prefers  advanced  rhetoric  for  clear
speech: “he who is solicitous about truth ought not to frame his language with
artfulness and care”591.  But enigmatic and symbolic language is necessary, simply
because “truth has been hidden (ἐπικεκρύφθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν) from us”, from which
584Osborn 1957, p. 39
585Str. 6.15.132, p. 511
586Str. 5.8.64.3, p. 457
587Str. 5.8.46.1, p. 455
588Str. 2.2.6.1, p. 348
589Str. 2.1.1.2, p. 347, modified. “ἐπικεκρυμμένον” should be '[being] concealed', not 
'occult'.
590Str. 2.1.1.2, p. 347
591Str. 2.1.3.2, p. 347
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reasonably follows that it is especially what is concealed in philosophy that has a
chance of representing truth.592
The  “prophecies  and oracles”,  whether  Hebrew or  Pagan,  are  (almost?)  per
necessity  spoken  in  “enigmas”  and  “mysteries”,  Clement  notes.  All  who  have
spoken of the “first principles of things” (whether Barbarian or Greek) have veiled
the  truth  in  “enigmas  (αἰνίγμασι),  and  symbols  (συμβόλοις),  and  allegories
(ἀλληγορίαις), and metaphors (μεταφοραῖς), and such like tropes.”593 
The veil in the Jewish temple indicated the “truly sacred Word” in “accordance
with the method of concealment (διὰ τοῦτό τοι τῆς ἐπικρύψεως τὸν τρόπον)”594. But
concealment can be understood as a more general phenomena, which both applies
to the object of the writing (intellectual truths) and the intention of a writer. Hence
Heraclitus’ “On Nature” present “the mind of the writer concealed”595. Not only is
concealment necessary, it also makes the truth appear grander: “all  things that
shine through a veil show the truth grander and more imposing”596. And this, it
seems, is precisely the point about the method of concealment. It  is exactly by
concealing the mysteries that the mysteries are represented as mysteries. Only
when using enigmas and signs to represent the ineffable does the ineffability of the
divine  become  apparent.  Language  and  signs  simultaneously  represent  and
conceal their objects.
But again, what language conceals can be grasped only by faith. Without faith
the signs have no significatory force. When it comes to the Hebrew Bible, this is
why, as Clement says, “[...]faith in Christ and the knowledge of the Gospel are the
explanation and fulfillment of the law”. Only if  one believes can he understand
what  is  prophesied  in  the  law  and  the  Old  Testament,  i.e.  what  is  concealed
beneath these.597
Knowledge of philosophy in the Hellenic sense is not needed in order to express
the truth in  enigmas.  Even if  the prophets  of  the Old Testament did  not  have
knowledge of philosophy, being led by God’s spirit they were able to express the
truth:  “For  the  prophets  and  disciples  of  the  Spirit  knew infallibly  their  mind
(ἐγνώκεσαν τὸν νοῦν). For they knew it by faith, in a way which others could not
easily, as the Spirit has said.”598
Analogy  (ἀναλογιστικός)  presents  concealed causes “through the medium of
592Str. 2.2.6.4
593Str. 5.4.21.4, p. 449
594Str. 5.4.19.3, p. 449
595Str. 5.8.50.2, p. 456, modified
596Str. 5.9.56.5, p. 457
597Str. 4.21.134.3, p. 434
598Str. 1.9.45.2, p. 310
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signs (διὰ σημείων)”599, Clement says.600 Now what does Clement mean by ‘sign’
(σημείων)?
“[...]in  definitions (ὅροις),  difference (διαφορά) is  assumed, which,  in the
definitions occupies the place of sign (σημείου). [...] For the things added by
way of difference to the definition are the signs of the properties of things;
but do not show the nature of the things themselves.”601
If a definition cannot be given of God, how is it possible to refer to God with
signs?  But  signs  do  not  refer  to  (they  are  not)  predicates,  but  to  difference,
Clement  seems  to  be  saying.  In  other  words,  a  sign  refers  to  a  property  by
distinguishing the property from other properties. The One, of course, does not
contain any difference, since it would then not be one (which is also why there can
be no adequate sign for the One). Neither would it  be infinite, then. Hence an
analogy that presents God must do so by using signs that distinguishes God from
that  which  is  not  God,  i.e.  through  negative  theology.  The  One  must  be
distinguished from difference as such. This is presumably why dialectics is needed
to  break  down  definitions  in  order  to  come  to  the  understanding  that  God  is
radically  different  from everything else,  or  rather  that  God is  that  from which
everything is radically different from.
Just as the Scriptures is parabolic in order to conceal the truth, Christ, “who was
not of the world, came as one who was of the world to men.”602 So while Jesus
Christ is on the one hand the revelation of the father to “the five senses”, he is also
hidden in the self-same means by which he is revealed. So even if Jesus Christ is
the final revelation of the mysteries and prophecies, the truth is still,  in a way,
concealed (it requires faith to see the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth).
It should also be mentioned, that according to Clement, prophecy is not marked
by  the  dialect  it  is  pronounced  in,  exactly  because  it  speaks  indirectly.603
Concealment, in other words, creates a degree of constancy (at the sign-level also).
This seems to be why Clement believes that “Scripture is clear to all, when taken
according to the bare reading”604. But of course Scripture is not clear to all when it
comes to the things signified, since this is a matter of faith.
With the emphasis  on the  ‘inner’  or  ‘spiritual’  meaning of  the mysteries  we
599Str. 8.9.32.6, p. 567
600Analogy can be distinguished from figure (tropos) and parable (parabolê). Str. 
6.15.126.3-4
601Str. 8.6.21.2, p. 563
602Str. 6.15.126.3, p. 509
603Str. 6.16, p. 510
604Str. 6.15.131.3, p. 51
131
might think that  Clement would agree with Heracleon (a Valentinian whom he
quotes), that confession with “the voice” but without “faith and conduct (πίστει καὶ
πολιτείᾳ)”, is of little value.605 Clement of course agrees that faith and conduct is
important, but adds that the confession of voice can be the “one good work”.606
Since Clement distinguishes between the ordinary Christian and the true Gnostic,
it seems reasonable that confession with both voice, faith (perhaps understood as
following Christ’s commandments for their own sake) and conduct belongs to the
true Gnostic, while the ordinary believer can settle for less. 
Not  only  does  Clement  see  the  Scriptures  as  concealing  the  truth  through
allegory, enigmas and symbols. For the above reasons he also finds it needful to
write so himself.  Hence he paradoxically notes that “I do not mention that the
Stromata, forming a body of varied erudition (πολυμαθίᾳ), wish artfully to conceal
(κρύπτειν ἐντέχνως) the seeds of knowledge.”607 Clement’s deliberate attempt to
write enigmatically suggests that there must be degrees of concealment,  i.e.  if
concealment was ‘automatic’ then it would not be something to deliberate about.
The  Stromata is  “patched  together”,  but  for  those  who  are  philosophically
inclined (the Gnostic), below the surface there will be truth: “For the scripture will
find  one  to  understand  it  (εὑρήσει  γὰρ  τὸν  συνήσοντα  ἕνα  ἡ  γραφή).”608 The
Stromata contributes to the recollection and expression of truth.609 The  Stromata
does not carry much meaning by itself, but by the proper dialectics it helps to give
birth to the truth already present in the true Gnostic (i.e. the Word/Christ). This
truth, however, must be considered revealed truth, i.e. it is only the Gnostic who
already  has  an  insight  into  God’s  mysteries  that  will  gain  something  from the
Stromata.
As argued above, symbolic and enigmatic language about God implies a kind of
negative theology. Mortley has noted that,
“Clement’s reflection on language is profound, and full of implications for all
meta-disciplines  such  as  philosophy  and  theology.  He  expects  to  find
language  full  of  enigmas,  and  treats  theology  as  a  generalised  parable.
Rational discourse is regarded as a kind of continuous symbol, an ainigma,
or  puzzle  to  be  considered  by  the  intellect.  Rational  discourse  does  not
demonstrate  reality,  as  Aristotle  would  have  it,  but  rather  it  symbolises
transcendent truth. Thus language itself calls for a hermeneutic.”610
605Str. 4.9.71.2, p. 422
606Str. 4.9.74.3, p. 422. This fits better with Rom 10:9.
607Str. 1.2.20.4, p. 304
608Str. 4.2.4.3, p. 409, modified. “ἡ γραφή” should be 'scripture', not 'word'.
609Compare with Plato, Phaedrus 257c-279c
610Mortley 1986, p. 36
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Also,  when  Clement  says  about  the  Stromata that  “it  will  try  to  speak
imperceptibly, to make manifest in secrecy, to demonstrate in silence”611, Mortley
takes it as a paradoxical claim about “speech as having a capacity for silence.”612
According to Mortley, Clement’s theory of language as symbolic and concealing
applies  to  language as such,  not  only  metaphors  or  allegories,  etc.,  as  we are
accustomed to think.613 Clement does not distinguish between “the clear and the
mysterious”.614
There is a certain Christological relevance to the theme of concealment. Mortley
sees  a  parallel  to  Middle-  and  Neo-Platonism:  In  Clement  the  Father  is
inaccessible, but is revealed in the Son (the Logos), as the One is revealed through
the Intellect (Nous). The Son has a name and can be accessed by language.615 This
should be kept in mind when we discuss what is implied when Clement talks about
the Gnostic as imitating God.
Clement's ethics
In the following we will discuss the links between Clement’s theology and his
ethics in the Instructor and the Stromata. The main questions are: Does Clement’s
version of negative theology result in anything that can be categorized as negative
ethics, e.g. aphairetic (as already suggested) or apophatic?
There will not be much comprehensive, systematic expositions of Clement's view
of the different virtues. Attempting this would hardly do justice to his eclectic style.
Moreover,  for  Clement  the  traditional  virtues  tend  to  be  expressions  of  more
fundamental things related to self-control and simplicity. What is relevant for our
study is how the true Gnostic according to Clement arrives at these things, and
how they can be described.
Anthropology and human likeness to God
As  discussed  above,  Clement  conceives  of  the  divine  relations  in  term  of
likeness. The Son is the express image of the Father. A similar relation is repeated
in Clement’s anthropology. This is of course not very surprising, since also Philo
and much of the Patristic tradition combined a Platonic idea of the soul’s divine
likeness with Gen. 1:26. But Clement’s version is more akin to the Neo-Platonic. As
the Logos is the image of God, the first principle, the image of the Logos is “the
611Str. 1.1.15, tr. Mortley
612Mortley 1986, p. 37
613Mortley 1986, p. 39
614Mortley 1986, p. 40
615Mortley 1986, p. 36
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true  man,  the  mind  which  is  in  man  (ὁ  ἄνθρωπος  ἀληθινός,  ὁ  νοῦς  ὁ  ἐν
ἀνθρώπῳ)”616.  The image of  God is  the “divine  and royal  Word,  the impassible
man”. The image of the image is the human mind.617 Clement seems to say that
Christ  (the  Word)  is  the  “true  man”,  which  is  reflected in  the  mind of  human
beings.  Clement  distinguishes  between  the  idea  of  Man  and  concrete  human
beings: “Man, then, generically considered, is formed in accordance with the idea
of the connate spirit (ἰδέαν πλάσσεται τοῦ συμφυοῦς πνεύματος).”618 Man is “not
created formless (ἀνείδεος) and shapeless (ἀσχημάτιστος)”. The “idea and form of
man” was, it seems, created before Adam, whom, when he was created with all the
distinctions of this, he “in the act of coming into being received perfection (ὃ δὲ ἐν
τῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν τελείωσιν ἐλάμβανεν)”619.
Clement  distinguishes  between  “the  true  man”,  the  intellect  created  in  the
likeness of the image of God, and the visible, concrete man.
“And an image of the Word [Logos] is the true man, that is, the intellect in
man, who on this account is said to have been created “in the image” of
God, and “in his likeness” [Gen. 1.26], because through his understanding
heart he is made like the divine Word and so reasonable. Of the earthly,
visible man there are images in the form of the statues which are far away
from the truth and nothing but a temporary impression upon matter.”620
Though Man is created in the image of God, the human soul is not ‘simple’ in the
sense that it has no parts. Clement takes over a more or less traditional three-fold
division of  the soul,  with the intellect as the ruling part.621 The intellect is  the
reasoning faculty, “the inner man, which is the ruler (ἄρχων) of this man that is
seen. And that one, in another respect, God guides.”622 It is not completely clear
what Clement means by this, but the point seems to be that the mind/intellect is
the image of the Word, and through this God guides the rest of Man. The other
parts  Clement  refers  to  as  “the  irascible  part  (θυμικόν)”  and  “appetite
(ἐπιθυμητικὸν)”.623
The simplicity of God and unity of Christ is reflected in the human person. An
example of this is that sexual differences are only secondary. Sexual desire “divides
humanity”, into male and female. But the virtuous life is “social and holy” and
616Protr. 10.98.4, p. 199
617Str. 5.14.94.4
618Str. 4.23.150.2, p. 437
619Str. 4.23.150.4, p. 437, modified.
620Protr. 10.98.4, tr. Butterworth, modified
621E.g. Plato, Phaedrus 246A; Aristotle De Anima
622Paed. 3.1.1.2, p. 271
623Paed. 3.1.1.2, p. 271
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based on “conjugal union”. The God of both male and female is one, just as there is
one church. Circumstances of life are common, and the virtue of man and woman
is the same. It is not that the nature of the sexes is by creation the same, but
“there is sameness (ταὐτόν ἐστι), as far as respects the soul”624. Differences are
only bodily. Being a liberation from the material, the reward for virtue is a life
where  sexual  distinctions  are  removed,  or  at  least  play  no  significant  role:
“Common therefore, too, to men and women is the name of man.”625 Women and
men have the same capacity  for  virtue,  and the Church is  full  of  both “chaste
(σωφρόνων) women as men”626.  Even manliness (ἀνδρείας) is  available to both,
since manliness is not the ability to fight in the manner of the flesh, but a virtue
that produces confidence and forbearance,  as when turning the other cheek.627
Hence manliness (or courage) is to some degree defined as a negative property.
Christ  is  the  “express  image  (δόξης  χαρακτήρ)”  God,  “who  impress  on  the
Gnostic  (ἐναποσφραγιζόμενος  τῷ  γνωστικῷ)”  his  own image,  transforming  the
Gnostic  into  “a  third  divine  image  (τρίτην  ἤδη  τὴν  θείαν  εἰκόνα)”.628 As  such
Clement  describes  “the  good  (σπουδαῖος)  man”  as  the  “boundary  (μεθόριος)
between an immortal and a mortal nature”.629 The Gnostic (supposedly identical to
“the  good man”)  is  the  perfect  Christian,  the one who is  after  the  image and
likeness of God and imitates God as far as possible.630 The soul of the righteous
man is “a divine image, resembling God (ἄγαλμα θεῖον καὶ θεῷ προσεμφερὲς)”631.
Likeness to Christ is hardly a ‘natural’ property, but something that only comes
by  virtue.  Some  live  “according  to  the  likeness  of  Christ  (κατὰ  τὴν  πρὸς  τὸν
σωτῆρα ὁμοίωσιν)”, while others “live according to their image (κατὰ τὴν τούτων
εἰκόνα)[...]”.632 What does Clement refer to when he says “their image”? Does he
mean that some live according to their own image? Human beings reflect what
they are attached to: “the individual man is stamped according to the impression
(κατὰ τύπωσιν) produced in the soul by the objects of his choice.”633
Paraphrasing Paul, Clement writes:
“If ye are of me, and I am of Christ, then become imitators of Christ (μιμηταὶ
Χριστοῦ γίνεσθε), and Christ of God. Assimilation to God, then, so that as far
624Str. 4.8.60, p. 420
625Paed. 1.4.10.3
626Str. 4.8.58.2, p. 419
627Str. 4.8.61.2, p. 420
628Str. 7.3.16.6, p. 527
629Str. 2.18.81.2, p. 365
630Str. 2.19.97, p. 369. Compare Plato, Tim. 176b
631Str. 7.3.16.5, p. 527
632Str. 4.6.30.1, p. 414
633Str. 4.23.150.2, p. 437
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as possible a man becomes righteous and holy with wisdom, he lays down as
the aim of faith, and the end to be that restitution of the promise which is
effected by faith.”634
Here we see more expressly the ‘layers’ of imitation or likeness.635 
Even if the soul is the “better part” of man, “neither is the soul good by nature,
nor, on the other hand, is the body bad by nature (κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα)”.636 It is,
to be sure, the complete person, in body and soul, that is saved. The “whole man
(ὅλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον)” is “purified in body and soul”.637 But again, Clement notes in
the sixth book of the Stromata, “the likeness is not, as some imagine, that of the
human form (κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον)”638.
Clement notes that “conformity with the image and likeness is not meant of the
body[...], but in mind and reason (κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμόν), on which fitly the Lord
impresses  (ἐνσφραγίζεται)  the  seal  of  likeness”639.  On the  other  hand Clement
argues that there need to be material things in order to constitute actions. Clement
writes that:
 “[...]without things intermediate (μεταξύ) which hold the place of material
(ὕλης),  neither  good  nor  bad  actions  (πράξεις)  are  constituted
(συνίστανται), such I mean as life, and health, and other necessary things
or circumstances.”640
Clement notes that “it is monstrous for those who are made in “the image and
likeness of God,” to dishonour the archetype by assuming foreign ornament”641. So
even if  the body does not  reflect the image of  Christ,  it  still  has some sort of
relation  to  the  ‘archetype’  (or  maybe  the  above  should  not  be  taken  too
philosophically).  Clement  also  notes  that  “[...]amours  (ἔρωτες),  and  diseases
(νόσοι), and evil thoughts (διαλογισμοὶ) “break through” the mind and the whole
man (τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ  τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον).”642 Vice is  reflected in  the whole
human person, soul and body, and results in visible evil acts.
But what about virtue? Recalling that Clement notes that “conformity with the
image and likeness is not meant of the body”643 this seems not to be the case, at
least not in any positively verifiable sense. The soul is, when virtuous, adorned with
634Str. 2.22.136.5, p. 377, modified. “γίνεσθε” should be 'become', not 'are'. 1 Cor. 11:1.
635See also Str. 4.22, p. 435; Str. 4.24, p. 437; Str. 4.26, p. 441, and many other places.
636Str. 4.26.164.3, p. 439
637Str. 5.10.61.3, p. 459. See also Str. 5.6, p. 453
638Str. 6.14.114.4, modified.
639Str. 2.19.102.6, p. 370
640Str. 4.6.39.2, p. 416
641Paed. 3.11.66.2, p. 287
642Str. 4.6.33.5, p. 415
643Str. 2.19.102.6, p. 370
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“righteousness, wisdom, fortitude, temperance, love of the good, modesty” etc.,
and, to be concrete again, this is reflected in not using such things as artificial
makeups for the body. But this is not a necessary sign of virtue (not using makeup
does not make a person virtuous). It seems that the relationship between soul and
body is a one-way conditional (virtue in the soul=>virtue in the body, or rather,
virtue in the soul=>~vice in the body).
We have seen that the soul (at least the soul of the Gnostic) is the image of
Christ,  who is the image of  God the Father.  However,  in the sixth book of  the
Stromata Clement in a critique of idolatry declares that nothing among created
things can be a “representation of God (ἀπεικόνισμα τοῦ θεοῦ)”644. 
At  another  instance  Clement  against  the  Stoics  argue  that  “it  is  utterly
impossible for any one to become perfect as God is”645. Hence Clement in this case
guards the Judeo-Christian distinction. Clement also denies that “the likeness to
the first cause [is] that which consists in virtue (οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ κατ' ἀρετήν, ἡ πρὸς τὸ
πρῶτον αἴτιον)”, since virtue in God and virtue in man is not the same.646 Instead,
rightly understood ‘likeness’ (ὁμοίωσιν) to God consists in the “adoption and the
friendship of God (υἱοθεσίαν καὶ φιλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ)”, which happens when following
the teachings of Christ.647
One  resolution  to  this  problem  might  be,  that  even  if  man  is  “not  created
formless and shapeless” (as quoted), according to Clement the invisibility of souls
means that it makes no sense to speak of ‘likeness’.648 What we might ask is: are
‘invisible’ things ‘alike’ because of a privation (the lack of visibility – obviously not
the case: God does not have privations), or do they have that in common that they
are not capable of being ‘alike’ to anything, e.g., a negative (apophatic) property?
The latter explanation seems more adequate. In this case Clement’s anthropology
(his idea of the human soul to be more precise) is  apophatic in the Aristotelian
sense, where  ἀπόφασις simply means denying that a thing belongs to a certain
class.  God and  brutes  have  that  in  common that  they  are  not  virtuous.649 Not
because they are viceful or lack virtue (that would be a privation), but because the
term ‘virtue’  is  only  applicable  to  human beings.  This  does not  make God and
brutes have anything positive in common, though. Similarly we could say that God
and the human soul (ideally) have that in common that they are invisible, lacks
644Str. 6.18.163, p. 519, modified. 
645Str. 7.14, p. 549
646Str. 6.14.114, p. 506. It is not clear from this passage, however, whether the difference 
is quantitative or qualitative.
647Str. 6.14.114.6
648Str. 6.8, p. 519
649Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 7, 1145a
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nothing and similar apophatic descriptions. Only in this sense are they ‘alike’.650
To be sure, and as noted above, Clement distances himself from the idea that the
soul of human beings in any (’literal’) sense can be the image or likeness of God:
“For we do not say, as the Stoics do most impiously, that virtue in man and
God is the same. Ought we not then to be perfect, as the Father wills? For it
is  utterly  impossible  for  any one to  become perfect  as  God is.  Now the
Father  wishes  us  to  be  perfect  by  living  blamelessly,  according  to  the
obedience of the Gospel.”651
Living accordingly to the obedience of the Gospel does not mean an essential
likeness to God,  bu to “walk at once piously and magnanimously,  as befits the
dignity of the commandment”652. This is what it means to be “perfect” as the Father
wills, and to imitate God.653
Ethics in The Instructor
As the above shows, since Man is made in God’s image and likeness, there is an
intimate connection between the soul and God. Because Man has been created
after “His likeness”, he contains the “love-charm (τὸ φίλτρον)”654, the inspiration
or breath of God. As such, the human being is “desirable on its own account”655,
“an  object  desirable  for  itself  (αὑτὸ  αἱρετὸν)”656.  Not  surprisingly  Clement's
anthropology has ethical as well as epistemological consequences. This is the case
in the Stromata, as well as in The Instructor. Knowledge of the one seems to entail
knowledge of the other. In a classical manner, Clement affirms that the greatest of
all lessons is to know one’s self, “[f]or if one knows himself, he will know God”. By
this one will be made like God, characterized by “well-doing (ἀγαθοεργῶν)” and
“by requiring as few things as possible.”657. The man with whom the Word dwells
has the form which is of the Word. This makes such a person beautiful. Beauty is
two-fold: 1) The beauty of the soul, beneficence, and 2) The beauty of the flesh,
immortality.658
If Clement’s negative theology had any influence on his ethics, we should expect
to find negative definitions of  such things as virtue and goodness in his major
ethical work, The Instructor, and maybe even a discussion of how to define virtue
650This theme will be discussed again below.
651Str. 8.14, p. 549
652Str. 8.14, p. 549
653Clement probably has Matt. 5:48 in mind.
654Paed. 1.3.7.3
655Paed. 1.3.7.2
656Paed. 1.3.7.3
657Paed. 3.1.1.1, p. 271
658Paed. 3.1, p. 272
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negatively. There is at least one property of God that is reflected in the Christian.
In The Instructor, being in need of nothing (not lacking anything) is presented as a
(if  not  the)  primary  property  of  the  divine.  God  alone  is  in  need  of  nothing
('indeficient') (ἀνενδεής), and “we call that perfect which wants nothing (τέλειον
δὲ τὸ ἀπροσδεές φαμεν).”659 He who knows God wants nothing.660 Ontologically
speaking,  the divine,  it  seems,  is  that  which is  wholly  without  privations.  This
entails that God needs nothing (is indeficient), which could arguably be understood
to  some  degree  as  a  negatively  defined  property.  It  is  hardly  an  instance  of
negative theology in the technical sense, though. But at any rate we are dealing
with a simple example of how a negatively defined theological property has an
impact on ethics in Clement.
The  only  time  Clement  discusses  negative  or  privative  definitions  in  The
Instructor is when he refuses to understand the name ‘νήπιος’ (child) as a privative
definition. Clement discusses the word as used descriptively of the Christians by
Paul  (in  Romans):  “[...]the  name  of  child,  νήπιος,  is  not  understood  by  us
privatively,  though  the  sons  of  the  grammarians  make  the  νή  a  privative
(στερητικὸν) particle.”661 Clement’s point seems to be, that ‘child’ is here to be
understood as a positive definition. If the word contained a negative definition by
means  of  the  particle  νή,  there  would  be  a  risk  that  the  name  referred  to  a
privative property (ontologically) in the strict sense of lacking something (rather
than just a negatively defined property implied by the privative alpha). Being a
‘child’ would then mean being deprived of something (adulthood?), which Clement
would not allow as a proper description of the Christian (who as God does not lack
anything, or at least not much, the point seems to be). The child, Clement explains,
is  “gentle  (Ἤπιος),  tender  (ἀταλός),  delicate  (ἁπαλὸς),  and  simple  (ἁπλοῦς),
guileless (ἄδολος), and destitute of hypocrisy (ἀνυπόκριτος), straightforward and
upright in mind”662.  In a sense it  could be argued that the positive term 'child'
contains a range of negative definitions, but this does not seem to be Clement's
belief.
Clement's use of  negative theology in other instances readily  proves that he
does  not  necessarily  confuse  negative  definitions  with  references  to  privative
properties (i.e. he seems to be aware of the difference between at least στέρησις
and ἀπόφασις/ἀφαίρεσις  and related concepts).  Why does  he not  define ‘child’
negatively, e.g. ‘without evil’, then? This, it seems, is related to Clement’s teaching
659Paed. 1.6.26.2
660Paed. 1.5
661Paed. 1.5.20.1
662Paed. 1.5.19.3
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on  the  Logos  and  his  anthropology.  Where  the  human  being  in  other  Church
Fathers is, in its essence, the image of the essence of God, for Clement the human
being is the image of the image, the divine Logos that expresses the otherwise
hidden character of God.
But  evil  is  defined  negatively,  with  reference  to  privation  (στέρησις).
Licentiousness is defined as “privation of sensation (ἀναισθησίαν)”663. Opposition
to vice follows from goodness (not the other way round, which would be a more
truly apophatic definition of virtue): “Now hatred of evil (μισοπονηρία) attends the
good man, in virtue of his being in nature good.”664 The Christian is (as with Paul)
characterized by “composure, tranquility, calmness and peace.”665 None of these
seem to be understood as negative definitions in Clement.
But again, the Christian first of all  reflects God’s self-sufficiency. Not lacking
anything is a primary characteristic of the believer, and “[i]f God denies nothing,
all things belong (γίνεται) to the godly.”666 This is the thread that runs through the
ethics of The Instructor (until the last chapters of the third book where the theme
of love becomes more predominant). 
“For he who has the almighty God, the Word, is in want of nothing, and
never is in straits for what he needs. For the Word is a possession that wants
nothing [is indeficient] (ἀνενδεὴς), and is the cause of all abundance.”667
Hence Clement famously notes that the righteous man is only in need of food
where there is no other righteous man around. It is a peculiar idea, but we get the
point, which seems to have love (agape) as its main theme.668 True philosophy is
available to all, and its purpose is love.
“But it is said that we do not all philosophize. Do we not all, then, follow
after life? What sayest thou? How hast thou believed? How, pray, dost thou
love God and thy neighbour, if thou dost not philosophize?”669
There is no excuse for not committing to philosophy. True philosophy is taught
without letters (hence one does not need to be literate), and its handbook is love, a
“spiritual  treatise  (σύνταγμα πνευματικόν)”  which  is  “at  once  rude and divine
(ἰδιωτικὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον)”.670 The Golden Rule, “[a]s ye would that men should do
663Paed. 2.4.41, p. 248
664Paed. 1.8.70.2, p. 227
665Paed. 2.7.60.5, p. 253
666Paed. 3.6.36.3, p. 280
667Paed. 3.7.39.4
668Paed. 3.8, p. 281
669Paed. 3.11.78.1, p. 290
670Paed. 3.11.78.2, p. 290, modified
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unto  you,  do  ye  likewise  to  them”,  is  “a  comprehensive  precept  (αὐτόθεν
κεφαλαιώδης   ὑποθήκη)”,  and  an  all-embracing  “exhortation  of  life  (βιωτικὴ
παραίνεσις)”.671 That love is in this way discussed as the finale of the Instructor,
suggests that this is really the point of Christian ethics, and that self-sufficiency is
only  a prequel  to  this.  Vice is  privation,  while self-sufficiency is a reflection of
God’s perfection. But this is only the negative side of things, a matter of avoiding
sin and evil. On the positive side is love, the doing of good works. The negative
side is in a very precise sense ‘abstract’, its purpose being abstraction from the
world (notice that in this case Clement’s ethics is somewhat  aphairetic while his
anthropology is  rather  apophatic,  according to  the above).  The positive side is
concrete in the sense that it has to do with action in the world. That this is a
meaningful distinction applicable to Clement’s thinking should become clear as we
discuss his ethics in the  Stromata. There are good reasons for thinking that the
ontology  of  the  somewhat  paradoxical  claims  about  likeness  to  God  discussed
above has to do with this ethical distinction.
We might add some remarks on Clement’s view on the atonement, since this is a
subject in which often crystallizes the premises of an authors theology and ethics
(as  such  it  can  serve  as  a  lense  through  which  to  view  our  author’s
presuppositions).  Emancipation  or  liberation  is  central  in  Clement’s  theory  of
atonement. The purpose of God’s law is to dissipate fear, and thereby emancipate
free-will, so that faith becomes possible (arguably an important sequence).672 The
law has a purificative function that makes faith possible.
Christ is the good Samaritan that liberates us from the “rulers of darkness”.673
But Clement’s atonement theory is to a large degree ‘subjective’. At least he puts
much weight on the moral perfection of the human subject. Christ is more than a
moral teacher, to be sure, but this aspect is the one focused most extensively on by
Clement. Is the reason for this Clement’s peculiar interest in the ‘Gnostic’, or are
there more fundamental reasons for prioritizing the moral and subjective aspect of
the atonement? (i.e. would he had focused on other aspects if he had written to
another audience, etc.?).
“The  Word,  who  in  the  beginning  bestowed  on  us  life  as  Creator
(δημιουργός) when He formed us, taught us to live well when He appeared
as  our Teacher;  that  as  God He might  afterwards  conduct us to  eternal
life.”674
671Paed. 3.12.88.1, p. 292
672Paed. 3.12.87, p. 292
673QuisDiv. 28
674Protr. 1.7.3, p. 173
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Christ is the “Saviour sent down – a teacher and leader in the acquisition of the
good”.675 In a passage that has a striking similarity with the Irenaen-Athanasian
motto “God became Man, so that man may become God”, Clement notes that:
“[...]the Word of God became man, that thou mayest learn from man how
man may become God (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἵνα δὴ καὶ
σὺ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου μάθῃς, πῇ ποτε ἄρα ἄνθρωπος γένηται θεός).”676
Hence ontology (the change of the ontological status of man) is closely tied to
ethics. But though emphasizing human subjectivity, Clement does not forget the
role of God’s will in the proces of deification: “man becomes God, since God so
wills (θεὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, ὅτι βούλεται ὁ θεός)”677, and “the Word
Himself  is the manifest mystery: God in man, and man God (Λόγος γὰρ ωὐτός·
μυστήριον ἐμφανές· θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θεός)”678. This last phrase
seems  to  imply  a  deeper  ontological  meaning  of  Christ’s  presence  than  mere
‘teaching’.
As instructor God is not only a moral teacher. He also uses a range of measures
to discipline those who he saves. Hence admonition, complaint, invective, reproof,
visitation, denunciation, accusation, censure, objurgation, indignation etc. are all
tools that God use to lead us to knowledge of the truth.679
For Clement there is a narrow connection between epistemology, ontology and
ethics. Hence moral perfection means a real ontological change, and  vice versa.
There is no doubt, however, that salvation is an epistemological concern.
Ethics in the Stromata
In  what  we have  remaining from the introduction  to  the  Stromata,  Clement
continues the thematic from The Instructor. Knowledge comes by right teaching.
The final purpose of knowledge (teaching and learning) is to make “faith active by
love  (τὴν  πίστιν  διὰ  τῆς  ἀγάπης)”,  or  at  least  this  serves  as  the  criteria  for
approving  knowledge.680 The  relationship  between  knowledge  and  action  is,
Clement says, such that first comes knowledge, from which arises an impulse that
results in (rational) action.681 In other words there is a spontaneous relationship
between knowledge and action (through impulse), so that knowledge is not just
675Str. 5.1.7.8, p. 446
676Protr. 1.8.4, p. 174
677Paed. 3.1.1.5
678Paed. 3.1.2.1
679Paed. 1.9, pp. 229-230
680Str. 1.1.4.1, p. 300
681Str. 6.8, p. 496
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instrumental.  Knowledge  and  ignorance  are  “the  boundaries  of  happiness  and
misery  (ὅρους  εὐδαιμονίας  κακοδαιμονίας)”682.  Though  Clement  speaks  in
eudaimonistic terms, he is reluctant to identify perfection with ‘happiness’: Man
can be virtuous without necessarily being happy.683 The virtuous person can be
affected by disease, though it is not virtue itself that is affected. But if the habit of
self-command has not been sufficiently developed, the inability to endure disease
“is found equivalent to fleeing” from virtue. Virtue is not in itself enough, it also
needs  to  be  established  by  a  “habit  of  self-control  (ἕξιν  τῆς  ἐγκρατείας)”.684
Clement's  ethics is  hardly  eudaimonistic.  It  is  not happiness that is  the aim of
virtue, but likeness to God.
As noted above, in the negative, there are obvious connections between God’s
lack  of  privations  and  ethics.  God  does  not  have  such  and  such  properties
(privations), and therefore there are particular ways in which we do not act. This
has an impact on religious practices:
“[...]we rightly do not sacrifice to God, who, indeficient (ἀνενδεεῖ), supplies
all men with all things; but we glorify Him who gave Himself in sacrifice for
us,  we also  sacrificing ourselves;  from that  which  needs  nothing to  that
which needs nothing (εἴς τε τὸ ἀνενδεὲς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνενδεοῦς),  and to that
which is impassible from that which is  impassible (εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς ἐκ τοῦ
ἀπαθοῦς). For in our salvation alone God delights.”685
Rather  than  sacrificing  to  God,  Christians  are  to  imitate  Him by  becoming
impassible. The connection between theology and ethics seems straightforward.
But  ethics works in  different  levels.  The purification of  body and soul  through
abstinence from evil things, is the “perfection of the common believer (ἁπλῶς τοῦ
κοινοῦ πιστοῦ)”686. This category (the common believer) does not only encompass
the ordinary Christian, but also “Jew and Greek”.687 A Greek that abstains from
sacrificing to idols is closer to truth than the Pagans that do not abstain from such
practices.
For the Gnostic, “righteousness advances to activity in well-doing (δικαιοσύνη
εἰς ἐνέργειαν εὐποιίας προβαίνει).”688 The Gnostic is the person who “abides in the
fixed habit  (ἀμεταβόλῳ ἕξει)  of  well-doing (εὐποιίας)  after  the likeness  of  God
682Str. 5.14.140.5, p. 475
683Compare with Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea
684Str. 4.5.20.2, p. 413, modified
685Str. 7.3.14.5, modified
686Str. 6.7.60.2
687Str. 6.7.60.3, p. 494
688Str. 6.7.60.3
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(ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ).”689
It is not necessary, however, to be a Gnostic to do good works: “do not those who
are called orthodox apply themselves to good works, knowing not what they do
(οὐκ εἰδότες ἃ ποιοῦσιν)?”.690
It does seem however, that in distinction to the ordinary Christian, the Gnostic
does good works for their own sake: “[...]he who does any duty for the sake of
recompense, is he not held fast in the custom of the world, either as one who has
done  well,  hastening  to  receive  a  reward,  or  as  an  evil-doer  avoiding
retribution?”691 The Gnostic does “good out of love, and for the sake of its own
excellence (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν)”692. The Gnostic never desires knowledge of God for
instrumental, practical reasons.
From the above it  might  seem that there are two ‘classes’  of  Christians (or
believers), but this should not be conceived of too radically, and certainly not be
confused with the rigid distinctions typically associated with forms of Gnosticism.
There  are  not,  Clement  argues,  “[...]in  the  same  Word  some  “illuminated’
(gnostics); and some animal (or natural) men;” but all who have abandoned the
desires of the flesh are equal and spiritual before the Lord.”693
Of course it could be argued that these claims are from a more ‘popular’ work
(the Instructor),  and  that  what  we  find  in  the  Stromata portrays  a  somewhat
esoteric  doctrine.  But  even  if  Clement  sometimes  seem  to  make  a  discrete
distinction, rather than belonging to an altogether separate class of Christians, the
Gnostic is the Christian who on top of faith has build knowledge (gnosis). Faith is
two-fold, not in the sense of any radical distinction, but in the sense that it “admits
of  growth  (αὔξησιν)  and  perfection  (τελείωσιν);  for  the  common  faith  (κοινὴ
πίστις) lies beneath as a foundation.”694 The purpose of “the faith which results
from  instruction  and  the  word”  is  “the  performance  of  the  commandments
(ἐντολὰς ἐπιτελεῖν).”695
Practice is in Clement (often) the consummation of perfection in faith. At other
instances Clement adds teaching to the result of perfection:
“Thus also it appears to me that there are three effects of gnostic power
(γνωστικῆς δυνάμεως): the knowledge of things; second, the performance of
whatever the Word suggests; and the third, the capability of delivering, in a
689Str. 6.7.60.3
690Str. 1.9.45.6, p. 310
691Str. 1.1.9.3, p. 301
692Str. 4.22.135.4, p. 434
693Paed. 1.6.31.2, p. 217
694Str. 5.1.2.4, p. 444
695Str. 5.1.2.6, p. 444
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way suitable to God, the secrets veiled in the truth.”696
At  least  in  this  passage  it  seems  that  Clement  conceives  of  perfection  as
consisting in three stages, though he does not claim that the “three effects” follow
chronologically or even logically upon each other.
At any rate, deification is the aim of the Gnostic life. Deification is to be made
incorruptible, whereby one participates in divinity, “the power of the incorrupt One
(τοῦ ἀφθάρτου δυνάμεως)”697. Simplicity is absolutely crucial here. Clement quotes
the “Pythagorean saying”, that “man ought to become one (ἕνα γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον δεῖ)”698. Christ, “the high priest himself is one, God being one (αὐτὸς ὁ
ἀρχιερεὺς εἷς, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ)”699.  When Man is deified into a passionless
state, he “becomes a unit (μοναδικὸς γίνεται)”, and thus becomes like Christ.700 To
believe in the Son, and by the Son, “is to become a unit (μοναδικόν ἐστι γενέσθαι),
being indissolubly united in Him; and to disbelieve is to be separated, disjoined,
divided.”701
As noted above, this is not because the Son is One or simplicity as such (this is
a, or rather the, characteristic of the Father), but because the Son is “one thing as
all things (ὡς πάντα ἕν)” and “the circle of all powers rolled and united into one
(ἓν) unity.”702
Self-control (ἐγκράτεια), self-mastering (αὐτεξούσιον) and similar, and the lack
of slavery, is crucial for Clement. Not being a master of oneself carries its own
punishment: “[...]it is the greatest boon to a bad man not to be master of himself
(αὐτεξούσιον)”703. God’s greatest gift is self-control (ἐγκράτεια), Clement says in
the second book of the Stromata.704 Self-control “does not overstep what appears in
accordance with right reason (τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον φανέντων)”705. Clement
adds  that  “[t]emperance  (σωφροσύνη),  too,  is  not  without  manliness”706.  Hence
these things seem to be somehow derived from self-control.  From such virtues
spring  wisdom,  “which  follows  (ἑπομένη  τῷ  διατεταγμένῳ)  God”707 and
righteousness,  which  “imitates  the  divine  character  (μιμητικὴ  τῆς  θείας
696Str. 7.1.4.2
697Str. 5.10.63.8, p. 459
698Str. 4.23.151.3, p. 437
699Str. 4.23.151.3
700Str. 4.23.152.1, p. 437
701Str. 4.25.157.2, p. 438
702Str. 4.25.156.2, p. 438
703Str. 2.19.99.3, p. 369
704Str. 2.20, p. 374
705Str. 2.18.80.4
706Str. 2.18.80.5
707Str. 2.18.80.5
145
διαθέσεως)”708.
Above we have noted that Clement is no radical voluntarist, since, though based
on will, faith needs the support of the virtues in order to be operative. But he is as
close  as  it  gets:  “volition  (βούλεσθαι)  takes  the  precedence  of  all;  for  the
intellectual  powers  are  ministers  of  the  Will  (λογικαὶ  δυνάμεις  τοῦ  βούλεσθαι
διάκονοι).”709 Clement’s  point  seems  to  be,  that  in  the  true  Gnostic,  the
“intellectual  powers” are fully  accommodated to the will:  “in the Gnostic,  Will,
Judgment, and Exertion are identical. For if the determinations are the same, the
opinions and judgments will be the same too;”710. It seems to be implied that this is
not the case in the non-Gnostic.
As is common in Patristic literature, Clement gives us an interpretation of the
beatitudes. The “meek (οἱ πραεῖς)”, Clement says, are “those who have quelled the
battle of unbelief in the soul, the battle of wrath, and lust, and the other forms that
are subject to them.”711 Clement stresses that Jesus “praises those meek by choice
(κατὰ προαίρεσι)”712, so again a virtue like meekness derives its value from self-
control  and the exercise of  will.  Similarly,  “mercy (ἔλεος)” is  not just  “pain on
account of others’ calamities (λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίαις συμφοραῖς)”713, but the merciful
are those who do acts of mercy, as well as those who wish to do such acts, even if
they are not able (mercy is not a ‘passion’, Clement’s reasoning seems to be, but a
matter of will).714
The “pure in heart (τοὺς καθαροὺς τὴν καρδίαν)”, are those who have reached a
state of  “impassible  identity  (ταὐτότητος ἀπαθοῦς)”715.  Such a person does not
need intermediates to relate to the good What Clement calls “things intermediate
(τῶν μεταξύ)”716 are necessary to constitute good and bad actions (as discussed
above). But what becomes of “good and bad actions” if there are no intermediates?
The ‘pure in heart’ does not just  have science and knowledge, but is science and
knowledge, i.e. such a person is the intermediate, it seems. This fits well with what
we  have  noted  above,  that  the  Gnostic  is  the  boundary  between  mortal  and
immortal nature.717 As Clement so often stresses the point of knowledge is the
doing of good works. This is an activity rather than just a habit, but habits can of
708Str. 2.18.80.5
709Str. 2.17.77.5, p. 364
710Str. 2.17.77.5, p. 364
711Str. 4.6.36.2, p. 415
712Str. 4.6.36.2
713Str. 4.6.38.1
714Str. 4.6.38.1, p. 416
715Str. 4.6.40.1
716Str. 4.6.39.3
717Str. 2.18, p. 365; Str. 4.6, p. 416
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course be the cause of good works. The Gnostic, it seems, is the person who have
internalized the co-operating (intermediate) causes that is necessary to produce
good works.
The “peacemakers (οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί)” are those “who have subdued and tamed
the law which wars against the disposition of the mind (τῷ φρονήματι τοῦ νοῦ)”718.
Perfect  peacemaking  “is  that  which  keeps  unchanged  (ἄτρεπτον)  in  all
circumstances what is peaceful”719. The ‘peacemaker’ will consider “the opposites
(ἐναντιότητας)  that  are  in  the  world  to  be  the  fairest  harmony  of  creation
(ἁρμονίαν κτίσεως)”720.  The will  of  God is  “the loving of  all  things because all
things bear a relation to the whole (ἅπαντα)”721. This is a positive definition of love,
presumably related to the fact that everything is united in Christ (though it might
sound stoic). To have “recourse to faith and peace” means to “despise death”, and
to “not detest our persecutors” (a negative definition of love, not resisting evil).722
As we see above, self-control and self-mastery is crucial. But this is only the
‘negative’ side of the coin (or rather 'abstractive', that which has to do with being
simple). It is not enough, says Clement, to be “justified by abstinence from what is
evil (ἀποχῇ κακῶν)” (he does not specify whether this is actually possible at all). In
addition to abstinence must come perfection “by Christlike beneficence (κυριακῇ
τελειωθεὶς εὐποιίᾳ).”723
At an early stage in the  Stromata,  imitation of Christ is central in Clement’s
ethics: “We must,  as far as we can, imitate the Lord (τὸν κύριον μιμεῖσθαι) .”724
Imitation of Christ means complying with the will of God. Loving Christ (our true
‘neighbour’, who as the good Samaritan comes to our help) means following his
commandments, i.e. loving others.725 If self-control and abstinence is the ‘negative’
side of the coin, faith, hope and love (the traditional ‘theological virtues’), what
Clement calls “the sacred Triad (ἡ ἁγία τριάς)” is the ‘positive’ side.726 The Golden
Rule, ‘do unto others...’727, is an all-embracing “exhortation of life”. When using a
virtue-oriented  language,  Clement  defines  love  much  like  Paul  in  1  Cor,  as
meekness,  mildness,  patience,  liberality,  freedom from envy,  absence of  hatred,
forgetfulness of injuries. Other virtues dealing with neighborly love are hospitality,
718Str. 4.6.40.2
719Str. 4.6.40.3, p. 416
720Str. 4.6.40.3
721Str. 4.12.86.1, p. 424
722Str. 4.6.41.1
723Str. 4.6.29.2, p. 414
724Str. 1.1.9.4, p. 301
725QuisDiv. 28
726Str. 4.7.54.1, p. 419
727Luk 6:31
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philanthropy, defined as “brotherly love to those who have fellowship, in the same
spirit (τοῦ αὐτοῦ πνεύματος κεκοινωνηκόσιν)”728.
Hope Clement defines as “the expectation of  good things,  or  an expectation
(εὔελπις) sanguine of absent good”, which arguably gives hope a somewhat ‘erotic’
meaning  (in  the  Platonic  sense).729 On  the  other  hand  “[...]love  is  not  desire
(ὄρεξις) on the part of him who loves (τοῦ ἀγαπῶντος); but is a relation of affection
(στερκτικὴ  δὲ  οἰκείωσις),  restoring  the  Gnostic  to  the  unity  of  the  faith  –
independent of time and place.”730 What this “relation of affection (στερκτικὴ δὲ
οἰκείωσις)”, does more precisely consist in is not clear, but the crucial point is that
its end is unity. Especially in regard to philanthropy we also see the importance of
unity: A precondition for philanthropy is that “persons are brought to sameness by
consent (ἡ ὁμογνωμοσύνη συμφωνία γνωμῶν)”731.
There are concrete consequences of this theological anthropology and ethics.
For example, the unity of God’s Word grounds a sense of solidarity and equality of
ownership: “God brought our race into communion by first imparting what was His
own, when He gave His own Word, common to all,  and made all  things for all
(πάντα ποιήσας ὑπὲρ πάντων).”732 All things are common, Clement argues, and the
rich should share what they have, but do not need.
On the other hand, despite of his awareness of the importance of 'agapic' love,
the  Decalogue  is  not  interpreted  as  an  expression  of,  e.g.,  the  Great
Commandment,733 or the Golden Rule (as it would be following Luke 6:31). Rather
the decalogue is interpreted on the one hand with reference to number-symbolism,
on the other as metaphorically (analogically) relating to philosophical questions
(e.g. the commandment not to steal is interpreted as forbidding stealing doctrines).
This is probably due to the fact that love for Clement itself expresses a deeper
virtue,  namely  simplicity  (as  noted above this  is  crucial  in  Clement’s  ethics  of
divine imitation since God is first of all the One). Even if it can be characterized in
numerous ways, most importantly love is “incapable of being divided (ἀμέριστός)
or distinguished (ἀδιάκριτος): its nature is to communicate (κοινωνική).”734 Hence
oneness and simplicity is of great importance. In the Church “different nations and
natures  (διαφόρων  ἐθνῶν  τε  καὶ  φύσεων)”  come  together  in  the  unity  of  the
728Str. 2.9.42.1, p. 357, modified
729Str. 2.9.41.1, p. 356
730Str. 6.9.73.3, p. 497
731Str. 2.9.42.3, p. 357
732Paed. 2.12.120.3, p. 268
733Matt 22:35-40
734Str. 2.18.87.2
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faith.735 The Church is “the principle of union (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς συστάσεως)”, and “in its
oneness  (κατὰ  τὴν  μονάδα)”  it  surpasses  all  things.736 Also,  “friendship  is
consummated in  likeness  (ὁμοιότητος);  the community  lying in  oneness  (ἐν τῷ
ἑνὶ).”737 This also means that the Gnostics choose and desire “the same things”.738
But love is not reserved for other Christans. Clement emphasizes “[t]he absence
of  respect  of  persons  in  God  (ἀπροσωπόληπτον  τοῦ  θεοῦ)”.  Philanthropy  also
means bringing other human beings into that unity of love which is the Church,
through witnessing.
The ethical function of dialectics
Much central for understanding his ethics, is Clement’s definition of dialectics.
Dialectics, the “opposing of one argument by another (λόγῳ λόγον ἀντικεῖσθαι)”739
(supposedly dialectics), is like a “pruning-hook (δρέπανον)” that cuts the thorns
from the  vines.740 Dialectics  is  “a  bulwark  (θριγκὸς)”  (or  a  fence)  against  the
Sophists.741 By practicing dialectics the Gnostic learns to distinguish between the
knowledge of  God and timely  matters,  whereby he also learns how to abstract
himself from the body and its pleasures.
In the first book of the Stromata Clement notes that “[d]ialectics (διαλεκτική),
according to Plato, is, as he says in The Statesman, a science (ἐπιστήμη) devoted to
the  discovery  of  the  explanation  (δηλώσεως  εὑρετική)  of  things.”742 To  this
definition Clement adds that “true dialectic” is “philosophy mixed with truth”743,
the activity by which the Gnostic is “examining things (ἐπισκοποῦσα τὰ πράγματα),
and testing forces and powers (δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας δοκιμάζουσα)”. Thereby
the Gnostic  “gradually  ascends in  relation to the most  excellent  essence of  all
(πάντων  κρατίστην  οὐσίαν),  and  essays  to  go  beyond  to  the  God  of  the
universe”744. From this “follows a suitable course of practice with respect to word
and deeds, even in human affairs (ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων περί τε τοὺς λόγους καὶ
τὰς πράξεις οἰκεία χρῆσις).”745
By dialectics the Gnostic fixes on “the distinction of genera into species, and will
master the distinction of existences, till he come to what are primary and simple
735Str. 7.6.34.2, p. 532
736Str. 7.17.107.6, p. 555
737Str. 7.11.68.2, p. 542
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744Str. 1.28.177.1, p. 340
745Ibid.
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(τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν).”746 More precisely Clement says that:
“[...]true dialectic is the science (φρόνησίς) which analyses the objects of
thought  (τὰ  νοητὰ  διαιρετική),  and  shows  abstractly  and  by  itself  the
individual  substratum of  existences (ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἀμίκτως τε  καὶ
εἰλικρινῶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δεικτική), or the power of dividing things into
genera, which descends to their most special properties, and presents each
individual object to be contemplated simply such as it is (οἷον ἔστι).”747
Only dialectics “conducts to the true wisdom”. True wisdom is: “[...]the divine
power which deals with the knowledge of entities as entities (τῶν ὄντων ὡς ὄντων
γνωστική),  which  grasps  what  is  perfect,  and  is  freed  from  all  passion”.  But
wisdom is only reached, however, when the Saviour reveals the father, to whom he
wills.748 True dialectic only comes about by revelation (“κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν”), as the
Son  reveals  the  Father,  when  he  withdraws  (καταγαγόντος)  “the  gloom  of
ignorance arising from evil training“.749
Revelation  has  a  negative  function.  When  the  ‘veil’  is  removed,  God  is
contemplated  as  He  is.  Above  we  have  suggested  that  for  Clement,  God  is  in
principle unknowable. This is, however, contradicted by a passage in the sixth book
of the Stromata. Here Clement acknowledges that some “comprehends that things
incomprehensible are incomprehensible (καταλαμβάνοντος, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα ἔσται
τὰ ἀκατάληπτα)”750, but the Gnostic, he argues, “comprehends what seems to be
incomprehensible  (δοκοῦντα  ἀκατάληπτα)  to  others;  believing  that  nothing  is
incomprehensible to the Son of God, whence nothing incapable of being taught
(ἀδίδακτον).”751 It  is  doubtful,  however,  that  Clement  by  this  means  that  the
Gnostic comprehends God in a positive sense. Rather the Gnostic knows God by
what He is not (see the quoted passage below), i.e. through a negative theology.
The Gnostic acquire his knowledge by training himself “in scientific speculation
(ἐπιστημονικῇ  θεωρίᾳ)”,  whereby  “he  proceeds  to  exercise  himself  in  larger
(καθολικώτερον)  generalizations  and  grander  propositions;”752.  For  this  person,
practicing his skills in disciplines such as astronomy is useful. In astronomy we
conceive of depth without breadth, etc., and so this is an example of dialectical and
abstractive reasoning.753 This is not because ‘theoretical’ or ‘scientific’ knowledge
746Str. 6.10.80.4, p. 498
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in itself brings salvation, but because the theoretical ability of abstraction can be
translated into ethical abstraction, so to speak.
There is a close link between knowledge and ontology. The ability of intellectual
abstraction and virtue is linked, since virtue is abstraction from the body: True
piety consists in “unswerving abstraction (ἀμετανόητος χωρισμός) from the body
and its passions.”754 Though Clement here uses a term that is better translated as
separation  (χωρισμός),  rather  than abstraction  (ἀφαίρεσις),  this  is  arguably  an
example of what we have called an aphairetic ethics. Large portions of Clement’s
ethics  is  negative,  but  not  in  the  strict  sense  of  an  apophatic ethics,  where
continual  negation  of  the  characteristics  of  the  human  subject  is  the  way  to
perfection.
Clement does note, to be sure, that he who professes abstinence from what is
bad is  perfect (though there is no one perfect in all  things,  while  still  human,
except Jesus Christ himself).755 But there is not much apophatic ethics in Clement,
if  by this  we mean that the good is  defined negatively  to  evil,  and that moral
progress requires negation of evil: “the choice which is truly gracious (τὴν ἀληθῶς
εὐχάριστον ἐκλογὴν)” does not consist “in the way of rejection of other things as
bad (κατὰ ἀπεκλογὴν τῶν ἑτέρων ὡς φαύλων)”, but “as to do things better than
what is good (καλῶν καλλίονα ποιεῖσθαι)”.756 The good, or the perfect, is to be
chosen for its own sake, and negation (epistemologically) or rejection (ethically) of
the bad is not synonymous with positively affirming or choosing the good. In an
aphairetic ethics,  as  Clement’s,  the  way  to  perfection  is  rather  abstraction
(perhaps by way of dialectics and analysis), whereby the good can be chosen on its
own  terms.  The  purpose  of  such  abstraction  is  unmixed  unity.757 In  a  famous
passage Clement writes that,
“We shall  understand the mode of purification by confession (καθαρτικὸν
τρόπον  ὁμολογίᾳ),  and  that  of  contemplation  by  analysis  (ἀναλύσει),
advancing  by  analysis  to  the  first  notion,  beginning  with  the  properties
underlying it; abstracting (ἀφελόντες) from the body its physical properties,
taking away (περιελόντες) the dimension (διάστασιν) of depth, then that of
breadth,  and then that of  length.  For the point (σημεῖόν)  which remains
(ὑπολειφθὲν) is a unit (μονὰς), so to speak, having position; from which if
we abstract (περιέλωμεν) position, there is the conception of unity. If, then,
abstracting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal, we cast
ourselves into the greatness of Christ (τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ κἀκεῖθεν),
754Str. 5.11.67.1, p. 460
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and thence advance (προΐοιμεν) into immensity by holiness, we may reach
somehow to the thought (νοήσει) of the Almighty, knowing not what He is,
but what He is not (οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστι γνωρίσαντες).”758
Through abstraction is reached a final point, a σημεῖόν, a trace or a sign, beyond
which lies “the greatness of Christ”. But this must also be negated.  Hence after
abstraction follows negation. The final move is not aphairetic, but apophatic.
For  Clement  analysis  is  a  kind  of  reversed  demonstration,  that  goes  back
through  the  “points  (τῶν  ἀποδεικνυμένων)”  of  a  proof  to  that  which  is  “self-
evident”  or  “evident  to  sense  and  to  understanding  (αἴσθησίν  τε  καὶ  νόησιν
ἐναργῆ).”759 As noted above Clement identifies the axioms of demonstration with
faith. Hence through analysis the Gnostic abstracts God (the One) from everything
else.  By  this  he  also  learns  to  abstract  himself  from  everything  else,  thereby
similarly becoming ‘one’ (but only similarly in a, perhaps, negative sense, since
nothing is like to God!). The Gnostic is the “man who is admitted to holiness being
illuminated in order to indissoluble union.”760
Knowledge of the Word leads to a “readiness for adopting a right mode of life
(πολιτείας προθυμίαν)”761. Its final significance is practical. From this perspective,
the Son becomes a moral teacher. Through his revelation he saves by teaching us
how to abstain from evil, and how to obtain a virtuous life that will lead to likeness
to God. In this way Clement's idea of dialectics is arguably present in his idea of
prayer. Prayer is an integral element of the perfection of the Gnostic. Though being
without words, prayer is  conversation with God.762 In prayer the Gnostic is united
“to the Spirit” through “boundless love (ἀορίστου ἀγάπης)”763, and made like the
Lord, “[...]through care of the beneficence which has us for its object;  and [...]
through worship, through teaching and through beneficence in deeds (δι' ἔργων
εὐποιίαν).”764 Prayer is a ‘way of life’ or a certain state of fellowship with God.765
That the Gnostic is in some way ‘abstracted’ from things does not mean that
Clement  endorses  the  radical  lifestyle  that  we  know  from  some  of  his
contemporaries, e.g. the ascetics of the deserts. Rather, the Gnostic “lives in the
city as in a desert (καθάπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τῇ πόλει βιοῖ)”.766 Also, Clement notes that
758Str. 5.11.71, p. 461, modified. A similar reasoning can be found in Albinus, Didaskalikos
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763Str. 7.7.44.6, p. 535
764Str. 7.3.13.2
765Str. 7.7.40.3
766Str. 7.12.77.3, p. 545
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“he is alone pious that serves God rightly and unblameably in human affairs (περὶ
τὰ  ἀνθρώπεια).”767 But  virtue  is  not,  like  speech,  perfected  “from  everyday
occurences”768.  So the point  in  7.1  seems not  to  be that  committing to human
affairs is a way of doing God’s will, but rather that it is only really possible to be
pious in (or in relation to) the midst of human affairs. When it comes to human
things,  the  Gnostic  rises  above  both  good  and  bad.769 The  same  sentiment  is
reflected in Clement’s view on marriage. So though Clement’s ethics is arguably
‘aphairetic’, in practice it will look like an ‘ethics of invisibility’, since the Gnostic
is not, it seems, that different from others.
Moral ontology and epistemology
The  following  discusses  the  relationship  between  such  notions  as  οὐσίᾳ,
ἐνέργεια, τὸ εἶναι, τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τὸ ἔπεσθαι and the idea of imitating God. This is
helpful  in  establishing  a  conception  of  epektasis  in  Clement,  and  thus  for
formulating an idea of Clementine theological ethics as theologia viatorum.
Being and becoming, deification and imitation
Being  (tο  be,  εἶναι)  and  becoming  (to  become,  τοῦ  γίνεσθαι)  should  be
distinguished (“διαφέρει τε τὸ εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι”)  as should cause and effect,
Clement notes.770 Now, Clement does not directly identify cause with being, and
effect with becoming, but it seems that there is a tight connection between these.
Clement  also  distinguishes  activity  from  existence.771 Granted  some  degree  of
identity between becoming and effect, Clement’s point seems to be that activities
are not  ‘beings’  but  ‘becomings’.  If  so,  this  is  highly  relevant  to  the ethics  of
imitating  God,  as  will  be  discussed  below:  Ethically  speaking,  perfection  is  a
matter of becoming (rather than being) an image of Christ.
For Clement likeness to God essentially means to be abstracted, and as such
simple. Thus we are dealing with a negative likeness. But imitation of God is not
only a question of negation or abstraction. The latter is true for essence, having to
do with being.  But rather than being what we might  call  a  static  mirroring of
essence, ‘likeness’ to God consists in the “adoption and the friendship of God”, and
is a matter of following the teachings of Christ.772 The Gnostic is an animate or
living image, the symbol of God's power. Clement says that:
767Str. 7.1.3.4, p. 524
768Str. 7.8, p. 528
769Str. 7.12, p. 546
770Str. 8.9, p. 566
771Str. 4.13, p. 426
772Str. 4.14, p. 506
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“[...]the  Gnostic,  considering  the  benefit  of  his  neighbours  as  his  own
salvation,  may  be  called  a  living  image  of  the  Lord  (ἄγαλμα  ἔμψυχον
εἰκότως ἂν τοῦ  κυρίου  λέγοιτο),  not  as  respects  the  peculiarity  of  form
(μορφῆς  ἰδιότητα),  but  the  symbol  of  power  (κατὰ  τὸ  τῆς  δυνάμεως
σύμβολον) and similarity of preaching.”773
Hence in action the Gnostic becomes a living parable of the divine mysteries.
It seems that only Christ himself can be a real, essential likeness to God, and
that human beings can only in a vague or indirect sense derive this likeness from
God when Christ rules in the mind of the believer. The likeness is never ontological
or essential, it seems, but has to do with the actions of the Gnostic, when these are
directed by Christ.
Following God is a matter of living in accordance with the Word: “[...]as is the
Word, such also must the believer’s life be (ὁ βίος εἶναι τῷ πιστῷ προσήκει), so as
to be able to follow (ἕπεσθαι) God, who brings all tings to end from the beginning
by the right course.”774
In the second book of the Stromata Clement explains, that God has commanded
us  to  follow  him,  and  that  following  should  be  understood  as  “assimilation
(ἐξομοίωσιν)” to God.775 Assimilation to God is “participation in moral excellence
(οἰκειότητος  ἀρετῆς)”.776 The  image  of  God  is  the  man  who  at  once  does  and
(thereby)  receives  good  as  “the  pilot  at  once  saves,  and  is  saved  (σῴζει  καὶ
σῴζεται)”.777 Other places Clement defines Christ/the Logos as the image of God,
and the soul of Man as the image of the image, but the point here is ethical, rather
than ontological, so the divergence can be excused (or is he talking of Christ?).
At times Clement speaks not only of the Gnostic as the one who has attained
likeness  to  God as  far  as  possible,  or  is  becoming  God,  but  as  one who have
“already become God (ἤδη γενέσθαι θεόν)”778.
As Osborn, Choufrine emphasizes that deification for Clement means nearness
to God.779 Choufrine also notes that the “significance of the notion of infinity in
Clement’s  thought  has not  been so  far  perceived by  any scholar.”780 Choufrine
reads  Clement’s  use  of  the  term  ‘magnitude’  in  Stromata 5.12  as  technically
related to Clement’s use of the term ‘infinite’ (ἄπειρον).781 When Clement talks of
773Str. 7.9.52.3, p. 538
774Str. 7.16.100.3, p. 552
775Str. 2.19.100.4, p. 369
776Paed. 2.12.99.1, p. 235
777Str. 2.19.102.2, p. 370
778Str. 4.23.149.8, p. 437
779Choufrine 2002, p. 159; Osborn 1976, p. 66
780Choufrine 2002, p. 159
781Choufrine translates: ”it is by virtue of its magnitude (megéthei) that it is ranked as the 
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“the magnitude of Christ”782 he is talking of infinity in the Aristotelian sense, i.e.
Christ is not ἄπειρον, at least not in the sense of which this property belongs to the
Father.783 This “magnitude” is what differentiates the Gnostic infinitely from God,
while simultaneously being the infinite proximity that allows seeing the face of
God.784 This makes Choufrine conclude against Mortley that there is hardly any
possibility that the human mind can come into direct ‘touch’ with God, which is
also  due  to  the  fact  that  even  the  Gnostic  is  still  in  some  way  embodied
corporeally.785 Still,  the “magnitude of Christ” holds “the possibility of unlimited
advance towards a transcendent limit.” The end (τέλος) of this advancement is a
limit (πέρας) which is not a part of this magnitude which is then in another (i.e. the
Aristotelian) sense infinite.
“[...]the true gnostic’s “un-ending” (ateleútêton) progress for Clement is an
ap-proximation of the Son’s proximity to the Father, which alone is in-finite
in  the  sense of  ἄπειρον (un-limited)  -  the  term,  applied to  God prior  to
Clement only by the pre-Socratics.”786
So  far  Choufrine’s  exposition  fits  with  what  we  have  argued  above,  that
Clement’s proleptic ideal is in many ways similar to the idea of epektasis. However,
Choufrine argues that deification in Clement means deification in the most radical
sense, where the Gnostic is made to participate fully in divinity. Hence, according
to Choufrine, assimilation to God (becoming like God as far as possible) according
to Clement is quite different from the traditional Platonic account:
“[...]in Platonism prior to Clement, “assimilation” does not make one closer
to God in any sense.  God is there not as an end to pursue but rather a
pattern (to parádeigma) to imitate (to follow, èpesthai).”787
Choufrine adds that “[t]he infinity of the deified humanity’s “nearness” to God is
intrinsic to His Son, whose body the true gnostic enters by silent prayer.”788
We should, however, be careful about how we construe the idea of deification
with Clement. Often times Clement seems to be closer to the Platonic idea, than
what we might think from the above. Clement's Christian version of the Platonic
idea of assimilation to God is not build around a blurring of the distinction between
whole (tò holôn) and is {or: there is} (kaì ésti) that Father of the universe (tôn hólôn).”
782Str. 5.71.3
783Choufrine 2002, pp. 173-174
784Choufrine 2002, p. 182
785Mortley, 1976, p. 119
786Choufrine 2002, p. 160
787Choufrine 2002, p. 179
788Choufrine 2002, p. 160
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Creator and creation. Far from it. As we have seen Clement often talks of moral
perfection  as  a  matter  of  following  God.  Moreover,  we  should  not  forget  that
Clement at times is quite clear about stating that nothing among created things
can be a “representation of God (ἀπεικόνισμα τοῦ θεοῦ)”789 (which is, of course, not
very Platonic, but at least it bars us from having to high ideas of deification) and
that “it is utterly impossible for any one to become perfect as God is”790. Remember
also that Clement argues that no action or activity (ἐνέργεια) is a habit (ἕξις).”791
We have argued that for Clement activity (ἐνέργεια) is to be distinguished from
existence (οὐσία).792 In the same way habits (having, possession, state: ἕξις) should
be  distinguished  from  activity,  much  like being  (τὸ  εἶναι)  and  becoming  (τοῦ
γίνεσθαι)  should be distinguished,  as cause from effect.793 A similar  distinction
could be made between existence (οὐσία) and habit (ἕξις) on the one hand, and
activity (ἐνέργεια) and following (ἔπεσθαι) on the other. Our claim is that there can
be no positive imitation of God as a matter of being (such imitation is a matter of
abstraction, and thus of a negatively defined likeness), but only in accordance with
activity.  Virtue produces good actions, but it is only, it seems, in actions that the
Gnostic resemble Christ.
All  this  should,  however,  be  perceived  from  the  perspective  of  Clement's
peculiar idea of faith as anticipation. In anticipation the Gnostic partakes of the
future good, which lies ahead. This is how the radical distinction between Creator
and creation is bridged, but always as a matter of becoming (in anticipation) rather
than as a matter of being (this should become more clear below, where we will
discuss whether Clement's ethics can be classed with our definition of epektasis).
The result of such anticipation is activity (ἐνέργεια), actions in which the Gnostic
resembles, becomes a “living image” (ἄγαλμα ἔμψυχον) and a symbol of the power
(δυνάμεως σύμβολον) of God.794
Faith,  “voluntary preconception”,  is  “the assent of  piety” and “the subject of
things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen”.795 When Clement says that faith
is no mere human custom,796 it could be interpreted as being somehow instilled in
789Str. 6.18.163, p. 519, modified. 
790Str. 7.14, p. 549
791Str. 7.11.66.2, p. 541
792See above. Clement only says expressly that “sin is an activity (ἐνεργείᾳ), not an 
existence (οὐσίᾳ)”. This does not mean, of course, that some activities cannot be 
existences/beings, but only that there is at least one form of activity that is not being. 
Str. 4.13.93.3, p. 426
793Str. 8.9, p. 566
794Str. 7.9.52.3, p. 538
795Str. 2.2
796Str. 2.6.30.1, p. 354
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human beings. But we should also be aware that for Clement faith is choice, a
matter  of  will,  rather  than of  habit.  Knowledge,  virtue and so  on  are habitual
things that are products of faith, but faith is itself a matter of will and action.
Faith as anticipation is, however, thoroughly tied up with a negative theology
where the infinity of God is central (an infinity which is, however, derived from
simplicity, at least ontologically). Faith is in this sense approximation to Christ's
infinite proximity to the Father (Choufrine above),  but a never in a final sense
(never as a matter of being, but always as a matter of becoming). 
If we are right in our claims above the “nearness” to God, this does not consist
in  an  actual  positive  participation  in  or  assimilation  to  God,  but  in  a  negative
similarity  consisting  in  simplicity.  Nothing  created  can,  according  to  Clement,
represent God, but by abstraction the Gnostic can become like to God in not being
similar  to  that  which  is  not  God.  This  makes  faith  possible,  and  thus  the
anticipation of the future good through which activity and thus likeness to God is
produced. This is how we should understand deification in Clement.
Epektasis in Clement (time, eternity and proleptic ethics)
Below we will discuss how Clement’s proleptic epistemology (the idea of faith as
anticipation) relates to his ethics. This should give us some idea of how we should
conceive the possibility of knowing the good in relation to practice and concrete
circumstances in time (and space). Before going on to this it will be useful to make
some observations on his conception of time and eternity, and the relation between
the two. This is relevant for understanding how the Gnostic (in time) relates to the
Father through faith (in eternity).
About eternity and time, Clement writes that:
“Eternity (αἰὼν), for instance, presents in an instant (συνίστησι) the future
and the present, also the past of time. But truth, much more powerful than
limitless duration (τοῦ αἰῶνος), can collect its proper germs, though they
have fallen on foreign soil.”797
Does Clement in this passage define eternity as “limitless duration”, the sum of
past, present and future? Clement distinguishes truth (in this passage identical to
Christ himself) and eternity. Truth transcends time, which is arguably why both
Hellenic and barbarian, as well as Jewish, sources can contain elements of truth.
In the Exhortation to the Greeks, Clement says that:
“[...]to the end the to-day and the instruction continue; and then the true to-
797Str. 1.13.57.4, p. 313
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day, the never-ending day of God, extends over eternity (ἡ ἀνελλιπὴς τοῦ
θεοῦ ἡμέρα τοῖς αἰῶσι συνεκτείνεται). Let us then ever obey the voice of
the divine word.  For the to-day signifies eternity (ἡ σήμερον γὰρ ἀίδιος·
αἰώνων ἐστὶν εἰκών). And day is the symbol of light; and the light of men is
the Word, by whom we behold God.”798
To sum up, ‘the true to-day’ is ‘the never-ending day of God’, which is ‘eternity’
(or co-extensive with eternity), which is ‘symbol of light’, which is ‘the Word’.799
Thus the “never-ending day” specifies a ‘moment’ outside time, an eternal moment
that is in some way represented in every moment in time.
Now this  is  hardly  a  ‘theory’  of  the relation between time and eternity  and
similar  matters.  Rather,  this  is  a  good  example  of  Clement’s  method  of
concealment in action.
The “light of truth” is “the Spirit of God indivisibly divided (ἀμερῶς μεριζόμενον)
to all, who are sanctified by faith”.800 This is of course a paradoxical formula, but it
should  probably  be  understood  in  relation  to  Clement’s  theory  of  the  Son  as
“neither simply one as one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as all
things”801,  as  discussed  above.  As  the  Son  is  the  boundary  between unity  and
plurality (creation), the Son must also be the boundary between time and eternity.
Eternity has to do with the Son’s relation to the Father, while time has to do with
the Son’s  relation to creation.  Creation,  however,  does not  take place in  time:
“[...]how could creation take place in time (ἐν χρόνῳ γένοιτο κτίσις), seeing time
was born along with things which exist.”802 The “activity exerted by the Son (τὴν δι'
υἱοῦ ἐνέργειαν)” is an “indefinite (ἀόριστον) and dateless (ἄχρονον) production.”803
Clement notes that since in any nation God accepts everyone who fears him (as
Peter says in Acts), “[t]he absence of respect of persons (ἀπροσωπόληπτον) in God
is not then in time, but from eternity. Nor had His beneficence a beginning[...]”.804
Time means here from a specific point in time.
Clement says that “[...]knowledge or wisdom ought to be exercised up to the
eternal  and  unchangeable  (ἀίδιον  καὶ  ἀναλλοίωτον)  habit  (ἕξιν)  of
contemplation.”805 What  does  Clement  mean  by  eternal  (ἀίδιον)  in  this  case?
Eternity  as  'ἀίδιον' means  everlasting  in  time  as  distinguished  from  αἰώνιος.
798Protr. 9.84.6, p. 196
799Daniélou and Choufrine notes the dependence on Philo in this, who identifies the 
seventh day of creation with the “noetic light”. Philo, Fragmenta 224 n.123
800Str. 6.16.138.2, p. 512
801Str. 4.25.156, p. 438
802Str. 6.16.142.4, p. 513
803Str. 6.16.145.5, p. 514
804Str. 6.8.64.1
805Str. 6.7.61.3, p. 494
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Hence Clement talks of an habit (ἕξις) that unfolds in time.
When the soul of the Gnostic improves in its acquisition of virtue, it, so to speak,
revolves around God (a well known theme in later Platonism). These revolutions
are distinguished by “[...]times (χρόνοις), and places (τόποις), and honours, and
cognitions  (γνώσεσι)”,  etc.,  all  “[...]according  to  the  particular  (καθ'  ἑκάστην
ἑκάστη)  order  of  each  change”.  Their  final  aim  is  the  “transcendent
(ἐπαναβεβηκυίας) and continual (προσεχοῦς) contemplation of the Lord in eternity
(ἐν ἀιδιότητι).”806
What  is  relevant  for  us  is  how Clement  understands this  “transcendent  and
continual contemplation”.
“[...]the  exertion of  the intellect  by  exercise  is  prolonged to  a  perpetual
exertion  (νοεῖν  ἐκ  συνασκήσεως  εἰς  τὸ  ἀεὶ  νοεῖν  ἐκτείνεται).  And  the
perpetual  exertion of  the  intellect  is  the essence of  an intelligent  being,
which  results  from  an  uninterrupted  proces  (ἀδιάστατον  γενομένη)  of
admixture  (ἀνάκρασιν),  and  remains  eternal  contemplation,  a  living
substance (ζῶσα ὑπόστασις).”807
Do we in Clement have something akin to the later idea of  epektasis,  constant
and infinite progress in virtue? Something which we might call  proleptic ethics,
with reference to his epistemology of faith?
As we have discussed above, central in Clement’s thinking on temporality is his
notions on anticipation. God's wish to bestow grace ensues the perfecting of His
grace (“πεπληρῶσθαι τὴν χάριν”), says Clement, since “[...]the future of time is
anticipated  by  the  power  of  His  volition  (τῇ  δυνάμει  τοῦ  θελήματος
προλαμβάνεται).” Hence salvation is made actual through following of Christ:
“We then alone, who first have touched the confines of life (τῶν ὅρων τῆς
ζωῆς),  are already perfect;  and we already live who are  separated from
death. Salvation, accordingly, is the following of Christ (ἕπεσθαι Χριστῷ).”808
In other words, to follow Christ is to anticipate the future perfection, just as
faith  is  voluntary anticipation.  If  imitation and assimilation  to God is  to  follow
Christ, then all these things tend to be more or less synonymous, it seems.
Mortley argues that for Clement the true Gnostic “[...]is characterized by the
present tense, and never the future: it is never said the he will obtain knowledge,
peace, righteousness or heavenly rewards; he has them now.”809 But is this true? It
806Str. 7.2.10.2, p. 526
807Str. 4.22.136.4, p. 434
808Paed. 1.6.26.3, p. 216
809Mortley 1986, p. 40
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is, in the sense that the Gnostic has “already become God”.810 In the sixth book of
the Stromata Clement notes that “[...]he who by love is already in the midst of that
in which is destined to be (ὃ δ' ἐνοἷς ἔσται, δι' ἀγάπης ἤδη γενόμενος), and has
anticipated hope by knowledge (λπίδα προειληφὼς διὰ τῆς γνώσεως),  does not
desire anything, having, as far as possible the very thing desired.”811 A range of
themes are knit together in this passage. Knowledge presupposes faith which in
turn is preconception,  prolepsis. Another aspect of the passage is the “as far as
possible (ὡς οἷόν)” which easily alludes to the Platonic idea of 'likeness to God as
far as possible'.
Clement uses the term ‘predestination’ almost synonymously with ‘anticipation’,
at least in the sixth book of the  Stromata where he writes that the Gnostic has
“predestinated  (προορίσας)  himself  by  reason  of  what  he  knew  and  whom  he
loved”.812 Through love, “the future is for him already present (κἄστιν αὐτῷ δι'
ἀγάπην  ἐνεστὸς  ἤδη)”,  so  the  Gnostic  has  “firmly  laid  hold  of  the  end  of  the
promise by knowledge (ἐπαγγειλαμένου κατ'  ἐπιστήμην βεβαίως ἀπείληφεν).”813
The Gnostic rejoices on account of the things promised by anticipation (φθάσας),
“as if they were already present (ὡς ἤδη παροῦσιν)”.814 This theme can also be
understood in terms of hope: The Gnostic loves “the things hoped for, or rather
already  known  (μᾶλλον  δὲ  τὰ  ἐγνωσμένα  ἤδη),  being  hoped  for  so  as  to  be
apprehended  (εἰς  κατάληψιν  δὲ  ἐλπιζόμενα).”815 Hence  hope,  anticipation,
predestination and prolepsis are aspects of the same thing.
Anticipation also plays a role  in  an interesting passage from  The Instructor,
where Clement discusses the relationship between time and eternity:
“[...]the end is reserved till the resurrection of those who believe; and it is
not the reception of some other thing (ἄλλου τινός), but the obtaining of the
promise previously made (προωμολογημένης). For we do not say that both
take place together at the same time – both the arrival at the end (πρὸς τὸ
πέρας  ἄφιξιν),  and  the  anticipation  of  that  arrival  (τῆς  ἀφίξεως  τὴν
πρόληψιν). For eternity and time are not the same, neither is the attempt
and the final result (οὐδὲ μὴν ὁρμὴ καὶ τέλος); but both have reference to
the same thing,  and one and the same person (ἄμφω καὶ περὶ  ἄμφω) is
concerned in both. Faith, so to speak, is the attempt generated in time (ἐν
χρόνῳ γεννωμένη); the final result is the attainment of the promise (τέλος
810Str. 4.24, p. 437
811Str. 6.9.73.4, p. 497
812Str. 6.9.76.4, p. 497
813Str. 6.9.77.2, p. 497
814Str. 7.7.47.5, p. 536. Notice that Clement here uses φθάσας for anticipation, not 
πρόληψις or similar epistemological concepts.
815Str. 7.11.63.1, p. 541
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δὲ τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας)[...]”816
Where faith, there is the promise. The consummation of the promise, knowledge,
is  rest  (“τελείωσις  δὲ  ἐπαγγελίας  ἡ  ἀνάπαυσις”),  which  is  the  final  object  of
aspiration (“ὃ δὴ ἔσχατον νοεῖται ὀρεκτόν”).817
In a puzzling statement (with allusion to Paul?) Clement says that: “Thou shalt
be what thou dost not hope, and canst not conjecture (ἔσῃ γὰρ οἷος οὐκ ἐλπίζεις
οὐδ'  εἰκάσαι  δύναιο  ἄν).”818 There  is  an  ‘apophatic’  feel  to  this.  But  it  is  not
impossible  that  these  words  are  directed  at  the  ‘ordinary’  believer,  since  the
Gnostic  is,  through anticipation,  already that  which he hopes for.  As there are
stages of perfection, Clement notices that the ordinary believer is “not yet also
righteous (οὐδέπω καὶ δίκαιος)”819 in the sense of “the righteousness of progress
and  perfection  (τὴν  κατὰ  προκοπὴν  καὶ  τελείωσιν  δικαιοσύνην),  according  to
which the Gnostic is called righteous.”820 So what characterizes the Gnostic is “the
righteousness  of  progress”.  Does  this  mean  that  righteousness  is  an  ongoing
process, a development taking place? Clement says that:
“[...]our  Gnostic  possesses  all  good  things,  as  far  as  possible;  but  not
likewise in number; since otherwise he would be incapable of changing his
place (ἀμετάθετος)  through the due inspired stages  of  advancement  and
acts of administration.”821
Hence we see that stability, impassibility and similar ideas of virtue does not
mean that the Gnostic cannot change.
Knowledge  “[...]leads  us  to  the  endless  and  perfect  end  (τέλος  ἄγει  τὸ
ἀτελεύτητον καὶ τέλειον), teaching us beforehand (προδιδάσκουσα) the future life
that we shall lead[...]”822. That the end itself is endless sounds very much like the
notions of infinite progress in virtue (epektasis), derived from Phil 3:13, by Gregory
of  Nyssa  and  Origen.  With  a  reference  to  Phil  3:13,  Clement  notes  that  Paul
reckons himself perfect because “he has been emancipated from his former life,
and strives after the better life, not as perfect in knowledge, but as aspiring after
perfection (τοῦ τελείου ἐφιέμενος).”823 Clement also notes that “the perfect man”
816Paed. 1.6.28.3, p. 216
817Paed. 1.6.29.3, p. 216
818Paed. 2.12.99.1, p. 235
819Str. 6.12.102.5
820Str. 6.12.102.5, p. 504
821Str. 6.6, p. 536
822Str. 7.10.56.2, p. 539
823Paed. 1.6.52.3. All this should of course be distinguished from the “vicious 
insatiableness (ἀπληστίαν ἄδικον)” (passions), that leads to a “depraved state 
(καχεξίᾳ)”. Str. 7.2.9.4, p. 525
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devotes himself to “the pure vision of insatiable contemplation.”824 And as quoted
above,  the Gnostic “having become son and friend,  he is now replenished with
insatiable contemplation face to face.”825
But the passage in Clement that most resembles our definition of  epektasis  is
when he argues that the soul of the Gnostic “is ever improving in the acquisition of
virtue and the increase of righteousness (πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν βελτιουμένην ἑκάστοτε
ψυχὴν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ δικαιοσύνης αὔξησι)”.826 In  each step the soul
advances  “towards  the  habit  of  impassibility  (εἰς  ἕξιν  ἀπαθείας)”827.  In  other
passages, however, it seems that there is an end to perfection:
“If  the  Word,  who  is  Judge,  call;  he,  having  grown  inflexible  (ἀκλινὴς
γενόμενος),  and  not  indulging  a  whit  the  passions,  walks  unswervingly
where justice advises him to go; being very well persuaded that all things
are managed consummately well, and that progress to what is better (εἰς τὸ
ἄμεινον ἀεὶ τὴν προκοπὴν προϊέναι) goes on in the case of souls that have
chosen virtue, till they come to the Good itself, to the Father’s vestibule, so
to speak, close to the great High Priest.”828
It is not only because of a proleptic capability of the soul that it can reach out
towards God in  faith.  If  this  is  the subjective  aspect  of  faith,  there is  also  an
objective aspect. He who obeys the call  for the right reasons “is on his way to
knowledge (ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ἵεται)”829, being “drawn by the love of Him who is the
true object of love”. Also “the attachment to intellectual objects naturally becomes
to the Gnostic an influence which draws away from the objects of sense”.830 There
is, of course, an obviously ‘erotic’ ring to this. Objectivity is important. It is not just
faith that makes prolepsis what it is, but also the character of God himself.
For now it is sufficient to note that Clement's point is that perfect insight is not
possible in this life, but that the anticipation of perfection in itself is a form of
perfection.
The possibility of moral epistemology
We will now discuss how moral epistemology should be conceived in Clement,
i.e. how can we reflect on moral truths? How can we describe the true Gnostic?
How does the Gnostic learn what is virtuous, right and good?
824Str. 6.13, p. 505
825Str. 5.6, p. 454
826Str. 7.2.10.1
827Str. 7.2.10.1, p. 525
828Str. 7.7.45.3
829Str. 4.22.145.2, p. 436
830Str. 4.24, p. 436
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At times we find traces of something that could be called an ethics of invisibility.
Granted that Clement’s ethics is first of all ‘aphairetic’, this invisibility is derived
from the unity brought about by the method of abstraction. Simplicity, as we have
seen in the case of God, is incomprehensible, and as such the simple person is
invisible.
Above we have asked whether imitation of the image and likeness of God, shows
in the body also, or only in the mind. Clement’s answer seems to be that while vice
shows, virtue does not show in the body in any obvious way. This invisibility is not
derived directly from the invisibility of God. Rather the invisibility of virtue in the
body  of  the  Gnostic  rises  from  constancy,  the  habitual  doing  of  good.  Such
constancy also makes the Gnostic invisible to himself, so to speak: With reference
to the sermon on the mount Clement notes that “[n]ot even he himself who shows
mercy ought to know (γινώσκειν) that he does show mercy; for in this way he will
be sometimes merciful, sometimes not.”831
Clement does not  consider obvious,  outward signs of  virtue as having much
significance. Maybe, what he is saying is that if there is such a significance in one
instance, it only exists relative to the lack of significance that a person might have
in other instances, when virtue is not habitual? Then the point seems to be, that
only if good acts are something extraordinary for a person, does it show. But good
acts should not be something ‘extraordinary’ but a habitual, natural character of
the  good  person.  Hence  virtue  does  not  show.  This  does  not  mean  that  the
Gnostic’s body is not sanctified as well as the soul.832 The Gnostic occupies himself
with God, logically as well as morally and physically.
It also turns out that ‘invisibility’ is not the whole part of the story. Imitating God
(also)  means  teaching others  to  imitate  God (just  as  Christ  has  instructed the
Gnostic):
“The Gnostic even forms and creates (κτίζει καὶ δημιουργεῖ) himself; and
besides also, he, like to God (ἐξομοιούμενος θεῷ), adorns those who hear
him;  assimilating  as  far  as  possible  the  moderation  which,  arising  from
practice,  tends  to  impassibility,  to  Him  who  by  nature  possesses
impassibility;”833
Such  work  can  hardly  be  completely  ‘invisible’.  As  Clement  notes  in  the
introduction to the Stromata, “Wisdom is a communicative and philantropic thing
831Str. 4.22.138.2, p. 435
832Str. 4.26, p. 439
833Str. 7.3.13.3
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(κοινωνικὸν δὲ ἡ σοφία καὶ φιλάνθρωπο)”.834 Hence the martyr plays a special role
in the fourth book of the  Stromata.  Martyrdom is perfection (at least a kind of
perfection),  “not  because  the  man  comes  to  the  end  (τέλος)  of  his  life”,  but
“because  he  has  exhibited  the  perfect  work  of  love  (τέλειον  ἔργον  ἀγάπης
ἐνεδείξατο).”835 By witnessing (and by teaching others) the Gnostic follows Christ.
On the other hand, martyrdom is to be understood broadly, as the confession of
God. Every soul that has “lived purely in the knowledge of God” and obeyed that
commandments is a witness by “[...]life and word (βίῳ καὶ λόγῳ), in whatever way
it may be released from the body[...]”836.
If there is any form of paradoxical character to the life of the Gnostic, then it
must be between the invisibility that arises from constancy on the one hand, and
the visibility that arises from witnessing on the other. The Stromata can itself be
conceived as an example of witnessing.
But how does the Gnostic himself  know what actions are right? For Clement
knowledge of God and right action is inseparable:
“All the action, then, of a man possessed of knowledge is right action; and
that done by a man not possessed of knowledge is wrong action, though he
observe a plan[...]”837
Hence knowing moral principles does not lead to right action in itself. Only the
knowledge of God through anticipatory faith can produce such action. Works, says
Clement “follow knowledge, as the shadow the body.”838 In this action the Gnostic
is ‘like’ to Christ, in that his actions are similar to Christ’s.
Clement says about virtue that,  “all  that is  characterized by virtue proceeds
from  virtue  and  leads  back  to  virtue  (ἀπ'  ἀρετῆς  τέ  ἐστι  καὶ  πρὸς  ἀρετὴν
ἀναφέρεται).”839 Knowing  God  is  just  as  much  about  being  “known  of  Him
(γνωσθείς τε πρὸς αὐτοῦ)”.840
Conclusion
The  Stromata,  much  rather  than  being  the  promised  work  of  systematic
philosophy,  is  a  “memoranda  (ὑπομνήματα)”,  “stored  up  against  old  age,  as  a
remedy  against  forgetfulness”.841 Rather  than  being  a  philosophical  ‘system’,
834Str. 1.1.1.3
835Str. 4.4.14.4, p. 411
836Str. 4.4.15.3, p. 412
837Str. 8.10, p. 540
838Str. 7.13, p. 547
839Str. 6.17.158.4, p. 517
840Str. 7.13.82.7, p. 547
841Str. 1.1.11.1, p. 301
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Clement’s thinking is a theologia viatorum. This seems to follow from the fact that
only a negative theology is possible, a fact that must influence ethics and moral
epistemology as well.
Between Clement’s negative theology and his anthropology is a layer of logos-
Christology, which makes his negative theology somewhat inapparent in his ethics.
In other Patristic authors we often see ethics with a ‘negative side’, where negative
theologies play a role, and a ‘positive side’ where imitation of Christ plays a role
(e.g. the Epistle to Diognetus and Gregory of Nyssa). This distinction cannot be
made easily in Clement. If there are two sides in Clement they rather consist in
imitation of the unity of Christ as the Logos on the one hand, and imitation of the
concrete actions of Christ as Jesus on the other. In the former a certain ‘negativity’
does plays a role, though, especially in the form of abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις), so that
Clement’s ethics can be said to be to a large degree ‘aphairetic’. In Clement this
ethics easily combines with a more traditional ‘ethics of invisibility’ (similar to that
in the Epistle to Diognetus).
Clement links being with cause and becoming with effect, in a way where habits
and actions are being, and becoming, respectively. Virtue is a cause that produces
actions as its effect. The Gnostic has reached a fixed habit of well-doing, but it is
the well-doing that makes him similar to God. Now, if the Gnostic is only like to
God in action, and not in form, it is only in becoming, not in being, that the Gnostic
can be like to God. The Gnostic is always becoming, but never is, like to God, it
seems.
The  doing  of  good  works  is  the  product  of  faith,  the  voluntary  anticipation
through which the Gnostic receives future perfection now. Virtue produces good
actions, but it is only in actions that the Gnostic resemble Christ. If likeness to God
(the Gnostic being an image of Christ, the express image of the Father) is not a
likeness in being but in following, and action, is not this equivalent to saying that
the Gnostic does not represent God in any ‘adequate’  way,  but only in a ‘true’
way?842 Does this not mean that moral knowledge can be true, but never adequate?
842As we have defined truth and adequacy above.
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Part IV. Gregory of Nyssa
“[W]hosoever searches the whole of Revelation will find therein no doctrine
of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial
existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant
first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is
there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul?” (Gregory of
Nyssa, Answer to Eunomius' Second Book, p. 261)
Introduction
Along with his older brother Basil the Great and their friend Gregory of
Nazianzus, another bishop, Gregory of Nyssa is known as one of the Cappadocian
fathers. Gregory was born c. 335 in Cæsarea, the capital of Cappadocia, into a
wealthy Christian family, where he received his theological and philosophical
training, according to himself, from his brother Basil and his sister Macrina.843
Though quite unwilling, he was appointed bishop in the small diocese of Nyssa by
Basil in 372. However, already in 374 he was exiled under emperor Valens, who
favored Arian theology. In 378, when Theodosius I became emperor, Gregory was
allowed to return to his see and in 381 he was present at the second ecumenical
council, in Constantinople. Here he successfully defended the orthodox Nicene
view on the trinity against Neo-Arianism, as represented by the Anomœan
Eunomius of Cyzicus (d. c. 393) who had argued that the Son was of a different
nature (οὐσία) from the Father. The twelve books against Eunomius, and the
Answer  to  Eunomius'  Second  Book (central to the present argument) was an
outcome of this conflict. Gregory drew on a wide range of philosophical sources:
Platonism,  Philo  of  Alexandria,  Origen,  not  least.844 There  are  similarities  with
Clement of Alexandria, but where Clement had emphasized the epistemological
side of Christ's  saving work, Gregory notes emphasized ontology:  “[...]the Lord
does not say that knowing something about God is blessed, but to possess God in
oneself”845,  and  where  Clement's  negative  theology  is  primarily  a  matter  of
abstraction it is in Gregory more thoroughly apophatic.
Much interesting work have been done on Gregory of Nyssa's polemical use of
notions of divine infinity, language and negative  theology.846 But something still
needs to be said about how these strategies influenced the development of
843VitMac.
844Daniélou 1967, pp. 333-345
845Beat. 142
846E.g. Heine 1975
166
Gregory's more systematic or speculative thought, not least when it comes to his
mature views on anthropology and the possibility of ethics. 
An obvious place to start if trying to get a hold on the developments in Gregory's
ethics and anthropology is by making a comparison of the early treatise On the
Inscriptions of the Psalms and the late On the Life of Moses (especially the second
book). On the Inscriptions of the Psalms was probably written around 377, while
On  the  Life  of  Moses was  probably  written  much  later,  in  the  390s.847 Both
discusses themes of spiritual growth and anthropology, and both contains
allegorical readings of Moses' life. Ronald Heine has argued that the changes from
the one to the other are not of a radical kind, but a mater of change of emphasis,
stemming from the theological controversies engaged in by Gregory.848 While this
might be true the apparently subtle changes might prove to be more deep-seated
in the developments in Gregory's epistemological and theological views than one
might initially think.
Gregory's early works are mostly on ethical or ascetic themes, and of a non-
polemical character. But we do get a sense of the negative theological  dialectic,
which arguably breaks out in his later works.  The fight against Neo-
Arianism/Anomeanism was central for this to take place. In 383 he was present at
the synod in Constantinople. From 382-384, Gregory wrote the books of  Against
Eunomius and  the  Answer  to  Eunomius'  Second  Book.849 Against Eunomius,
Gregory held that God's essence is infinite (ἄπειρον), in a radical sense, and thus
completely ineffable. This  he  combines  with  the  idea  that language works
conceptually, and that talk about the divinity is possible in spite of His infinity:
Language is always imprecise, but terms can be invented by human beings in
order to say either something about God's ἐνέργεια or something in  negative
definitions about God's οὐσία.
In Gregory's  mature works, these developments seems to have influenced his
ethics. Gregory now not only defines evil as privation, but often the good,  and
virtue is defined simply as the negation  of evil  and  vice, i.e.,  the negation  of a
specific privation.850 As such the term 'virtue' becomes an indirect,  negative
conception, meaningless in itself, but dialectically pointing beyond itself to the
ineffable good. The following especially focuses on how these dialectics can be
observed in Gregory's interpretations of Moses' three theophanies.
The point is not that Gregory was not aware of (some of) the implications of
847Ferguson 1978, p. 1
848Heine 1995, p. 2
849ConEunI. 1-12; ConEunII.
850ConEunII. 146; DeAnRes., p. 436; Cant. 374, p. 395
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negative theology in his early works. At Gregory's time this tradition was already
well developed. But  the polemics against Eunomianism helped him  to purify his
notions on ethics, as well as made him rethink what was increasingly revealed to
be inherent contradictions in his early anthropology (for example that Man is a
microcosm, and created in the image of God).
Based on a study of Gregory of Nyssa, according to Guilio Maspero the elements
constituting “a system that is to be called apophatic” are “(1) the division between
created  and  uncreated,  (2)  the  theory  of  language,  (3)  the  οὐσία-ἐνέργεια
distinction and (4) the argument concerning the goodness and power of God”.851
We shall  see how each point  can be treated,  though we will  not  use the term
'apophatic' as a general description of Gregory's thought. This term will be used
more  narrowly,  since  great  portions  of  Gregory's  negative  theology  and  ethics
could also be described as 'aphairetic' (especially his early works).
If  we  look  at  the  ethical  consequences  of  the  developments  in  Gregory's
negative theology and anthropology, the above does not mean that some sort of
'negative' ethics is the only option in Gregory. This is due to the fact that, in
Gregory, negative theology primarily has to do with being: Negative theology only
relates to essence  or  nature (οὐσία, φύσις) and not activities (ἐνέργεια) or
relations (and it is distinctions such as these which can be used to clear up the
apparent contradictions in Gregory's anthropology).  Hence as negative theology
results in a parallel negative anthropology, it is only in essence that the human soul
cannot be described in positive terms. And as God can be positively described in
his activities, human beings can be described positively as they relate to a context.
Notions of virtue, right and wrong must reflect this two-foldedness. It is our claim
that  Gregory's  theory  of  language,  as  developed  during  the  Eunomian
controversies, can also be applied to a range of ethical subjects. This is not least
the case  for  his  theory of  epektasis852,  his idea of  following,  and his  notion of
spiritual  freedom.  Lastly  we  will  discuss  how  Gregory's  negative  theology
influences his social ethics, his famous attack on slavery in particular. Our claim is
that  just  as  negative  theology  is  central  in  his  defense  of  trinitarianism,  the
negative anthropology derived from it is central for his idea of human relations.
Because  of  the  idea  of  humankind  as  made  in  the  image  of  God,  splitting
humankind into positive categories (e.g. slave and master) is indirectly an attack
on the Judeo-Christian distinction and the negative theology derived from it.
851BDG, “Apophatic theology”, p. 73
852Gregory rarely uses precisely this term, but the idea is obviously present in much of his
thinking. Hence we will use this as a generic term for constant progress in virtue.
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Gregory's early ethics (up to the Eunomian controversies)
 Throughout  the  treatment  of  Gregory's  works  we  will  use  a  simplified
distinction  between  his  early  works  and  his  mature  works.  By  Gregory's  early
works will  be meant everything up to the controversies against Eunomius. The
philosophy of language developed in these controversies was arguably important
for Gregory's mature works, though it might not have been the only reason that
Gregory's  thinking  developed.  The  perspective  on  Gregory's  thinking  in  the
following is, however, highly focused on the developments in his view on language
and epistemology. Hence for the present purpose the distinction between early and
mature works, with the Eunomian controversies at the border, is arguably useful.
In the following we will discuss first Gregory's basic ideas in the early treatise On
Virginity.  Secondly we will discuss his treatise On the Inscriptions of the Psalms.
The  latter  will  especially  focus  on  Gregory's  allegorical  treatment  on  Moses'
theophanies, since this makes us able to compare Gregory's early ethics with has
later, as developed in On the Life of Moses.
On Virginity
Gregory  of  Nyssa's  On Virginity may  be  his  first  treatise  (ca. 368).853 In  it
Gregory  uses  'virginity'  (παρθενίᾳ)  as  the  approach  to  the  life  of  virtue  and
Christian perfection. Gregory describes 'virginity' as a representation of a future
blessedness:
“In fact, the Life of Virginity (ὁ ἐν παρθενίᾳ βίος) seems to be  an actual
representation  (εἰκών) of the blessedness in the world to come  (ἐν  τῷ
μέλλοντι αἰῶνι), showing as it does in itself so many signs (φέρων) of the
presence of those expected  (ἐλπίδος) blessings which are reserved
(ἀποκειμένων) for us there.”854
Hence there is a certain reminiscence of Heb 11:1, where “faith is assurance of
things hoped (ἐλπιζομένων) for, a conviction of things not seen”855. Virginity stands
in an anticipatory relationship to the 'invisible'. As such it is quite incapable of
being described, Gregory notes. The only sufficient way of praising virginity is to
show that it  is  above praise,  and praise it “[...]by our lives rather than by our
words.”856
Some degree of anti-propositionalism857 is a part of Gregory's philosophical
853BDG, “De virginitate”, p. 774
854DeVir. 14.4, p. 360
855Hebrews 11:1, ASV
856DeVir. 1.1, p. 344
857Talbot Brewer defines moral philosophical propositionalism as the belief that moral 
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repertoire from early on. Anyone who entrusts language the ability to speak of the
ineffable beauty is, with the words of David, a liar.858 The reasons for this are not
obvious  though,  since  Gregory  only  marginally  touches  more  fundamental
ontological  and epistemological  issues in the treatise (at  least  of  the kind that
would  be  relevant).  One possible  perspective  is  this:  As  has  often  been  noted
Gregory seems to believe that the life of virginity is not possible for himself. This is
amongst the arguments that Gregory was married. In the treatise this statement is
used as a rhetorical strategy: Gregory's treatment is done from the perspective of
an  outsider,  which  simultaneously  allows  him  to  side  with  the  listeners  while
exalting  'virginity'  indefinitely  (since  it  cannot  be  reduced  to  any  definite
descriptions). It is not impossible, however, that there are more principled reasons
for seeing virginity as being above praise. If human beings are made in the image
(εἰκόνα)859 of God and can be an imitation (μίμησις)860 of the future good, then it is
not  implausible  that  some  sort  of  negative  theology  spills  over  into  his  moral
epistemology.
Likeness  to  God is  a  gift  of  God received at  creation,  whereas  sin  is  as an
“operative darkness (σκότους ἐνεργειαν)”861.  The likeness to God is regained as
this activity is stopped. The soul “will grasp the object of its search as a natural
consequence of rejecting the opposite attractions”862, but this only happens after
the soul has been purified and has attained “the high and heavenly realities”.863
The opposite of darkness is necessarily light.
Human efforts can only achieve to make the divine likeness shine forth once
again. Virginity is a “fellow-worker (συνεργόν)” and “practical method (τέχναι)”
aiming at creating a “complete forgetfulness of natural emotions” in the soul, by
means of moderation.864 The divine books, Gregory notes, are full of instructions
revealing “a process (μέθοδον) by which we may be actually guided” to “the only
absolute, and primal, and unrivalled Beauty and Goodness.”865 There is a certain
element of theosemiosis866 in  On Virginity. The beauty in nature – “the beauty of
truths and intentions can be definitely captured in propositional descriptions. According
to Brewer Gregory of Nyssa's view is not propositionalistic. Brewer 2009, p. 37
858DeVir. 10.2, p. 355
859DeVir. 12.2, p. 357
860DeVir. 4.8, p. 351
861DeVir. 12.2, p. 357
862DeVir. 18.4, p. 364
863Ibid. Likewise Gregory notes that “the man whose thoughts are fixed upon the invisible 
is necessarily separated from all the ordinary events of life” (i.e. not the other way 
round). DeVir. 4.8, p. 351
864DeVir. 4.9, p. 351
865DeVir. 11.6-12.1, p. 357
866See above.
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the heavens, and of the dazzling sunbeams”867 – acts as “the hand to lead us to the
love of the supernal Beauty”, Gregory notes. Due to the weakness of the human
mind, it must be led “[...]towards the invisible by stages through the cognizances
of the senses.”868 Natural theology as a preparation for seeing “the beauty of the
true and intellectual light”  is prevalent throughout Gregory's works.  In On
Virginity the intellectual movement from creation to the Creator is best described
as one of discrete continuity, i.e. a non-broken 'ascension' not  involving any
necessary negation(s), if any.869 
Gregory criticizes ethical rigorism,870 which by  overdoing asceticism is  still (as
hedonism) concerned with the flesh rather than the “peaceful action of the soul's
functions.”871 This result is the loss of the “heavenly liberty (ἐλευθερία)”872. Hence
Gregory defends a doctrine of temperance where anti-propositionalism and a more
rule-bound ethics are balanced.873
On the possibility of theorizing virginity, Gregory writes that:
“Any theory divorced from practice (τῶν ἔργων), however admirably it may
be dressed out, is like the unbreathing statue, with its show of a blooming
complexion impressed in tints and colours; but the man who acts as well as
teaches, as the Gospel tells us, he is the man who is truly living, and has the
bloom of beauty, and is efficient and stirring.”874
Instruction in the virtuous life style must happen through “actual practice” (“διὰ
τῶν  ἔργων  διδάσκεσθαι”).875 Ethical  principles  cannot  be  formulated  without
reference to  actual  instances  of  morally  good  persons.  We shall return to this
theme  later. By now we shall simply note the double thematic of ethical anti-
propositionalism on the one hand and some sort of ethical 'methodism' on the
other, and the tension which is  inherent herein.
867DeVir. 11.3, p. 356, modified
868DeVir. 11.1, p. 355. What follows might sound akin to Diotima’s so-called scala amoris 
in Plato's Symposion, but Gregory lets us have no doubt that “[t]he Beauty which is 
invisible and formless” can never be illustrated by language or grasped by the mind. 
869I.e. negation is only a relative matter of freeing the soul from material things. This 
continuity does not preclude the notion that spiritual progress happens in steps 
(=discretion).
870DeVir. 22.1, p. 367. Gregory talks of people who unconsciously “laboriously thwart their
own design” by sliding “into the very opposite kind of excess”. Hence these are 
probably not just, e.g., Montanists or others who dogmatically embrace rigorism. 
871DeVir. 22.2, p. 368
872DeVir. 22.1, p. 368, modified
873DeVir. 22.2, p. 368
874DeVir., p. 368, modified.
875DeVir. 23.1
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On the Inscriptions of the Psalms
An analogy to this dual description of morality can be found in On the
Inscriptions of the Psalms. The “purpose (τέλος)” of the virtuous life is beatitude
(“μακαριότης”), Gregory notes in the first chapter of this commentary.876 Indeed,
all hard labor (σπουδὴν) relates to some standard (ἀναφοράν). While this of course
expresses a common teleological view on the virtues, Gregory's statements more
specifically seem to resemble an (ethical) equivalent to the hermeneutical method
of Iamblichus (c. 242-327 AD).877 This methodology sought after the aim (σκοπός)
of the text in terms of intentionality, and in accordance with this Gregory notes
that “[f]irst, one must understand the aim (σκοπός)” to which the writing looks. In
the present context Gregory uses the terms σκοπός and τέλος more or less
interchangeably. In a similar manner he speaks interchangeably of the aim
(σκοπός/τέλος) of the virtues and that of the inscriptions. This conflation could
reasonably be considered as Gregory's methodological basis in the commentary on
the inscriptions.878
The definition of beatitude is the traditional Platonic idea of likeness to God (τὸ
θεῖον ὁμοίωσις).879 Hence, since the purpose of the virtuous life is beatitude, then
the purpose of the virtues is in the end likeness to God. According to Gregory, the
inscriptions teaches that this is managed in three stages, namely 1) separation
from evil, 2) the meditation on sublime things, and 3) finally the actual likeness to
God.880 In accordance with this, Gregory argues, the inscriptions teaches a “subtle”
teaching intended to direct the hearer to the virtuous way of life by certain
“suggestions and bits of advice”  (ὑποθήκαις τισιν καὶ συμβουλαῖς).881 Hence
Gregory does not promise a grand theory of ethics. He moreover expresses a
healthy anti-positivism (or anti-empiricism) when he complains that ”the majority
define the good in terms of phenomena when they say that that alone is good
which one might demonstrate to sense-perception.”882 But though virtue is hidden
to immediate sense-perception, “one can find virtue separated from evil by obvious
indications (φανεροῖς σημείοις)”883. This means that the difference between virtue
876InIns. 25. Where other fathers, e.g. Origen had commented on the psalms  themselves, 
Gregory's comment is specifically on the inscriptions, i.e. the added headings of the 
Psalter, containing instructions on music, the author and historical circumstances.
877Heine 1995, pp. 34-36
878InIns. 24; InIns. 29
879InIns. 26
880InIns. 26. This three-stage notion of the virtuous life has been proposed as a basic key 
to Gregory's spiritual teachings (e.g. Danielou 1944). But as we shall see, Gregory's 
view becomes much less rigid in his later works.
881InIns. 28
882InIns. 35
883InIns. 34
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and evil is something 'distinct' (διαφοράν), the distinguishing (ἐγγινομένης) marks
being types of joy (εὐφροσύνη). While virtue brings joy to the soul, evil brings joy
to  the  physical  senses.  Pleasure, the  joy  of  which  disappears  immediately  and
passes into non-existence, leaves traces of shame (αἰσχύνη). But not only can we
talk about virtue and evil by means of positive indications. By noting that the goal
of virtue is peace and rest etc., the author of the psalms points out that which is
contrary to this by means of silence.884 In other words, evil is described by means
of  negative  definitions.  This,  of  course,  fits  well  with  the  (by  Gregory's  time)
traditional  definition  of  evil  as  some sort  of  privation  (στέρησις which  can be
described through negation, ἀπόφασις), and as such as something that must be
defined negatively in reference to what we know is good. Similarly, on the ethical
level Gregory argues that “the acquisition of the good becomes the avoidance and
destruction of its opposite.”885 Hence when the good is achieved, it seems, evil is
automatically destroyed.
Again,  this  does  not  amount  to  full-blooded  negative  theology  or  negative
definition  of  the  good.  Gregory  does note  that  initially,  spiritual  progress
(“entrance to the good”) starts with “the departure from those things which are
opposite to it” and that the “participation in what is superior occurs by means of
this entrance.”886 But this does not seem to amount to an absolutely negative (not
to  say  dialectical)  definition  of  'the  good',  since,  as  noted  above,  Gregory
distinguishes between three levels of progress in the virtuous life. Of these, only
the third, highest level consists in actual likeness to God, something which is not
talked of  in  negative definitions.  Moreover,  as Heine notes,  though Rondeau is
wrong in claiming that Gregory does not assert the theme of “divine darkness” at
all in On the Inscriptions (there is at least one reference to this)887, this theme is
never  developed  further,  as,  e.g.,  in  On  the  Life  of  Moses,  where  Moses'
contemplation in the “cloud of darkness” is identified with the peak of spiritual
growth.888 Rather Gregory talks in terms of “brightness” as when he notes that we
are united with the divine when “the brightness of God” shines in our conduct.889
Hence, as in  On Virginity,  the statements in  On the Inscriptions seem to place
negative  definitions of  evil  as  secondary to positive definitions  of  the good (or
virtue), though this happens in a somewhat metaphorical or allegorical form. This
884InIns. 37.
885InIns. 38.
886InIns. 39.
887Rondeau 1972, p. 517. Rondeau argues that the Gregory perceives five stages of 
spiritual development in the inscriptions.
888Heine 1995, pp. 53-54
889InIns. 51.
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is at least the case when it comes to the higher levels of spiritual progress.
This is also the case with ethical concepts, such as virtue. Indeed, though being
well  aware  that  “virtue  is  above  praise”,  in  the  early  works  Gregory  often
prioritizes descriptions with positive definitions of virtue. For example, he takes
psalm 4,7 to mean that “the face of God” can be contemplated in certain “imprints”
(the virtues) in which the “divine form” is imprinted.890 After coming down from the
mountain, Moses “bore upon his face the tokens of the divine power which had
been revealed to him”891.
Gregory's description of Man as a miniature cosmos, containing all the elements
of the universe, arguably reflects this semiotic.892 The arrangement of the cosmos is
like a polyphonic musical harmony, Gregory claims (in  a basically  Pythagorean
manner),  and  the  concord  of  creation  with  itself,  composed  of  opposites  in
harmony, is a hymn to the  inaccessible and inexpressible God.893 The part of the
whole is of the same kind as the whole in all respects,894 and the constitution of the
human body reflects the music in the universe, like a fragment of glass reflects the
sun. Hence, the human body can be compared to a musical instrument reproducing
the music of the universe.895 This “music”  presumably consists of what Gregory
calls the “banquet of virtues”896, the marks of which is the types of joy and shame
noted above.
But not only does the harmony of the components of the individual human
person  produce such “music”. Gregory distinguishes between the virtues of
speculative philosophy (which is unclear to the majority) and “the moral character
of life (ἦθος τοῦ βίου)” (a Philonic distinction?) which is “zealously perfected at the
same time by others”897, by the “rhythmical order”  of life made known publicly.
When human nature is exalted to its original condition, it will produce “that sweet
sound of thanksgiving through their meeting with one another”898, which, more
precisely, means that humanity, having been made “an instrument for God”  will
imitate “the harmony of the universe in the variety and diversity of the virtues.”899
And when the author of the Psalms talks of a city,900 he means “that orderly and
890InIns. 35. Such talk of the “divine form” seems quite contrary to Gregory's later 
explicitly apophatic theology.
891InIns. 44
892InIns. 30
893InIns. 31
894InIns. 32
895InIns. 32
896InIns. 34
897InIns. 76
898InIns. 66
899InIns. 66
900Ps. 58:7
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well-arranged society which is joined together as a city by means of virtue”.901
Hence, for Gregory virtue has a social meaning, not only eschatologically (as the
above might seem to imply), but also in regard to ethical guidance, in that the
virtuous becomes able to lead others to virtue (see below on the example of
Moses).
The definition of Man as a microcosm might seem to be contradicted by
statements in other works, most clearly in On the Making of Man, where Gregory
calls such a definition a mean and unworthy fancy of “some heathen writers”.902 On
the other hand, in the passages where Gregory discusses the former position he
often seems a bit reluctant to actually defend this  as his own, thus making the
apparent contradiction less brutal. At least in two instances, Gregory refers this
theory to “wise men”.903 Perhaps this should be considered as a “rhetorical”
strategy? At any rate, when defining Man as a microcosm in On the Inscriptions,
Gregory writes that “man is a miniature cosmos”, but he also adds that “this same
man has also been made an image of the one who composed the cosmos”.904 Again,
this duality is also exhibited in Gregory's description of the virtues as both a
“musical”  harmony reflecting the harmony of the universe on the one hand
(corresponding to Man as a microcosm), as well as imprints of the divine form on
the other (corresponding to Man as created in the Image of God). So while we in
On Virginity saw that the tension between what we called ethical anti-
propositionalism and ethical  methodism was resolved by an ethics of moderation
(perhaps of an Aristotelian kind), in On the Inscriptions a tension analogical to this
is resolved by a distinction between Man as created in the image of God
(indescribable) and Man as a microcosm (describable). Hence in other words we
see a (tentative) shift from ethics to ontology.
While it would be easy to refer this distinction to a simple body-soul distinction
(the soul as created in the image of God, the body as a microcosm) Gregory does
not, however, explicitly do this.
There are at least three reasons for not seeing the proposed duality in On the
Inscriptions (but also elsewhere in the early works) as a simple body-soul
dichotomy: 1) Virtues are dispositions or states of the soul, not of the body, 2) The
marks of virtue (types of joy and shame) are found in the soul, hence the soul can
be described and known, at least partly, 3) The harmony produced by “the part” is
901InIns. 173
902DeOp., p. 404. This rejection refers to the definition of man as a microcosm, rather than
more specifically the soul.
903InIns. 30; DeAnRes., p. 433
904InIns. 25 (italics added)
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also a matter of a social whole, hence the individual soul and body is not absolutely
discernible  from  its  surroundings.  At  least  Man  cannot  be  described  as  a
microcosm without reference to his social context.
Anticipation and the possibility of moral philosophy
In On the Inscriptions to begin with Gregory had claimed types of “joy” to be the
defining characteristics of virtue and evil.  But he subsequently (in the same
treatise) argues that the difference between virtue and evil can only be judged
according to their ends. Gregory writes that:
“The means of judging these matters is on the basis of their ends, not on the
basis  of  what is  currently  at  hand.  For by that eye of  the soul  which is
capable of contemplation and discernment he has understood what has been
stored up for the good through hope as though it were present[...]”905
While Gregory had initially talked about the purpose and aim of the virtuous life,
he now talks of the end of virtue in terms of hope. The one “who adheres to God
through hope (διὰ τῶν ἐλπίδων)” becomes united with Him.906 Similarly, using the
prevalent metaphor of the virtuous life as a wrestling match, Gregory notes that
“the labours which they experience in the wrestling are disguised by the honour
which is anticipated (ἐλπιζομένης).”907 The virtuous person “makes day for himself
by hoping in the light, by means of which the darkness utterly disappears.”908 Such
a thematic of hope and anticipation can be found in On Virginity, where virginity is
seen as a representation of the blessedness in the world to come (as quoted
above). Similarly, in his Sermons on the Lord's Prayer, Gregory characterized
prayer as “the substance of the things to come”.909 Now, while we might talk of
these instances as some sort of anticipatory view of the future 'good' being made
present through hope (roughly reminiscent  to a Clementine prolepsis)910, it does
not seem to have any obvious bearing on ethics as such. Rather than being an
active part of practical matters, it seems to be a conclusion of such matters.911 Still,
905InIns. 41, p. 99
906InIns. 43
907InIns. 73
908InIns. 149. Notice that we again see an identification of moral perfection with 
metaphors of brightness.
909Again reminiscent of Hebrews 11:1. Gregory writes that “Prayer is intimacy with God 
and contemplation of the invisible. [...] Prayer is the enjoyment of things present and 
the substance of the things to come.” DeOrDom., p. 24
910According to Clement of Alexandria faith (pistis) is voluntary preconception (prolepsis). 
This theory was partly inspired by Stoic and Epicurean epistemology. See the part on 
Clement. 
911In the terms introduced in part one, such anticipation of the future good is not 
theologia viatorum, but theologia beatorum.
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hope might, in Gregory's early works, be thought of as the presupposition of an
eschatological anthropology and ethics, where the alleged dichotomies are
dissolved through some sort of anticipation. As noted above, Gregory often talks of
ethics in terms of the end or purpose of the virtuous life. But for this the terms
σκοπός and τέλος are used, rather than hope. Hence we should be careful about
not conflating themes of hope with themes of practical ethics in some grand theory
of anticipation (though below we shall see how Gregory's ethics become
increasingly epektatic). But perhaps the noted anthropological duality, whether
ontological or ethical, is what defines human life now, while unity should be
conceived as an eschatological matter that can, however, be partly achieved
through anticipation? At least some passages in Gregory suggests this, for example
when he in his sermons in On the Beatitudes argues that the life of the virtuous is
not conceived as a duality:
“We  should  […]  beware  of  thinking  that  […]  the  life  of  the  virtuous  is
conceived as a duality; on the contrary, when the partition wall of evil that
blocks us up has been taken away, the two will become one and coalesce,
because both are united to the good.”912
Body and soul becomes one when they are united to God. Only in so far as virtue
is lacking does a split between the two occur.
We have already mentioned that the spiritual 'movement' from creation (i.e.
perceptions of natural beauty) to creator (i.e. the divine, ineffable beauty) in On
Virginity is one of discrete continuity. Spiritual progress in Gregory's early works
happens  in  stages. Similarly, it has been noted that Gregory believes the
inscriptions of the Psalms to guide to blessedness in fundamentally three stages.
This somehow schematic view of spiritual progress is arguably central for making
a general ethics possible in the early works.
According to Gregory, the alleged “suggestions and bits of advice” (ὑποθήκαις
τισιν καὶ συμβουλαῖς) in the inscriptions has the function of dissuading “from what
is  inferior”  by  their  reference  to  virtue  (again  positive  definitions  of  virtue  is
primary  to  negative  definitions  of  evil).  Similarly,  the  representation  of  the
accomplishments of holy men is mentioned in Scripture in order to lead to the
good which is equal (ὅμοιον, i.e. not the same, but like) and similar (μιμήσεως).913
But though Gregory mentions that the purpose of the reference to those admired
for virtue and those condemned for evil is that we grasp “the distinguishing mark
912Beat., p. 165
913InIns. 161
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of  each  of  the  lives  in  advance”  this  does  not  amount  to,  e.g.,  some  sort  of
biographic ethics,914 since the temporary order of things made known in the events
in Scripture is not necessarily equivalent to the order of the stages of spiritual
growth, the “logic of virtue (τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀρετῆς)”.915 Neither is it necessary or
possible to mimic the life of virtuous men and women in every detail.  In other
words, it is the “distinguishing mark” (types of joy and shame, to be sure) of the
virtuous and evil lives which is the theme of ethics, not the lives themselves.  So,
ethics  in  On the  Inscriptions ethics  revolves  around  some  sort  of  teleological
casuistry, the purpose of the virtuous life being beatitude.916 And for Gregory this
seems  to  mean  that  it  is  only  possible  to  formulate  an  ethics  when  one  has
achieved such beatitude. This is  one of  the things that makes his whole moral
philosophical endeavor a paradoxical one, since he often claims that he has himself
not reached the heights of virtue that he tries to describe.917 Still, since we have
the Scriptures, with rules formulated by, e.g., Moses we do have a basis for
speaking of ethical principles in a (seemingly) positive form. Moses, Gregory notes,
was “the kind of person who no longer needed to be led by law, but could himself
become the author of a law for others.”918 This status reflects the duality noted
above, but, because of his high degree of spirituality, in Moses the inner and outer
(or whatever the dichotomy consists of) are not opposed but mediated.
The above exemplifies that although the ethics of the inscriptions of the Psalms,
as Gregory interprets it, is sometimes (and then only  initially) stated in negative
terms, it is arguably not a negative or apophatic ethics as such – only for us who
have not reached the peaks of virtue, is moral perfection indescribable, and must
be talked about in something akin to negative definitions, if at all: Though Gregory
comes close, not even shame is defined as the lack of joy, but rather as a “stamp”
or “trace” that reveals the beast (bodily joy) by “the track it leaves behind”.919
914I.e. an ethics that does not abstract from the complexity, historicity of concrete human 
lifes.
915“The things which are first and those which are last have been arranged sequentially 
according to the logic of virtue (τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀρετῆς), and the order is not subject to 
the material occurence (τῇ ὑλικῇ συντυχίᾳ) of the events.” InIns. 151
916By “simple casuistry” is here meant a case-based ethics aiming at producing non-
ambiguous propositions that can guide moral conduct.
917The first instance of such, perhaps mostly rhetorical humility, is in On Virginity, where 
Gregory declares that his knowledge of virginity is useless to him (he might have been 
married). DeVir.
918InIns. 43. Compare this with Plotinus Ennead 6.9.7.16-28.
919InIns. 36
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Negative anthropology and imitation of God in On the Making 
of Man and On the Beatitudes.
Before continuing to Gregory's controversies with Neo-Arianism, we shall briefly
consider  to  which  degree  his  early  works  contain  what  we  call  a  negative
anthropology.  This  theme  is  important  from  early  on,  and  arguably  also
increasingly so. We have noted above that Gregory in On the Making of Man, calls
the idea of Man as a microcosm a mean and unworthy fancy of “some heathen
writers”920.  The anthropology developed by Gregory in this treatise is essentially
negative. As God is incomprehensible, so is the human soul.
“'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?' the apostle asks; and I ask further,
who has understood his own mind? Let those tell us who consider the nature
of  God  to  be  within  their  comprehension,  whether  they  understand
themselves – if they know the nature of their own mind.”921
The soul is the image of God, and as such it can only be described in negative
terms. Gregory argues that “[t]he image (εἰκόνα) is properly an image so long as it
fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the archetype”. Hence he
notes  that  the human soul  should  resemble  God by  being incomprehensible  in
essence (οὐσία), in order not to be deficient as an image of God. Hence in On the
Making of Man Gregory argues that:
“[...]since  one  of  the  attributes  we  contemplate  in  the  Divine  nature  is
incomprehensibility of essence (τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας),  it is clearly
necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of
the archetype. For if,  while the archetype transcends comprehension, the
nature  of  the  image  were  comprehended,  the  contrary  (ἐναντιότης  )
character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the defect of the
image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator,
evades  (διαφεύγει)  our  knowledge  (γνῶσιν),  it  has  an  accurate  (ἀκριβῆ)
resemblance  (ὁμοιότητα)  to  the  superior  nature,  figuring  by  its  own
unknowableness (ἀγνώστῳ) the incomprehensible Nature (τὴν ἀκατάληπτον
φύσιν). ”922
This does not mean that the interior, incomprehensible soul cannot in some way
communicate to its material surroundings. This is exactly the purpose or function
of the body. The body communicates the soul through conception (epinoia), a kind
of semiotic device that makes indirect communication possible.
920DeOp. 177, p. 404
921DeOp.,155, p. 396. Compare with Philo, De Mutatione Nominum 7.10
922DeOp. 156, p. 396. A similar example of a 'negative analogy' between the soul and God 
can be found in Basil of Caesarea, Homilia in illud Attende tibi ipsi 7, p. 103
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”Since the spirit  is  in itself  something thinking and immaterial,  it  would
have a savage (ἄμικτον) and incommunicable (ἀκοινώνητον) beauty if its
interior movement had not been capable of being revealed by conception
(ἐπινοίας  φανερου).  It  is  to  this  end  that  this  organic  constitution  was
necessary, so that the interior movement might succeed in being interpreted
(ἑρμηνεύσῃ) through the varied formation of articulations by touching, like a
plectrum, the organs destined for the voice.”923
Again, while Gregory in On the Inscriptions had described eschatology in terms
of  cosmic  harmony,  his  talk  of  simplicity  (oneness)  in  the  sermons  in  On the
Beatitudes  suggests that he has made a shift from a more or less stoic view of
human nature to one that is more in line with the Neo-Pythagorean or Neo-Platonic
idea  of  simplicity  that  we find in  Clement of  Alexandria.  For  example  Gregory
writes that:
“Since  then,  it  is  believed  that  the  divine  nature  is  simple,  free  from
composition and impossible to represent, when human nature is liberated
from the  double  composition,  and  returns  perfectly  to  the  good,  having
become simple and impossible to represent and truly one, then that which
appears will be the same as that which is hidden, and that which is hidden
the same as that which appears, then truly is carried to accomplishment the
beatitude and such men are truly called sons of God”924
But what does this mean for Gregory's notion of imitation of, or likeness to, God,
here and now? The fact that it is, now, only in a material reality that the soul can
be described, though indirectly, in other contexts seem to imply that imitation of
God is a matter of imitating not some abstract virtues (though this is a frequent
concern for Gregory), but a concrete historical reality. In his sermons in  On the
Beatitudes it is not God's essential qualities, but the character of the incarnated,
crucified and risen Christ that is to be imitated. Gregory writes that:
“[...]the  goal  of  the  virtuous  life  is  likeness  to  the  Divinity  (τὸ  Θεῖον
ὁμοίωσις).  And yet that which is passionless and undefiled totally eludes
imitation by human beings. It is quite impossible for the existence which is
subject to passion (τὴν ἐμπαθῆ ζωὴν) to be assimilated to the nature which
admits no passions. But if the Divinity 'alone' is 'blessed', as the Apostle puts
it  (1  Tim  6,15),  and  sharing  (κοινωνία)  in  beatitude  belongs  to  human
beings through their likeness to the Divinity, and imitation is not possible
(μίμησις  ἄπορος),  then  blessedness  is  for  human  life  unattainable.
Nevertheless there are some features of godhead which those who wish to
may take as models to imitate.”925
923DeOp. 149, tr. Balthasar 1988, p. 60, modified
924Beat. 7.2.160, tr. Maspero 2007, p. 73
925Beat. 1.4, p. 26
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Is Gregory saying that in so far as the nature of human beings is subject to
passions, then there can be no imitation of the Divine? Or is he making the more
radical claim that the nature which is now subject to the passions will never be
able  to  imitate  the  Divine  in  any  full  sense,  even  if  it  becomes  passionless?
Becoming passionless means not belonging to the category of things subject to the
passions. In this sense imitation of the divine essence is possible, but this does not
put  the  passionless  human soul  and God in  the  same positive  class  of  things.
Gregory's words in  On the Making of Man (quoted above) seems to support our
claim that likeness to God for Gregory, at least in some contexts,  is a negative
question.  The  image,  the  human  soul, resembles  the  archetype  by  a  negative
character, incomprehensibility. Likewise, in the first sermon of On the Beatitudes,
Gregory sets out to consider the meaning of 'beatitude', but almost immediately
after  argues  that  since  the  mind  cannot  reach the  ineffable  and inconceivable
good. Hence 'beatitude' must be understood in comparison with its opposite, and
the opposite of 'blessed' is 'miserable', the experience of painful and undesirable
things.926
Of  course  Gregory  is  not  saying that  blessedness  is,  at  the  end  of  the  day,
unattainable. But he does say that this is not possible by imitating God's essence,
at  least  not  positively.  But  blessedness  is  attainable,  to  some degree  at  least,
through imitation of God's external character. Gregory does not here talk in terms
of God's essence (οὐσία) versus his activities (ἐνέργεια). But something akin to this
arguably shapes his claims (if so, then “some features of godhead” refers to some
of  God's  activities).  One of  the  features  of  godhead that  should  be  imitated is
voluntary humility, as defined by 2 Cor 8:9.927 Hence, we cannot abstract the idea
of imitation of God from the concrete history of salvation in Jesus Christ, at least
not in this aspect.
We will  discuss this  very central  issue further below, when we have a more
detailed idea of Gregory's theory of language. For now we will notice that Gregory
at times conceives of imitation of God as something positively non-essential (i.e.
not having to do with a positive imitation of οὐσία). Imitation is of God's activities
in the concrete.  Gregory's words on baptism in the sermon  On the Baptism of
Christ illustrates  this  well:  We  ought  narrowly  to  scrutinize  our  Father's
characteristics, Gregory notes, so that we can fashion and frame ourselves to the
likeness of God.928 From this will (ought to) follow some sort of “manifest proof”
926Beat. 1.2
927“though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor, so that we by his poverty might 
become rich”. 2 Cor 8:9, NIV
928InDiem. 237-239, pp. 523-524
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(συμβόλοις  τισὶ  φανεροῖς),  even if  “of  those  things  which are before  our  eyes
nothing is altered”.929 Hence such proofs must be of an indirect character. Even if
imitation of God has concrete consequences, such imitation stays in some sense
invisible.
The polemicism against Neo-Arianism
Gregory's polemics against neo-Arian Anoemeanism930 in the form of Eunomius
of Cyzicus (d. c. 393) did not only affect the Church (in the very concrete form of
the creed of Constantinople). It  also had an impact on Gregory's own way of
thinking about theological issues in the first place, and seemingly also ethical
issues in the second. Eunomius and other Anomœans argued that the Son was of a
different nature (οὐσία) from the Father. Against (neo-)Arianism Gregory affirmed
that “all hope of salvation should be placed in Christ”931, and thus defended a
christocentrism that made it crucial to ensure the theological (ontological) status
of the Son.
The argument against Eunomius
Eunomius' view was a form of subordinationism, claiming that Christ cannot be
true God. In terms of modern philosophy, his view could be described as an
extreme form of positivism: “God knows no more of His own substance, than we
do”932, Eunomius allegedly claimed. According to Eunomius the terms 'generate'
(γεννητός) and 'ungenerate' (ἀγέννητος) apply to the essence(s) of the Son and the
Father respectively, from which follows that their essence cannot be the same.
Hence trinitarianism must be false. In this he relied on a largely Platonic view of
language, where concepts are according to nature.933 In large parts Gregory's
strategy against Eunomius was to make clear the absurdity of this view and to
propose a different conception of language. Negative theology played a crucial role
in this project.
Eunomius claimed that since God's ungeneracy is an essential property, the term
ἀγέννητος (ungenerate/unbegotten) is 1) not an invention of human thought and
speech (epinoia), 2) not a privative definition (in terms of στέρησις, i.e. generation
929Ibid. Presumably the characteristics of the body.
930Anomœans (from ἀ(ν)-ὅμοιος) believed the nature of the Father and the Son to be 
dissimilar, in opposite to the homoousians, who defended the formulations of the Nicene
Creed.
931ConEunII. 50, p. 255
932Socrates Historia Ecclesiastica 4.7
933I.e. kata physis as opposed to kata thesis, according to convention. Both views had 
followers in antiquity.
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is  not  something God is  deprived of), 3) not a relational definition.934 In other
words, the terms ungenerate and generate are positively derived from the very
nature of God, and as such the very basis of a fully adequate positive theology. For
this reason Eunomius also (allegedly) claimed that:
“[...]whatever we know about the Divine substance, that precisely is known
to God; on the other hand, whatever He knows, the same also you will find
without any difference in us”935
Eunomius had claimed that God is to be defined as οὐσία ἀγέννητος, i.e,
'ungenerate essence'.936 In Gregory's treatment of Eunomius' argument, he notes
that since the Father is ungenerate, the life of the Father is 'prior' to the Son's, i.e.
there must be an interval (διάστημα) between the two. This interval, however,
must either be infinite, or included within fixed limits. But the distance cannot be
infinite, Gregory argues, since there would then be nothing connecting the Father
and the Son at all. But it cannot be finite either, since the nature of God is infinite,
Gregory claims.  Hence there  can be  no gap between the  Father  and the Son.
Against  this  Gregory,  in  his  books  Against  Eunomius  1-12,937 and  Answer  to
Eunomius Second Book,938 held that God's nature is infinite and thus completely
unknowable. Hence, terms such as ungenerate says nothing about God's essence,
and so Eunomius' arguments against trinitarianism must be wrong.
Rather  the  terms  'generate'  and  'ungenerate'  says  something  about  the
relationship  between  the  divine  persons.  That  the  Father  is  ungenerate  is  a
negative fact. It simply means that he is not generate. That the Son is generate
simply means that his person (ὑπόστασις) stands in a certain relationship to the
Father's person. But their essence (οὐσία) and nature (φύσις) is common. Positive
names applied to the Father and the Son are not about their essence, but their
activities  (ἐνέργεια)  and  relations.  Hence  we  see  how  the  Judeo-Christian
distinction  is  applied  in  favor  of  orthodox  trinitarianism,  against  theological
'positivism'. What Eunomius failed to understand, according to Gregory, is that we
only speak of God's essence in terms of a negative theology. Hence there can be no
theological  language  according  to  nature  (kata  physis).  While  Eunomius  had
scorned at  the  idea  that  theological  language works  conceptually  (by  epinoia),
Gregory defends this idea:
934Eunomius, Apologia 30.844
935According to Church historian Socrates, Historica Ecclesiastica 4.7
936Eunomius, Apologia 30.841
937ConEunI.
938ConEunII.
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“I say, then, that men have a right (εἶναι κυρίους) to such word-building
(ὀνοματοποιΐας), adapting their appellations to their subject, each man
according to his judgment; and that there is no absurdity in this, such as
our controversialist [Eunomius] makes a pretence of, shuddering at it as
at some gruesome hobgoblin, and that we are fully justified in allowing
the use of such fresh applications of words in respect to all things that
can be named, and to God Himself.”939
Gregory's way of pulling of this argument is to insist that God is infinite. Or to
be  more  precise,  the  divine  essence  is  infinite  (ἄπειρον)  and  unlimited
(άόριστος).940 Gregory  was not  the first  to  make this  claim,  but  he places  this
doctrine firmly as the basis for his arguments against Eunomius.
Divine infinity and the theology of the gap (diastema)
What does it mean that God is infinite? It has been argued that Gregory's
primary argument for the infinity of God is that God's goodness, which is essential
to God, is unlimited (άόριστος), from which follows that infinity and limitlessness
must also be a (qualitative) property of His essence.941 This sounds strangely close
to the Eunomian view that God's ungeneracy is an essential property, though it of
course  differs in ascribing goodness equally to the Father and the Son, where
Eunomius had wanted to separate the essence of the two. Still, it seems reasonable
to argue that in spite of some formulations in Gregory, his overall view is rather
that we can only talk of God's essence in purely negative definitions, which must
also mean that His essence is not essentially,  in  any  positive,  qualitative  way
'infinite' (or if so we would not know what that means).
This is the view of Brightman who argues that not even infinitude is ascribed to
the divine nature by Gregory:942 'Infinite' is an apophatic term, Brightman argues
against Mühlenberg's famous interpretation of Gregory. It simply means the denial
of any attribution of finitude to God. The divine essence does not belong to the
category of things that are finite. This says nothing about God's positive qualities.
But  Mühlenberg,  says  Brightman,  understands 'infinity' in  Gregory  too
qualitatively.  This is not least the case when Mühlenberg says that for Gregory
'infinity' is a “Wesenprädikat fur Gott.”943 Brightman concludes that “[a]ny study of
St. Gregory of Nyssa which does not give adequate treatment to his apophaticism
939ConEunII. 148
940Gregory identifies άόριστος and ἄπειρον. ConEunI. 30
941Maspero & Seco 2009, p. 424. ConEunI. 77
942Brightman refers to Gregory's homilies on Ecclesiastes: “[Scripture] does not say that 
God's essence is without limits, judging it rash even to express this in a concept; rather 
it merely marvels at the vision of the magnificence of His glory.” Eccl. 415
943Mühlenberg 1966, p. 202
184
is ipso facto defective.”944 We  agree  that infinity  in  Gregory is first of all an
apophatic denial  that God belongs to any finite class of  things, even if  it  also,
hypothetically, could be  a positive essential predicate.945 At times this seems to
have been Gregory's own view.946 At any rate this means that any other predicate
can only be apophatic.947 Divine  infinity  means  that  negation  is  primary  to
affirmation,  when  defining  God's  nature.  Denying  that  God  belongs  to  some
positive class does not automatically allow us to put Him in any other positive class
of things, even if we can find a class that is opposite.948
What is primary for now is the dialectic set in motion by Gregory's discussions
on infinity. Plass' somewhat  relational/relative approach should be noted: Plass
takes Gregory's view to mean that while  the diastema is the  created, finite
measure, the unextendedness of the infinite “could mean both “infinite extension”
and “no extension.””949. Plass argues that the most reasonable interpretation of
this is that God's infinity “is extended when it is related to us”  and that “our
extension is conversely “frozen”  when it is related to God.”950 Or maybe God's
infinite extension is the positive side of God having no extension? If both are true it
seems that though God is not extended in time, from our point of view eternity is
infinite temporal extension in past and future (i.e. a qualitative infinity).
The notion of diastema is presumably so central to Gregory's theology that Scot
Douglass talks of  Gregory's  theology as a  “theology of  the gap”.951 No created
being exists outside space or time (the  diastema), which means that the whole
created order is unable to transcend itself. One point where this issue is raised is
during  Gregory's  argument  against  Eunomius.  Gregory's  argument  raises the
question whether God is infinitely distant from creation, or if there is no distance
at all? Gregory's answer to this problem is an original one: Distance (diastema), he
says, is nothing but creation itself (“τὸ διάστημα οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἠ κτίσις ἐστίν”).952
944Brightman 1973, p. 111
945Hence Pannenberg's claim that “[t]he concept of the actual Infinite has had a firm place
in the Christian doctrine of God since Gregory of Nyssa”, seems unwarranted, if by this 
is meant any positive definition of the infinite. Pannenberg 1990, p. 34
946ConEunII. 554, p. 306
947We have distinguished between different forms of negative theology. Apophatic 
theology differs from aphairetic theology. The latter deals in abstraction, the former in 
negation.
948E.g. 'if God does not belong to the positive class A, and the positive class B is 'opposite' 
to A, then perhaps God is B'. But this cannot be the case.
949Plass 1980, p. 188
950Plass 1980, p. 186
951Douglass 2005
952Ecc. 7.1.729. Balthasar translates diastema as “espacement”, while Douglass translates
it as “gap”. Both have different connotations. In the present text we follow Sebanc in 
using the more neutral, direct transliteration 'diastema' and 'diastasis' etc. Balthasar 
1988, p. 28
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No being in the created world exists outside either space or time,953 which also
means that the whole created order is “unable to get out of itself through a
comprehensive vision”954 and that “whatever it beholds, it is looking at itself.”955
Even though “the strength of angels compared with our own seems preeminently
great”, being undisturbed by sensation, their power of understanding is basically
subject to the same limits as our: “[...]for wide and insurmountable is the interval
that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature (πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ
ἀδιεξίτητον,  ᾦ  πρὸς  τὴν  κτιστὴν  οὐσίαν  ἠ  ἄκτιστος  φύσις  διατετείχισται).”956
Hence, by insisting on the infinity of the divine essence Gregory is able to
encounter Eunomius' attack on trinitarian theology.
Against Eunomius Gregory argued that since the diastema is an inescapable
trait of created things (human nature included), we cannot say anything about the
infinite in positive terms. Hence there is no language kata physis when it comes to
non-diastemic being, and so Eunomius' Platonic view on language is false.957
Instead Gregory defended the ability of conception, which Eunomius had rejected:
All our concepts must have been formed by conception (epinoia), including those
found in Scripture, Gregory argues.958 From this follows that the term 'ungenerate'
cannot be an essential property of the divine nature, but must be a negative
definition: “it is a negative attribute of God (ὀυ πρόσεστι δὲ τῷ θεῷ), that neither
does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in
generation”959.
On the ontological level Gregory at times defends what might seem as a form of
idealism, where the properties of things are nothing but the notions (ἔννοιαι) and
bare thoughts (ψίλα νοήματα) of God, while the substance of things is His will.960
When these combine, they become  matter (ὕλη γίνεται).961 For similar  reasons
Gregory at times sounds as a theological voluntarist962.  There is  “no difference
between will and performance (βουλήσεως καὶ ἐνεργειας)”963,  says Gregory, and
953ConEunI. 368
954InEccl. 412
955InEccl. 412
956ConEunII. 69, p. 257
957That Eunomius' view on language is “Platonic” is Gregory's own interpretation. 
ConEunII. 403-409, p. 291
958ConEunII. 183, p. 268
959ConEunII. 530, p. 303
960From this it has been argued that Gregory's view was much like Berkeley's. See Hill 
2009
961InHex. 69, quoted in Sorabji 1983, p. 290
962By voluntarism we understand the claim that God is first of all absolute power and will. 
Associated with John Duns Scotus, the doctrine is typically contrasted with 
intellectualism.
963ConEunII. 228, p. 273
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“all that we can conceive as in Him is entirely work and action (ἐνέργεια καὶ
πρᾶξίς)”964. This does not make God's properties arbitrary, since Gregory firmly
insists on the difference between  Creator and creation: The divine essence is
always  infinite, while creation is always diastemic.965 Moreover, the relation
between diastemic and non-diastemic being is also fundamentally what defines
creation (i.e. Creator and creation are, or can be, defined relationally): Gregory
notes that “It is precisely through its comparison and union with the Creator that
it[creation] is other than him.”966 In Balthasar's words this means that for Gregory
the first essential characteristic of the creature is negative, consisting in the very
fact that the creature is not God.967 Again, this makes it reasonable to see
Gregory's understanding of 'infinite' as purely negative, in that infinitude is
ascribed to God as a means of distinguishing Him from finite creation (and finite
creation from God).
Gregory's theory of conception (epinoia)
As noted above already in his treatise On the Making of Man Gregory described
conception  (epinoia)  as  a  method  by  which  the  incomprehensible  soul  can
indirectly communicate through the body. Conception is as such a way of talking of
that which cannot be talked of directly in positive terms.  Against Eunomius the
Cappadocians defended the legitimacy of inventing new names for God. This was
what the prophets did. Divine revelation is not as such a matter of propositional
discourses, it seems, but it can be put into human words. Moses revealed the will
of  God  in  so  far  as  it  was  lawful,  by  “known  and  familiar  words”,  thereby
describing  “God's  discourse  (διάλογον  θεοῦ)  corporeally  (σωματικώτερον),  not
indeed expressed in words, but signified by the effects themselves? (τῶν ἓργων
αὐτῶν)”.968
By conception can be made new names for God.  God has no beginning and no
generation. The ideas, ἔννοια, of such things can be turned into names (ὄνομαι) by
conception.969 For example “incorruption”, Gregory says “denotes by the privative
(ἀφαιρετικοῦ)  particle  (μορίου)  that  neither  corruption  nor  birth  appertains  to
God”.970 It seems that names capture ideas that are not linguistic items, though
they  have  a  linguistic,  propositional  content.  Its  content  is  rather  its  function.
964ConEunII. 230, p. 273
965See Jenson 2002, pp. 163-164
966ConEunI. 368., tr. Balthasar, p. 28
967Balthasar 1988, p. 27
968ConEunII. 268, p. 277
969ConEunII. 147
970ConEunII. 142
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Negatively defined names does not say anything about God, but they refer to God
by saying something about what God is not. In this Gregory clearly distinguishes
God's  essence  (οὐσία)  from  his  activities  (ἐνέργεια).  We can talk in positive
definitions about God's activities (ἐνέργεια) as they are revealed immanently to us
in time and space (inside the diastema),  “from what are believed to be His
operations in regard to our life”.971 When we speak of God as “overlooking and
surveying  all  things”,  we  talk  of  something  “immanent”  (προχείρου).972 Such
positive talk is not possible when it comes to the divine essence or nature as such.
This does not mean that we should keep silent about non-diastemic being: “it is a
sacred  duty  to  use  of  Him  names  privative  of  the  things  abhorrent  to  His
Nature”973, Gregory notes. This we can only talk about by using conception to make
up names from negative definitions.
But  what  exactly  is  conception  (epinoia)?  Conception  is  a sort of inventive
faculty, it seems, that can be described as neither deduction, nor induction. Every
discovery (i.e. all positive as well as negative knowledge) is made through
conception, Gregory argues.  We seek  by  “variety  (πολυειδοῦς  καὶ  ποικίλης)  of
nomenclature  (σημασίας)  to  gain  some  glimmerings  (ἐναύσματά)  for  the
comprehension (κατανόησιν) of what we seek (θηρεύοντες)”.974 Conception enables
human beings  to  talk  of  that  which  is  outside  time  and space,  non-diastemic,
transcendent being.  But,  Gregory  notes,  in any object that is in this way
conceptually discovered we, for the same reason, comprehend “the diastema in the
being of the apprehended object”975. Hence, what makes conception  possible as
such also makes use of and thereby includes the limits of its object (i.e.
diastema).976
As such we can distinguish between at least three kinds of conception: 1)
Positive, diastemic conception, that produces concepts that positively describe the
characters of immanent objects experienced in time and/or space (created objects
as well as the activities of God), 2) Negative diastemic conception, that produces
concepts that describes objects in time and/or space by means of negation (created
objects as well as the activities of God), 3) Negative,  non-diastemic conception,
that produces concepts that describe the divine nature by way of negation.977
971ConEunII. 149, p. 265
972ConEunII. 149, p. 265
973ConEunII., p. 308
974ConEunII. 145
975Eccl. 412.6-14
976It is not that diastema consists in categories of experience as, e.g., in the Kantian 
sense, but rather that time and space is a property of the objects of experience, 
independently of our comprehension of these.
977This three-fold distinction is an interpretation. See Gregory's four-fold distinction in 
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Gregory argues against Eunomius, that “every name is but a recognizing mark
placed on some reality or some idea, having of itself no existence either as a fact or
a thought (γνώρισμά τι καὶ σημεῖον οὐσίας τινὸς καὶ διανοίας γίνεται πᾶν ὃνομα,
αὑτὸ ἑφ ἑαυτοῦ μήτε ὑπάρχον μήτε νοόυμενον)”978. This might seem to mean that
concepts are nothing but conventional names (i.e. nominalism). But  rather than
just being conventional names in the nominalistic sense, concepts are pointers or
signs: By working as guides towards the comprehension of “hidden things”
conceptions seem to have a perhaps 'iconic' rather than simply a nominal  or
symbolic character.979 We have claimed that conception is neither induction nor
deduction. In modern terms something like retroduction or abduction seems to be
the most appropriate.980 Hence theological conception in Gregory could also be
described as theosemiosis981.
Each new discovery (arrived at by conception as all discoveries) is a “stepping-
stone”  to the next, though  eventually leading to “the belief that [God] is greater
and more sublime than any token by which He may be known  (γνωριστικοῦ
σημείου).”982 Correspondingly, it seems that idolatry appears when conceptions
loose their semiotic  quality and becomes, so to speak, self-referential  and thus
deified. This is what happened to Eunomius' concept of 'ungeneracy',  when the
idea it refers to was made into an idol (“εἰδωλοποιῦντες”).983 It is clear, however,
that conceptions cannot be iconic in the simple direct sense, since they do not, as
iconic signs, share any positive characteristic with the divine nature.
In spite of the clearly negative theological bend of Gregory's arguments against
Eunomius, he at  times  seems  to  distinguish between (positive) terms which
express qualities inherent in God and (negative) terms which express qualities that
are not.984 This distinction must, however, be considered as purely conceptual (or
linguistic), even though Gregory claims that such terms does not have “a uniform
significance”. With regards to opposites, there is no difference in saying that the
one is, or that the other is not.985 The change from positive to negative definitions
is just formal, Gregory notes.  Since 'justice' is the contradictory of 'injustice' we
can employ contraries, e.g., by saying that God is “not unjust, which is equivalent
ConEunII. 578, p. 308
978ConEunII. 590, p. 309
979See Klager 2006
980For a definition of these Peircean terms, see Liszka 1996
981See our definition in part 1.
982ConEunII. 89
983ConEunII. 100, p. 260
984ConEunII. 131, p. 263
985ConEunII. 595
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to saying that He is just”.986 Saying that God is good amounts to the same as saying
that he is unsusceptible of evil (“ἀνεπίδεκτόν τε πονηρίας”)987.  Again, this shows
that we ought to consider the distinction between positive and negative terms
above as a purely linguistic one.988 The meaning of the terms is the same, whether
they are negatively or positively defined. Again, all  this revolves around a non-
qualitative, negative notion of infinity.
If a term says something (seemingly positive) about God's  nature it must
necessarily do this negatively, i.e. it must contain a non-explicit negation (i.e. non-
linguistic, but logical and semantic etc.). This negation must refer to that which is
not God, e.g.  'corruption' or 'injustice'. But arguably such terms themselves
contain negations referring to God, i.e. 'injustice' means that which is not just (as
God is), or is deprived of justice (through privation, στέρησις).
This brings us back to Balthasar's claim  that for Gregory the first essential
characteristic of creation  consists in the very fact that it  is not God. This means
that God does not derives his identity from creation.  That the divine nature can
only be spoken of in negative definitions does not mean that, e.g., God's justice is
(only) relative to creation (which is un-just, i.e.  it lacks justice as an essential
property). That God is un-generate does not mean that He is  ontologically
dependent on His relation to “the ages”. This, Gregory argues, would follow from
Eunomius' view, which must be taken to imply that essential (intrinsic) properties
can be relationally determined. But while this might be true of created nature
(which only has its existence through participation, μετουσία), it is certainly not
true of God. Hence, while good and evil, Creator and creation, non-diastemic and
diastemic being, etc., are mutually (negatively) defined concepts in terms of
epistemology and conceptual matters, God is still ontologically independent of His
creation. God does not need creation in order to truly be Himself.989
For our notion of conception and negative theology this means that God cannot
simply be defined negatively in reference to something that we know positively.
Only if these things are understood to be themselves different from God do we
understand conception deeply enough. When we say that God is good we implicitly
say that he is not-not-good (not lacking of goodness, 'good' means the negation of
privation of 'good'). Such empty formal notions only makes sense if conception is
more  than  a  purely  linguistic  method.  Conception  is,  as  noted,  in  principle  a
986ConEunII. 132, p. 263
987ConEunII. 134, p. 263
988It would be an anachronism to apply such categories as 'logical', 'semantic', 
'ontological' and 'epistemological', too rigidly to Gregory.
989ConEunII. 535, pp. 303-304
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semiotic  activity.  The  moment  this  activity  stops  and  settles  for  whatever
descriptions we might have of God, these become empty and meaningless. Or they
become idols, like Eunomius' idea of 'ἀγέννητος οὐσία'. Only by keeping its 'drive'
can conception reach outside the diastema and thus talk of the God that is beyond
words.
God  reveals  himself  inside  the  diastema through  his  immanent  (προχείρου)
activities (ἐνέργεια).990 It is when confronted with these activities, that we are able
to  invent  theological  language.  But  while  we  can  speak  of  God's  activities  in
positive terms, they are never paths to a positive knowledge of the divine essence,
only  of  its  existence.  Since  the  diastema characterizes  all  created  things,  we
cannot say anything about the infinite (non-diastemic) in positive terms. All  our
concepts are formed by conception. That God is in His nature infinite means that
all  predicates  of  God's  nature  can  only  be  defined  apophatically.  God  can,
essentially, only be defined in negative terms.
Finally  some  remarks  should  be  made  on  Gregory's  account  of  Abraham's
journey in Answer to Eunomius' Second Book. This account has obvious parallels to
Moses theophanies as he treats them in  On the Inscriptions  and later in  On the
Life of Moses.991 Gregory's exposition of Abraham's spiritual journey in the middle
of the discussion on conception, suggests that conception and epektasis are related
matters. This is also evident when Gregory defines conception as “[...]the method
by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries by
means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception with regard to the
thing studied.”992 
Abraham's journey is no migration (μετάστασις) of physical place.993 Abraham,
says Gregory, “[...]desired to behold the archetype of all beauty[...]” and hence he
raised his thoughts “[...]as far as possible above the common boundaries of nature
(τῶν κοινῶν τῆς φύσεως ὄρων)[...]”994. Abraham's journey is a gradual negation of
every prejudice about the divine nature, resulting in an ecstasy the moment where
Abraham recognizes that God is greater than “[...]any token by which He may be
known (γνωριστικοῦ σημείου).”995 This 'ecstasy', however, is not the final end of
Abraham's  journey.  Rather  it  becomes  the  acknowledgment  of  Abraham's  own
human  weakness,  and  thus  the  presupposition  of  faith,  which  Gregory,  by
990ConEunII. 149
991See below.
992ConEunII. 182, p. 268
993ConEunII. 86, p. 259
994ConEunII. 86, p. 259
995ConEunII. 89, p. 259
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paraphrasing  Heb.  11:1,  interprets  as  related  to  hope  rather  than  knowledge.
Gregory concludes: “[k]nowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from
our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits (ὅροις … ἡσυχίας).”996
This exemplifies Gregory's mature belief that the perfection of human nature
consists in its continuous growth in goodness, which is possible precisely because
the human nature is limited. Hence we see that the themes of negative theology,
diastemic conception  and  hope,  are  unfolded  in  Answer  to  Eunomius'  Second
Book. These are the themes that Gregory developed further in his commentary On
the Life of Moses and his Homilies on the Song of Songs.
On the Life of Moses and On the Song of Songs
The following primarily deals with Gregory's treatise On the Life of Moses. This
treatise is similar to On the Inscriptions of the Psalms in structure as well as
theme, but of a much later date. This makes a comparison interesting. The dating,
like many of Gregory's works, is a bit unsure, though. Jaeger and Daniélou have
placed the dating after 390, while Heine argues for an earlier dating, perhaps in
the mid-380s.997 While this would mean that the treatise was worked out during or
shortly after what Danielou categorizes as Gregory's polemical middle-period (from
Basil's death in 379 to the end of the Eunomian controversy in 385),998 rather than
during his more “tranquil”  later period, it does not change the fact that if the
debate with Eunomianism reshaped central parts of Gregory's theological
presuppositions, then there would be a good chance that this will  crystallize and
become apparent in a comparison of On the Life of Moses with On the Inscriptions
of the Psalms. Norris claims that “[t]here can be no question, then, that this is the
same  Gregory  as  the  one  who  speaks  in  In  inscriptiones  Psalmorum  and  in
Moses.”999 Our  claim  is  that,  while  there  are  obvious  similarities,  Gregory's
thinking had also changed in important ways.
Already in the sermons in On the Beatitudes, which are probably a bit later than
On the Inscriptions, but not as late as On the Life of Moses,1000 Gregory adopts an
epistemologically more negative view on the possibility of describing perfection.
But  the full  consequences of  Gregory's  negative theology for anthropology and
ethics only becomes clear in On the Life of Moses. The last parts will discuss how
Gregory treats central issues in his commentary On the Song of Songs. There are
996ConEunII. 96, p. 260
997Daniélou bases his late dating on Gregory's mentioning his “grey hairs”. But as Heine 
points out, Gregory also mentions this in the writings against Eunomius.
998Daniélou 1966
999Norris 2012, p. xlv
1000Drobner & Viciano (ed.) 2000, Meredith, p. 94
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obvious parallels in the Song of Songs to On the Life of Moses.
Some remarks on the polemical background
That Gregory's explicitly polemical thought influenced his mature views, is a
well-known claim.1001 Hence, Ronald Heine has argued that On the Life of Moses
should not primarily (if at all) be read as a 'mystical' or spiritual-speculative
treatise (as which it is often considered to be)1002, but as a product of Gregory's
long lasting polemical engagement on especially two fronts, namely Eunomianism
and Origenism. Heine argues that in On the Life of Moses Gregory's discussion of
the two first theophanies relfects an anti-Eunomian emphasis, while the third
theophany and Gregory's notion of spiritual ascent expresses an anti-Origenist
argument.1003 According to  Heine  the origins of Gregory's  use  of  the  notion  of
divine infinity in relation to spiritual ascent is to a high degree the controversy on
Origenism in the late 370s. During this  controversy  Epiphanius of Cyprus had
attacked Origen’s view of the origin and the final destination of the human soul.
Rational souls were created before material creation, and according to Origen, the
fall came about when  souls grew “tired”  or “satiated”  (κορός) of contemplating
God.1004 When  this  happened  they  fell  into  the  bodily  realm.  Origen saw the
resurrection as a return to the pre-bodily state, but the basic “instability”  which
caused the fall in the first place would prevail, it seems. In order to explain how
this “satiety” came about in the first place, Origen had to presuppose that God was
in some way finite,  Heine argues.1005 Heine quotes Koetschau's rendition of On
First  Principles: “[...]if the divine power were infinite (ἀπειρος), of necessity it
could not even understand itself, since the infinite is by its nature
incomprehensible.”1006 Hence souls could only have a finite contemplation of God,
thus growing tired.1007
1001Langerbeck 1957, Heine 1975
1002E.g. Daniélou 1944, Lieske 1939, Koch 1898, Weiswurm 1952, Graef 1954
1003Heine 1975, pp. 194-195
1004According to Marguerite Harl the notion of satiety was used by Origen to explain the 
fall, though this is only explicit from the reconstructions from the anathemas against 
Origen by the Second Council. In On First Principles Origen, according to Koetschau, 
allegedly claimed about rational beings that “they were seized with satiety of the divine 
love and contemplation, and changed for the worse, each in proportion to his inclination
in this direction.” See Origen, On First Principles, Koetschau, 159.5-9
1005Heine 1975, pp. 74-79
1006De Principiis 2.9.1, Koetschau, 164.3-6
1007While this would seem to imply the comprehensibility of God's essence, we should be 
careful about ascribing such views to Origen. In other passages he claims that God is 
incomprehensible, e.g. “God is incomprehensible, and incapable of being measured. For
whatever be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by perception or 
reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far better than what
we perceive Him to be.” De Principiis 1.1.5-6
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According to Heine, Gregory saw “[...]an implicit connection between the two
doctrines, supposing that the satiety of souls implied that they had come to full
comprehension of the divine nature”1008. Gregory never seems to have agreed with
Origen that the human soul was created before the body. In On the Making of Man
there seems to be a logical or ontological, rather than a temporal, priority. But
traces of Origen's views on satiety can be found in Gregory's early work(s), for
example when he says that “[...]since you fell away from the good because you are
changeable, submit yourselves to the good again by means of change.”1009 Gregory
resolves the problems of the theory by arguing that the infinity of God means that
the soul can contemplate God endlessly, without getting satiated. The soul as such
constantly reaches forward, growing infinitely (epektasis1010). Where change and
becoming had for Origen, as for the Platonists, been closely related to sin and evil,
it for Gregory became the possibility of spiritual growth. Hence Gregory applied
the idea of God’s infinity polemically, with the intention of securing the orthodox
view on the fall and resurrection.
Though the debate on Origenism is relevant, the following will primarily discuss
the effects of the Eunomian controversy. Much of Gregory’s negative theology is
developed, not as a part of the polemic against Origen's system, but against
Eunomius. Our  main concern is whether the differences in Gregory’s thoughts in
On the Inscriptions and On the Life of Moses, especially regarding the possibility
of ethics in general, and the treatment of Moses’  life (which is a topic of both
treatises), reflects any influence of the view on language and negative theology
developed in the critique of Eunomius. It would be strange, Heine notes, if after
the conflict with Eunomianism “Gregory should cease to show any concern with
this problem in his subsequent writings, especially as Eunomians continued to
exist.”1011 The rest of this chapter (and the following), however, will not focus on
the directly polemical aspects of On the Life of Moses, but on how the polemical
aspects of the Eunomian controversy might have indirectly shaped Gregory's
mature  ethical views. As such the discussion on whether On the Life of Moses
should be considered a product of a period of tranquility in Gregory's life or as a
product of an ongoing, but now more subtle, polemicism (Heine), is left untouched.
Eunomius is shortly mentioned (though without name) in the Song of Songs 8, but
the homilies are rather non-polemical, at least at face value. But as with  On the
1008Heine 1975, p. 9
1009InIns. 46, p. 104. However, already in this passage the opposite of change is not 
stability, but change to the good.
1010Ἐπέκτασις, extension. See our definition in part 1.
1011Heine 1975, p. 193
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Life  of  Moses  the  homilies  bear  traces  of  the  ideas  developed  through  the
Eunomian controversies.
Gregory's introductory remarks in On the Life of Moses
The treatise On the Life of Moses was probably written as a reply to a young
(soon to be) priest, Caesarius, who had asked Gregory for advice on how to lead a
life fitting for a priest. Moses' life is presented as an allegory for the ideal
priesthood. In the introduction to  Gregory sets out to obtain “suggestions of
virtue” (ἀρετῆς ὑποθήκην) from Scripture, as he had done in On the Inscriptions of
the Psalms.1012 The history of Moses' life is as a beacon, a clear sign, the memory of
which brings “our soul to the sheltered harbor of virtue”1013. Hence the purpose of
Gregory's treatise is to bring out “the spiritual understanding which corresponds
to the history”.1014
Hence both treatises are, allegedly, answers to requests from fellows who ask
for some sort of moral council for spiritual perfection. But where Gregory had in
his early treatise “enthusiastically”  welcomed the injunction to investigate the
meaning of the inscriptions, he is a lot more reluctant in the work on Moses: “It is
beyond my power to encompass perfection in my treatise or to show in my life the
insights of the treatise.”1015 This,  of  course,  sounds much like his  words in  On
Virginity.1016 But what is new in On the Life of Moses is the reasoning that follows.
Gregory notes that while the perfection of “everything that can be measured by the
senses”  is marked off by definite boundaries, the perfection of virtue knows no
limit, since “no good has a limit in its own nature”.1017 The good can only be limited
by its opposite. Therefore, everything that is marked off by boundaries is not
virtue. From this also follows that it is “undoubtedly impossible to attain
perfection”.1018 Gregory closes of the section (1.5-1.9) by introducing the, in
Gregory's works by the time of writing already prevalent, theme of epektasis
(though he does not use that term): “For the perfection of human nature consists
perhaps in its very growth in goodness.”1019
Introductory notes such as these should prevent us from considering Gregory's
treatise as a schematic exposition of the virtuous life. Where Moses' theophanies in
1012InIns. 28-29; DeVitMoys. 1.15
1013DeVitMoys. 1.13
1014DeVitMoys. 1.15
1015DeVitMoys. 1.3
1016DeVir. 1.1, p. 344
1017DeVitMoys. 1.5
1018DeVitMoys. 1.8
1019DeVitMoys. 1.10
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On the Inscriptions are clearly understood as a three-stage progress of spiritual
ascent, steps in discrete continuity resulting in some sort of enlightenment, it is (as
Heine has noted) highly doubtful whether spiritual progress is considered in stages
at all in  On the Life of Moses. Moreover, if the treatise is supposed to provide
actual moral guidance to the recipient, a young priest, it seems that it is not
Moses' spiritual 'ascension' that is the primary topic of the treatise, but rather the
consequences that the epistemological and ontological aspects of this ascension
has for our notions of  morality. Hence, it is not the 'content' of Moses' spiritual
progress, that Gregory teaches Caesarius, but how this 'content' influences Moses'
concrete moral practice and shapes the way we should think of ethics.
Negative theology and following in Moses' three theophanies
Throughout the treatise Gregory discusses Moses' three theophanies,  which
already  in On the Inscriptions had been schematized as instances of spiritual
progress. We have argued that the exposition in this early work fits with an idea of
aphairetic theology and an aphairetic ethics. To start with this is also the case in
the mature exposition of the theophanies, but the aphairetic idea is superseded by
a much more apophatic thinking.
The first theophany, the burning bush, Gregory takes to symbolize a spiritual
enlightenment, “illuminating the eyes of our soul with its own rays”1020. God's
commandment to Moses to take of his sandals, Gregory takes to mean that for this
illumination to take place, we must purify “our opinion concerning nonbeing.”1021
This goes all the way down to Gregory's (epistemological) concept of truth: “In my
view the definition of truth is this: not to have a mistaken apprehension of
Being.”1022 From this follows (Gregory seems to believe) the ontological truth that
“none of those things which are apprehended by sense perception and
contemplated by the understanding really subsists”1023. Hence, already in his
interpretation of the first theophany in On the Life of Moses Gregory seems to be
formulating a negative dialectics similar to that discussed above (developed in the
writings against Eunomius). Still, the point of the first theophany seems to be that
Moses learns, that by putting off worldly (material) things, he draws near to God
and thereby comes to a, at first impressions, somewhat positive conception of the
divine. Gregory does not actually say in this section that it is not possible to have a
1020DeVitMoys. 2.19
1021DeVitMoys. 2.22
1022DeVitMoys. 2.23
1023DeVitMoys. 2.24. That this ontological claim follows from the former epistemological 
claim of course presupposes that these aspects are logically linked.
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positive conception of God's nature. As such, despite of clear negative theological
tendencies, this first part of Gregory's exposition is not logically incompatible with
his exposition in On the Inscriptions.
In the second theophany, the theme of light (which arguably symbolizes positive,
spiritual illumination) is replaced by a theme of darkness  (which  arguably
symbolizes a negative theology).
This is more likely to be incompatible with his  early  treatises.1024 Gregory
himself notes that “[w]hat is now recounted seems somehow to be contradictory to
the first theophany”1025. Knowledge about God  comes at first as “light”  and is as
such perceived as contrary to “darkness”. Such  knowledge seems to be positive
and opposed to the knowledge of evil, which can only be defined negatively. But
where truth was first defined as “not to have a mistaken apprehension of Being”
(as quoted above), now knowledge of the divine is defined paradoxically  as “the
seeing that consists in not seeing”1026. So Moses' spiritual growth at this points
consists in recognizing that what he had thought was positive knowledge about the
divine is, in fact, only negative knowledge.
In  the third theophany the main theme is that of eternal progress in virtue
(epektasis). Moses' experience of the divine darkness leads him to acknowledge
that all he can do is to follow God. When God walks by Moses who had wished to
see God, Moses is only allowed to see God's back, and not his face. Hence, “[t]he
divine voice granted what was requested in what was denied, showing in a few
words an immeasurable depth of thought.”1027 Gregory soon relates this to a theme
of hope: “Hope always draws the soul from the beauty which is seen to what is
beyond, always kindles the desire for the hidden through what is constantly
perceived.”1028 As in the early treatises spiritual progress is a form of anticipation.
But what is especially interesting in the exposition of Moses' third theophany is the
negative theology implicit in the idea that Moses sees God exactly when his wish is
denied. A special notion of ethics emerges from this, as Gregory alludes to Matt
16:24-28:
“[...]when the Lord who spoke to Moses came to fulfill his own law, he
likewise gave a clear explanation to his disciples, laying bare the meaning of
1024In On Virginity we lack the full dialectical structure that negative theology introduces 
into Gregory's later works. The movement is from darkness to light, only. Although 
Gregory is aware that language cannot capture the divine beauty, this does not yet 
amount to apophatic thought, of his later kind, where beyond light is divine darkness.
1025DeVitMoys. 2.162
1026DeVitMoys. 2.163
1027DeVitMoys. 2.232
1028DeVitMoys. 2.231
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what had previously been said in a figure, when he said, If anyone wants to
be a follower of mine and not “If any man will go before me.” And to the one
asking about eternal life he proposes the same thing, for he says Come,
follow me. Now, he who follows sees the back.”1029
Hence Gregory draws from Moses' spiritual experiences  an ethics of following
(ἀκολουθία), or what might be termed an  akolouthetic  ethics: “[...]to follow God
wherever he might lead is to behold God”.1030 Hence the anti-intellectualistic
elements in Gregory's negative theological  approach to Moses' theophanies does
not mean that these culminate in, e.g., some passive  'blissful ignorance' (as one
might be led to believe), but that God's passing by “signifies his guiding the one
who follows”1031. Moses cannot see God's face, “for good does not look good in the
face, but follows it.”1032 Hence Moses' spiritual journey does not end in the third
theophany. Rather it only really begins there.
This also gives us some clues why Gregory believed it to be beyond his power to
encompass perfection in his treatise. Things as these are reminiscent of Gregory's
statements in early treatises, such as that quoted above, where he notes that the
only way to praise virginity is “to show that virtue is above praise, and to evince
our admiration of it by our lives rather than by our words.”1033 In On the Life of
Moses, any real attempt at formulating en ethical method or formal casuistry is put
aside, however. Both Mühlenberg and Heine takes a basically 'non-mystical' stance
on Gregory,1034 and Heine concludes that “what Gregory means by progress in the
spiritual life is not that the battlefield on which one fights changes, but that the
soldier grows stronger.”1035 In other words, despite the 'mystical' language in the
treatise, spiritual progress is for Gregory more a matter of “improving one's daily
life”1036, than of leaving the concrete and visible world behind. In other words,
spiritual growth is thoroughly diastemic, i.e. it  goes  on inside the diastema. As
such the life of virtue is also always historical (if we by this term mean something
that has particular existence in time and space etc.). That this was indeed
Gregory's view in his later years can arguably be seen from a shift in what we
might call his moral teleology: Where Gregory had in the introductory chapter of
On the Inscriptions of the Psalms claimed that the goal (τέλος) of the virtuous life
1029DeVitMoys. 2.251
1030DeVitMoys. 2.252
1031DeVitMoys. 2.252
1032DeVitMoys. 2.253
1033DeVir., p. 344
1034'Non-mystical' in the sense that spiritual progress does not end in, e.g., illumination or
a union with the divine in any sense. Heine 1975, p. 197; Mühlenberg 1966, pp. 147-69.
1035Heine 1975, p. 196
1036Heine 1975, p. 196
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is beatitude (μακαριότης), he in the closing chapter in On the Life of Moses notes
that “the goal of the sublime way of life is being called a servant of God.”1037 For
Gregory this seems to be more or less synonymous with being “known by God and
to become his friend”. This, however, is given a partly negative definition in that
Gregory notes that “disregarding all those things for which we hope and which
have been reserved by promise, we regard falling from God's friendship as the only
thing dreadful”1038.
Where the theology and ethics of On the Inscriptions was largely aphairetic, the
theology  and  ethics  of  On the  Life  of  Moses rather  ends  up  being  apophatic.
Gregory's reading of Moses' theophanies in the former is mostly about removing
ideas of evil from the conception of God, so that the good can stand out unmixed.
This is a process of abstraction. In the latter this is initially also the case in Moses'
theophanies (as when Moses removes his shoes), but abstraction turns out to have
a limited use and must be substituted for negation.1039
Following does hardly mean to follow specific rules or ethical principles (see
below), even if the term can mean being consistent with or following in an orderly
sequential manner, as in logical deduction, or even be used of soldiers in a line
up.1040 Such interpretations suggest a rather 'rigid' idea of following, which seems
incompatible  with  Gregory's  line  of  thought  in  On  the  Life  of  Moses,  where
friendship to God ends up being central:
“This is true perfection: not to avoid a wicked life because like slaves we
servilely fear punishment, nor to do good because we hope for rewards, as if
cashing  in  on  the  virtuous  life  by  some  business-like  and  contractual
arrangement. On the contrary, disregarding all those things for which we
hope and which  have been reserved by promise,  we regard falling from
God's friendship as the only thing dreadful and we consider becoming God's
friend (τῆς φιλίας τοῦ Θεοῦ ) the only thing worthy of honor and desire.”1041
This passage is interesting since following was up till then understood in terms
of  'anticipation',  hope  or  reaching  forward  (epektasis).  But  all  this  is  now
secondary to 'friendship' with God. Gregory seems to be drawing on Philo in this,
though  the  idea  can  also  be  found  in  the  New  Testament  and  early  Patristic
sources.1042 But if Gregory's apparent equation of following and friendship (he does
1037DeVitMoys., p. 136
1038DeVitMoys. 2.319, p. 137
1039Notice again that Gregory does not distinguish technically between negation and 
abstraction. This distinction is ours, as developed above.
1040LSJ, ”ἀκολουθία”
1041DeVitMoys. 2.320, p. 137
1042E.g. Philo, Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 7.44
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not identify these explicitly) is to be coherent, friendship with God must mean a
concrete imitation of his activities in history with humankind. This would fit with
the  οὐσία/ἐνέργεια-scheme,  which  renders  positive  imitation  of  God's  essence
impossible.
In his discussion of the second theophany Gregory notes that:
“Moses learns at first the things which must be known about God (namely,
that none of those things known by human comprehension is to be ascribed
to him). Then he is taught the other side of virtue, learning by what pursuits
the virtuous life is perfected.”1043
In other words, virtue has two sides, a negative and a positive. The negative side
is primarily epistemological, while the positive is practical.
What Moses experiences is this: First he experiences God's activities (ἐνέργεια)
as revealed inside the  diastema.  But he then realizes that the only way he can
move beyond  diastemic being is  through negation.  Finally  he realizes that  this
process cannot be terminated in a final comprehensive, though negative, vision of
God.  Moses  realizes  that  the  only  way  of  upholding  a  contemplation  of  non-
diastemic being is through a continuous relation with diastemic being, inside the
diastema, which he can never escape. To follow God is in this sense the ethical
aspect of what in epistemological terms is an ongoing conception or semeiosis.
These come together in epektasis, where virtue and knowledge are united.
Language, epistemology and ethics in On the Song of Songs
There are obvious similarities between On the Life of Moses and On the Song of
Songs. For example in a passage much similar to the introduction to On the Life of
Moses,1044 where the good is defined as unlimited, Gregory writes that:
“[...]where there is no place for evil, there is no limit set to the good. In the
case of the mutable sort of being, both the good that is in us, and the evil as
well, are limited by each other's effects, because our capacity to choose has
an equal power for motion in the direct of each of the opposites.”1045
The  “simple  and  pure  and  uniform and  unalterable  Nature”  is  unlimited  in
goodness and never alienated from itself. It does not participate in evil, and sees
“no limit of itself”, since it sees “none of its contraries in itself”.1046 Hence here
God's infinity is closely related to His simplicity.
1043DeVitMoys. 2.166
1044DeVitMoys. 1.5
1045Cant. 158, p. 171
1046Cant. 158, p. 171
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As in On the Life of Moses God's infinity leads to the idea of epektasis. Spiritual
ascension is a matter of continuously transcending the limits of perfection: “[...]”
the outer limit of what has been discovered becomes the starting point of a search
after more exalted things”1047. No point in this process is self-contained, but points
to the next: “[...]nor does the starting point of ever-greater things find fulfillment
simply in itself.”1048 This arguably reflects the fact that nothing  diastemic  is self-
contained.
As truth is in  On the Life of Moses  initially defined as not having a mistaken
conception of being, the light-metaphor used to express this finds a parallel in the
Song of Songs:  “[...]when darkness departs it  is strictly necessary that light be
visible in its place, and when evil has gone away, that good be introduced in its
stead”.1049 But as in On the Life of Moses, beyond light is darkness. God is found in
the “[...]the very darkness of obscurity (γνόφος ἀσαφείας)[...]”1050. Moses entered
“into the darkness in which God was”1051, and Gregory writes that:
“[...]the  revelation  of  God  to  the  great  Moses  began  with  light  as  its
medium, but afterward God spoke to him through the medium of a cloud,
and when he had become more lifted up and more perfect, he saw God in
darkness.”1052
Gregory does not mention the third theophany, however, which in On the Life of
Moses is interpreted as Moses' experience that all he can do is to follow God. This
theme is brought in at another point, though.
The divine power is “inaccesible (ἀπρόσιτόν) and uncontainable (ἀχωρητον) by
human thought processes (λογισμοῖς)”, since God's nature has no boundaries and
so cannot be comprehended by “the connotations of words.”1053 Since God's name
cannot  be  spoken  or  grasped  by  any  rational  nature,  His  name  is  “the  soul's
attitude  (σχέσις)”  towards  God.1054 Norris  argues  that  this  attitude,  love,  is
simultaneously a name that declares not the nature of God, “but only his effect on
us.”1055 Hence 'love' (ἀγάπη) is in this respect a conception that pertains to God's
activities, something we know through his immanent works of atonement.1056
On God's activities Gregory writes that:
1047Cant. 249, p. 261
1048Cant. 249, p. 261
1049Cant. 298, p. 315
1050Cant. 26, p. 29
1051Cant. 181, p. 193
1052Cant., p. 339
1053Cant. 36, p. 39, modified
1054Cant. 61, p. 69
1055Norris 2012, p. 69 footnote
1056As God's mercy in ConEunII. 151-152
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“Stirring all  her  thought processes  and all  the exploratory  power of  her
concepts,  and striving earnestly to comprehend what she is seeking, she
attains,  as the limit of her apprehension of God, nothing more than that
divine activity (ἑνέργειαν) that comes down and reaches to us, and which
we sense through the medium of our life.”1057
Notice that we sense God's activities through “our life (διὰ τῆν ζωῆς ἡμῶν).”1058
Gregory argues that “knowledge of the Good that transcends every intellect comes
to us through the virtues”.1059
God is  known solely  by  his  activities,  but  when contemplating God the  soul
realizes that God's “existence is known only in incomprehension (ἐν μόνῳ τῷ μὴ
καταλαμβἁνεσθαι) of what it is, in whose case every conceptual trait (γνώρισμα) is
an obstacle to its discovery for those who seek it.”1060 Even so, by way of what can
be seen is formed a conjecture (καταστοχάζεται) about the incomprehensible (τὸ
ἀκατάληπτον).1061 Our  thought(s)  (νόημα)  concerning  the  divine  nature  is  a
“likeness (ὁμοίωμα) or image of what we seek”.
“All speech, however, that refers to such intuitions has the function of some
indivisible mark, being unable to make clear what the mind intends. Thus all
out thinking is inferior to the divine understanding, and every explanatory
word of speech seems to be an abbreviated tracery mark that is unable to
embrace to breadth of the act of understanding.”1062
What is spoken is not unambiguous, but “more like a probability (εἰκασμῷ)”,
since what is said “is not bound to any single meaning”.1063
The ethics in  On the Song of Songs  can at times be described as 'aphairetic'.
Just as a statue is made by removal of the bits, the evil dispositions of the soul
must be scraped away by the tools of one's thoughts.1064 Gregory argues that:
“Our greatest safeguard is not to be ignorant of oneself and not to suppose
that one is looking at oneself when in fact one is viewing something else,
something that hangs about the outer edges of oneself. This is the affliction
of those who do not seriously appraise themselves.”1065
Gregory mentions strength, power, glory, riches, pride, dignity, good looks and
1057Cant. 334, p. 353
1058Cant. 334, p. 353
1059Cant. 91, p. 101
1060Cant. 183, p. 195. Is Gregory saying that it is only in so far as we realize that we do 
not know what God is that we know that God is?
1061Cant. 36-37, p. 39
1062Cant. 86-87, p. 97
1063Cant. 139, p. 151
1064Cant. 408, p. 433
1065Cant. 63, p. 71
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similar, as the things to aware of.1066 As in On the Life of Moses the pomegranate is
used as an allegory for the “life that is harsh and self-controlled and austere”1067.
But Gregory has not left the idea of virtue as moderation: “[...]every virtue is a
mean between two evils, that which falls short of the good and that which exceeds
it.”1068 As in his early works Gregory still talks of perfection in terms of stages. The
term for following (ἀκολουθία) is often used more or less synonymously with order
(τάξις). For example Gregory writes that:
“[...]one can see in the soul something analogous to the ages of the body,
stages by means of which there is discovered particular order and sequence
(τάξις  τις  καὶ  ἀκολουθία)  that  brings  the  human  person  to  the  life  of
virtue.”1069
The purified soul anticipates “the one who is coming in the future as if he were
already present”1070. Again we see how virtue is a matter of relating to a future
goodness through anticipation.
As in other contexts moral perfection cannot be thought of independently of the
history of salvation. Gregory asks: “[...]how could a mortal and perishable nature
be adapted to  live  together  with the imperishable and inaccessible,  unless  the
shadow of the body had mediated between the Light and us who live in darkness
(cf. Isa 9:1)?”1071. God becomes “limited for your sake and dwells in you”, but is
simultaneously not confined as he penetrates human nature.1072 As such Paul was
the “palpable dwelling” of the “impalpable Nature”.1073
Before the revelation of God's grace, the gentiles were far removed from God
“by a great intervening space (διαστήματι) of ignorance”.1074 This is arguably the
epistemological  equivalent of  the  diastema  that ontologically separates creation
from Creator. As God bridges this gap in the incarnation a new epistemological
foundation is laid. The equivalent of this in 'biblical' terms is the dynamics between
Law and Gospel,  which Gregory  also  discusses  in  On the  Song of  Songs.  This
theme is related to Gregory's idea of following: As noted, Gregory when describing
Moses' theophanies in the 11th homily does not describe the third theophany. But
he does that in the 12th. As in  On the Life of Moses  Gregory interprets Moses'
1066Cant. 64, p. 71
1067Cant. 230, p. 241
1068Cant. 284, p. 299
1069Cant. 18, p. 19
1070Cant. 144, p. 157
1071Cant. 108, p. 119
1072Cant. 68, p. 75
1073Cant. 88, p. 97
1074Cant. 205, p. 217
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experience as an ethics of following:
“[...]the Scripture teaches that a person who desires to see God catches
sight of the One he seeks by always following (ἀκολουθεῖν) after him and
that the contemplation of God's face is an unceasing journey toward him
that is brought to fulfillment by following behind the Word.”1075
Gregory says about Philip that “[...]once he had become the Lord's “find” (as the
Gospel says, Jesus “found Philip”), he was made a follower (Ακολούθει) of the Word
who said to him, “Follow me””.1076 What does such following consist in? When the
soul  is  “transposed  into  the  intelligible  and  immaterial  realm”  it  becomes  a
“supremely vivid image (ἐναργεστάτην εἰκόνα) of the prototypical Beauty.”1077 This
brings us back to a theme from On Virginity. Here Gregory talked of “the man who
acts as well as teaches, as the Gospel tells us, he is the man who is truly living, and
has the bloom of beauty, and is efficient and stirring.”1078 Every virtue is made
manifest in life (διὰ τοῦ βίου) by being displayed in “habitual conduct”.1079 When
this happens the soul becomes an imitator of Christ and becomes “toward others
what Christ became for the human race”.1080 Hence the 'vivid image' or the life in
which  the  virtues  are  made  manifest  cannot  be  abstracted  from  a  person's
relationship  to  others.  The  result  is  that  such  a  person  will  also  be  imitated:
“[...]when one individual has made something his business, that form of activity
makes its way into the stream of our life by being imitated.”1081
The Word, Gregory argues, follows a certain sequence (ἀκολουθία) in adapting
human nature to God. There is a certain dialectic between the prophets and the
Law: “the windows are the prophets, who bring in the light, while the lattices are
the network of the law's injunctions.” The law casts the shadow of the good things
to  come.1082 Through  the  prophets  and  the  gospel  is  radiated  the  Word  that
“destroys the shadowy imagery of the type” and takes away the “dividing wall”.1083
The law is “the wall of the evangelical faith”,1084 but the soul that has heard the
Word (“beheld the rays of light come through the prophetic windows”), remain “no
longer under the shadow of the law's wall”.1085
1075Cant. 356, p. 377
1076Cant. 432, p. 459
1077Cant. 439, p. 467. Compare with Clement of Alexandria, Str. 7.9.52.3, p. 538
1078DeVir., p. 368, modified.
1079Cant. 442, p. 469
1080Cant. 443, p. 471
1081Cant. 453, p. 481
1082Cant. 148, p. 161
1083Cant. 148, p. 161
1084Cant. 162, p. 175
1085Cant. 162, p. 173
204
The whole of Scripture is spiritual law,1086 Gregory argues,  in the sense that
everything in Scripture guides to purity, through “[...]explicit commands (φανερῶν
παραγγελμάτων),  but  also  through  its  historical  narratives  (ἱστορικῶν
διηγημάτων)”1087.  There  is  on  opposition  between  the  (outward)  Law  and  the
Gospel, but they are inseparable. The Law is the form, through which the Word
shines.  Hence  the  order  (ἀκολουθία)  through  which  the  Word  adapts  human
nature to God goes through an outward to a spiritual understanding of the law.
In his reading of Romans 1:201088 Gregory argues that “the foundation of the
cosmos”  should  be  understood  as  the  creation  of  the  Church.  God's  “invisible
things” are not his incomprehensible being, but “the economy (κατ' οἰκονομίαν)”
of salvation.1089 God's invisible things, the new heaven and earth, are revealed in
the Church, which was established as the body of the invisible God. As such the
'bridegroom' can be discerned through the 'bride',1090 and through the Church the
wisdom of God is made known. This wisdom consists in the knitting together of
contraries. Hence it is through the Church that it is revealed “[...]how the Word
becomes flesh; how life is mingled with death; how by his own stripe our calamity
is  healed;  how by  the  weakness  of  the  cross  the  power  of  the  Adversary  was
overthrown”1091, etc.
This is idea of contraries is expressed in the fact that both the tree of life and
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 2:9 are described as both
standing in the midst of the garden. Gregory interprets this paradoxically, in the
sense that they are placed at the exact same location:
“[...]life is the very center of God's plantation. Death on the contrary is, in
and of itself, rootless and unplanted, since it has no place of its own. It is in
consequence of  the  absence of  life  that  death  gets  planted,  when living
beings lack participation in the nobler condition.”1092
Hence this paradox expresses that fact that evil is nothing more than privation
of good. The tree with the knowledge of good and evil is in itself a paradoxical
image.1093 The fruit “possesses a power mixed together out of opposites”, or rather
1086As in Rom 7:14, “ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἑστιν”
1087Cant. 5, p. 5. Gregory subsequently argues for the legitimacy of analogy by referring 
to Paul's use of the Abraham story in Gal 4:20
1088“For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities (τὰ [...] ἀόρατα)—his 
eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what 
has been made[...]”. Rom 1:20, NIV
1089Cant. 384-385, p. 405
1090Cant. 256, p. 269
1091Cant. 255-256, p. 269
1092Cant. 349, p. 369
1093Cant. 351, p. 371
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“good and evil are one and the same thing”. By this Gregory means that evil as
well as pleasure (a misconceived kind of 'good') leads to death.
The interdependence of the two trees means that the way to the tree of life goes
through a negation of the knowledge brought about by the tree of the knowledge
of good and evil. Through an exposition of Matt 5:37, “let your word 'yes be 'yes,'
and your 'no be 'no'”, Gregory argues that 'yes' and 'no' are inseparable: “[...]the
truth in the “yes” is equally discerned through both”.1094
As a matter of epistemology this is somewhat equivalent to Gregory's definition
of truth in his exposition of Moses' first theophany in  On the Life of Moses:1095
“[...]the truthfulness of one's idea of that which authentically is, […] is in truth the
“yes.””1096 But to this should be added that Gregory seems to define truth as a
negation of positive knowledge as such. Hence Norris argues that what Gregory
recommends is “a negative action – that supports the affirmation of Truth.”1097
This is the order through which the soul is adapted to God. It is through death
that the soul gains life. By dying the soul emerges into life.1098 It is a good thing to
be struck, Gregory says, since this is how the soul is freed from death: “by killing
he gives life, and by striking heals”.1099 This is not something that only happens in,
e.g., baptism. Paul died every day, Gregory explains, so that “at every point he was
going over into new life, dying to the past and forgetting things that were already
over and done.”1100 Hence such contraries are what connect past and future in a
constant progression in virtue, epektasis. This progression is given impetus as the
soul is reminded of “the hopelessness of what she seeks”, and then realizes that
the “true fruition” is to ever and again discover the divine beauty to be greater
than what can be comprehended.1101
Re-reflections on Gregory's ethics
Finally  we  will  discuss  some  of  the  issues  that  we  have  touched  upon  in
Gregory's views on ethics, in a way that makes it easier to abstract these from
their particular contexts, even at the risk of imprecision, anachronism and so on.
Gregory's idea of virtue as participation (μετουσία) in the godhead is central. We
will discuss this from the perspective of some of the subjects that we have touched
1094Cant. 374, p. 395
1095DeVitMoys. 2.23
1096Cant. 376, p. 397
1097Cant. p. 397 footnote
1098Cant. 347, p. 367
1099Cant. 362, p. 383
1100Cant. 366, p. 387
1101Cant. 370, p. 389
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upon above. Our claim is that we cannot properly understand this concept without
letting  Gregory's  negative  theology  play  a  role.  Participation  in  God  is
simultaneously a positive and a negative relationship. It is simultaneously imitation
of the divine nature and the works of Christ. In positive terms it is a matter of
following Christ. As Mateo-Seco says on Gregory's idea of imitation of God:
”For Gregory,  the theology of  the imitation of  God is  identified with the
theology of  the imitation and following of Christ,  the participation in his
name (”Christians” bear the same name as Christ),  and the sacramental
participation  in  the  mysteries  of  his  life,  particularly  in  his  death  and
resurrection. Like Clement of Alexandria and Origen before him, Gregory
firmly unites imitation of the divine nature and imitation of Christ.”1102
The dialectic character of participation in God unfolds in Gregory's conception
of progress in virtue (what we generically call  epektasis). This idea might seem
primarily relevant in relation to personal or individual ethics, rather than social
ethics. But this theme should also be touched upon, and so finally we will shortly
discuss Gregory's view of political power. This may seem even more misplaced, but
his many scattered critical remarks on different forms of domination turn out to be
good examples of how the relationship between theology and moral ontology has
practical consequences for social ethics.
The possibility of moral judgment
If we based on Gregory's thinking want to define such normative concepts as
good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, we should, not surprisingly, look to
his theory of language and his negative theology. The characteristic of the divine
nature is to transcend all characteristics.1103 But by making use of negative
definitions, conception enables us to invent signs that points beyond the diastema,
to the ineffable, divine nature, by negating the properties of the created nature.
For example Gregory notes that:
“[...]when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own
unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death's dissolution
to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at
once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind”1104. 
God is that “in which evil finds no place, and from which no good is absent”.1105
Often we see this strategy applied to normative concepts as well. We either convey
1102Mateo-Seco, ”Imitation” in BDG, p. 502
1103DeVitMoys. 2.234
1104ConEunII., p. 298
1105ConEunII. 146
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“the idea of goodness by the negation of badness, or vice versa”1106, Macrina noted
according to Gregory in the dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection. This arguably
implies that 'evil' can (and should) be defined negatively, i.e. (as is common) as the
lack of good. But since God is incomprehensible, to put it sharply this seems to
imply that 'good' can only be defined as not  'not-evil'. But  'evil' is equal to 'not-
good', and 'not-good' to 'not-not-evil' and so on. In other words, an apophatic term
can  refer to its referent by logically being a double negation of itself, i.e.  the
definition of A is nothing but ~~A. This might seem as implying double negations
ad infinitum (~~A=~~~~A etc.), so that we never get to a positive definition of A,
which would make such apophatic terms parts of an empty structure, without any
external reference.  But  this  is  to  oversimplify  things,  since  there  is  still  the
difference between negation and privation in play.  This  is  why 'not-evil'  cannot
simply be identified as 'good' if not 'good' is understood implicitly as the negation
of the privation of 'good'. In practice apophatic terms clearly does have a function,
since they have a reference to something beyond our conceptions (God, goodness,
virtue).  They  might  not  have  any  intension  besides  the  negation  of  all  other
intensions, but they do have an extension.1107
In the passage from On the Soul and Resurrection quoted above, Gregory says
that:
“[...]Now granted that the inquirer has had his doubts set at rest as to the
existence of the thing in question, owing to the activities (ἐνέργεια) which it
displays to us, and only wants to know what it is, he will have adequately
discovered it by being told that it is not that which our senses perceive,
neither a colour, nor a form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity,
nor a cubic dimension, nor a point, nor anything else perceptible in matter;
supposing, that is, that there does exist a something beyond all these.”1108
But  as  noted  above,  even  if  God  is  defined  negatively  with  references  to
creation, He is still ontologically independent of His creation. The term 'good' is an
1106DeAnRes., p. 436
1107By 'intension' we mean the definition of a term, by 'extension' the class of things 
picked up by the term. Negative definitions of God might not have any positive 
intension, but by denying other intensions they exclude everything from their extension,
but God. Or rather, using a two-dimensional logic, we could say that the primary 
intension of implicitly apophatic conceptions is the ordinary positive meaning, while the 
secondary intension is a negative definition., e.g. the term 'God' means 'good' on the 
one hand, and 'not evil' on the other, or 'ungenerate' means 'God' on the one hand, and 
'not generated' on the other (which of course does not mean that 'goodness' supervenes 
on 'not-evil'). Following Gregory's definitions idolatry appears when the secondary 
intension falls away. For a discussion of two-dimensional logic, see Chalmers 1996
1108DeAnRes., p. 436. This is clearly different from Gregory of Nazianzus' view, as 
discussed above. De Theologia 28.9
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epinoetic conception that works as a sign. As such it points beyond language, to
the ineffable divine nature. While apophatic terms might be considered 'empty' on
a purely linguistic and logical (etc.) level, they point to an ontological truth, namely
that God is absolutely independent of creation.
This is also true for positive definitions, that are not implicitly negative. All such
positive  descriptions  we  use  of  God,  are  according  to  his  activities,  never  his
essence (since this is inaccessible). Concepts such as 'mercy' and 'pity' does not
refer to abstract properties of the divine essence (neither positively or negatively),
but  to God's work in the world in relation to human beings.  In the  Answer to
Eunomius' Second Book Gregory writes that:
“The  Lord  is  full  of  compassion  and  mercy,  long-suffering,  and  of  great
goodness.  Now  what  do  these  words  tell  us?  Do  they  indicate  His
operations, or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His
operations. At what time, then, after showing mercy (οἰκτιρμοὺς) and pity
(ἐλέου), did God acquire His name from their display? Was it before man’s
life began? But who was there to be the object of pity? Was it, then, after sin
entered into the world? But sin entered after man. The exercise, therefore,
of pity, and the name itself, came after man.”1109
Again,  this  should  remind us  that  the  history  of  salvation  and atonement  is
central for understanding positive moral concepts and virtues.  In his catechism
Gregory notes that “one cannot observe a good purpose in the abstract; a purpose
cannot possibly be revealed unless it has the light of some events upon it.”1110 This
arguably reflects the relationship between the incomprehensible essence of the
human  soul  and  its  comprehensible  activities.  Gregory  adds  that  “the  things
accomplished, progressing as they did in orderly series and sequence, reveal the
wisdom and the skill of the Divine economy.”1111 
Since it is not possible for Christ not be justice, purity and truth, etc., it is not
possible to be a Christian without displaying these virtues.  There  is  a  moral
ontological  necessity  at  works  in  the  relationship  between the  nature  and  the
virtues of a person.  Gregory argues that:
“If, therefore, someone puts on the name of Christ, but does not exhibit in
his life what is indicated by the term, such a person belies the name and
puts on a lifeless mask in accordance with the model proposed to us. For it
is  not  possible  for  Christ  not  to  be  justice  and  purity  and  truth  and
estrangement from all evil, nor is it possible to be a Christian (that is, truly a
1109ConEunII. 151-152
1110OrCat., p. 491
1111OrCat., p. 491
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Christian) without displaying in oneself a participation in these virtues.”1112
Gregory's ethics does not mean that no positive moral epistemology is possible.
It is possible to talk in positive terms about God's activities in creation. And since
the human soul is  (created in) the image of God, moral judgment of a directly
descriptive kind must be possible in concrete situations, where human activities
unfold with their diversity of particular characteristics. But such activities never
makes human nature comprehensible in positive definitions. If conceptions, moral
judgments, about human activities have any meaning beyond a particular situation,
this  must  either  be  conceived  of  historically  (diastemically), in  virtue  of  their
relations in time and space, or apophatically, in virtue of their pointing negatively
beyond themselves and the diastema, to the divine nature.
So  how  is  it  then  possible  to  talk  of  ethics  with  Gregory's  ethics  and
epistemological framework in mind? Gregory's exposition of Abraham's spiritual
journey in the middle of the discussion on conception, suggests that conception
works  very  much  like  epektasis.  This  is  also  evident  when  Gregory  defines
conception as “[...]the method by  which we discover  things that  are unknown,
going on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our
first perception with regard to the thing studied.”1113
The dialectics of  epektasis (and following) could be defined as consisting in a
liberation from sin and servitude, symbolized in On the Life of Moses by 'Egypt', on
the  one  hand,  and  a  movement  towards  the  opposite,  namely  freedom  and
deification, symbolized by 'the promised land', on the other. The former (negative)
aspect  is  especially  present  in  Gregory's  emphasis  on freedom in the sense of
liberty (ἐλευθερία) and impassibility (ἀπάθεια).1114 The latter (positive) aspect can
be found in terms of self-mastery (αὐτοκράτεια) and 'beauty' (a recurring theme
from his early works).  But these are aspects of  epektasis,  not  separate things.
Gregory's  apophatic  philosophy  of  language  reminds  us,  that  any  positive
description of virtue (deification or beatitude) must implicitly be a negation of non-
virtue (liberation, overcoming of sin) and vice versa.
Speaking of names as icons, as Gregory sometimes does, might also be helpful.
Ethics as an epinoetic discipline becomes a description of iconic signs,1115 that can
as  such  be  true,  but  never  adequate.  The  activities  of  human  beings  can  be
described through conception, by which is also opened an indirect access to the
1112DeProf. 133.15-20
1113ConEunII. 182, p. 268
1114ConEunII., p. 452
1115Klager 2006
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ineffable nature of the human being. As such ethics is in a sense 'iconographic'.
Though names are nothing more than recognizing marks that we place on things,
they  still  have  the  ability  of  working  as  guides  towards  the  comprehension  of
“hidden things”. Names have an iconic rather than simply a nominal character.1116
In a sense idolatry appears when the iconic and apophatic character of conception
is  overlooked,  so  that  descriptions  seem  to  be  simple  confirmations  of  actual
properties.  This  is  what  happened to  Eunomius'  concept  of  ungeneracy,  which
Eunomius believed to be a positive definition, even if it is seems obvious that it is
not.1117
If moral judgments are arrived at by conception, then absolutizing moral norms,
as if some ethical principle could fully describe the good, has this in common with
idolatry that  it  misunderstands the iconic  and implicitly  apophatic character of
conception. It was precisely because of the insight that “[...]none of those things
known by human comprehension is to be ascribed to Him[...]”, that it was possible
for Moses to formulate a law for others.1118 Hence in following, moral judgments
are meaningful only insofar as they express this and simultaneously point beyond
themselves,  as  stepping  stones.  Hence  ethics  of  following,  akolouthetic ethics,
must  be  distinguished  from  one  of  abstract  principles  simpliciter. Only  when
formulated in negative (apophatic) terms are ethical principles of a more general
kind  possible.  Ethical  principles  can  only  play  a  minor  role  in  following.  As
epektasis,  following  moves,  so  to  say,  intra-diastemically.  And  as  all  language,
moral judgment is always relativized by time and space. At most ethical principles
are conceptions that leads from one spiritual state to the next.
Often it seems that Gregory believes that only the virtuous can formulate moral
principles.  Only  by  being  in  a  process  of  spiritual  progression  can  a  person
formulate an ethics. Moses (being a priest), as described in On the Inscriptions,
was the kind of person “who no longer needed to be led by law, but could himself
become the author of a law for others.” In On the Life of Moses  Moses' priestly
(mediatory) role is now more  centered around  his function  as liberator. Through
“the illumination from above”, Gregory notes, Moses “considered it a loss not to
lead his countrymen to the life of freedom.”1119 Arguably Moses'  person is now
conceived from the perspective of the atonement, so that Moses' through his deeds
becomes a type of Christ. But since Moses' must keep on following God, this status
is not something that is finally achieved once and for all. Hence neither can Moses
1116See Klager 2006
1117ConEunII., p. 260
1118ConEunII., p. 96
1119DeVitMoys. 2.89
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be capable of formulating a final and adequate ethics.
Is the notion of participation in God an apophatic conception?
A central  concept in Gregory's  work is  μετουσία,  participation (Gregory also
uses  the  term μετοχή,  sometimes  he  talks  of  fellowship  or  κοινωνία).1120 This
notion,  somewhat peculiar to Gregory's thinking, is  used frequently to describe
participation  in  divine  things.  In  the  Platonic  tradition  participation  is  usually
described in terms of μέθεξις.  David Balás mentions that there is at least sixty
instances  of  μετουσία in  Philo,  who  is  likely  to  be  Gregory's  source  for  this
notion.1121 Balas notes that though Gregory talks of the creature's participation in
God it  should not  be understood as a matter of  the creature possessing God's
nature. When Gregory about intelligible nature writes that “its growth toward the
better is not confined by any limit”, we should arguably keep this in mind. The
good that is given at any particular time is always a starting point for something
better, which, it seems, also means that the creature never 'owns' perfection in its
own right.1122 Only God possesses, is identical (φύσει,  κατ οὐσίαn) with the good.
Again, becoming has priority over being, when talking of created nature.
Balás writes that:
“[...]in  reality  the  relationship  between  God  and  the  rational  creature
participating is rather the inverse. God is the personal source continuously
giving a share in a divine perfection to the creature; that latter is recipient
(though not an entirely passive recipient).  Now whereas μετοχή (derived
from having) would stress the active possession of a perfection, μετουσία
(derived from “being”) stresses more that the participant “is with” or rather
“dependently with” the One in whom he participates.”1123
But  being  does  here  clearly  not  mean  a  static  being,  but  one  of  constant
becoming (by receiving). Balás further argues that since participation in God is for
Gregory not a matter of being in a certain fixed stated, but a process, μετουσία
expresses  “the  relationship  envisaged  between  the  (rational)  creature  and  the
Creator”.  Balás  furthermore  distinguishes  between  vertical  and  horizontal
participation. In the former participation the creature participates in the Creator
(in the sense described above, as receiving)1124, while in the latter things share in
1120Virtue is participation in the godhead. Cant. 285, p. 301
1121David L. Balás, “μετουσία” in BDG, pp. 500-501
1122Cant. 174, p. 187
1123Balás, “μετουσία” in BDG, pp. 500-501
1124The whole creation derives its goodness by participation: “[...]the Church believes, as 
concerning the Son, so equally concerning the Holy Spirit, that He is uncreated, and 
that the whole creation becomes good by participation in the good which is above it 
[...]”. AdSimp.
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the  common  nature  of  the  species.1125 Balás  argues  that  participation  in  God
(μετουσία θεοῦ) is for Gregory nothing but participation in God's perfections in
their  totality.  The participating creature does not  have (does not  posses)  God's
essence  (οὐσία),  but  continuously  becomes  perfect  (receives  perfection)  by
partaking in his perfections. This means that the distinction between Creator and
creation  is  not  blurred,  but  rather  upheld,  by  participation.  Hence  that  the
creature  continues  to  exist  diastemically  (διαστηματικῆ),  is  not  contrary  to  its
participation in God.1126 But Balás warns against interpreting Gregory of Nyssa
simply in terms of Gregory of Palamas's notion that 'μετουσία' means participation
in the divine activities (energies).1127
A positive concept of participation cannot be separated from a negative one.
Participation in Gregory is participation in the divine activities, but also, perhaps,
in some sense in the essence of God, though only negatively. While the former can
be  said  in  a  positive  sense,  the  latter  is  only  negatively  possible.  But  from
(negative) participation in the godhead must follow (positive) participation in the
“secondary elements” that follows. Gregory writes that:
“If we who are united to Him by faith in Him, are synonymous with Him
whose  incorruptible  nature  is  beyond verbal  interpretation,  it  is  entirely
necessary for us to become what is contemplated in connection with the
incorruptible nature and to achieve an identity with the secondary elements
[virtues] which follow along with it.”1128
Jesus  Christ  becomes  'Lord'  “[...]by  bringing  the  Human  Nature  to  that
participation in the Godhead which is signified by the terms Christ and Lord.”1129
But this does not mean that Christ has changed essentially (he is always one with
the Father in essence).  It  is through the historical works of God in Christ that
human beings can come to participate in God in a positive sense. In practice it is
not  God  understood  as  the  abstract  infinite  that  are  to  be  followed,  but  the
concrete personal incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Gregory
distinguishes between following “precepts in the way of teaching” and Christ “Who
leads the way”, by his deeds. Hence Gregory writes that:
“[...]the method of our salvation was made effectual not so much by His
precepts in the way of teaching (ἐκ τῆς κατὰ διδαχὴν ὑφηγήσεως) as by the
deeds  of  Him Who has  realized an  actual  fellowship with  man,  and has
1125Balás, “Participation” in BDG, pp. 581-582
1126See Balás 1966
1127Balás, “Participation” in BDG, p. 586
1128De Professione Christiana ad Harmonium
1129ConEunI. 6.2
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effected life as a living fact (ἔργῳ τὴν ζωὴν ἐνεργήσας).”1130
Following the deeds of Christ establishes “[...]a kind of affinity (συγγένειά) and
likeness (ὁμοιότης) between him who follows and Him Who leads the way.”1131 This
is how imitation (ἡ μίμησις) must be regulated.
As quoted above Gregory says in his first sermon of On the Beatitudes, that God
“totally  eludes  imitation  by  human  beings”1132,  since  He  is  “passionless  and
undefiled”.  But Gregory simultaneously argues that it is the job of Christians to
imitate the works of Jesus Christ as known in the divine plan of salvation. If these
two passages are to make sense in union, then “participation in the Godhead” must
positively mean imitation of  the concrete historical  deeds of  God in the world.
Participation  in  God  means  participation  in  his  love  for  human  beings,  his
philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία).1133
So  what  is  the  relationship  between  the  human  and  divine  nature,
epistemologically speaking?  As noted above, in On the Making of Man Gregory
most interestingly argues that “since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness
of the Creator, evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the
superior nature”1134. This argument is of course not 'logically sound': That 'a' and
'b' does not share certain properties does of course not mean that we can deduce
that they share all other  properties they have. This does not make Gregory's
reasoning illegitimate, though: Rather than arguing from certain premises to a
conclusion, Gregory's statement can be seen as what might be termed a negative
analogy. Where an icon represents its object by its possession of (some of) its
characters, the sign in such negative analogies represents its object negatively, by
means of the characters it does not have.
Yet an example of such a negative analogy between the human and the divine
nature can be found in Gregory's arguments against Eunomius:
“For if  some one,  wishing to describe the nature of  man (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
φύσεως), were to say that it is not lifeless, not insentient, not winged, not
four-footed,  not  amphibious,  he  would  not  indicate  what  it  is:  he  would
simply  declare  what  it  is  not,  and he would be no more making  untrue
statements respecting man than he would be positively defining his subject.
In the same way, from the many things which are predicated of the Divine
nature, we learn under what conditions we may conceive (ὑπονοεῖν) God as
1130Cat. 35, p. 502
1131Ibid.
1132Beat. 1.4
1133Cant. 107, p. 119
1134DeOp., p. 396
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existing, but what He is essentially, such statements do not inform us.”1135
In the Aristotelian idea of negation (ἀπόφασις) negative properties denotes that
something does not belong to certain classes of  things.  Saying that God is not
virtuous,  and that animals are not virtuous does not at all  imply that God and
animals belong to the same class. It only means that both are neither able of being
virtuous or non-virtuous since this property only belongs to human beings. So if it
is  true  that  participation  in  and  imitation  of  God  is  essentially  (κατ οὐσία)  a
negative  matter,  then  Gregory's  logic  works  differently  than  Aristotle's.  Being
virtuous is for Gregory a negative property. It means not being vicious (viceful,
lacking,  deprived of  virtue).  Hence This  also  means,  however,  that  saying that
something  participates  in  the  godhead  is  implicitly  synonymous  to  saying  that
something  does  not  participate  in  what  is  different  from  God.  In  this  sense
'μετουσία θεοῦ' is an  apophatic conception. As virtue can only be defined as the
negation of the privation of virtue, participation in God can only be thoroughly
understood with negative reference to that which is not God.
Ontology and the idea of epektasis
All this is of course related to Gregory's notion of  epektasis.  It is in  epektasis
that negative and positive participation is held together. Already in  On Virginity
and On the Making of Man, there is a thematic of anticipation and hope. Human
beings can have the “good things” promised, by way of hope.1136 But this idea is
radicalized and transformed in his later works. Paul's words on “the things God has
prepared for those who love him” in 1 Cor 2:9, which “has not entered into the
human heart”, Gregory quotes as a proof for the idea that the “process of ascent”
has no outer limit.1137 That participation in the godhead is essentially a negative
thing (but  a  positive  things  in  regard to  following)  is  maybe also  what  makes
Gregory's  idea  of  continuous  growth  in  virtue  possible.  Hence Gregory  argues
about the soul's participation in the divine good that, “[...]when she has shared, as
far as is possible for her, in the good things, he draws her toward participation in
the transcendent Beauty just as though she had hitherto had no part in them at
all.”1138
Gregory of Nyssa's idea of moral perfection and progress in virtue (epektasis)
has been taken up in a range of modern discussions.1139 We will now discuss a few
1135ConEunII. 144
1136DeOp., p. 412
1137Cant. 247, pp. 260-261
1138Cant. 159, p. 171
1139E.g. Hart 2003; Brewer 2009
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of these.  The above issues of moral epistemology are central to a discussion of
modern  issues  of  moral  epistemology  taken  up  by  Talbot  Brewer  in  his  The
Retrieval of Ethics. Brewer argues that practice is often construed around what he
calls 'dialectical  activities'.  These activities aim at an intrinsic goodness that is
more  or  less  'opaque'.  As  practices  are  entered  they  become self-revealing.1140
Hence intentions are not propositional attitudes. Brewer's concept of dialectical
activities is interesting since he illustrates his notion with reference to Augustine
and Gregory of Nyssa's concept of epektasis (eternal progress in virtue).
In Brewer's definition dialectical activities have an intrinsic value. This value is
more or less opaque to those who lack experience with the activity, but it unveils
itself incrementally as one gains first-hand experience.1141 This means that actions
have a “symbolic or expressive” relation to a subjective picture of goodness, rather
than a justificatory. It is only possible to make sense of the symbolic and expressive
character of  actions if  allow reference to this kind of  opaque value.1142 Brewer
argues  that  it  is  “[t]he  fugitive  and  perfectionist  nature  of  the  concept  of  the
human good that guarantees the endlessness of the dialectic.”1143
Brewer develops his idea with reference to Gregory. But for Gregory, there are
profound metaphysical reasons why epektasis can continue infinitely (namely the
infinity of God). Brewer fails to take the theological premises seriously enough for
his notion to be useful as a way of dealing with Gregory. If  we are to think of
epektasis as dialectical activity (which we have good reasons to do),  we either
need to be sure to distinguish it from other forms of dialectical activity (with a
more limited character) or we need to claim, more radically, that epektasis is the
only true form of dialectical activity.
Above we have mentioned Robert Jenson's use of Gregory of Nyssa's idea of
divine infinity. Robert Jenson has also argued that Gregory's notion of time comes
close to Wolfhart Pannenberg. This is interesting in the present context since it can
easily turn out to be related to the idea of epektasis. According to Pannenberg 'the
whole' becomes the future goal of striving only within the finite realm. The future,
in terms of eschatology, should have a primacy in the understanding of time.1144
Hence,  “[...]the totality  of  existence is  possible  only  from the standpoint  of  its
future.” Faith, accordingly, is a form of anticipation. As we have seen anticipation,
1140Brewer 2009, p. 39
1141Brewer 2009
1142Brewer 2009, p. 179
1143Brewer, 2009, p. 41
1144Pannenberg partly bases this on a reading of Plotinus against Augustine. Pannenberg 
also utilizes the Clementine proleptic idea of faith. Pannenberg 1990, p. 78
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hope and similar ideas play a central role in Gregory's notion of the virtuous life.
Robert  Jenson's  claim  is  that  Gregory  prioritizes  the  future  as  defining  for
existence, as Pannenberg. The passage in Gregory's Against Eunomius, that Jenson
uses as example is this:
“[...]the past period of his life is nothing to him who has lived it, and all his
interest is centred on the future and on that which can be looked forward to,
that  which  has  no  end  will  have  more  value  than  that  which  has  no
beginning. So let our thoughts upon the divine nature be worthy and exalted
ones; or else, if they are going to judge of it according to human tests, let
the future be more valued by them than the past, and let them confine the
being  of  the  Deity  to  that,  since  time's  lapse  sweeps  away  with  it  all
existence in the past, whereas expected existence gains substance from our
hope.”1145
Above we have argued for views similar to these. To recall, often in Gregory the
present and the future is bound together in prayer: “Prayer is the enjoyment of
things present and the substance of things to come.” Or take an even more famous
quote, from  On the Life of Moses: ”This truly is the vision of God: never to be
satisfied in the desire to see him.”1146 We must always reach out for what is ahead
(epektasis), and not linger on the present, since the presence is always in some
sense 'unreal' (without being in itself). Only God has real being, but the reality of
God  always  lies  ahead.  So  far  so  good.  But  is  this  enough  to  establish  a
Pannenberg-like notion of the primacy of the future based on Gregory? Against
Jenson, Morwenna Ludlow has argued that the quoted passage is first of all a piece
of 'rhetoric'. This, Ludlow argues, is proved by the context.
“[...]Gregory's suggestion that the Arians ought to accentuate the positive in
God,  by  stressing  his  future  orientation,  is  in  fact  sheer  sarcasm –  not
advocacy  of  a  Pannenberg-style  eschatologically  directed  God,  as  Jenson
would want.”1147
Ludlow  argues  that  Gregory's  ontology  is  not  of  the  Pannenbergian  kind.
According to Gregory, God is infinite throughout past, present as well as future. So
perhaps Jenson is too eager to think in terms of ontology? In Gregory it is hardly
the future that is the establishing point for existence, but the cross, Christ's death
and resurrection. The constant process of dying and coming to life that this sets in
motion is what drives  epektasis (at least according to our discussion of  On the
1145ConEunI., p. 98
1146DeVitMoys. 2.239, p. 116
1147Ludlow 2007, p. 47
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Song of Songs above). It is in this sense that becoming is prioritized over being,
not  in  the  sense  that  the  future  defines  the  reality  of  the  present.  Such  a
relationship  is  at  most  secondary.  But  speaking  in  terms  of  epistemology  and
ethics, the 'future' is nevertheless the focal center-point. For the human subject
looking forward to what lies ahead is possible exactly because of the resurrection.
But to see this we need to think in terms of  epektasis and conception. There are
good reasons for developing the thematic of anticipation in terms of these. Above
we have argued that Gregory's idea of conception can be described as a form of
theosemiosis. Interpreting God's work in the world is a kind of iconic semiotic.
Things consist (are conglomerates) of  'divine thoughts'1148, and  are thus icons that
point  beyond  themselves  to  an  infinite  nature  that  can  only  be  described
indirectly.1149 Such  sem(e)iosis  spawns  new  iconic  signs  and  thus  continues
infinitely.1150
Infinity and freedom
Gregory's ethical thinking turns the whole scheme of negation and affirmation in
relation to virtue and vice upside down. This means that human beings can imitate
God  without  compromising  the  Judeo-Christian  distinction.  It  even  means  that
human beings can imitate God's ineffable nature, since God's essence is purely
negatively defined. God's essence is infinity, freedom, incomprehensibility and so
on. God's essence is not a thing, but a no-thing. Robert Jenson argues that:
“Infinite being is an odd sort of being. It cannot be anything other than its
infinity, cannot be an infinite something, for there can be no infinite some-
thing:  A  substance  without  clear  boundaries  could  be  only  a  wavery,
insubstantial substance, and a substance with no boundaries must instantly
dissipate.  Just  this  observation  was  the  starting  point  of  Hellenic
philosophy’s analysis of the notion of infinity. An infinite something would
always generate new characteristics beyond those that make its given self at
any moment. Thus Aristotle: “That is infinite … which has always something
beyond itself.” Therefore an infinite something would have no “nature” at
all, for a “nature” is precisely what defines, that is, limits, the possibilities of
an entity.”1151
So,  according  to  Jenson,  in  a  sense  the  Christian  God  in  the  Cappadocian
analysis does not have a nature or an essence in any traditional sense. Jenson
1148Hex. 69
1149DeAnRes., p. 436
1150Annette Ejsing has argued that Michael Raposa's version of such a Peircean 
theosemiotic can be conceived of in terms Pannenberg's theory of anticipation. Ejsing 
2007
1151Jenson 2002, pp. 163-164
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continues:
“The  syllogistic  proof  “All  humans  are  mortal.  Socrates  is  a  human.
Therefore Socrates is  mortal” transforms the true guess that Socrates is
mortal into actual knowledge, but it can do so only because humanity names
a fixed and finite set of characteristics. Did it not, the minor premise would
instantly transform itself into a whole new syllogism, with its own minor
premise, which would do the same and so on; and the security of knowledge,
as over against guessing, would never be achieved. On both these counts,
God–in the judgment of Hellenic philosophy–cannot be infinite; this is the
one negative predicate that cannot fit deity, for it is deity’s function to be
the final object of knowledge, the middle term of the proof of the world’s
existence. And the very difference of God and world, of timelessness and
time, presumes that God is not the world and is not temporal, that is, that
there are limits to what deity is and can be.”1152
If the concept 'humanity' did not name a fixed and finite set of characteristics
then it would, in other words, spawn an infinite semeiosis. This is exactly the case
in Gregory since participation in the godhead means not to participate definitely in
any finite set of characteristics. To participate in God means in this sense to be
indefinite.
This might be the key to understanding Gregory's idea of 'freedom'. Already in
the treatise On Virginity Gregory defines liberty (ἐλευθερίαν), “the moral habit of
liberality”, as the point  of Christian ethics.1153 But only in his later works are the
epistemological and ontological requisites of this ethical view unfolded. In a most
interesting passage in On the Soul and Resurrection, Gregory notes that:
“[...]liberty [ἐλευθερία] is the coming up to a state which owns no master
[ἀδέσποτόν] and is self-regulating [αὐτοκρατὲς]; it is that with which we
were gifted by God at the beginning, but which has been obscured by the
feeling of shame arising from indebtedness. Liberty too is in all cases one
and the same essentially; it has a natural attraction to itself. It follows, then,
that as everything that is free will be united with its like, and as virtue is a
thing that has no master, that is, is free, everything that is free will be
united with virtue. But, further, the Divine Being is the fountain of all virtue.
Therefore, those who have parted with evil will be united with Him; and so,
as the Apostle says (I Cor. 15.28), God will be "all in all "; for this utterance
seems to me plainly to confirm the opinion we have already arrived at, for it
means that God will be instead of all other things, and in all.”1154
1152Jenson 2002, pp. 163-164
1153DeVir. 7.3.13, p. 352. In this, one might argue, Gregory rather neatly combines Paul, 
e.g., in 1 Cor 6,12 with an Aristotelian doctrine of the middle.
1154DeAnRes. 101-105
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Similarly, virtue has no master, Gregory says in the  Song of Songs. Virtue “is
voluntary and free of all compulsion.”1155 In his homilies on Ecclesiastes, where
Gregory attacks slavery, he notes that not even God enslaves what is free.1156 In On
the Life of Moses, Gregory talks of the Word as a “liberator from tyranny”1157, and
Moses as having the role of a mediator who gives his people “the words of
freedom”1158 and thereby strengthens their desire for freedom.
Gregory interprets the chariot chasing the Israelites as a picture of the tripartite
division of the soul.1159 Hence, the crossing of the Red Sea becomes a picture of
baptism in which we drown “the whole Egyptian person”, i.e., “every form of
evil”.1160 The radical interpretation of this would be that Gregory rejects positive
anthropology as such, as he had done in On the Making of Man. A less radical
interpretation would note that it is only the passions belonging to the tripartite
soul that should be “drowned”. At any rate, Gregory is now at odds with his early
belief, that “the face of God” (the divine form) can be contemplated in certain
“imprints” (the virtues).1161 This is at least true if the virtues here can be described
in  positive  definitions.  Virtues  would  then  be  incapable  of  expressing  the
inexpressible nature of the divine. But if the virtues cannot be described in positive
definitions, then things would seem to be different. Virtue, it seems, is simply the
lack  of  'slavery',  and  freedom  always  something  negatively  defined  (e.g.  ἀ-
δέσποτόν).  This  does not  mean that  we cannot  talk of  the positive works of  a
human person in concrete contexts.
Social ethics and Gregory's critique of political power
Since God is beyond comprehension, nothing which can be comprehended in
this world should rationally be regarded as absolutely valuable. What is obvious for
everyone is that this world is subject to death and decay. We know this, especially,
in winter when “[a]ll things mimic the misery of death.”1162 Observations such as
these often contain the negative (natural) theological starting point of Gregory's
critique  of  domination  and  power  (force).  Criticism of  Paganism is  in  a  sense
criticism of what in modern terms is called ideology.
1155Cant. 161, p. 173
1156Eccl., tr. Hall, p. 336. See the discussion of Gregory's social ethics below.
1157DeVitMoys. 2.56
1158DeVitMoys. 2.54
1159DeVitMoys. 2.123
1160DeVitMoys. 2.126
1161InIns. 35. Such talk of “divine form” seems quite contrary to Gregory's later explicitly 
apophatic theology.
1162Cant. 151, p. 165
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”Most  people  do  not  judge  for  themselves  how things  stand  by  nature.
Instead, they look to the customs of their forebears and fail to achieve a
sound judgment about reality,  because they set up an irrational  habit  as
their  criterion  of  the  good  rather  than  any  intelligent  consideration.
Consequently,  they thrust themselves into positions of authority and power
and make much of prominence in this world and of material things[...]”1163
The  premise  for  this  reasoning  is  basically  a  polemical  negative  theology.
Nothing of what can be seen and thought is God, and so it is irrational to pursue
things in this world. But Gregory's critique of political power goes further than
this.  On the  positive  side  it  is  grounded in  his  trinitarian  theology.  Trinitarian
orthodoxy (that God is three  persons in one being) has practical consequences
through the social analogy. The divine persons all participate in the divine essence.
Likewise,  every  human being  to  some degree  participates  in  human nature  (a
horizontal participation with Balás' term), which again participates in the divine
nature (through horizontal participation). Hence, saying as Eunomius does, that
the Son (Christ) is not equal with the Father, is like saying that some human beings
are not equal to others. After introducing the social analogy during his polemicism
against  Eunomius,  Gregory  argues  that  human  governments  experience
revolutions since it is “[...]impracticable that those to whom nature has given equal
value should be excluded from power”1164. Human beings instinctively attempt to
make themselves equal with the dominant party, since they have a common nature.
This  line of  thought can be easily recognized in Gregory's  famous attack on
slavery. In his sermons on Ecclesiastes, Gregory discusses the Qohelet's statement
“I bought male and female slaves”1165. Gregory argues that turning the property of
God (humankind) into one's own property and to arrogate dominion to one's own
kind  implies  overstepping  one's  “own  nature  through  pride”.  By  dividing
humankind in two it has become “enslaved to itself” and “the owner of itself”.1166
There is an almost Kantian line of thought in this (according to, perhaps, especially
the  second  definition  of  the  categorical  imperative):1167 The  division  of  human
species in two is (almost) a logical absurdity. The premise is that humankind is in
principle undivided, and that domination brings division.
Gregory continues his argument by noting that not even God himself holds power
1163Cant. 2, p. 73
1164ConEunI. 1.35, modified.
1165Eccl 2:7, NIV
1166Eccl. 336
1167Kant 1785, §4. Of course the whole theological context is very different from Kant. 
According to Kant the doctrine of the trinity could per definition not have any practical 
consequences.
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of  human beings,  since he “when we had been enslaved to  sin,  spontaneously
recalled us to freedom.”1168 Again, the atonement plays a central role in Gregory's
ethical thinking. The participation in God that human nature is made capable of
does not mean an 'enslavement' to God, but freedom.
In his sermons in On the Beatitudes Gregory argues that true justice is first of
all  a  question  of  moral  virtue.  As  was  common  in  antiquity,  Gregory  viewed
virtuous/moral dispositions to be related to happiness. Gregory notes that when
the beatitudes says  “blessed are they that hunger and thirst for justice, for they
shall have their fill” (Matt 5:6), we should understand that “hunger” is the desire
for what one is lacking spiritually. While worldly, finite, things never really bring
lasting satisfaction, devotion to God does, since God is the only true, infinite good.
Happiness consists in loving God, and those who “hunger and thirst” after justice,
will  have their fill,  i.e. happiness, precisely because justice is not a question of
ruling fairly, but of practicing devotion. This can always be done independently of
one’s worldly circumstances. So far, Gregory’s view is reminiscent of Plato’s in The
Republic. Plato argues that justice is not only a question of the harmony of the city
state, but also of the soul, i.e. moral virtue. But Gregory goes further than this, and
argues that:
“[...]if,  according  to  the  words  of  those  outside  the  fold  [i.e.,  Pagan
philosophers], the purpose of the just man is equality, but on the other hand
pre-eminence presupposes inequality, then this definition of justice cannot
be regarded as true”1169.
True justice does not admit anything bad, Gregory states. So not only is justice
more  than  a  question  of  political  distribution,  but,  by  presupposing  injustice,
political justice becomes impossible. In order to distribute money, one needs to
accumulate wealth; in order to punish crimes, one needs to obtain political power,
and so  on.  Again the idea  that  humanity  share a common essence and thus a
common ownership, shapes Gregory's thinking.
In his sermon on slavery in the  Homilies on Ecclesiastes  Gregory argues that
slavery means setting one's power above God's, not so much because God is the
only 'master', but because God has once for all set humankind free:
“God would not therefore reduce the [human] nature (τὴν φύσιν) to slavery,
since he himself, when we had been enslaved to sin, spontaneously recalled
us to liberty (εἰς ἐλευθερίαν). But if God does not enslave what is free, who
1168Eccl. 336
1169DeBeat. 112, p. 358
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is he that sets his own power above God’s?”1170
Hence  not  only  is  Gregory's  critique  of  domination  based  upon  an  idea  of
equality derived from the ontology of humankind. Gregory's critique is also based
on  an  idea  of  freedom  grounded  in  the  historical  events  of  the  cross  and
resurrection.  The  freedom  Gregory  speaks  of  arguably  reflects  our  negative
definition  of  what  it  means  to  participate  in  the  divine  nature.  Through  its
participation in the godhead, made possible by the incarnation, humankind has
been set free in the radical sense that it is now capable of self-determination.
Conclusion
Scot Douglass has argued that the primary value of Cappadocian thought lies in
the  “performative  aspect  of  their  Christian  proclamation”,  rather  than  in  a
systematic metaphysics:
“There was a performative invitation to enter into an encounter, mediated
by  the  constant  re-reading  of  Scripture  and  the  recounting  of  lives  and
epiphanic  events  according  to  the  liturgical  calendar,  that  asked  of  the
listener an epinoetic engagement, an imaginative leap back into the world of
Moses, into the lives of saints and martyrs, into the silence of the Holy of
Holies, and around the very edges of the inaccessible.”1171
Theological thinking is not external to  epektasis. Conception, the formation of
iconic linguistic items that point towards the ineffable divine nature, is an engaged
endeavor that cannot be disconnected from moral progress. Epektasis involves the
whole human person, in its vertical relationship to God as well as its horizontal
relationship  to  its  context.  But  as  negation  is  with  Gregory  logically  prior  to
affirmation when speaking of the divine nature, the invisible is prior to the visible.
Hence there can be no imitation of God's work in history without imitation of God's
transcendent invisibility.
Ethics in Gregory of Nyssa is complex and many-faceted. Hence we have talked
of  it  from many perspectives.  The central  keywords are:  aphairetic,  apophatic,
epektatic,  akolouthetic,  biographic,  iconographic.  All  these  concepts  have  been
used generically,  though they are  to  some degree  derived from Gregory's  own
writings.
Where Daniélou and others have interpreted Gregory's On the Life of Moses as a
mystical treatise, Heine and others have interpreted it as rather polemical and
non-mystical. While both of these options might be partly right and partly wrong,
1170Eccl. 335-337, p. 336, modified.
1171Douglass 2005, p. 247
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both fail to point out the basic dialectical mechanism at play in the center of
Gregory's thinking. To put it in short, what Moses recognizes is that when we 1)
put off material (diastemic) ideas of God's nature we approach God (the first
theophany), 2) but thereby recognize that we cannot know and speak of God's
(non-diastemic) nature (the second theophany), except in negatively defined terms,
3) which must eventually make us recognize that the only relationship we can have
with God is one of following (that diastemic nature is related to non-diastemic
human nature through epektasis).
Conception as it unfolds in  epektasis frames  the possibility of ethics. We are
here  talking  of  theological  ethics  as  theologia  viatorum.  Gregory defines
conception as “the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going
on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first
perception with regard to the thing studied.”  In this “going on to”  seems to
resonate Gregory's famous notion of epektasis, the final spiritual journey where
the soul infinitely reaches out into the divine beauty. Conception should  be
regarded dialectically as the actual 'reaching out' as well as the product of the
journey, an 'infinite semiosis'.1172
Where  ἀκολουθία is  ofte  used  as  a  term  for  a  particular  order  in  a  text,
reflecting certain stages of progression in the spiritual life, it in Gregory's later
works also becomes a matter of following Christ, where ever he may lead. Finally
this is conceived in terms of friendship.
1172See Hart 2003
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Part V. Final remarks
In the previous parts we have attempted to exemplify the relationship between
the  negative  theology  resulting  from the  Judeo-Christian  distinction  and  moral
epistemology.  We  will  now  reconsider  some  of  the  more  general  discussions
already hinted at in the first part, in the light of a few contemporary discussions.
A living image of God: Theological ethics and the problem of 
(in)visibility reconsidered
We claimed in part one that the idea of epektasis must follow from the fact that
any negative theology based on the Judeo-Christian distinction must be a theologia
viatorum. This, we have argued, is the case in Clement of Alexandria and Gregory
of  Nyssa.  We  can  hardly  derive  any  idea  of  epektasis  from  The  Epistle  to
Diognetus. But its claims about divine invisibility and imitation of God does mean
that there can be no final ethical system with regards to human conduct in the
world. Rather the Christian follows whatever norms are present in society. This
leads to a certain relativism with regards to everyday conduct. With regards to
imitation of God there is, however, no doubt that this must always consist in love of
neighbor  as  exemplified  by  Jesus  Christ's  concrete  works  in  the  history  of
salvation.  These  two  themes  comes  together  in  the  concrete,  in  a  paradoxical
manner.
The thinking of  Clement of  Alexandria and Gregory of  Nyssa can to a large
degree be seen as an attempt, if not to dissolve this paradox, to bridge the gap
between the visible  and the invisible,  then at  least  to  explain  how the tension
between the poles create the framework for a life of moral perfection. Anticipation
plays a central role in this. In Clement, knowledge “[...]leads us to the endless and
perfect  end  (τέλος  ἄγει  τὸ  ἀτελεύτητον  καὶ  τέλειον),  teaching  us  beforehand
(προδιδάσκουσα) the future life that we shall lead[...]”1173 Gregory's interpretation
of Moses' third theophany as the experience that seeing God means to follow him
arguably has a similar point. Gregory's ethics is firmly based on his theological
ontology.  Moses'  vision of  God's  back is “[...]a  sign for an elusive intermediate
region, a quasi-space and quasi-time between God's totally transcendent face and
the spatial/temporal creation.”1174 It is the dialectics of this “intermediate region”
(which can of course be no “region” at all,  except through the incarnation and
resurrection of Christ) that transforms Man's attempt at spiritual ascension into an
1173Str. 7.10.56.2, p. 539
1174Plass 1980
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ethics of following God. The gap between Creator and creation is bridged in an
ethics of following. But this bridging can never be final or actual. In the words of
David B. Hart, “[...]for beings, in their becoming, being is absolute futurity.”1175
Human beings are always in a state of becoming.  In  epektasis  the soul is “in a
certain  fashion,  always  being created as it  is  changed for  the better  by  being
enhanced in goodness.”1176 In epektasis becoming has priority over being. But this
does mean that God only exists as futurity.  It  is  precisely  because only God is
stable  and  immutable,  while  everything  created  is  subject  to  change,  that
epektasis is needed, and can take place.
There are differences between Clement and Gregory, to be sure. Clement argues
that the soul should be abstracted from the body, since “it is impossible that the
immutable  should  assume  firmness  and  consistency  in  the  mutable  (ἐν  τῷ
τρεπομένῳ τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν πῆξιν καὶ σύστασιν, ἐν τροπῇ).”1177 This
suggests  an  incompatibility  between  the  Clement  and  Gregory’s  somewhat
paradoxical  diastemic  ontology,  where  human  immutability  or  unchangeability
simply  consists  in  a  constant  change  to  the  better  (since  nothing  created  is
permanent). But in both cases anticipation in terms of such things as  prolepsis,
epinoia and epektasis, and similar, is what bridges the gap between the visible and
the invisible, and makes actual imitation of God possible.
So what does it mean to imitate God, and finally: How can we describe moral
perfection?  In  Clement,  neither  ordinary  Christians,  nor  the  true  Gnostic,  are
expected to reflect too much on their conduct. The ordinary Christian does “good
works”, but without knowing what they do,1178 while the constancy in well-doing
makes the virtue of the Gnostic somewhat invisible.1179 This does not mean that the
Gnostic cannot be described, but as the truth can only be represented by veiling
and concealment, the same is arguably the case with virtue. On the other hand,
when the Gnostic considers the benefit of his neighbour, he is a “living image of
the Lord (ἄγαλμα ἔμψυχον εἰκότως ἂν τοῦ κυρίου λέγοιτο)”,  by “the symbol of
power  (κατὰ  τὸ  τῆς  δυνάμεως σύμβολον)  and similarity  of  preaching.”1180 In  a
similar way Gregory describes the soul that reflects the divine as  a “supremely
vivid image (ἐναργεστάτην εἰκόνα) of the prototypical Beauty.”1181 We sense God's
1175Hart 2003, p. 229. Hart claims, partly based on Gregory of Nyssa, that finite being is 
always 'erotically' and 'ecstatically' standing beyond itself, directed towards the infinite 
divine beauty.
1176Cant. 174, p. 187
1177Str. 6.9, p. 498
1178Str. 1.9.45.6, p. 310
1179Str. 4.22.138.2, p. 435
1180Str. 7.9.52.3, p. 538
1181Cant. 439, p. 467. Compare with Clement of Alexandria, Str. 7.9.52.3, p. 538
226
activities through “our life (διὰ τῆν ζωῆς ἡμῶν)”1182, says Gregory.
We have suggested above that we can talk of an iconographic ethics.1183 The idea
was that conceptions applied to describe the moral character of a person signifies
the good which that person imitates. Human beings are made in the image of God,
and describing what this means is to do 'iconography'. That the medium of God's
activities  is  our life suggests that such  iconographic ethics is more precisely a
matter of biography.1184 Apophatic or otherwise negative descriptions of virtue as a
reflection  of  the  ineffable  God,  must  be  followed  by  a  concrete,  narrative,
biographical ethics.
This might prove to fit well with developments in modern Christian theological
ethics, where such things as biography and narrativity play a large role.1185 These
ideas are often bound up with a notion of what it means to 'follow God', where
ethics should not be thought of in terms of (positive) ideals. This,  it  is argued,
would replace the living God with abstract propositions,  turning ethics into an
idol.1186 Hence Dietrich  Bonhoeffer  placed  Christ as the personal and concrete
basis for ethics, which means that though “[t]he form of Christ is one and the same
at all times and in all places [...] Christ is not a principle in accordance with which
the whole world must be shaped.”1187 The Christian should not be “fettered by
principles, but bound by love for God”  and as such “free from the problems and
conflicts of ethical decision.”1188 Ethical principles are as “tools in God's hand, soon
to be thrown away as unserviceable.” At most ethical principles are instrumental in
an ongoing spiritual development, which again suggests a narrative or biographic
take on such things as moral  reasoning,  virtues and rules,  rather than a more
abstract one.
In biographical ethics, moral characteristics can only be grasped as they exist in
a  concrete,  personal  history.  William  Stringfellow  notes  that  “[t]he  theological
exploration of biography or the theological reconnaisance of history are apt, and
even  normative,  styles  because  each  is  congruent  with  the  definitive  New
Testament  insight  and  instruction:  the  Incarnation.”1189 As  such  the  idea  of
1182Cant. 334, p. 353
1183If so, we might draw on certain semeiotic ideas in this, but the problem with the 
semeiotic approach is, however, that it lacks a sufficient conception of the negative 
dialectics at play in negative theologies based on the Judeo-Christian distinction. It is no
surprise that Peirce's natural theology is fundamentally panentheistic. Raposa 1989
1184Maybe this is why Gregory's treatment of his sister Macrina's life ends up exceeding 
“[...]the limits of a letter and stretches into a lengthy narrative.”? VitMac. 1, p. 21
1185See Stassen & Gushee 2003
1186See Bonhoeffer 1955
1187Bonhoeffer 1955, p. 65
1188Ibid., p. 50
1189Stringfellow 2005, p. 20
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theology as biography is based on fundamental theological premises. But how we
conceive of biography to a large degree depend on our views on such things as
history, person, action, and of course modern ethics is typically based on theories
of  personal  identity  quite  different  from  that  of  late  antiquity.  The  modern
individualistic and anti-traditionalistic idea of personhood makes it hard to explain
how a moral epistemology as that proposed is possible.1190 But as Gregory says:
“[...]when one individual has made something his business, that form of activity
makes its way into the stream of our life by being imitated.”1191 Imitation of God's
works automatically entails a tradition.
Hauerwas and Willimon has argued that the Church should be thought of, not so
much as a collection of individual believers, but rather as a community in which a
certain form of moral thought is bound up with a concrete tradition that sees itself
as eschatologically narrated.  Hence they complain  that  theological  ethics  after
Constantine changed with especially Augustine. Augustine, in his interpretation of
the Sermon on the Mount, moved the focus from its outward, practical demands to
the  subjective,  by  making  its  demand  to  turn  the  other  cheek  (Matt  5:39)  a
question of an “inward disposition”,  rather than a bodily action.1192 But “[s]uch
interpretation is  not  supported by the text  itself,  which has  as its  role,  not  to
cultivate some subjective attitude, but rather to form a visible people of God.”1193
Theological ethics gradually became adapted to societal norms as Christianity was
fused with imperial culture, says Hauerwas and Willimon. But our discussion of the
'ethics of invisibility' in especially The Epistle to Diognetus shows that we should
be careful about making such distinctions, and that they did not simply develop
gradually.
There are some credibility to Hauerwas' claim, though. What we find in  The
Epistle to Diognetus is not a distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer' (e.g. the
soul and the body, or the private and the social), but one between the Christians
(plural)  and  the  World.  This  distinction  is  marked  by  a  certain  paradoxality
between  invisibility  and  visibility.  This  again  has  to  do  with  the  paradoxality
between imitating God as invisible on the one hand, and God as He reveals himself
in the concrete historical works of Jesus Christ on the other. As God according to
Tertullian “[...]is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as at once
known  and  unknown”1194,  the  Christians  are  in  The  Epistle  to  Diognetus
1190MacIntyre 1981
1191Cant. 453, p. 481
1192Augustine, Contra Faustum 22.76
1193Hauerwas & Willimon 1989, p. 82
1194Tertullian, Apologeticus pro Christianis 17, p. 32. Discussed above.
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simultaneously visible and invisible.
We  have  suggested  that  negative  theology  can  imply  anti-propositionalism
(descriptions of value cannot be captured adequately in propositions), and a sort of
holism of reasons (understanding a property as 'good' means understanding it as a
negation of  other,  'non-good'  properties).  This does not necessarily  exclude the
formulation and use of ethical principles. Anti-propositionalism only means that we
cannot capture moral value or 'goodness' in general, direct, positive propositions.
Holism does not mean that we cannot speak of standard reasons. That reasons are
context  dependent  does  not  mean  that  they  are  not  codifiable.1195 But  this
codification cannot be abstracted from a concrete context. Hence we may need a
sort of (non-formal) casuistry1196, where paradigm cases are taken as the concrete
historical  (i.e.  particular,  rather  than  abstract  and  general)  basis  for  moral
reasoning in new contexts.1197 Such thinking would not be possible with, e.g., an
Eunomian idea of language, where analogy is untenable. Gregory of Nyssa clearly
saw that any talk of relationality and likenesses was impossible with this idea of
language, and thus substituted it for a theory of epinoetic language.
With Clement and Gregory, the paradigms used be ethical reflection must be
biographical or at least take biographical elements into account. As Gregory writes
in his early work  On Virginity:  “Any theory divorced from practice[...], is like the
unbreathing statue, with its show of a blooming complexion impressed in tints and
colours”1198.  Gregory's  own life  turned  out  to  become a  good  example  of  this.
Gregory's  theological  development can itself  be interpreted by reference to his
mature works on spiritual progress. His early works are the works of a philosopher
who  pursues  an  adequate  ethics,  but  the  Eunomian  controversies  makes  him
realize that this is not possible, since theological language always works through
conception. Hence in his mature works he is very reluctant to call his account of
Moses' virtue adequate in any way.1199
The first and primary paradigm of Christian ethics must, of course, be the life of
1195McKeever & Ridge 2006
1196Toulmin & Jonsen 1988, p. 307. Toulmin & Jonsen argues that for casuistry ”[...]moral 
knowledge is essentially particular, so that sound resolutions of moral problems must 
always be rooted in a concrete understanding of specific cases and circumstances.” 
Toulmin & Jonsen 1988, p. 330. By 'non-formal' casuistry we here mean one that is not 
based on abstract and formal principles (the casuistry rejected by Bonhoeffer), but 
concrete cases. Bonhoeffer 1955, p. 51
1197Toulmin & Jonsen 1988, p. 251. Casuistry consists in ”[t]he reliance on paradigms and 
analogies, the appeal to maxims, the analysis of circumstances, degrees of probability, 
the use of cumulative arguments, and the presentation of a final resolution.” 
1198DeVir., p. 368, modified.
1199It is tempting to identify each of these stages with Moses' three theophanies in On the
Life of Moses, but we will leave that possibility open.
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Jesus  Christ  himself.  Osborn,  in  his  study  of  early  Christian  ethics,  is  right,
however, when he says even if (or precisely because) Christian ethics must respect
historical contingency, imitation of a historical account is not enough: 
“The imitation of  Christ cannot look to a literal  account of  the historical
Jesus.  Following  and  assimilation  are  personal  things  which  go  beyond
mechanical  mimicry.  A  literal  account  could  not  rule  centuries  and
civilisations  in  the  way  the  gospels  have.  That  is  not  what  respect  for
contingency means. ”1200
Osborn calls for a theology of hope.1201 Only in anticipation of an eschatological
future does imitation of Christ make sense beyond the literal historical account.1202
As  we  have  seen  the  ethics  of  of  Clement  and  Gregory  accounts  for  this,  as
following God does  not  only  mean imitating  the  works  of  Jesus  Christ  (it  also
means  that),  but  also  means  anticipating,  reaching  out  for,  the  ineffable  good
which lies ahead. Describing how this looks like is a matter of biography, but in a
way that never confuses the biography with its object, the invisible and ineffable
God. Biographies are clusters of  diastemic conceptions that veil and conceal but
thereby also represent Truth: “We are each one of us parables.”1203
Conclusion
In The Epistle to Diognetus the Judeo-Christian distinction is affirmed especially
in the polemics against Pagan and Jewish forms of worship. Clement of Alexandria
affirms the distinction when he says that nothing among created things can be a
“representation of God”, and that “it is utterly impossible for any one to become
perfect as God is”. Virtue in God and virtue in man is not the same, says Clement.
Gregory of Nyssa affirms the distinction when he says that distance is nothing but
creation itself, and that the interval that divides uncreated and created nature is
wide and insurmountable. This interval is creation itself.
In all three cases kinds of negative theology follows from these claims. In  The
Epistle  to  Diognetus  God  is  invisible  and  has  never  been  discovered  by
'philosophers'. In Clement of Alexandria God's difference from created things has
to do with His simplicity and the fact the He is the first principle, from which
follows that He is infinite and cannot be comprehended. In Gregory of Nyssa divine
infinity bars any attempt to comprehend God's nature.
We have argued that in all three cases negative theology has consequences for
1200Osborn 1976, p. 219
1201As when Clement links telos and elpis. Osborn 1976, p. 219
1202This partly affirms Hauerwas' claims.
1203Stringfellow 2005, p. 20
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ethics. In The Epistle to Diognetus this can be seen as the Christians in some way
resemble God by being indiscernible from others, and thus invisibly present in the
cities of the world as the soul is invisibly present in the parts of the body. A similar
claim can be found in Clement, when he argues that the true Gnostic lives in the
city, though as in the desert. The true Gnostic imitates God's simplicity and self-
control. In Gregory's mature works he stresses that human beings (or humankind),
as made in the image of God reflects the incomprehensibility of the divine nature,
and is thus wholly ineffable. The soul is hidden, and only indirectly discernible
through the activities of the body.
These notions of divine infinity and unity has consequences for social ethics, not
least in Clement and Gregory who criticizes such things as property, inequality,
power  and  slavery.  These  all  break  the  unity  of  humankind  by  placing  limits
between human beings. Thus there follows a negative social ethics from certain
negative theologies and an idea of humankind as created in the image of God.
In addition, the indefiniteness following from negative thinking is also a matter
of human freedom and liberty. As is the case with the divine nature, human nature
flees any attempt at final, positive definitions. Such can only refer to the activities,
works and doings of God and human beings, but never their essence. Any attempt
to place the essence of human beings in finite categories does violence to this fact.
Imitation of God must be imitation of the freedom that follows from infinity. This
can lead to a certain asceticism.
But there is also a positive and comprehensible side to imitation. In all three
cases this has to do with imitation of the concrete deeds of God in Jesus Christ. As
something  positive,  imitation  of  God  means  imitating the  works  of  God  in  the
atonement.  In  The  Epistle  to  Diognetus  we  see  that  though  Christians  are
indiscernible from others, their conduct can be described after all, since they do
not pursue power and wealth, but imitate God's concrete work in Jesus Christ in
the history of salvation by becoming servants for others. Clement in addition sees
witnessing and teaching as characteristic activities of the true Gnostic. This fits
neatly with his idea that the saving work of Jesus Christ too a large degree was a
matter  of  moral  teaching.  In  Gregory,  the  infinity  of  God  means  that  no  final
positive description of the good is possible, whether this refers to God or the soul,
the image of God. But Gregory also maintains that we can speak of God's activities,
his immanent operations in time and space, and as a matter of imitating God this
means imitating God's activities in the form of the works of Jesus Christ in the
atonement. This takes place in an ethics of following, where following is a matter
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of imitating the concrete actions of Jesus Christ rather than abiding by abstract
rules.
There are of course great differences in the ethics of the three cases. The author
of  The  Epistle  to  Diognetus  stresses  that  Christians  do  not  practice  an
extraordinary  life,  but  imitate  God's  love  for  human beings  as  revealed  in  the
history of salvation. But both Clement and Gregory defends a kind of asceticism,
where the attainment of simplicity, self-control and similar is needed in order to
imitate  God.  But  where  Clement  prioritizes  epistemology,  Gregory  prioritizes
ontology.
There  are  in  all  three  cases  an  apparent  paradox  between  imitation  of  the
invisible and the visible. In Clement this is partly solved through an idea of faith as
voluntary anticipation, and in Gregory through the idea that the soul must always
reach out for the divine good which always lies ahead (epektasis). Thus in both
cases moral  perfection is  a matter of  'becoming'  and action,  rather than static
being. Positive imitation of God is first of all a matter of doing. For Clement and
Gregory 'life' is where such imitation takes place. Thus doing positive ethics must
be a matter of doing biography.
This  means  that  while  there  can  arguably  be  general,  true  and  adequate
descriptions of moral wrongness (slavery, violence), there can be general and true,
but not adequate, descriptions of moral goodness. Because of negative theology
descriptions  of  the  good  must  be  negative,  indirect  definitions,  and  thus  such
descriptions are true because they lead to the divine good, but not adequate since
they do never capture the good fully. This means that theological ethics must be
conceived as a theologia viatorum. Hence we have a rough sketch of how a certain
moral epistemology follows from the Judeo-Christian distinction and the negative
theology produced by it.
It finally turns out that our title has been misleading: It is not about doing the
unthinkable, but  becoming an imitator of the unthinkable, while  doing as Jesus
Christ.
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Appendix I: Terminology
A list of frequently used Greek words (in their most commonly used form) with
special meanings and their translations, partly based on LSJ and PGL.
ἀδιάστατος: Without gap, without distance, continuous
ἀκατάληπτος: Incomprehensible
ἀκατονομάστος: Unnameable
ἀόρατος: Invisible
ἀόριστος: Unlimited
ἀχωρητος: Uncontainable
ἀγένητος: Unoriginate(d)
ἀγέννητος: Ungenerate(d), unbegotten, unborn
ἄγνωστος: Unknown
ἀλέκτῳ: Indescribeable
ἀθάνατος: Immortality
ἀθέατος: Invisible
ἀκολουθία: Following
ἀμορφος: Formless
ἀνείδεος: Formless
ἀναλλοίωτος: Unchangeable
ἀναφής: Impalpable
ἀνεξερεύνητος: Unsearchable
ἀνεξιχνίαστος: Inscrutable
ἀνεπιδεής, ἀνενδεής: Indeficient
ἀνεπίδεικτος: Hidden
ἀνεκδιήγητος: Indescribeable
ἀνεννόητος: Inconceivable
ἀνωνόμαστος: Unnameable
ἀπαθές: Impassible
ἄπειρον: Infinite
ἀπερίγραφος: Uncircumscribed
ἀπερινόητος: Unthinkable
ἀπόρρητος: Ineffable
ἀπόφασις: Negation, judgment
ἀπρόσιτος: Inaccessible
ἄρρητος: Ineffable
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ἀσχημάτιστος: Formless
ἀσώματος: Incorporeal
αὐτοκρατές: Self-mastering
ἀφαίρεσις: Abstraction, removal
ἄφθαρτος: Incorruptible, immortal
ἄφατος: Unutterable
διάστημα: Gap, interval, distance
ἐλευθερία: Liberty
ἐνέργεια: Activity
ἔννοια: Notion
ἐπέκεινα: Beyond, above
ἐπέκτασις: Anticipation, reaching out, extension
ἐπίνοια: Conception
ἔργον: Work, function
κοινωνία: Fellowship, participation
μετουσία: Participation
μίμησις: Imitation
νόημα: Thought
οὐσία: Essence, being, existence
πρόληψις: Anticipation, preconception
στέρησις: Privation
φύσις: Nature
Abbreviations
Clement of Alexandria
Str. = Stromata (Miscellanies)
Protr. = Protrepticus
Paed. = Paedagogus
QuisDiv. = Quis Dives Salvetur? (Who is the Rich Man, that shall be Saved?)
Gregory of Nyssa
AdSimp = Ad Simplicium de Fide (On Faith)
Beat. = Orationes viii de beatitudinibus (On the Beatitudes)
Cant. = In Canticum Canticorum (On the Song of Songs)
ConEunI. = Contra Eunomium I (Against Eunomius 1-12)
ConEunII. = Contra Eunomium II (Answer to Eunomius' Second Book)
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DeAnRes. = Dialogus de Anima et Resurrectione (On the Soul and Resurrection)
DeOrDom. = De Oratione Dominica (On the Lord's Prayer)
DeOp. = De Opificio Hominis (On the Making of Man)
DeProf. = De Professione Christiana ad Harmonium
DeVir. = De Virginitate (On Virginity)
DeVitMoys. =  De Vita Moysis I+II (On the Life of Moses)
InDiem. = In Diem Luminum
InEccl. = In Ecclesiasten (Homilies on Ecclesiastes)
InHex. = Apologia in Hexameron
InIns. = In Inscriptiones Psalmorum (On the Inscriptions of the Psalms)
OrCat. = Oratio Catechetica (Great Catechism)
VitMac. = Vita Sanctae Macrinae (The Life of Macrina)
Epistle to Diognetus
AdDiog. = Epistola Ad Diognetum (The Epistle to Diognetus)
Biblical
ASV = American Standard Version; ESV = English Standard Version; NIV = New
International Version; YLT = Young's Literal Translation; NRS = New Revised 
Standard w/ Apocrypha 
Other
ANF = The Ante-nicene Fathers: the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.d. 325. 
Roberts, Donaldson & Coxe (ed.): 1885.
GNO = Gregorii Nysseni Opera. Jaeger et al (ed.), Vol. 1-, Brill, 1996-
LSJ = A Greek–English Lexicon. Liddel, Scott, Jones: 1996.
NPNF = Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Schaff & Wallace (ed.): 1893.
PG = Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca. J.P. Migne (ed.). Paris: 1857-
1912.
SC =  Sources Chrétiennes. Mondésert et al (ed.), Paris: 1942-
PGL = A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Lampe, G. W. H. (ed.), Oxford: 1961 (1989).
BDG = The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa. Brill: 2009.
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